Case: United States of America v. State of Mississippi

3:70-cv-04706 | U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi

Filed Date: July 9, 1970

Case Ongoing

Clearinghouse coding complete

Case Summary

Fifteen years after Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 88% of Mississippi’s black students still attended all-black schools. Ubiquitous “freedom of choice” plans let white children transfer to predominantly white schools. Individual lawsuits and threats of funding cuts from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare proved unable to effect wholesale desegregation. But in 1969, the Supreme Court ruled that the freedom of choice plan in Holmes County, Mississippi, was unconstitutional and …

Fifteen years after Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 88% of Mississippi’s black students still attended all-black schools. Ubiquitous “freedom of choice” plans let white children transfer to predominantly white schools. Individual lawsuits and threats of funding cuts from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare proved unable to effect wholesale desegregation. But in 1969, the Supreme Court ruled that the freedom of choice plan in Holmes County, Mississippi, was unconstitutional and ordered districts to “begin immediately to operate as unitary school systems.” Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969). This case is one part of a larger effort that desegregated 146 of Mississippi’s 148 districts within a year of Alexander.

On July 9, 1970, the United States filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. It sued the State of Mississippi under 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6, alleging that Mississippi’s use of racially segregated schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Thirteen Mississippi public school districts immediately intervened as defendants; three more would join them later. The United States sought injunctions ordering the districts to operate “unitary” (integrated) schools.

The next day, the court ordered the districts to submit plans for “immediate conversion” to unitary systems. It set a deadline of one week, and the districts quickly drew up desegregation plans. Over the next two months, the court issued a series of injunctions requiring districts to implement their desegregation plans, and several districts entered into consent decrees. The orders typically required districts to:

  • Stop discriminating against individual students;
  • Dismantle overlapping busing systems for students of different races;
  • Adopt new school zones or assignment plans of students to different schools;
  • Provide regular reports to the court; and
  • Take all other “reasonable and necessary steps” to integrate the schools.
Several individual students also intervened as plaintiffs to obtain injunctions allowing them to attend specific schools during the 1970-71 school year.

Since 1970, and continuing into 2019, the court has monitored the districts’ compliance. The following sections illustrate what kinds of disputes that have arisen.

Unwillingness to Desegregate Schools

The Laurel Municipal School District had been ordered to desegregate in 1970. In 1977, it operated seven elementary schools. Three were all black. Two were all white, except for twelve students. The other two were at least 70% white. The district court’s response arrived in July: it directed the school board to “again consider pairing or clustering the elementary schools” and determined that a “transportation study should be made.” The court cited “rather extreme physical difficulties” that integration might cause to justify its delay.

The Fifth Circuit reversed in a brief per curiam opinion issued on February 1, 1978. It directed the school district to desegregate by the start of the 1978 school year and ordered the district court to adopt a new plan by May 1st. 567 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir. 1978). In response, the district court directed the school district to close two elementaries entirely, teach grades four through six at two of the existing schools, and teach grades one through three at the remaining three.

State Support for Segregation Academies

In 1963-64, Mississippi was home to only sixteen private, non-Catholic schools. By 1969-70, it had 124. Many of the new private schools opened during this time were “segregation academies” designed to allow whites to avoid integration by withdrawing from public education entirely. Some segregation academies sought implicit or explicit state financial support. Therefore, courts closely scrutinized efforts by Mississippi's state or local governments to evade desegregation orders by providing aid to segregation academies.

Here, the United States alleged that Smith County provided unlawful subsidies to the Sylvarena Baptist Academy, a private school in Smith County open only to whites. In particular, five months after the court ordered Smith County's public schools to desegregate, the County allowed the Academy to lease a vacant public school for $5.00 per year.

The United States moved for relief from the court, arguing that the lease constituted “state financial assistance” for segregated schools designed to “reestablish a dual school system.” The district court, a panel of the Fifth Circuit, and the Fifth Circuit en banc all agreed. Circuit Judge Gewin held that “‘white flight’ academies will not be sanctioned” and voided the Academy’s lease. Judge Gewin's opinion relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Norwood v. Harrison that states could not provide aid to private schools that discriminated based on race. 476 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1973); 499 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1974).

Efforts to Limit Integration to Prevent White Flight

The Hattiesburg Municipal Separate School District entered into a consent decree in 1970 to desegregate its schools. But by 1985, eight of the eleven elementary schools remained at least 80% white or 80% black. The court weighed several possible desegregation plans. One used a “mandatory reassignment pairing and clustering” approach to ensure that no school would have a student body that had more than 80% students of one race. Another modestly adjusted existing boundaries but called for the creation and promotion of two magnet schools to attract children of both races. The District agreed with the United States to adopt the magnet school approach, but children intervened as plaintiffs to challenge it. The intervenors objected to the District's plan on several grounds: its lack of specificity about the magnet school programs, the greater burden it placed on black children who would be transferred farther from home, and its lack of potential to effect substantial integration. Nevertheless, Judge Tom S. Lee rejected the clustering plan, which he found would “cause much more white flight” and “continue to do so at a faster rate” than the magnet school plan. 622 F. Supp. 662 (S.D. Miss. 1985).

The Fifth Circuit reversed in an opinion written by Judge John Minor Wisdom. Judge Wisdom was one of the “Fifth Circuit Four,” a group of progressive judges who aggressively enforced civil rights laws. He characterized the magnet school plan as “too little and too late” and the district court’s opinion as “a voice from the past crying for ‘gradualism.’” Primarily objecting to the fact that magnet schools would serve only a small number of students while leaving many more in overwhelmingly segregated schools, Judge Wisdom reversed and remanded the case. He instructed the district court to consider “mandatory reassignment” and “pairing and clustering” so that no schools remained entirely black. 808 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1987). The district court adopted a new consent decree on April 29, 1987.

Consolidation of City and County Schools

The City of Laurel is located in Jones County. The Laurel School District serves students who live in Laurel, and the Jones County School District serves students in Jones County who live outside of Laurel. Tensions between the City and County led to an unusual dispute in which the NAACP and State of Mississippi worked together to defeat an effort by the United States to integrate the City and County schools.

Both the Laurel and Jones County School Districts had agreed to desegregation plans in 1970. At the time, the Laurel schools were split roughly equally between black and white students, whereas the County schools were about 80% white. By 1988, the City’s schools were 75% black, but the County’s racial composition remained about the same. During the intervening years, Mississippi did not consolidate the districts despite the potential for significant efficiency gains, and the state had made it easier for students to transfer between districts.

In December, 1987, Laurel tried to absorb some Jones County students by modifying the boundary between the Laurel School District and the Jones County School District. The action was removed to federal court and merged with this case because both the City and County desegregation plans contained Singleton provisions, which:

  • Prohibited moving students between districts in order to discriminate; and
  • Prohibited moving students between districts when doing so would have the “cumulative effect” of segregation.
The United States supported consolidation, which would help equalize the proportions of black and white students in the Laurel School District. Mississippi opposed it as part of a broader effort to prevent consolidation of city and county schools. Bizarrely, the NAACP intervened to support Mississippi’s position. Its counsel explained that consolidation would dilute black voting strength in majority-black Laurel. Moreover, Laurel’s schools outperformed their County counterparts; the Fifth Circuit speculated that the NAACP feared that the quality of instruction for black students would decline if consolidation occurred.

District Judge Tom S. Lee held that consolidation would only be an appropriate remedy if the County had violated the Singleton provisions of its desegregation plan. He then found that no violations occurred and vacated the consolidation order. 719 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Miss. 1989). The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Circuit Judge Thomas G. Gee recognized that Mississippi officially encouraged white flight by preventing city-county school consolidations and promoting interdistrict transfers. But he found that no white flight actually occurred in Jones County because its racial composition remained constant. 921 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1991).

Transition to Unitary Status

The Simpson County School District was placed under court supervision on August 10, 1970. After three decades, the District had tired of the oversight. On November 13, 2001, it moved for a declaration of unitary status to terminate the injunction to which it was subject. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s approval of unitary status in student body composition, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities and denial of unitary status in faculty and staff assignment on December 22, 2006. 211 Fed. App’x 296. Over the next decade, the District, federal government, and intervenors exhaustively litigated the District’s efforts to obtain a declaration of unitary status in faculty and staff assignments that would end all remaining supervision over the District.

The government and District entered into a new consent decree relating to faculty and staff assignments in 2011 requiring nondiscrimination and merit based hiring along with:

  • An end to the District’s “Transfer of Personnel within the District” policy; and
  • Good cause for all dismissals and non-renewals.
The District moved for a declaration of unitary status on January 30, 2013 on the grounds that it had complied with the consent decree.

In 1982, a group had intervened on behalf of the class of “present and future black children” in the District to enforce the original desegregation orders. The same group returned to court in 2013 to challenge the District’s motion. District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr., first cousin and former law partner of Haley Barbour, Mississippi’s governor from 2004 to 2012, questioned whether the Intervenors still had standing in the case. In a September 26, 2013 opinion, Judge Barbour held that they did have standing because the Intervenors had obtained class certification when they originally intervened. He rejected the Intervenors’ argument that the district discriminated by hiring more white teachers than black teachers because the consent decree required hiring the most qualified candidates regardless of race and scheduled a fairness hearing on the District’s motion for unitary status. 2013 WL 12176996.

The court received more than 500 objections to the District’s motion for declaration of unitary status from the public as part of its fairness hearing. Judge Barbour determined they were due “little weight” because most were short and generic. He then analyzed the District’s recent employment practices and found that the District had “eliminated the vestiges of prior de jure segregation to the extent practicable.” Nevertheless, he denied the District’s motion because it had failed to use court-approved forms in its hiring decisions. He extended the consent decree until 2015. 2014 BL 456699.

Both the District and Intervenors moved for reconsideration, which Judge Barbour denied. The Intervenors then appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which determined that the Intervenors lacked standing to appeal because they had prevailed at the district court. Circuit Judge Stewart rejected the Intervenors’ argument that they should be able to challenge the district court’s finding that the District had eliminated de jure segregation because “appellate courts review judgments, not opinions.” 805 F.3d 596 (2015).

The District moved promptly for unitary status once the extension of the consent decree expired in 2015. Judge Barbour determined that a school system “need not employ a faculty having a racial composition substantially equivalent to that of its student body” to fully desegregate. And he described the court’s fairness hearings as “forums for disgruntled applicants to present race-based employment grievances” rather than relevant inquiries into the District’s general policies and suggested that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission would be a better forum to hear such complaints. Concluding that Simpson County’s schools were “fully integrated both as to students, and as to teachers,” he granted the District’s motion for unitary status on September 30, 2016. 2016 WL 7971190.

The Intervenors appealed. On February 6, 2018, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court’s ruling was “plausible in light of the record.” It acknowledged that many employees the district hired had “some connection” to those who hired them, but concluded that these connections were “not surprising” in such a small school district. And it accepted the district court’s finding that the District had “genuine” non-racial reasons for preferring certain candidates over others. 882 F.3d 151.

Current Status

The case is ongoing, and districts still under consent decrees continue to be monitored by the court. It appears likely that more school districts will move for declarations of unitary status in the coming years. Some already have: on September 11, 2018, the court declared the Poplarville Municipal Separate School District unitary, and the court granted Jones County's motion for a declaration of unitary status on May 1, 2019.

476 F.2d 941

499 F.2d 425

567 F.2d 1276

808 F.2d 385

921 F.2d 604

805 F.3d 596

882 F.3d 151

622 F. Supp. 662

719 F. Supp. 1364

2014 BL 456699

2013 WL 12176996

2016 WL 7971190

Summary Authors

Timothy Leake (3/1/2019)

People

For PACER's information on parties and their attorneys, see: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/7420980/parties/united-states-v-state-of-mississippi/


Judge(s)

Anderson, Linda Randle (Mississippi)

Attorney for Plaintiff

Acosta, R. Alexander (District of Columbia)

Attorney for Defendant

Adams, Holmes S. (Mississippi)

Adelman, Michael (Mississippi)

Allison, Lawrence E Jr. (Mississippi)

Expert/Monitor/Master/Other
Judge(s)

Anderson, Linda Randle (Mississippi)

Barbour, William Henry Jr. (Mississippi)

Barksdale, Rhesa Hawkins (Mississippi)

Coleman, James Plemon (Louisiana)

Davidson, Glen H. (Mississippi)

Davis, W. Eugene (Louisiana)

Estes, Joe Ewing (Texas)

Fay, Peter Thorp (Florida)

Gee, Thomas Gibbs (Louisiana)

Gewin, Walter Pettus (Alabama)

Higginbotham, Patrick Errol (Texas)

Jordan, Daniel Porter III (Mississippi)

Lee, Tom Stewart (Mississippi)

Owen, Priscilla Richman (Texas)

Prado, Edward Charles (Texas)

Rubin, Alvin Benjamin (Louisiana)

Simpson, John Milton Bryan (Florida)

Smith, Jerry Edwin (Texas)

Tjoflat, Gerald Bard (Florida)

Wiener, Jacques Loeb Jr. (Louisiana)

Wisdom, John Minor (Louisiana)

show all people

Documents in the Clearinghouse

Document
14

3:70-cv-04706

Docket

Nov. 15, 2009

Nov. 15, 2009

Docket

3:70-cv-04706

Docket [PACER]

United States v. State of Mississippi

April 24, 2020

April 24, 2020

Docket

72-02521

Opinion

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

April 11, 1973

April 11, 1973

Order/Opinion

476 F.2d 476

3:70-cv-04706

Opinion

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

April 23, 1974

April 23, 1974

Order/Opinion

499 F.2d 499

76-04398

Opinion

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Feb. 1, 1978

Feb. 1, 1978

Order/Opinion

567 F.2d 567

3:70-cv-04706

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Oct. 21, 1985

Oct. 21, 1985

Order/Opinion

622 F.Supp. 622

85-48014

Opinion

United States of America v. Pittman by Pittman

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Jan. 12, 1987

Jan. 12, 1987

Order/Opinion

808 F.2d 808

3:70-cv-04706

Memorandum Opinion and Order

July 27, 1989

July 27, 1989

Order/Opinion

719 F.Supp. 719

90-01184

90-01353

Opinion

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Jan. 22, 1991

Jan. 22, 1991

Order/Opinion

921 F.2d 921

91-04859

Opinion

Gardner v. School Board Caddo Parish

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

April 14, 1992

April 14, 1992

Order/Opinion

958 F.2d 958

Resources

Docket

See docket on RECAP: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/7420980/united-states-v-state-of-mississippi/

Last updated March 20, 2024, 3:05 a.m.

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Aug. 4, 1992

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Case Details

State / Territory: Mississippi

Case Type(s):

School Desegregation

Key Dates

Filing Date: July 9, 1970

Case Ongoing: Yes

Plaintiffs

Plaintiff Description:

United States of America Department of Justice Civil Rights Division

Plaintiff Type(s):

U.S. Dept of Justice plaintiff

Attorney Organizations:

U.S. Dept. of Justice Civil Rights Division

Public Interest Lawyer: Yes

Filed Pro Se: No

Class Action Sought: No

Class Action Outcome: Not sought

Defendants

State of Mississippi, State

Mississippi State Board of Education, State

Defendant Type(s):

Elementary/Secondary School

Case Details

Causes of Action:

Title IV, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c et seq.

Constitutional Clause(s):

Equal Protection

Available Documents:

Trial Court Docket

Injunctive (or Injunctive-like) Relief

Any published opinion

Outcome

Prevailing Party: Plaintiff

Nature of Relief:

Injunction / Injunctive-like Settlement

Attorneys fees

Preliminary injunction / Temp. restraining order

Source of Relief:

Settlement

Litigation

Form of Settlement:

Court Approved Settlement or Consent Decree

Order Duration: 1970 - None

Content of Injunction:

Preliminary relief granted

Magnet school

Busing

Student assignment

Hire

Discrimination Prohibition

Develop anti-discrimination policy

Other requirements regarding hiring, promotion, retention

Reporting

Recordkeeping

Monitoring

Issues

General:

Education

Racial segregation

School/University policies

Discrimination-basis:

Race discrimination

Race:

Black

Type of Facility:

Government-run