On Dec. 3, 1997, an applicant to the University of Michigan Law School brought this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the University of Michigan Law School. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, claimed that, in denying her admission, the school discriminated against her on the basis of her race, and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. She claimed that the school used the race of its applicants not merely as a plus factor in determining admission, but as one of the predominant factors. Moreover, she claimed, the school had no compelling interest to justify their use of race in the admissions process, nor did they ever employ any race-neutral alternatives. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On Jan. 7, 1999, the Court (Judge Bernard A. Friedman) certified the class.

In March 2001, after a bench trial, Judge Friedman ruled for Grutter and determined that the law school's admissions policy was unconstitutional. By using race to ensure the enrollment of a certain minimum percentage of underrepresented minorities, the court held, the law school had "made the current admissions policy practically indistinguishable from a[n unconstitutional] quota system." 137 F. Supp. 2d 821. The district court also concluded that the achievement of racial diversity is not a compelling state interest.

The law school appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, which heard the appeal en banc. On May 14, 2002, the court (Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr. wrote the majority opinion) reversed the district court. The court held (1) that the Supreme Court had established in Bakke that achieving a diverse student body was a compelling interest, and (2) that the school's policy was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 288 F.3d 732.

Grutter petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, which granted it in December 2002. On June 23, 2003, the Court affirmed the 6th Circuit decision, and held that the law school's desire to obtain a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students counted as a narrowly tailored use of race in its admissions process. Moreover, the Court held, the school's use of race furthered its compelling interest in "obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body." Because the law school engaged in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant, giving serious consideration to all the ways the applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment, it ensured that all factors that could contribute to diversity were meaningfully considered alongside race. Its admissions process was not unconstitutional.

The majority opinion (written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) did note that affirmative action should not be allowed to exist forever, but, rather, that at some future date (the opinion mentions 25 years hence), only colorblind policies should be allowed.

Justice Thomas issued an opinion concurring only with the majority opinion's implication of a 25-year window of affirmative-action legitimacy. He dissented from the rest of the opinion, stating that the law school had no compelling interest in maintaining an elite, but racially diverse, campus. If the school wanted to achieve greater diversity, he wrote, it could relax its test score and GPA requirements.

On March 17, 2004, Judge Friedman ordered the case closed.

Andrew Junker - 11/13/2014


compress summary