Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Arizona state court after being convicted of violating A.R.S. s 32—261, an Arizona statute prohibiting any person from practicing law in Arizona unless he is an active member of the state bar. The underlying facts are as follows:

On October 24, 1966, Plaintiff appeared in a state court habeas corpus proceeding on behalf of an indigent prisoner in the Superior Court of Maricopa County. Plaintiff had graduated from an unaccredited law school but was refused admission to the Arizona Bar. Because Plaintiff was not a licensed attorney, he was advised by a deputy county attorney that should he insist on representing the prisoner he would be subject to prosecution for violation of a state law, i.e. A.R.S. s 32—261, prohibiting the illegal practice of law. However, after unsuccessfully attempting to secure independent counsel for the prisoner, Plaintiff chose to conduct the hearing on his behalf.

After being convicted at a jury trial for violating A.R.S. s 32—261, Plaintiff appealed his conviction to the Superior Court of Maricopa County where his conviction was upheld and he was sentenced to 15 days in the Maricopa County jail. He then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Arizona. In his petition, he raised three issues: (1) A.R.S. s 13—2002, a statute permitting any person acting on behalf of the prisoner to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus, authorized petitioner's representation of the individual habeas applicant; (2) Plaintiff's conviction violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech; and (3) A.R.S. s 32—261 is unconstitutional because its terms are too vague and indefinite to meet constitutional standards.

The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected all three arguments and denied Plaintiff's writ. In particular, the court held that while a non-attorney may file an individual habeas applicant's petition on their behalf, they may not represent the individual in habeas proceedings.

Plaintiff's appeal to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Justice Douglas dissented from the dismissal. After lamenting the state of indigent defense representation, Justice Douglas suggested that the Arizona statute prohibiting laypersons from providing free legal representation may violate the First Amendment rights of advocacy and petition of redress, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal justice. In particular, he argued that statutes like the Arizona statute have "the potential to ‘freeze out’ the imaginative new attempts to assist indigents realize equal justice, merely because lay persons participate."

Plaintiff's subsequent petition for rehearing was denied.

Elena Malik - 02/27/2020


compress summary