In October 1969, plaintiffs, an independent candidate and his supporters, filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the Democratic Organization of Cook County, the City of Chicago, and various government officers at the state and local levels under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to enjoin the extensive patronage system of Chicago politics. They argued that this system violated their rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and of certain civil rights statutes.

Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that their constitutional rights as a candidate, and as taxpayers and voters, were violated by the defendants' practice of coercing employees as a condition of keeping their jobs to contribute money to various Democratic organizations and candidates. Defendants had also allegedly coerced employees into doing political and campaign work both during their regular working hours and on their own time for candidates endorsed by the organization and its affiliates. Finally, defendants had allegedly coerced employees into voting for specific party candidates. Plaintiffs asserted that these coercive practices directly resulted in the defeat of independent candidates and perpetuated the dominance of the Democratic Party in Cook County.

On November 6, 1969, District Court Judge Abraham Marovitz granted defendants' motion to dismiss. 310 F.Supp. 1398 (1969). The district court found that plaintiffs did not have standing to assert the alleged violations of the rights of employees and that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to demonstrate injury. Plaintiffs appealed and filed an amended complaint joining additional Democratic defendants and numerous Republican defendants also engaged in the patronage system. On October 23, 1970, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Thomas Fairchild reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. 435 F.2d 267 (1970). Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari.

Over the course of the next couple of years, the parties engaged in a series of negotiations resulting in a consent order entered into by the majority of the defendants. The order was approved by District Court Judge Marovitz on May 5, 1972. 356 F.Supp. 1241 (1972). The order prohibited compulsory or coerced political financial contributions and permanently enjoined politically motivated firings, demotions, transfers, or other punishment of government employees. This consent order came to be known "the Shakman decree."

Litigation continued for several years involving those defendants that declined to enter into the aforementioned consent agreement. On September 24, 1979, District Court Judge Nicholas Bua issued a ruling concluding that the patronage system infringed upon the plaintiffs' rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 481 F.Supp. 1315 (1979). Defendants appealed. On August 5, 1987, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Kenneth Ripple reversed the district court, finding that plaintiffs did not have standing. 829 F.2d 1387 (1987). The circuit court found that a number of very speculative inferences would be required to connect plaintiffs' alleged injury with activities attributed to the remaining defendants. However, the circuit court explicitly noted that nothing in the holding could be construed as affecting the continued validity of the Shakman decree. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari.

Over the next two decades, litigation continued with periodic revivals for enforcement of the consent agreements and for seeking damages or lawyers' fees. Also, consent agreements, like that entered into in 1972, were periodically made with various defendants. Individual defendants found to be substantially compliant with the terms of consent decrees were intermittently dismissed from further requirements related to the consent agreements. On August 28, 2006, plaintiffs filed an application to hold Cook County and other government personnel in civil contempt for violation of the consent agreements. A series of negotiations between the parties began that month and a settlement was reached. As part of the settlement, on November 29, 2006, District Court Judge Wayne R. Andersen, appointed a compliance administrator in an effort to ensure future compliance with the decree.

On May 15, 2014, the parties jointly moved for a hearing regarding the substantial compliance of the City of Chicago. On June 16, 2014, the court found the City of Chicago to be in substantial compliance and dismissed the City from the case.

On November 18, 2014, the court appointed a Special Master to oversee the determination of which positions within the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) could be properly exempt from compliance with the consent decrees. Employers could take political affiliation into account when filling particular positions if that consideration was relevant for effective performance. This order arose from the IDOT's overuse of exemptions. On August 15, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to expand the Special Master's responsibilities to oversee all bodies under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Illinois. On November 28, 2016, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion, reasoning that the Special Master's experience and oversight would aid in compliance and avoid downstream litigation when non-compliance was uncovered.

Tensions once again came to a head on September 6, 2019, when the plaintiffs moved for supplemental relief, alleging that the Clerk of Cook County violated the consent agreements. The County Clerk argued that the court was unable to rule on the alleged violations and that the consent agreements were irrelevant due to changes in legal and factual circumstances over the past few decades, but the court ultimately ruled on April 17, 2020, in favor of the plaintiffs. The court thus found the County Clerk in violation of the consent agreements and additionally appointed a Special Master to oversee compliance.

On July 14, 2020, Governor Pritzker moved to vacate the consent decree, arguing that the State of Illinois has been substantially compliant with the decree. The State additionally argued that the consent agreements were so far removed from the original controversy that there was no longer a relevant claim under law.

As of February 26, 2021, the litigation concerning the State of Illinois is still ongoing.

Richard Jolly - 09/21/2014
Matthew Feng - 02/26/2021


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