Case: Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles

(This summary is temporary, while we research the case.)

In Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Proposition I was lawful. 

The subject matter of this litigation was equal educational opportunity. The legal basis of the action was (1) U.S. Const. amend. V, (2) U.S. Const. amend. XIV, (3) C.A. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 3,13, (4) C.A. Const. art. IX, (5) Cal. Admin. Code tit. 5, T. 5, Div. 1, Chap. 1, Regulation 2010 (1970).

According to the U.S. Supreme Court's summary of this case, "In a California state court action seeking desegregation of the schools in the Los Angeles Unified School District (District), the trial court, in 1970, found de jure segregation in violation of both the State and Federal Constitutions and ordered the District to prepare a desegregation plan. The California Supreme Court affirmed, but based its decision solely upon the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution, which bars de facto as well as de jure segregation. On remand, the trial court approved a desegregation plan that included substantial mandatory pupil reassignment and busing. While the trial court was considering alternative new plans in 1979, the voters of California ratified an amendment (Proposition I) to the State Constitution which provides that state courts shall not order mandatory pupil assignment or transportation unless a federal court "would be permitted under federal decisional law" to do so to remedy a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

The trial court denied the District's request to halt all mandatory reassignment and busing, holding that Proposition I was not applicable in light of the court's 1970 finding of de jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court then ordered implementation of a revised plan that again included substantial mandatory pupil reassignment and busing. The California Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the trial court's 1970 findings of fact would not support the conclusion that the District had violated the Federal Constitution through intentional segregation. The Court of Appeal also held that Proposition I was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, and barred that part of the plan requiring mandatory student reassignment and busing."

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People NAACP, American Civil Liberties Union ACLU, Congress of Racial Equality CORE and the American Jewish Congress made presentations to the Los Angeles City Board of Education on 06 07 1962. The Board adopted a motion "to appoint an ad hoc committee to consider the proposals ... [and] to call on outside experts from the [California] Department of Education or elsewhere and to meet with community leaders in the human relations field, with re responsibility of evaluating present Board policies and practices as they relate to equal educational opportunities for all students. That effort was insufficient to prevent litigation. The original complaint listed 2 Negro pupils of David Starr Jordan High School (Mary Ellen Crawford, Inita Watkins) as named plaintiffs for the class of approximately 1600 Jordan High pupils. Ms. Crawford's family was approached by Elnora Crowder, a District teacher working on behalf of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People NAACP, see Carol McGraw, Los Angeles Times, L.A. Schools : Integration Fight--No Victor Seen (04 06 1989).

In 1961, the Los Angeles City School District and the Los Angeles City High School District merged, forming the Los Angeles Unified School District LAUSD. 09 1961, Mary Ellen Crawford sought to enroll in Southgate High School, the closest high school to her residence. Southgate's student demographics were alleged to be 97% white. LAUSD officials told Ms. Crawford to enroll at Jordan High School, 1.5 miles distant from her residence. Jordan's student demographics were alleged to be 99% Negro. Between 1961-August 1963, the LAUSD voted to appropriate $1M to enlarge and rebuild Jordan High School. The complaint cites "numerous occasions" when the LAUSD Board had been requested to take corrective measures to desegregate Jordan High, and was requested to not expend public funds on a racially segregated school.

The original complaint sought (1) a declaratory judgment explaining the plaintiff's rights and the Board's duties, including a legal duty to take measures to correct the racial imbalance at Jordan High; (2) a judgment finding Constitutional violations by the LAUSD; (3) a judgment containing actionable steps to correct Jordan High's racial imbalance; (4) a preliminary injunction (a court order early in a lawsuit that would prohibit LAUSD from taking a disputed action until the court can decide the merits of the case), pendente lite (a legal latin term for a court order that is in effect only until the end of a lawsuit), and/or further orders enjoining the construction at Jordan High; (5) litigation costs.

A writ of mandate is a California court order requiring LAUSD - a governing agency administering the Los Angeles public schools - to perform specified desegregation acts. The Crawford class petition (p) for the writ of mandate, their reply (r) and the LAUSD answer (a) - (1) changed the plaintiff parties by adding 8 Negro students, 4 Mexican descent students, 4 Negro and 3 Mexican descent parents / court appointed persons to represent their legal interests (guardians ad litem); (2) overruled a LAUSD defense; (3) established 05 1963 as the starting date for this action (that date being the point at which the LAUSD presented the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Equal Educational Opportunities. The parties agreed to limit the scope of the court's inquiry into LAUSD's activities from 05 011963 to 10 28 1968 (p1 date unknown, p2 07 06 1966, amended 06 11 1969 ; a2 10 14 1966; r1 07 23 1968).

The court also received several stipulations (s1 07 19 1966, s2 06 06 1968). Stipulation s2 requested an order dismissing Mary Ellen Crawford from the action without prejudice (meaning the plaintiff is capable of refile the claim in a different court), but retained her name for identification of the action.

In this case, the judge determined the questions of fact and law submitted to him by the parties. Judge Gitelson established 118 facts, made no finding on 1 fact and made 30 legal conclusions.

Among the 118 facts, these were noteworthy. (1) the facts forced a redefinition of the plaintiff class (Negro and Mexican descent pupils attending LAUSD schools, SD-CA-0006-0005 II.7 at 9); (2) that LAUSD maintained no records of ethnic or racial demographics of its student populations and only commenced data collection when required by the California Board of Education (SD-CA-0006-0005 II.8 at 9; IV at 19; IV.34 at 54); (3) that the California Constitution, Education Code and case law do not allow the use of funds to create, maintain or perpetuate segregated education (SD-CA-0006-0005 IV.14 at 23, see Cal. Const. Art. IX, § 5; Cal. Edu. Code §§ 5001 et seq., 8001 et seq; Kennedy v. Miller, 97 Cal. 2d 429, 434 (1898)); (4) with respect to education, equal educational opportunity and educational discrimination there is no meaningful difference between schools adjudged to have de jure (legislation overtly segregates students by race) and de facto (legislation does not overtly segregate students by race) segregation (SD-CA-0006-0005 IV.25 at 39; the distinction was an important aspect of the Board's legal defense of its acts and failures to act; see also legal conclusion SD-CA-0006-0005 V at 85); (5) the Board intentionally refused to instruct / define for its staff de / segregation, integration, racial balance / imbalance or equal educational opportunity (SD-CA-0006-0005 IV.35-36 at 54,55); (7) the plaintiff's costs were $65K (SD-CA-0006-0005 IV.45 at 64).

Among the 30 legal conclusions, these were noteworthy. (1) LAUSD schools were de jure segregated (SD-CA-0006-0005 IV at 84, legislation overtly segregates students by race); (2) the Superior Court has no jurisdiction over California Board of Education Rules 2010 and 2011 which set specific percentage racial / ethnic targets for desegregation plans (SD-CA-0006-0005 X at 92 - the legal challenges to these rules depends on an administrative remedy in Cal. Gov't. Code § 11440); (2) the potential for 'white flight' "if it should occur, cannot and does not justify segregated education" (SD-CA-0006-0005 XII at 95); (3) the requested Writ of Mandate was granted, and LAUSD ordered to present a desegregation Master Plan for the school year 1970 (or 1971 at the latest) (SD-CA-0006-0005 XV at 100).

The 1970 election defeat of Judge Gitelson

Judge Gitelson became known as the "busing judge" in local newspapers and among advocacy groups. In the 1970 judicial election campaign, his opponent - Playa del Rey attorney William Kennedy - campaigned on the political issue that Judge Gitelson ordered busing. His opponent then joined forces with a San Fernando Valley organization that opposed mandatory assignment and busing called "Bustop" (see below). Gitelson drew ire--even an aborted assassination plot--based on his 103-page decision. Although the order did not mention busing, it was widely perceived by the public, as well as the LAUSD, that forced busing in a city as geographically wide as Los Angeles would be among the remedies considered. Gitelson, who had served as judge since 1957, received 815,530 (44%); Kennedy, received 1,020,963 (56%), see Roger M. Grace, 1970s: LACBA Ends Plebiscites, Stops Endorsing Candidates, Metropolitan News Enterprise (07 12 2005) at http://www.metnews.com/articles/2005/perspectives071205.htm

The LAUSD filed an appeal with the Second Division of the Court of Appeals in 1970. When an opinion was issued in 1975 the Court of Appeals found the issuance of the Writ of Mandate unconstitutional. The Crawford class plaintiffs appealed to the California Supreme Court.

In 1977, the District submitted its integration plan. In 1978, Judge Paul Egly issued orders requiring "large-scale mandatory reassignment of pupils on a racial and ethnic basis." (Crawford v. Board of Education (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 633, 636 [170 Cal. Rptr. 495].) In 1979, the voters approved Proposition 1 (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a)), eliminating the state court's power to order mandatory reassignment of pupils based on race unless required by the United States Constitution. (Crawford v. Board of Education, supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at pp. 636-637.) Although Judge Egly modified the 1978 order in 1980, the modified order "required substantial mandatory reassignment and transportation of pupils in the District." (Id. at p. 637.) On appeal, Judge Egly's 1980 orders were reversed in light of Proposition 1. (Crawford, 113 Cal.App.3d at pp. 638-657.) The United States Supreme Court affirmed. (Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education, supra, 458 U.S. 527.)

Also in 1975, the California Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision approving Judge Gitelson's Writ of Mandate - but rejected Judge Gitelson's definition of a "desegregated" school in terms of specific percentages.

Judge Matthew Tobriner wrote "findings in this case adequately support the trial court's conclusion that the segregation in the defendant school district is de jure in nature ... for more than a decade this court has adhered to the position that school boards in this state bear a constitutional obligation to attempt to alleviate school segregation, regardless of its cause. ... In California, school boards possess plenary authority to determine school assignment policies; to establish and reestablish geographic attendance zones; to determine where new schools will be built, what their size will be and what "neighborhood" they will serve; to create or eliminate transfer options between schools; and to establish specialized programs that may attract particular students to particular schools. ... it is clear that a trial court's task in supervising the preparation and implementation of a school desegregation plan is an exceedingly difficult, sensitive and taxing one, requiring the balancing and reconciliation of many competing values. It is not a task that any court readily seeks, but it is one that courts may not shirk when the appropriate school authorities default in their constitutional obligation to minority children in their school districts." Crawford v. Board of Education, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724, 726, 732, 744.

LAUSD was ordered to present a 'reasonably feasible' desegregation plan to the Superior Court.

The District submitted its plan for desegregation on June 30, 1981. The plan was framed in terms of the 1981-1982 school year, but "it is intended to be a continuing master plan" subject to adjustments necessary to meets its goals. To meet its goals of maximum desegregation, preservation of schools and neighborhoods that have achieved desegregation, and alleviation of the harmful effects of segregation, the plan utilized several components, including the Magnet and PWT programs.

Magnet programs were an integral part of the District's desegregation program. The program grew from six schools in 1977 to 86 schools and centers by September 1981, with more than 15,000 students enrolled and plans to increase enrollment. Priority is given to minority students presently attending overcrowded schools.

The District's 1981-1982 Choices booklet describes the Magnet schools and PWT programs. All students may apply, but school assignments are made only on the basis of improving the ethnic balance of the school to which the student is transferring. "For 1981-1982, virtually every school in the District with a White enrollment in excess of 40-50 [percent] will be a designated PWT receiving school, and it is planned that as many as 18,000 to 20,000 minority students will participate." The assumption was that PWT would continue to be a viable part of the District's integration plan, which will provide ethnic balance at the receiving school and an integrated education for the participating minority student.

Whenever possible, the District will encourage voluntary programs including Magnet and PWT programs involving the reassignment of students to under-crowded facilities, and "[m]inority students attending overcrowded schools will continue to receive priority for admission."

This case was again tried in Department 20 (Judge Paul Egly) Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles on March 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, April 01, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, May 02, 03, 04, 05, 06, 09, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, June 01, 02, 03, 06, 07, 08, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 28, July 01 1977.

On remand, the Court of Appeals assigned the case to Judge Egly. Egly was the presiding judge in NAACP v. San Bernardino City School District. This case raised a "persistent fear that busing" would be among the proposed remedies, see Paul Egly, Crawford v. Los Angeles Unified School District an unfulfilled plea for racial equality, 31 U. La Verne L. Rev. 257 (2009-2010).

LAUSD filed its first plan (Plan 1) on 03 18 1977. Because LAUSD at first tended to agree with the Crawford class position that widespread reassignment of students was required, various community groups applied for permission to intervene in the remedy proceedings.

Six intervenors raised objections to this plan - (i1) Bustop (i2) Better Education for Students Today BEST (i3) United Teachers of Los Angeles UTLA (i4) Robert M Loveland (i5) Mary Keipp, i6 Integration Project.

The LAUSD plan had both mandatory and voluntary provisions. Under the mandatory portion 38 segregated white elementary schools and 55 segregated minority schools (of 559) were included in the desegregation process. The voluntary portion relied on 1) a year of integrated learning experience (which the court termed vague); 2) Educational Planning Units EPUs intended to cluster segregated schools and involve parents and staff to determine voluntary integration steps (the court found merit in these constructs but found that the imposition of mandatory transportation limits would narrow their scope); 3) Permits With Transportation a program which allows certain students to voluntarily bus out of their segregated school on a space and transportation available basis (the court found the program lacking because it is constitutionally suspect minority based initiative with limited numbers of participants, it does not desegregate sending schools and it has a high financial cost).

Calling the LAUSD plan a "hastily conceived" reaction to a Citizens' Advisory Committee on Student Integration CASCI plan, Judge Egly determined that "this plan ... would result in the district continuing to maintain three separate school systems: brown, black and white, each isolated from the other". The court noted that by the end of 1975 there were at least 1500 United States school districts "subjected to this same trauma ... their history teaches us that the index of a successful effort has been the resolution and good faith shown by a Board of Education and its staff in preparing and leading their community in a court ordered desegregation of its schools" (07 05 1977 Minute Order at 2, 8, 10).

The CASCI plan was vetted at a hearing of the United States Civil Rights Commission (12 13+14 1976). At that time, Calvin Hamilton (director of

planning for the city of Los Angeles appointed by the mayor) attested to an evidence based approach. Mr Hamilton testified that the CASCI about the CASCI process:

"When is a school integrated? What percentages are there, make sense, when are they racially isolated? [The committees were] trying to get the data and information on the distance between each school if you had to provide transportation, ... and experimented with ... 10 alternative or methods of possible integration that had been explored in other school districts ... and in effect divided the whole school district into ... a green and a yellow task force ... going into far greater detail, exploring clustering schools, exploring different ways and methods, and the school district has been then running those figures

out on their computers. We've been using resources in the city of Los Angeles, at UCLA, at Rand Corporation, wherever we could find information and knowledgeable people" (Hearing before the United States Commission on Civil Rights at http://archive.org/stream/hearingbeforeuni00unit/hearingbeforeuni00unit_djvu.txt last accessed 04 24 2013).

Judge Egly ordered LAUSD to return in 10 1977 with a revised plan (Plan 2), and to submit all reasonable alternative plans accompanied or supported by detailed findings and conclusions, evidentiary data, summaries of expert opinions, statistical information, financial and educational information from internal and external sources. 07 08 1977 the court appointed Monroe Price, then a UCLA law professor (as of 2013 director University of Pennsylvania Center for Global Communication Studies), referee to monitor compliance with the court's orders. Price provided weekly reports to Judge Egly.

02 22 1978 the court appointed a committee of experts (Thomas Pettigrew, Gary Orfield, Bernard Gifford, Reynolds Farley, Beatriz Arias, Robert Crain, Elwood Hain Junior, Francine Rabinovitz) on school integration and desegregation to examine independently the means, time frames and methods for desegregation, enhanced voluntary and involuntary provisions, calculations regarding the risk of white flight, definitional terms, priorities. The court did not require a consensus opinion.

The Crawford class, i4 Loveland, i5 Keipp, and i6 Integration Project filed objections to Plan 2. LAUSD and i2 BEST moved Judge Egly implement the plan.

01 23 1978 Judge Egly conducted a hearing on Plan 2 (Integrated Educational Excellence Through Choice was supported by i2 Better Education Students Today BEST) anticipating the eventual integration of the entire district. In advance of the hearing, Judge Egly asked the LAUSD Board to answer 22 specified questions. Testimony continued on January 24, 25, 27 February 01, 02, 03 1978. This plan had a target start date of 09 01 1978, incorporated voluntary participation of some students in all grades (Kindergarten through 12th grade). In grades 4 through 8, the voluntary emphasis persisted but there was introduced an alternate mandatory assignment plan should the preferred methods fail (64 minority segregated schools were subject to the involuntary mechanism, 204 schools were not).

i1 Bustop moved for an order staying implementation of Plan 2, asking the trial court to enjoin LAUSD from implementing its proposal or, in the alternative, from reassigning any student to any school where the total round trip transportation time exceeded one hour. The motion was denied and Bustop appealed. The California Court of Appeals stayed implementation of the plan. The California Supreme Court (at 200 Cal. App. 3d 1403) reversed the stay. i1 Bustop unsuccessfully sought relief in the United States Supreme Court. See Bustop, Inc. v. Los Angeles Board of Education (1978) 439 U.S. 1380 [58 L.Ed.2d 88, 99 S.Ct. 40.

09 1978 Plan 2 commenced. The Crawford class and i6 Integration Project unsuccessfully moved to discontinue the plan and substitute a new, court-designed plan.

10 22 1979 Judge Egly commenced renewed hearings to reexamine Plan 2 and consider alternative plans. For the first time, the LAUSD board indicated to the court that mandatory busing had failed to achieve its objective of desegregating the city schools and that it desired a return to an all-voluntary plan. Concurrently, the Crawford class and most of the interveners presented their own desegregation approaches.

10 18 1979, a consulting firm Hamilton Rabinovitz & Szanton Incorporated (Francine Rabinovitz, a member of the expert's committee was vice president) performed computer simulations of 17 desegregation plans at a cost of $171,210.

10 22 1979 to at least 01 14 1980 Judge Egly conducted the trial on the merits and sought to reconcile the data and alternative plans submitted for review. 11 06 1979 California voters approved Proposition 1, an initiative measure which amended article I, section 7, subdivision (a), of the California Constitution. The effect of the amendment was to prohibit state courts, in desegregation cases, from ordering school boards to mandatorily reassign and transport pupils on the basis of race, except to remedy a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution under circumstances which would authorize a federal court under federal decisional law to issue such an order. The amendment further provided that any previously issued court order which contained a mandatory reassignment provision could be modified by proper application to a court having jurisdiction over the matter, unless modification was precluded by the United States Constitution.

09 1981, following several months of hearings, Judge Egly gave final approval to Plan 4. Regarding the District's submitted desegregation plan, the superior court made the following orders: (1) the District may construct new schools and make additions to existing ones to meet overcrowding and other needs; (2) the definition of groups in the plan as "minority" (PHBAO) was to end forthwith, as the term is factually inaccurate because those students comprise the vast majority of the school population, the label is harmful, the District had a duty to use factual descriptions, and those students should be referred to with accurate descriptions. The term "Racially Isolated Minority Schools" (RIMS) was barred as it is deceptive, demeaning, and inaccurate and should be replaced with a neutral term, but not "minority"; (3) all new elementary and junior high Magnet schools and programs "established under this plan" shall be located in areas of PHBAO enrollment; (4) pupil-teacher ratios must be maintained at 27 to 1 or less in PHBAO school; (5) all PHBAO pupils who volunteer are entitled to access all programs involving the voluntary transfer of students; (6) the District is to publicize transfer options to pupils in areas where most PHBAO families reside; (7) the District must issue annual reports on educational conditions and achievements in PHBAO schools; (8) the share of desegregation expenditures allocated to payment of administrative expenses shall not exceed the administrative expense ratio characteristic of the District's overall budget; and (9) the District shall prepare and make public, before July 15, 1983, a report of the measures taken and results achieved under the plan.

Gary Orfield, an expert in desegregation cases, declared that he was a court-appointed expert in Crawford. In his experience, it is highly unusual for a court-ordered desegregation plan to have an expiration date. Generally a desegregation plan remains in place until a party to the case or other interested person with standing applies to the court for the plan's termination. It is not unusual for a plan to remain in effect for several decades. Short-term desegregation would leave the underlying patterns largely unchanged and the plans must be continued until they become part of the accepted structure of the school district and its community.

Orfield further declared he did not believe the superior court intended the Crawford desegregation plan would remain in effect for only two years (until the date of the court-ordered 1983 status report). No such discussion took place and he was unaware of anyone else involved in the Crawford litigation who believed the plan would be implemented for such a short period of time. It would be absurd and destructive to send children to another school for a brief period of time and then send them back to an inferior, segregated school. The types of changes necessary to achieve successful desegregation in a jurisdiction like Los Angeles cannot be achieved quickly because of the need to create educational benefits that justify commuting to another school.

The Crawford class received $1.3M ($3.3M in 2013) in fees and costs. No other party did. i1 Bustop unsuccessfully argued that it was entitled to an award because it was the only party that steadfastly opposed mandatory busing and that without its contribution to the lawsuit the school system would have eventually become resegregated because of White flight. i2 BEST unsuccessfully maintained that it was the only litigant who sought to vindicate the important rights of desegregation and quality education. i4 Loveland and i5 Keipp received no award despite their involvement in the Citizens Advisory Committee on Student Integration CACSI formulating alternative desegregation plans. i3 UTLA unsuccessfully claimed that it participated in the trial court proceedings to provide quality education in a desegregated school system.