On May 20, 1975, a non-veteran woman who had applied for civil service positions in Massachusetts filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its Division of Civil Service, and the members of the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission. Represented by private counsel, she sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking injunctive relief.
Massachusetts had passed the Massachusetts Veterans' Preference Statute, which gave an absolute preference to veterans when hiring for state civil service positions. The application process included an exam, but the Veterans' Preference took precedent over exam scores by ranking applicants as follows: (1) disabled veterans, (2) other veterans, (3) widows and widowed mothers of veterans, and (4) all other applicants. Within each group, applicants were ranked according to their exam scores. The plaintiff alleged that the Veterans' Preference was discriminatory against women and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. She argued that because women had fewer opportunities to serve in the armed forces due to various statutory limitations, the practical consequence was that women were deprived of the opportunity to compete for the most attractive state civil service positions despite having higher test scores than most of the veteran men who had been given preference.
Because the case challenged the constitutionality of a state law, under the court procedure then applicable, it was assigned to a three-judge district court, with direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The three judges were Circuit Judge Campbell, and District Judges Murray and Tauro.
With the parties' consent, the district court entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the defendants from filling any positions sought by the plaintiff.
After, the court consolidated this case with
Anthony v. Commonwealth (Docket No. 74-5061), a previously filed case where four non-veteran women had also challenged the Veterans' Preference.
On March 29, 1976, the district court, in an opinion by Judge Tauro, held that
Anthony was moot. The positions that the
Anthony plaintiffs had sought were eliminated on July 16, 1975. The plaintiffs argued that the act of compiling a list of eligible applicants with preference to veterans violated their equal protection rights. The district court held that, because the eligibility list did not guarantee appointment to a position, the potential injury would have to be tied to the (no longer open) positions themselves rather than the eligibility list, and thus the case was moot. 415 F. Supp. 485.
In the same opinion from March 29, 1976, the district court proceeded on the merits for
Feeney and held that the Veterans' Preference was unconstitutional. There was an equal protection violation because the Veterans' Preference created an "absolute and permanent disadvantage over another clearly identifiable group, Massachusetts' women," despite the "worthy purpose" of rewarding veterans for their service. Because veteran status was the primary criterion for ranking, the Veterans' Preference "relegated job-related criteria and professional qualifications to a secondary position." 415 F. Supp. 485.
The Massachusetts Attorney General appealed on behalf of the defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court certified a procedural question to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts about the Massachusetts Attorney General's authority to prosecute the appeal. On September 16, 1977, the Supreme Judicial Court held that it was within the Attorney General's authority. 373 Mass. 359.
On October 11, 1977, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case in light of
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that disparate impact alone was not enough to show an equal protection violation). 434 U.S. 884.
On May 3, 1978, the district court concluded that its March 1976 opinion was not changed by
Davis, or by the Court's later opinion elaborating the difference between disparate impact (often lawful) and disparate treatment (unlawful) in
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that the plaintiff needed to show there was discriminatory intent or purpose). The district court distinguished this case from
Davis by describing how the explicit preference for veterans foreclosed, on average, 98% of women from significant civil service appointments. Moreover, a large percentage of women who did work in civil service held positions that men traditionally did not seek. Also unlike
Davis, the defendants had not demonstrated any attempt to mitigate the impact of the Veterans' Preference on women. 451 F. Supp. 143.
The Massachusetts Attorney General appealed again on behalf of the defendants to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded the case on June 5, 1979. The Court found that the Veterans' Preference was gender neutral and that Massachusetts had consistently defined "veteran" to include women who served in the military. In addition, the Court took into account the district court's admission that Massachusetts had not enacted the Veterans' Preference for the purpose of giving men an advantage. Thus, applying
Davis, the Court held that the law merely favored veterans (of any gender) over non-veterans (of any gender). 442 U.S. 256.
On remand, after the Supreme Court's opinion, the plaintiff moved to continue litigating the case on her due process claims, which she argued had not been foreclosed by the Court's opinion. On August 17, 1979, the district court denied the motion because the plaintiff's motion asserted a new due process claim, alleging that denying access to public employment on a wholesale basis deprived all non-veterans (regardless of gender) of liberty. The district court also held that relevant due process claims were foreclosed by the Supreme Court's opinion because the reasoning was similar enough to the equal protection claim. 475 F. Supp. 109.
The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which summarily affirmed the district court's judgment on February 25, 1980. 445 U.S. 901.
This case has ended.
Lauren Yu - 06/15/2021
compress summary
