On January 17, 1995 two motorists who had been stopped by U. S. Border Patrol agents patrolling the Mexican border filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, challenging the constitutionality of the stops. Plaintiffs alleged that the Border Patrol agents ...
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On January 17, 1995 two motorists who had been stopped by U. S. Border Patrol agents patrolling the Mexican border filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, challenging the constitutionality of the stops. Plaintiffs alleged that the Border Patrol agents engaged in a pattern or practice of routinely stopping motorists without reasonable suspicion. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. Plaintiffs amended their complaint several times and moved for class certification.
Defendants objected to the class certification and moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that plaintiffs lacked standing to request injunctive relief. The Court converted that motion to one for summary judgment, when the parties submitted materials for the Court to consider.
On June 23, 1997, the District Court (Judge John M. Roll) granted defendants motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. Judge Roll determined that plaintiffs did not sufficiently establish that they were at risk of being stopped again by Border Patrol, they lacked standing to pursue a case for injunctive relief. He also held that class certification was not appropriate. Durgin v. De La Vina, 74 F.R.D. 469, (D.Ariz. 1997). Plaintiffs appealed.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Rhoades) reversed and remanded the case. Durgin v. De La Vina, 165 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1999). Defendants moved for a rehearing en banc. Following rehearing, the Ninth Circuit en banc (Judge W. Fletcher) affirmed the dismissal of the case. Judge Fletcher's opinion held: (1) standing to seek damages did not alone serve as a basis for standing to seek equitable relief; (2) motorists did not establish a sufficient likelihood of future injury to warrant equitable relief; and (3) relief could not be based on injury of unnamed class members. Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. En banc 1999).
Brian Ponton - 09/17/2007
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