On July 18, 2001, a California state inmate housed at San Quentin filed a § 1983 action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California that challenged restrictions placed on his participation in special prison programs, including religious programs. The restrictions followed a period of administrative segregation for allegedly engaging in "inappropriate activity" in the prison chapel. The plaintiff initially filed a grievance with California prison officials, but it was rejected as untimely under state law, as it was filed eight months after the restrictions were placed into effect. His federal court suit followed. The plaintiff claimed that the restrictions violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and the free exercise of his religion. He also claimed that the restrictions lessened his chances for parole eligibility.

The defendants filed to dismiss the case on January 27, 2003. On May 5, the district court granted dismissal of the case for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The plaintiff appealed.

On March 24, 2005, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed (Judges Pregerson, Kozinski, and Rhoades). The court held that the plaintiff had exhausted administrative remedies simply because no remedies remained available to him. Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2005). The defendant's petition for rehearing en banc was denied. But, the defendants' filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was granted in November 2005.

The U.S. Supreme Court (Justice Samuel Alito) reversed and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that the PLRA exhaustion requirement required "proper exhaustion" and that plaintiff's filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Mere unavailability of remedies is insufficient to exhaust under the PLRA. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (2006).

On remand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Pregerson, Kozinski, and Bybee) held that, because the plaintiff did not appeal his restriction within the fifteen-day statute of limitations, he had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. As a result, the plaintiff could not sue in federal court. The Ninth Circuit also rejected the plaintiff's argument that fifteen days did not provide him with a meaningful opportunity to to exhaust his administrative remedies, stating that, even if they were to "double or triple the 15-day period, [the plaintiff] would still come nowhere close to meeting the deadline."

The case is now closed.

Dan Dalton - 10/16/2007
Cianan Lesley - 02/25/2019


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