On October 12, 2005, an inmate in the Eastham Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), its executive director, and the warden of the Eastham Unit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §2000, and Texas State Code §110.001. The plaintiff alleged that the TDCJ and specifically the Eastham Unit denied him access to a kosher diet, which he required as part of his sincere religious belief. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. This case was assigned to Judge George C. Hanks, Jr.
On December 19, 2005, this case was consolidated with a similar case also regarding the rights of a Jewish inmate under RLUIPA. On April 6, 2006, both parties moved to stay the litigation pending settlement negotiations to address both plaintiffs’ claims. This was approved on April 12, 2006. The court requested progress reports at the beginning of each month regarding the status of settlement negotiations. In September of 2006, the second plaintiff who joined the case passed away. The consolidation order was withdrawn on October 16, 2006.
The parties continued to file status reports on settlement negotiations, but on June 1, 2007 the plaintiff was transferred to the Stringfellow unit where a kosher kitchen was recently put in operation. On November 20, 2007, this case was transferred to the Southern District of Texas because the court determined that was a more proper venue as the Stringfellow unit was located in the Southern District. Based upon this transfer, on August 22, 2008, the defendants moved to dismiss the case and, in the alternative, moved for summary judgment. They argued that the plaintiff received the relief sought. However, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 11, 2008 claiming that the defendants refused to guarantee that he would receive kosher meals if transferred to another unit.
On March 26, 2009, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiff received the relief sought. Further, the court ruled that the plaintiff’s amended complaint regarding the defendant’s future actions was inconsequential on the grounds that he could always file another suit and that government actors should be “accorded a presumption of good faith because they are public servants.”
The plaintiff appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on April 10, 2009. While the appeal was pending, the plaintiff was transferred to the Stiles Unit for disciplinary reasons. There, kosher meals were available for purchase but not provided. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court on February 5, 2010. The Fifth Circuit found that this case was no longer moot since the conditions the plaintiff complained of about had substantially changed following his transfer. 364 Fed. Appx. 110.
On December 10, 2010, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Their motions were fully briefed and the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (DOJ) filed a brief arguing that the defendants had not met their burden of demonstrating a compelling government interest to justify the substantial burden placed on the plaintiff given the refusal to provide him with a kosher diet. Further, the defendants did not show that this refusal was the least restrictive means of furthering the defendants’ interest.
On September 20, 2011, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on two grounds: (1) that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) exhaustion requirement and (2) that the defendants established the plaintiff’s “lack of sincerity regarding [his] kosher practice as a matter of law.” 2011 WL 4376482. Since RLUIPA required the inmate show a substantial burden on his religious belief, a necessary component of this burden was to establish that his religious belief was sincere. The court found that the plaintiff only offered a conclusory declaration that his religious dietary needs were sincere, and rather “his personal desire to harass defendants with an unnecessary lawsuit took precedence…” Id.
The plaintiff filed an appeal on October 14, 2011 and on December 21, 2012 the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court. The Fifth Circuit disagreed that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. The Court held, contra the district court, that the plaintiff did not need to “re-exhaust” his grievance due to the changed circumstances in the case. The Fifth Circuit also found that the defendants had not proved the plaintiff’s lack of sincerity and that religious lapses were not equal to insincerity. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit found that there was a remaining factual question: whether there was a less restrictive means for minimizing costs and maintaining security than to force the plaintiff to pay for his kosher meal. The court said that if there was a less restrictive means, then RLUIPA commands that the defendants adopt it. 2012 WL 6635226.
This case went back to the district court where the discovery process continued until April 4, 2014 when the parties again moved to stay the case in order to negotiate a settlement. The parties ultimately reached a private settlement agreement. According to a court-mandated status report, the plaintiff had been moved from the Stiles Unit back to the Stringfellow Unit on April 18, 2013 where he was participating in the Jewish dietary program and receiving kosher meals. On January 8, 2016, both parties issued a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal, which was granted on March 31, 2017.
This case is now closed.
Nichollas Dawson - 10/05/2017
Hannah Greenhouse - 03/22/2019
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