On May 17, 2010, a group of organizations and individuals filed this lawsuit against the sheriff and district attorney of each of the fifteen counties in Arizona, in their official capacities, in the U.S. District Court of Arizona. The plaintiff, represented by organizations such as the ACLU and the National Immigration Law Center along with private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the recently enacted S.B. 1070 was a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that S.B. 1070 conflicted with federal law and procedures and that local law enforcement agencies were ill-equipped to deal with the complexities of immigration law. For example, one provision of S.B. 1070 allowed police officers to ask for identification during a routine stop if there is a "reasonable suspicion" that the individual is not a U.S. citizen. The plaintiffs claimed that this provision was written primarily to provide a pretextual reason to stop an individual for some other state or local law violation in order to investigate that individual's immigration status. Immigration status, however, is not easily determined through an identification card of some kind—federal authorities may be aware of an individual's presence in the country but may not be pursuing deportation proceedings. The plaintiffs contended that local law enforcement lacked the training and knowledge to investigate immigration status.
On June 4, 2010, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. The court (Judge Susan R. Bolton) held a hearing on June 22, 2010, and stated that the motions would be held under advisement. On June 18, 2010, the court granted the State of Arizona and the governor's motions to intervene as defendants.
On June 25, 2010, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to transfer related case. In this order, the court allowed the transfer of four other cases challenging the constitutionality of S.B. 1070.
On October 8, 2010, the court granted in part and denied in part motions to dismiss filed by several of the defendants. The plaintiffs' first preliminary injunction motion, regarding certain provisions of S.B. 1070, was denied. At oral argument, the plaintiff withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction regarding part of S.B. 1070 based on the NInth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in
Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach. The court found that a preliminary injunction was moot because an injunction was already issued in the related case
United States v. Arizona. This case and
United States v. Arizona challenged enforcement of the same provisions of S.B. 1070.
On January 7, 2011, the plaintiffs filed another motion requesting a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendant from enforcing the provision of S.B. 1070 affected by the Redondo Beach case. On May 10, 2011, the court denied this motion without prejudice to its refiling at a later time because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had not yet issued their opinion from the en banc court.
In October 2011, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and a third motion for a preliminary Injunction.
On February 29, 2012, the court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the defendants from enforcing A.R.S. § 13-2928 (A) and (B). This section of the law was intended to prevent employment solicitation on roadways where it interferes with the proper flow of traffic.
The State of Arizona, as an intervenor-defendant, appealed the issuance of the preliminary injunction and, on May 9, 2012, filed their opening brief with the Ninth Circuit.
The plaintiff sought class action status in their original complaint and on December 12, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class. While that motion was pending, on June 25, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in
Arizona v. United States, affirming in part and reversing in part. The Court held that several provisions of S.B. 1070 were properly enjoined but declined to strike down Section 2(B), which required state police to check the immigration status of people arrested under nonimmigration state law. The Court explained that the legality of the provision would depend on how it was construed—if it did not authorize extra detention time, it may be constitutional.
Following that Supreme Court decision, the plaintiffs in this case filed a motion for preliminary injunction on July 17, 2012, seeking an injunction against two sections of the law. The plaintiffs requested that the court preliminarily enjoin § 2(B) on preemption, Fourth Amendment, and Equal Protection Clause bases, and A.R.S. § 13-2929 on preemption grounds.
On March 27, 2013, the court affirmed the preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the day labor provisions. On April 9, 2013, the district court dismissed some of plaintiffs' claims in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in
Arizona v. United States. The parties went through discovery and on March 17, 2015, the defendant moved for summary judgment with regard to plaintiffs' claims under the Supremacy Clause (Count One), Equal Protection Clause (Count Two), the First Amendment (Count Three), the Fourth Amendment (Count Four), Article II, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution (Count Five), the Due Process Clause (Count Six), and 42 U.S.C. §1981 (Count Seven).
On September 4, 2015, the district court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment for Counts One, Two, Four, Five, Six, and Seven. The district court, however, entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the claim in Count Three. In other words, the court found that plaintiffs had not presented any evidence that police would enforce S.B. 1070 differently for Latinos than other people and that the plaintiffs failed to prove that § 2(B) was unconstitutional. The court also found that parts of the law targeting day laborers violated the First Amendment free speech protections.
The parties filed cross-appeals to the Ninth Circuit. Before that appeal was decided, however, the plaintiffs and intervenor-defendants settled. The parties stipulated that the defendants would release an informal attorney general opinion, which would provide guidelines for the implementation of §§ 2(b) and 2(d) of S.B. 1070, among other sections. The parties also stipulated that A.R.S. §§ 28-3511A (1)(d) and (e) would be
enjoined, and asked the court to enjoin those provisions. Finally, the plaintiffs would receive attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $1.4 million. On September 19, 2016, the court entered an order enforcing all of these stipulations.
There have been no further developments in this case; the case is presumably closed.
Elizabeth Daligga - 07/20/2012
MJ Koo - 03/12/2017
compress summary
