The Philadelphia District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought this lawsuit against Spitzer Management, Inc., an auto dealership, in September 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The case was assigned to Judge Ann Aldrich. The complaint alleged that Spitzer management had created a hostile work environment for employees by harassing a Nigerian complainant, a Korean complainant, and other employees based on their national origin in violation of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e). The complaint also alleged that Spitzer constructively discharged the Korean employee on the basis of his ethnicity. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief for the complainants.
On June 26, 2008, the EEOC filed another lawsuit against the defendant alleging racial discrimination and retaliation on behalf of a different employee. On September 19, 2008, the parties filed a joint motion with the court asking that the two cases be consolidated for the purpose of discovery and trial.
On February 24, 2009, two of the complaining employees filed motions to intervene. Since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant opposed the motion to intervene, the court granted the motion.
The two intervenors filed an amended complaint on April 12, 2010. This complaint alleged that the defendants discriminated on the basis of race and national origin and retaliated against the intervenor plaintiffs. These plaintiffs, represented by their own private counsel, sought injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief, claiming violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Ohio Revised Code § 4112 as well as abuse of process. The plaintiffs’ abuse of process claim alleged that the defendants brought lawsuits against these plaintiffs to dissuade them from engaging in protected activity such as opposing illegal discrimination and retaliation.
On May 6, 2010, Judge John R. Adams replaced Judge Aldrich on the case. And then, on October 20, 2010, the court ordered that this lawsuit be consolidated with three other cases, all of which were brought by the EEOC alleging that the defendant's Motor City dealership had engaged in discrimination in violation of Title VII. This case, however, served as the leading case.
On September 7, 2010, the defendant filed separate motions for summary judgment on each claim before the court. Judge Adams granted in part and denied in part the motion. 866 F. Supp. 2d 851. Specifically, he found that there was no evidence: of pervasive harassment against the Yemeni employee; that the Yemeni employee was constructively discharged; that there was no evidence of a causal connection between the Nigerian employee's filing an EEOC charge and his suspension; and that there was no evidence suggesting that the president of the defendant company was involved in any of the plaintiffs' discipline. However, Judge Adams did find that there was sufficient evidence to proceed to trial regarding the severity and pervasiveness of the defendant's conduct toward the Korean employee; the Korean employee's alleged constructive discharge; the employer's alleged failure to exercise reasonable care in preventing the harassment of the Korean employee; and the abuse of process claim.
On January 14, 2013, a jury trial began. During the course of the trial, the plaintiff objected to certain documents presented by the defendants. On January 22, the plaintiff moved for a mistrial and a default judgment against the defendants, alleging the defendants had engaged in 'gamesmanship' through the "last-minute production and misrepresentation regarding the investigatory notes" that had been central to the case. On January 23, the court declared a mistrial. On May 22, 2013, the court denied the plaintiff’s request for default judgment, however, the court awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs as sanctions against the defendants. 2013 WL 2250757.
The court arrived at this sanction after coming to three conclusions. First, the defendants’ failure to produce the original documents to the plaintiffs during discovery was not an act of negligence. It was intentional. The court arrived at this conclusion when it observed that in less than 24 hours, only after the court demanded the documents, the defendants were able to locate and produce the documents. These documents were documents that the plaintiff requested during discovery. The defendants gave no reasons for withholding the documents.
Second, the defendants’ misconduct deprived the plaintiffs of meaningful discovery, which prevent the plaintiffs from being able to meaningfully prepare for trial. The withheld documents were files that the defendants had on their employees. More specifically, these documents contained information on employee evaluations, hiring and firing information. The court deemed these documents as relevant for discovery and the trial.
And finally, the court declared that the sanction of attorney fees and costs was more appropriate than granting a default judgment. The court reasoned that a default judgment would have constituted a windfall in favor of the plaintiffs. In other words, the judgment would benefit the plaintiffs more than they deserved. To the court, the evidence that the court observed was not strong enough to grant the plaintiffs a default judgment.
The court ordered the following attorney fees and costs for the defendant to pay: $49,000 to the EEOC, $148,920 to one plaintiff, and $115,395 to another (this amount was later adjusted to $130,415).
The parties then began preparing for retrial, with a special master overseeing discovery.
Before the second attempt at a trial, the parties reached a settlement. On September 12, 2013, the court approved the parties’ consent decree. This decree was set to last for five years and the court retained jurisdiction to enforce it. The consent decree had the following terms:
1) the defendants were prohibited from engaging in employment discrimination and retaliation;
2) the defendants had to pay $50,000 to each plaintiff and intervenor;
3) the defendants had to develop anti-discrimination policies, anti-harassment policies, and complaint procedures;
4) the defendants had to provide management accountability concerning discrimination and retaliation;
5) the defendants were required to offer anti-discrimination training;
6) the defendants had to report to the EEOC on any employment discrimination and/or retaliation complaints filed to the defendants; and
7) the defendants had to post a notice of the decree in all their employment establishments and ensure it was visible to all its employees.
There was no further litigation during the span of the consent decree, so the case is presumably closed.
Shankar Viswanathan - 05/29/2008
Sean Whetstone - 05/29/2018
Hope Brinn - 02/06/2020
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