On Mar. 21, 2017 the city of Richmond, California filed this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging President Trump’s Jan. 25, 2017 Executive Order 13768, which dealt with immigration enforcement. The Order threatened to withhold federal funds from "sanctuary jurisdictions" and take enforcement action against any locality that impeded the federal government's enforcement of immigration law. Plaintiff, represented by its own counsel and the law firm Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, asserted that the U.S. had begun to designate certain cities as "sanctuary jurisdictions" and that Richmond stood to be designated as such, putting it in financial and legal jeopardy.

Specifically, Richmond asked for a declaration that it had complied with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, and that the Executive Order violated the Tenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, would require the plaintiff to violate the Fourth Amendment, and violated the Separation of Powers and Spending Clauses. The plaintiff alleged that the Executive Order violated the Separation of Powers and Spending Clauses by usurping Congress' spending power, as well as by imposing new and unrelated conditions on existing funding. The plaintiff also maintained that the Executive Order violated the Tenth Amendment by coercing cities to choose between losing federal funding and losing control of their municipal self-governance. The Executive Order and subsequent administrative Memoranda provide an unconstitutionally vague definition of what it means to be a "sanctuary" jurisdiction, apart from referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which provides that a local government entity cannot prohibit or restrict communication between government entities or officials and federal immigration authorities. The plaintiff alleged its own compliance with § 1373, noting that ICE had not requested information or detainers from the plaintiff.

Since 1990, Richmond had maintained a policy requiring approval of the city manager or police chief before any city employee may inform, cooperate with, or assist Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The State of California had also enacted legislation restricting the information that local law enforcement could provide to federal immigration enforcement. Due to these local and state policies, Richmond feared being designated as a "sanctuary jurisdiction" under the Executive Order and thus losing federal grants. As a small city with a large Latino immigrant population, Richmond feared the implications of such a loss of key funding for its municipal budget, including for public services that have nothing to do with immigration. Richmond alleged it had already suffered costs since the issuance of the Executive Order, because it was forced to expend resources in planning for the loss of federal funding for critical services, and because immigrant residents were discouraged from contacting the police. Finally, Richmond alleged that the Executive Order would compel the city to detain people who would otherwise be released, thus exposing Richmond to liability for violating the Fourth Amendment.

The case was at first assigned to Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim, but on Mar. 24, 2017, it was reassigned to Judge William H. Orrick after he issued an order relating this case to one already assigned to him, County of Santa Clara v. Trump (IM-CA-0089 in this Clearinghouse).

On Apr. 4, 2017, Richmond filed a motion for preliminary injunction, alleging that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its claims that the Executive Order was unconstitutional and would expose the plaintiff and its critical municipal services to irreparable financial harm. On Apr. 18, 2017, the defendants opposed Richmond's motion for preliminary injunction. The defendants argued that Richmond could not show irreparable harm because no immediate, concrete federal action against plaintiff yet existed. Defendants also argued that plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits because the plaintiff lacked standing and its claim lacked ripeness. The defendants also maintained that the President had broad discretion in the enforcement of immigration law and that no injunction should issue against the president to avoid separation-of-powers concerns. In the alternative, defendants argued that if any preliminary injunction did issue, it should be limited to plaintiff and should not apply nationwide.

On Apr. 25, 2017, Judge Orrick entered a nationwide preliminary injunction suspending operation of the Executive Order at issue in the related San Francisco/Santa Clara litigation. On May 22, Judge Orrick denied Richmond's Apr. 12 motion for preliminary injunction as moot in light of the nationwide injunction. 2017 WL 6945397.

On June 8, 2017 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. They argued that Richmond lacked standing, that its claim was not ripe, and that it failed to state a claim regarding the Order (which defendants claimed was an internal directive not affecting plaintiff), regarding the AG Memorandum, and regarding its own compliance with § 1373. On June 16, the states of West Virginia, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas moved for leave to file an amicus brief in support of defendants' motion to dismiss. On July 6, plaintiff Santa Clara (followed by joinders from San Francisco and Richmond on July 7) moved for leave to file a surreply in opposition to the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs argued that recent statements by President Trump and Department of Homeland Security officials contradicted assertions in defendants' reply brief.

On July 12, 2017 Judge Orrick held a hearing (in all three related cases) on defendants' motions to dismiss and motion for reconsideration. Although on July 20 he denied defendants' motions regarding Santa Clara and San Francisco, and on Aug. 21 he granted defendants' motion regarding Richmond. In the latter order, Judge Orrick contrasted the other plaintiffs, which the federal government had clearly identified and targeted as sanctuary jurisdictions, with Richmond, which the federal government had apparently not targeted at all. He held that Richmond had established neither pre-enforcement standing (as it had demonstrated no well-founded fear of enforcement against it), nor a viable claim for declaratory relief (as it had demonstrated no actual controversy with the federal government about its compliance with § 1373). 2017 WL 3605216. Judge Orrick noted that if the federal government does target Richmond as a sanctuary jurisdiction in the future, Richmond may then litigate its claims by filing an amended complaint.

On Aug. 25, Judge Orrick found State of California v. Sessions to be a related case. That case also challenges DOJ's immigration-related conditions on law enforcement funding. On Sept. 25, Richmond filed a notice that it would not file an Amended Complaint. It added:

Richmond will accept the Court’s invitation to continue as an amicus curiae in this important case and if Defendants’ position against Richmond changes, Richmond will litigate the issues. . . . Richmond will continue to support its immigrant community and all residents of Richmond.

In the absence of an amended complaint, this case appears to be closed in light of the July 12 dismissal.

Ava Morgenstern - 02/10/2018
Olivia Wheeling - 10/18/2019


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