Filed Date: April 23, 2018
Case Ongoing
Clearinghouse coding complete
On April 23, 2018, five residents of Tennessee filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiffs sued the Tennessee Correctional Services, and two for-profit probation companies, Community Probation Services (CPS) and Progressive Sentencing, Inc. (PSI), all under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Civil Rights Corps and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was originally assigned to Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr.
The plaintiffs claimed that CPS and PSI, through their contract with Tennessee Correctional Services, acted as "for profit probation officers" overseeing the collection of fines and other court debts on behalf of Giles County. In this role, the defendants allegedly maximized their own profits for the purposes of collecting court debts by adding additional fees and surchages on top of the existing debt owed by probationers. The companies' supervision of probation payments, according to the plaintiffs, consisted of charging monthly fees' the probationers often could not afford, repeatedly making threats of jail time to induce payment, and humiliating supervision of drug testing. They also alleged that this created a conflict of interest: purportedly neutral probation officers were financially inclined to impose higher costs on indigent probationers.
Claims
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated RICO by acting as an extortionate enterprise focused on creating financial hardship. Individuals who were supervised by the companies had lost homes, jobs, and personal belongings, suffered severe medical problems; they had gone without food, clothing, and medicine for themselves and their children to pay for the escalating supervision fees that the companies demanded under threat of arrest and jailing.
Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that Giles County's process for setting bail violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They alleged that judges set bail for probationers alleged violations without an inquiry into their ability to pay. Consequently, the plaintiffs faced the prospect, and in some instances were, jailed for up to 10 days. The plaintiffs alleged that this deprivation of liberty violated the constitutional prohibition against wealth-based detention and discriminated against them on the basis of their indigence.
Early Procedural History
On the same day the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs moved to certify two classes, a class for equitable relief encompassing “[a]ll persons who, at any time since April 23, 2014, (1) have incurred, or will incur, court-imposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Giles County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) are currently being supervised, or will be supervised, on probation in that case by any of the defendants” and a separate damages class under the same definition.
On July 13, 2018 the case was transferred to Judge William L. Campbell, Jr. On the same day, plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order barring the defendant from jailing one of the named plaintiffs. The order was granted. Judge Campbell held that the plaintiff had demonstrated she was likely to succeed on the merits of both Fourteenth Amendment challenges. Further, the Court held that her jailing would cause an immediate and irreparable harm to her and the four children she supports.
On July 30, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for a class-wide preliminary injunction. Giles County moved to dismiss the complaint on August 6, 2018. They argued that the plaintiffs' claims were misplaced; judicial actions, not Giles County policy or custom, were the source of the plaintiffs' alleged constitutional violations. Additionally, they argued that Giles County retained sovereign immunity for any abuse of process claim, and therefore could not be liable for the plaintiff's allegations of wealth-based detentions.
For the next few months, the parties traded motions on the preliminary injunction and class action certification. U.S. Magistrate Judge Jeffrey S. Frensley denied a non-party's motion to quash testimony. 2018 WL 5728527. The court also held that private parties would not be subject to adjudications on injunctive relief on January 3, 2019. On January 7, 2019, Judge William L. Campbell Jr denied as moot a number of motions related to exclusion of testimony and evidence. 2019 WL 298474.
Preliminary Injunction
On February 14, 2019, the judge granted the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction against the county's enforcement of bail requirements for an indefinite period. 2019 WL 633012. Judge William L. Campbell Jr. held that the county's failure to inquire into the probationers' failure to pay, and subsequent jailing for that failure to pay, likely violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court found that the county's secured bail policy was entitled to heightened judicial scrutiny because "plaintiffs have demonstrated an inability to afford bail and an absence of meaningful consideration of alternatives to secured bail." Further, the defendants' failure to make factual findings concerning the arrestee's ability to pay, the necessity of detention, or the adequacy of alternative conditions of release was also held likely to be unconstitutional. Judge Campbell rejected the defendants' argument that they were following the statutorily-defined process, finding that there was "no state statute requiring such a procedure" and holding that the Supremacy Clause allowed the Court to enjoin the process.
The order stated that the defendant correctional services agency was enjoined from detaining any person on misdemeanor probation for a secured bail amount unless there was (1) notice to the arrestee and an opportunity to be heard by an appropriate judicial officer; and (2) findings by that judicial officer concerning the arrestee’s ability to pay, alternatives to secured bail, and whether pre-revocation detention is necessary to meet a compelling governmental interest. Giles County and the Sheriff appealed this order on March 20, 2019 to the Sixth Circuit.
Summary Judgement and Appellate Proceedings
On April 18, 2019, CPS and one of its employees moved for summary judgment, claiming qualified and sovereign immunity for their actions. Over the next few months, the parties began discovery and attempted to settle the dispute. On June 14, 2019, Judge William L. Campbell Jr. denied the motion for summary judgment without prejudice as premature, allowing discovery to continue. The defendants appealed on June 19, 2019.
United States Magistrate Judge Jeffrey S. Frensley held on October 29, 2019 that the named defendant PSI was compelled to produce electronically stored information, rejecting the defendant's motion to stay discovery pending a decision on the previous motion for summary judgment. 2019 WL 5957004.
Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction on December 23, 2019 in an opinion written by Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton. The court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs should have sued the state judges rather than the sheriffs and county officials who enforced the bail requirements. 945 F.3d 991. Judge Sutton held that the alleged violation was the product of two actions - the judge's determination of bail without consideration of financial condition and Giles County's jailing of the probationer. Both were actionable. Consequently, the court found that since the plaintiff is the "master of the complaint" they were free to choose which parties to sue. In addition, the Court found that since the sheriff was "actively administering" the alleged unconstitutional policy, sovereign immunity did not apply, rejecting the defendant's argument that the preliminary injunction unduly expanded ex Parte Young liability.
On February 28, 2020 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment for CPS and one of its employees. 803 Fed.Appx. 846. The court held that qualified immunity did not apply to the defendants because they faced "no prospect of damages liability." Judge Sutton also rejected CPS's argument that they acted in an official capacity barring any money damages of relief. The threshold question was whether CPS acted for the state or the county. The court held that because the county paid judgment, CPS's actions were county actions. Consequently, since county actions are not eligible for sovereign immunity, neither was CPS's action; the court indicated it knew of "no case in which a private probation company has successfully invoked sovereign immunity."
With motions for summary judgment and dismissal pending, the PSI defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on June 4, 2020. On June 23, the court issued an order staying additional discovery until the pending dispositive motions were resolved.
After extensive briefing, the court ruled on defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment on February 3, 2021. 2021 WL 366776; 2021 WL 365844. The court granted summary judgment for defendants on the RICO claims, the equal protection claims, and several abuse of process claims. It denied summary judgment on the due process claims, the unjust enrichment claims, the abuse of process claims concerning the remaining defendants, and the civil conspiracy claim. The court denied the parties’ motion to set oral argument, and denied PSI Defendants’ motion to ascertain the status of the case as moot. The court subsequently lifted the discovery stay, instructed the magistrate to set new case management deadlines, and scheduled briefing on class certification.
On March 23, 2021, after being informed that a named class member had passed away, the court substituted the class member’s estate so that it could continue to litigate the damages claims. 2021 WL 1110675. Plaintiffs then filed the Third Amended Complaint on April 30 to reflect the fact that the Sixth Circuit had issued rulings related to plaintiffs’ claims, and to substitute an unnamed class member for the deceased class member to ensure that the equitable class continued to be represented in the litigation. 2021 WL 8055679.
In June, the court held a case management conference with the parties to discuss a proposed settlement. Giles County indicated that it had approved a settlement agreement resolving all claims against them, but the private defendants did not participate in negotiations and did not consent to the proposed consent decree. Following the conference, the court directed plaintiffs to file a motion for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. On July 26, 2021, the court preliminarily approved that settlement agreement pending a fairness hearing.
On November 23, 2021, the plaintiffs and Giles County defendants filed a joint motion for final approval of a class action settlement. In anticipation of final approval of the settlement agreement, the parties stipulated to dismissal of the private probation services defendants—Community Probation Services, LLC and PSI Probation, LLC.
The court entered a Consent Decree on January 13, 2022, which included the named plaintiffs and defendants Giles County and the Giles County Sheriff. The private probation services defendants objected to the findings but remained unbound by the provisions in the Decree. The Decree included a variety of forms of relief. First, the parties agreed that “it violates equal protection and due process to keep a person on supervised probation solely to make payments if the person is too poor to pay without sacrificing basic necessities.”
The County defendants agreed that all of its officials and employees would be bound by the provisions, and that any contracts the county entered into must be consistent with the terms of the Decree. The parties agreed to select an independent monitor to evaluate and report on defendants’ implementation of the Consent Decree provisions for a period of three years, which could be extended for good cause. The Decree also provided that the parties have a duty to confer in good faith with each other and the monitor before seeking judicial intervention. The court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree.
Injunctive Relief: The Consent Decree imposed comprehensive injunctive relief for the class of: “All people (1) who are or will be convicted of a misdemeanor offense in Giles County and (2) who are required to make payments and/or who are sentenced to probation.” The Decree prohibited Giles County from contracting with a third party to supervise misdemeanor probation services if that third party funds their activities with payments from probationers. The Giles County Sheriff’s Office was required to identify and deactivate all arrest warrants for alleged violations of misdemeanor probation, and to inform authorities in nearby jurisdictions that these warrants were no longer active within seven days of the entry of the Decree.
The Consent Decree did not prohibit the County from collecting any payments from individuals convicted of misdemeanor offenses, but it established standards that the County must follow to determine an individual’s ability to pay. The Decree also established procedures for reassessing a misdemeanant’s ability to pay, and permitted an individual to request reassessment at any time.
The Decree prohibited the County from keeping a person on supervised probation solely due to indigency. It also required the County to eliminate fees for other probation conditions—such classes, treatment, or drug testing—for people who have demonstrated an inability to pay.
If the County chose to continue the practice of supervised probation, the Consent Decree required 20 hours of training of new employees within their first 90 days, as well as 8 annual hours of training on best probation practices and rehabilitation.
Damages: The parties agreed that the County would pay $2 million to the plaintiffs, inclusive of attorneys’ fees and costs. The County was also deemed responsible for paying the costs of claims administration, monitoring, and any other implementation measures. The classes certified for damages relief were: a) “All people who were on probation in connection with a misdemeanor offense in Giles County on or after April 23, 2017 through March 31, 2021;” and b) “All people who paid CPS Fees and/or PSI Fees while on probation in connection with a misdemeanor offense in Giles County on or after April 23, 2015 through March 31, 2021.”
On February 1, 2022, the court entered a final order and judgment approving the class settlement, and dismissed the action against the County defendants with prejudice. The order specified that attorneys’ fees and costs would be awarded as provided in the Settlement Agreement. On February 25, the court approved the parties’ joint motion to appoint a Consent Decree monitor.
The monitor filed reports on February 21 and October 27, 2023, pursuant to the consent decree. The Clearinghouse does not have access to the reports.
As of April 2024, this case is ongoing.
Summary Authors
Jake Parker (6/13/2018)
Graham Rotenberg (6/2/2020)
Grayson Metzger (4/12/2024)
For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6848853/parties/mcneil-v-community-probation-services-llc/
Campbell, William Lynn Jr. (Tennessee)
Arandes, Laura Gaztambide (Tennessee)
Badlani, Chirag (Illinois)
Blanton, Samuel J. (Tennessee)
Ahillen, Joseph Paul (Tennessee)
Campbell, William Lynn Jr. (Tennessee)
Crenshaw, Waverly David Jr. (Tennessee)
Frensley, Jeffrey S (Tennessee)
See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6848853/mcneil-v-community-probation-services-llc/
Last updated April 11, 2024, 10:37 a.m.
State / Territory: Tennessee
Case Type(s):
Special Collection(s):
Fines/Fees/Bail Reform (Criminalization of Poverty)
Key Dates
Filing Date: April 23, 2018
Case Ongoing: Yes
Plaintiffs
Plaintiff Description:
All persons who, at any time since April 23, 2014, (1) have incurred court-imposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Giles County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) have been assigned to be supervised on probation in that case by any of the defendants.
Plaintiff Type(s):
Attorney Organizations:
Public Interest Lawyer: Yes
Filed Pro Se: No
Class Action Sought: Yes
Class Action Outcome: Granted
Defendants
Tennessee Correctional Services, LLC, State
Community Probation Services, LLC, Private Entity/Person
Progressive Sentencing, Inc., Private Entity/Person
Defendant Type(s):
Case Details
Causes of Action:
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201
Ex parte Young (federal or state officials)
Constitutional Clause(s):
Available Documents:
Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief
Outcome
Prevailing Party: Plaintiff
Nature of Relief:
Injunction / Injunctive-like Settlement
Preliminary injunction / Temp. restraining order
Source of Relief:
Form of Settlement:
Court Approved Settlement or Consent Decree
Amount Defendant Pays: $2,000,000
Content of Injunction:
Issues
General:
Jails, Prisons, Detention Centers, and Other Institutions: