In 1977, the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) and four members of the school board and their children (KCMSD students), brought this school desegregation lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the States of Kansas and Missouri, three federal agencies, and several suburban school districts in Kansas and Missouri. The Kansas-Missouri state border forms the western boundary of the KCMSD, so the districts surrounding KCMSD were in both states. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had created and perpetuated a system of racial segregation in the Kansas City metropolitan area schools, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
The case was assigned to Chief Judge John W. Oliver of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, then transferred to Judge Russell G. Clark after the defendants challenged Judge Oliver’s impartiality (due to his representation of KCMSD prior to his appointment to the bench fifteen years earlier). Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, 438 F. Supp. 830, 832, 839 (W.D. Mo. 1977). The district court certified a plaintiff class of present and future KCMSD students, and the plaintiff class was represented by Arthur Benson and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. In 1978, the district court dismissed the claims against the State of Kansas and the Kansas suburban districts for want of personal jurisdiction, and “realigned” the school district as a defendant. Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 427–28 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
Until
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Missouri Constitution mandated racially segregated schools. The plaintiffs argued that after 1954, Missouri failed to take the required affirmative steps to eliminate the vestiges of its prior racially segregated dual school system, and in fact perpetuated racial segregation through discriminatory housing practices. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
After a seven-month trial on liability, on Sept. 17, 1984, the district court found that the State of Missouri and KCMSD had unconstitutionally failed to eliminate the vestiges of the prior dual school system and thus had joint and several liability for desegregation expenses. Id. at 1493. The court made findings, in its liability decision and in a series of subsequent orders, that unlike most other desegregation cases, the most notable effect of KCMSD’s segregation was not racial imbalances in areas such as student and faculty assignments, rather, it was that “segregation had caused a system wide reduction in student achievement in the schools of the KCMSD.” Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24 (W.D. Mo. 1985). The court had also dismissed the claims against the suburban school districts and two of the federal defendants (Department of Transportation and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) during the trial, finding that none of those defendants had acted in a racially discriminatory manner that "substantially" caused racial segregation in KCMSD. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. at 1490, 1495. The claims against the third federal agency, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), went to trial, after which the court found that HUD was not liable. Id. at 1506. The defendants were ordered to submit a proposed plan to remove the vestiges of the dual school system to the court. Id.
On June 14, 1985, the district court held that past segregation and need to attract and maintain white enrollment justified a remedy that included reduction in class sizes, implementation of summer school program, full-day kindergarten, before and after school tutoring, early childhood development programs, magnet school program, staff development program, volunteer interdistrict transfer program, and capital improvements. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 26, 32–41 (W.D. Mo. 1985). The court also ordered the formation of a monitoring committee to oversee the plan’s implementation. Id. at 41–42.
This was the first court-ordered intradistrict remedy to be paid for by the State and KCMSD. Over the next several years, the district court ordered various other remedies, some of which were modified or vacated by the Eighth Circuit or Supreme Court. In total, the plans included $260 million in capital improvements and a magnet school plan costing over $200 million. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987); Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
One of the district court’s orders that was challenged had established a desegregation plan and the methods by which the plan would be funded. Jenkins v. State of Missouri, 672 F.Supp 400 (1987). The state, county, and taxpayers appealed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 855 F.2d 1295 (1988). The Eighth Circuit held, among other things, that the use of magnet schools to attract minority students was proper, and that the increase of property tax levy was appropriate; however, it reversed the state income tax surcharge, finding that the district court had exceeded its authority in ordering one. Id. at 1301–03, 1308–11, 1315–16. In 1990, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice White, affirmed in part and reversed in part. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). The court held that the order imposing an increase in property taxes levied by school district to insure funding for desegregation plan violated principles of federal and state comity, and that courts could require the school district to levy taxes above the limits set by state statute in order to fund the desegregation plan. Id.
Litigation continued for several years on various other issues, including attorneys’ fees, the voluntary interdistrict transfer plan, and the State’s obligation to pay for salary increases and remedial education programs, among other costs.
For services provided from 1979 to 1986, the district court awarded the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in the amount of $4 million. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 838 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1988). On appeal, the Supreme Court also affirmed. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989). First, the Court affirmed the district court’s calculation of attorneys’ fees, which used current market rates—rather than those applicable at the time the services were rendered—in order to account for the years-long delay in payment. Id. at 274. The Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit enhancement of a fee award under § 1988 against a State to compensate for a delay in payment. Id. Second, the Court upheld the district court’s compensation for the work of paralegals, law clerks, and recent law school graduates at the market rate for their services, rather than their cost to the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Id.
The first remedy order provided for a voluntary interdistrict transfer plan, though the design and implementation of the plan was a “long, laborious process.” Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 981 F.2d 1009, 1011 (8th Cir. 1992). Funding over the plan was disputed, and black KCMSD students unsuccessfully trying to enroll as non-residents in nearby suburban school districts, then sued those districts. Id.; see Naylor v. Lee's Summit Reorganized School District R–VII, 703 F. Supp. 803 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
In 1993, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders for the State to fund salary increases and remedial education programs. Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993). However, the Supreme Court granted review and reversed in a 5-4 decision, finding that the orders sought goals which were beyond the scope of the constitutional violation and beyond the scope of the court’s remedial authority. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). The Court also held that whether students’ performance was at or below national norms was not the appropriate test to determine whether the district had achieved partially unitary status. Id.
In 1996, the State of Missouri moved for a determination of unitary status and approval of a transition plan and settlement with KCMSD that would result in the State’s dismissal from the case. The plaintiffs were opposed. On Mar. 25, 1997, the district court denied the motion to declare the district unitary as to assignment of students and faculty, facilities, and transportation, but granted the motion as to extracurricular activities. Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151, 1179–80 (W.D. Mo. 1997). The court nevertheless approved the settlement agreement permitting the State to satisfy any further obligations to the KCMSD by the payment of $320 million. Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 122 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 1997).
Most recently, the district, students, and teachers’ union obtained an injunction against the state’s requirement that the district use property tax levy proceeds to fund charter schools. 516 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2008).
The most recent activity on the docket was in 2008, so the case appears to be closed, or at least long-dormant.
Available OpinionsSch. Dist. of Kansas City, Missouri v. Missouri, 438 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Missouri v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Missouri v. Missouri, 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979).
Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 816 (1987) (denying certiorari).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 838 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1988).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988).
Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 488 U.S. 888 (1988) (granting certiorari).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 488 U.S. 889 (1988) (denying certiorari).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 862 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1988).
Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1989 WL 299246 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 3, 1989).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 864 F.2d 1454 (8th Cir. 1989).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989) (denying certiorari).
Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274 (1989).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 890 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1989).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 731 F. Supp. 1437 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 904 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1990).
Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1990 WL 515176 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 1990).
Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1990 WL 362044 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 29, 1990).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1991).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 1273 (8th Cir. 1991).
Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1991 WL 346392 (W.D. Mo. May 28, 1991).
Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1991 WL 538841 (W.D. Mo. July 5, 1991).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 942 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1991).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 943 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1991).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 502 U.S. 925 (1991) (denying certiorari).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 502 U.S. 967 (1991) (denying certiorari).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 981 F.2d 1009 (8th Cir. 1992).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 965 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1992).
Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77–0420–CV–W–4, 1992 WL 551569 (W.D. Mo. June 17, 1992).
Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77–0420–CV–W–4, 1992 WL 551568 (W.D. Mo. June 25, 1992).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 967 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1992).
Clark v. Jenkins, 506 U.S. 915 (1992) (denying certiorari).
Clark v. Jenkins, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992) (denying certiorari).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 981 F.2d 1009 (8th Cir. 1992).
Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77–0420–CV–W–4, 1993 WL 546576 (W.D. Mo. June 30, 1993).
Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77–0420–CV–W–4, 1993 WL 566488 (W.D. Mo. July 30, 1993).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 13 F.3d 1170 (8th Cir. 1993).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1994) (denying rehearing en banc).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 23 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1994).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 512 U.S. 1287 (1994) (granting certiorari).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 38 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 1994).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 1139 (1995) (granting certiorari).
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 73 F.3d 201 (8th Cir. 1996).
Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 78 F.3d 1270 (8th Cir. 1996).
Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 103 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 1997).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151 (W.D. Mo. 1997).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 965 F. Supp. 1295 (W.D. Mo. 1997).
Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 122 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 1997).
Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 97-2626, 1997 WL 464173 (8th Cir. Aug. 14, 1997).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 124 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1997) (granting petition for rehearing en banc).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 133 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 1997) (granting petition for rehearing en banc).
Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 127 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1997).
Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 131 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 1997).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 133 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1997).
Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 158 F.3d 980 (8th Cir. 1998).
Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 158 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 1998).
Jenkins ex rel. Jenkins v. Missouri, 170 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 1999).
Jenkins v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Missouri, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (W.D. Mo. 1999).
Jenkins ex rel. Jenkins v. Missouri, 205 F.3d 361 (8th Cir. 2000).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 216 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2000).
Jenkins v. Kansas City Missouri Sch. Dist., No. 77-0420-CV-W-DW, 2006 WL 3386563 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2006).
Jenkins v. Kansas City Missouri Sch. Dist., 516 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2008).
Jenkins v. Kansas City Missouri Sch. Dist., 525 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2008).
Elizabeth Greiter - 05/11/2018
compress summary
