On May 18, 2017, the Georgia State Conference of the Georgia NAACP, the Troup County Chapter of the NAACP, Project South, and a small number of named and unnamed plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the City of LaGrange, Georgia in the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued the city on one federal claim – violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3604(b) – and two state claims: tortious interference with utility service and unconscionability. They sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys’ costs.

The plaintiffs objected to two policies regarding the provision of municipal utilities in the City of LaGrange. The first policy required an individual to pay any outstanding court debt prior to receiving utility service from the City. The plaintiffs argued that this policy had a disproportionate impact on African-Americans, was the only policy of its kind nationwide, and was not justified by any legitimate purpose. The second policy required an individual to provide a valid social security number and government-issued photo identification in order to receive utilities. The plaintiffs argued that this policy had a disproportionate impact on Latinos and was not justified by any legitimate purpose.

On July 21, the City of LaGrange moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The City argued that disparate impact theory did not apply to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. §3604(b). It further argued that the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the Fair Housing Act as not applying to post-acquisition conduct; that is, it did not apply to conduct that occurred after a housing sale or rental transaction, and that the conduct at issue fell into that category. Finally, the City claimed their policies were reasonable, and not arbitrary, artificial, or unnecessary.

Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. granted the City of LaGrange’s motion to dismiss on December 7, 2017, ruling that the defendants were correct in their interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit’s narrow reading of the FHA. Judge Batten found that the plaintiffs did not present cognizable claims under the Fair Housing Act because all but one plaintiff alleged violations that occurred post-acquisition of housing, and that the plaintiff’s injury was not sufficiently concrete to have standing. Having dismissed the federal claim, Judge Batten did not address the two state claims.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on January 4, 2018. The Court of Appeals (Circuit Judges Wilson and Branch, and District Judge Vinson, sitting by designation) issued an opinion on October 10, 2019, vacating the District Court’s decision and remanding the case for further proceedings. The Appellate Court ruled that §3604(b) encompasses some post-acquisition conduct and the basic utility services in question fell within the scope of services covered by §3604(b). It directed the District Court to determine anew whether the plaintiffs’ disparate impact allegations stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. This opinion was made a judgment of the District Court on November 25.

On December 23, 2019, the parties filed an amended joint preliminary report and discovery plan and Judge Batten ordered that discovery end on August 18, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Alexandra Gilewicz - 01/25/2018
Sichun Liu - 01/20/2020


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