On July 27, 1993, the U.S. Department of Justice ("D.O.J.") filed a lawsuit under Title VII against the New York City Transit Authority in the U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York. The D.O.J. sought injunctive relief alleging that the defendant had violated Title VII's prohibition ...
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On July 27, 1993, the U.S. Department of Justice ("D.O.J.") filed a lawsuit under Title VII against the New York City Transit Authority in the U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York. The D.O.J. sought injunctive relief alleging that the defendant had violated Title VII's prohibition against retaliation by maintaining a policy under which employees who filed discrimination complaints with outside agencies were prohibited from filing discrimination charges with the Authority's equal employment opportunity division. The D.O.J. argued the Authority's policy of denying employees the right to have their claim filed with the internal EEO department was an adverse employment action used against employees who sought to challenge discriminatory actions by the Authority.
On March 17, 1994, the district court (Judge Eugene H. Nickerson) denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint as moot since it had changed it policies.
On April 21, 1995, the district court (Judge Nickerson) granted the D.O.J.'s motion for summary judgment on its retaliation claim and denied defendant's cross-motion for either summary judgment or dismissal, finding that even though the Authority had ceased its policy there was a significant risk that the Authority would resume this behavior. The court further held the Authority's policy embodied an "adverse employment action" in violation of Title VII's prohibition against retaliation.
On October 8, 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Judges Dennis G. Jacobs, Pierre L. Nelson, and Fred I. Parker) upheld the district court's decision that the D.O.J.'s claim was not moot, but reversed the district court's decision to grant the D.O.J.'s motion for summary judgment on its retaliation claim. The Second Circuit held that the Authority's policy was a permissive defensive measure that, although adverse to the employee, did not rise to the level of being retaliatory.
We have no further information on this case.
Janani Iyengar - 10/17/2007
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