

- 1 (2) Section 109 of Title I of the Foreign Intelligence
2 Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 USC § 1809, by
3 engaging in illegal electronic surveillance of
4 plaintiffs' communications under color of law;
- 5 (3) Section 802 of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
6 Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended by section 101 of
7 Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
8 1986 (ECPA), 18 USC §§ 2511(1)(a), (1)(c), (1)(d) and
9 (3)(a), by illegally intercepting, disclosing, using
10 and/or divulging plaintiffs' communications;
- 11 (4) Section 705 of Title VII of the Communications Act of
12 1934, as amended, 47 USC § 605, by unauthorized
13 divulgence and/or publication of plaintiffs'
14 communications;
- 15 (5) Section 201 of Title II of the ECPA ("Stored
16 Communications Act"), as amended, 18 USC §§ 2702(a)(1)
17 and (a)(2), by illegally divulging the contents of
18 plaintiffs' communications;
- 19 (6) Section 201 of the Stored Communications Act, as amended
20 by section 212 of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act, 18 USC
21 § 2702(a)(3), by illegally divulging records concerning
22 plaintiffs' communications to a governmental entity and
- 23 (7) California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal Bus & Prof Code
24 §§ 17200 et seq, by engaging in unfair, unlawful and
25 deceptive business practices.

26 The complaint seeks certification of a class action and redress
27 through statutory damages, punitive damages, restitution,
28 disgorgement and injunctive and declaratory relief.

1 On April 5, 2006, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
2 injunction seeking to enjoin defendants' allegedly illegal
3 activity. Doc #30 (MPI). Plaintiffs supported their motion by
4 filing under seal three documents, obtained by former AT&T
5 technician Mark Klein, which allegedly demonstrate how AT&T has
6 implemented a warrantless surveillance system on behalf of the NSA
7 at a San Francisco AT&T facility. Doc #31, Exs A-C (the "AT&T
8 documents"). Plaintiffs also filed under seal supporting
9 declarations from Klein (Doc #31) and J Scott Marcus (Doc #32), a
10 putative expert who reviewed the AT&T documents and the Klein
11 declaration.

12 On April 28, 2006, AT&T moved to dismiss this case. Doc
13 #86 (AT&T MTD). AT&T contends that plaintiffs lack standing and
14 were required but failed to plead affirmatively that AT&T did not
15 receive a government certification pursuant to 18 USC §
16 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B). AT&T also contends it is entitled to statutory,
17 common law and qualified immunity.

18 On May 13, 2006, the United States moved to intervene as
19 a defendant and moved for dismissal or, alternatively, for summary
20 judgment based on the state secrets privilege. Doc #124-1 (Gov
21 MTD). The government supported its assertion of the state secrets
22 privilege with public declarations from the Director of National
23 Intelligence, John D Negroponte (Doc #124-2 (Negroponte Decl)), and
24 the Director of the NSA, Keith B Alexander (Doc #124-3 (Alexander
25 Decl), and encouraged the court to review additional classified
26 submissions *in camera* and *ex parte*. The government also asserted
27 two statutory privileges under 50 USC § 402 *note* and 50 USC § 403-
28 1(i)(1).

1 surveillance activities. Finally, the court addresses the
2 statutory privileges raised by the government.

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4 A

5 "The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary
6 rule that protects information from discovery when disclosure would
7 be inimical to the national security. Although the exact origins
8 of the privilege are not certain, the privilege in this country has
9 its initial roots in Aaron Burr's trial for treason, and has its
10 modern roots in United States v Reynolds, 345 US 1 (1953)." In re
11 United States, 872 F2d 472, 474-75 (DC Cir 1989) (citations omitted
12 and altered). In his trial for treason, Burr moved for a *subpoena*
13 *duces tecum* ordering President Jefferson to produce a letter by
14 General James Wilkinson. United States v Burr, 25 F Cas 30, 32
15 (CCD Va 1807). Responding to the government's argument "that the
16 letter contains material which ought not to be disclosed," Chief
17 Justice Marshall riding circuit noted, "What ought to be done under
18 such circumstances presents a delicate question, the discussion of
19 which, it is hoped, will never be rendered necessary in this
20 country." *Id* at 37. Although the court issued the subpoena, *id* at
21 37-38, it noted that if the letter "contain[s] any matter which it
22 would be imprudent to disclose, which it is not the wish of the
23 executive to disclose, such matter, if it be not immediately and
24 essentially applicable to the point, will, of course, be
25 suppressed." *Id* at 37.

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1 The actions of another president were at issue in Totten
2 v United States, 92 US 105 (1876), in which the Supreme Court
3 established an important precursor to the modern-day state secrets
4 privilege. In that case, the administrator of a former spy's
5 estate sued the government based on a contract the spy allegedly
6 made with President Lincoln to recover compensation for espionage
7 services rendered during the Civil War. Id at 105-06. The Totten
8 Court found the action to be barred:

9 The service stipulated by the contract was a secret
10 service; the information sought was to be obtained
11 clandestinely, and was to be communicated
12 privately; the employment and the service were to
13 be equally concealed. Both employer and agent must
14 have understood that the lips of the other were to
15 be for ever sealed respecting the relation of
16 either to the matter. This condition of the
17 engagement was implied from the nature of the
18 employment, and is implied in all secret
19 employments of the government in time of war, or
20 upon matters affecting our foreign relations, where
21 a disclosure of the service might compromise or
22 embarrass our government in its public duties, or
23 endanger the person or injure the character of the
24 agent.

25 Id at 106, quoted in Tenet v Doe, 544 US 1, 7-8 (2005). Hence,
26 given the secrecy implied in such a contract, the Totten Court
27 "thought it entirely incompatible with the nature of such a
28 contract that a former spy could bring suit to enforce it." Tenet,
544 US at 8. Additionally, the Totten Court observed:

It may be stated as a general principle, that
public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit
in a court of justice, the trial of which would
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which
the law itself regards as confidential, and
respecting which it will not allow the confidence
to be violated. * * * Much greater reason exists
for the application of the principle to cases of
contract for secret services with the government,
as the existence of a contract of that kind is
itself a fact not to be disclosed.

1 Totten, 92 US at 107. Characterizing this aspect of Totten, the
2 Supreme Court has noted, "No matter the clothing in which alleged
3 spies dress their claims, Totten precludes judicial review in cases
4 such as [plaintiffs'] where success depends upon the existence of
5 their secret espionage relationship with the Government." Tenet,
6 544 US at 8. "Totten's core concern" is "preventing the existence
7 of the [alleged spy's] relationship with the Government from being
8 revealed." Id at 10.

9 In the Cold War era case of Reynolds v United States, 345
10 US 1 (1953), the Supreme Court first articulated the state secrets
11 privilege in its modern form. After a B-29 military aircraft
12 crashed and killed three civilian observers, their widows sued the
13 government under the Federal Tort Claims Act and sought discovery
14 of the Air Force's official accident investigation. Id at 2-3.
15 The Secretary of the Air Force filed a formal "Claim of Privilege"
16 and the government refused to produce the relevant documents to the
17 court for *in camera* review. Id at 4-5. The district court deemed
18 as established facts regarding negligence and entered judgment for
19 plaintiffs. Id at 5. The Third Circuit affirmed and the Supreme
20 Court granted certiorari to determine "whether there was a valid
21 claim of privilege under [FRCP 34]." Id at 6. Noting this
22 country's theretofore limited judicial experience with "the
23 privilege which protects military and state secrets," the court
24 stated:

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1 The privilege belongs to the Government and must be
2 asserted by it * * *. It is not to be lightly
3 invoked. There must be a formal claim of
4 privilege, lodged by the head of the department
5 which has control over the matter, after actual
6 personal consideration by that officer. The court
 itself must determine whether the circumstances are
 appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do
 so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing
 the privilege is designed to protect.

7 Id at 7-8 (footnotes omitted). The latter determination requires a
8 "formula of compromise," as "[j]udicial control over the evidence
9 in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive
10 officers," yet a court may not "automatically require a complete
11 disclosure to the judge before the claim of privilege will be
12 accepted in any case." Id at 9-10. Striking this balance, the
13 Supreme Court held that the "occasion for the privilege is
14 appropriate" when a court is satisfied "from all the circumstances
15 of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of
16 the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of
17 national security, should not be divulged." Id at 10.

18 The degree to which the court may "probe in satisfying
19 itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate"
20 turns on "the showing of necessity which is made" by plaintiffs.
21 Id at 11. "Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim
22 of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even the most
23 compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the
24 court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake."
25 Id. Finding both a "reasonable danger that the accident
26 investigation report would contain" state secrets and a "dubious
27 showing of necessity," the court reversed the Third Circuit's
28 decision and sustained the claim of privilege. Id at 10-12.

1 In Halkin v Helms, 598 F2d 1 (DC Cir 1978) (Halkin I),
2 the District of Columbia Circuit applied the principles enunciated
3 in Reynolds in an action alleging illegal NSA wiretapping. Former
4 Vietnam War protestors contended that "the NSA conducted
5 warrantless interceptions of their international wire, cable and
6 telephone communications" at the request of various federal
7 defendants and with the cooperation of telecommunications
8 providers. *Id* at 3. Plaintiffs challenged two separate NSA
9 operations: operation MINARET, which was "part of [NSA's] regular
10 signals intelligence activity in which foreign electronic signals
11 were monitored," and operation SHAMROCK, which involved "processing
12 of all telegraphic traffic leaving or entering the United States."
13 *Id* at 4.

14 The government moved to dismiss on state secrets grounds,
15 arguing that civil discovery would impermissibly "(1) confirm the
16 identity of individuals or organizations whose foreign
17 communications were acquired by NSA, (2) disclose the dates and
18 contents of such communications, or (3) divulge the methods and
19 techniques by which the communications were acquired by NSA." *Id*
20 at 4-5. After plaintiffs "succeeded in obtaining a limited amount
21 of discovery," the district court concluded that plaintiffs' claims
22 challenging operation MINARET could not proceed because "the
23 ultimate issue, the fact of acquisition, could neither be admitted
24 nor denied." *Id* at 5. The court denied the government's motion to
25 dismiss on claims challenging operation SHAMROCK because the court
26 "thought congressional committees investigating intelligence
27 matters had revealed so much information about SHAMROCK that such a
28 disclosure would pose no threat to the NSA mission." *Id* at 10.

1 On certified appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit
2 noted that even "seemingly innocuous" information is privileged if
3 that information is part of a classified "mosaic" that "can be
4 analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how
5 the unseen whole must operate." *Id* at 8. The court affirmed
6 dismissal of the claims related to operation MINARET but reversed
7 the district court's rejection of the privilege as to operation
8 SHAMROCK, reasoning that "confirmation or denial that a particular
9 plaintiff's communications have been acquired would disclose NSA
10 capabilities and other valuable intelligence information to a
11 sophisticated intelligence analyst." *Id* at 10. On remand, the
12 district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims against the NSA and
13 individuals connected with the NSA's alleged monitoring.
14 Plaintiffs were left with claims against the Central Intelligence
15 Agency (CIA) and individuals who had allegedly submitted watchlists
16 to the NSA on the presumption that the submission resulted in
17 interception of plaintiffs' communications. The district court
18 eventually dismissed the CIA-related claims as well on state
19 secrets grounds and the case went up again to the court of appeals.

20 The District of Columbia Circuit stated that the state
21 secrets inquiry "is not a balancing of ultimate interests at stake
22 in the litigation," but rather "whether the showing of the harm
23 that might reasonably be seen to flow from disclosure is adequate
24 in a given case to trigger the absolute right to withhold the
25 information sought in that case." Halkin v Helms, 690 F2d 977, 990
26 (DC Cir 1982) (Halkin II). The court then affirmed dismissal of
27 "the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the CIA
28 defendants based upon their submission of plaintiffs' names on

1 'watchlists' to NSA." Id at 997 (emphasis omitted). The court
2 found that plaintiffs lacked standing given the court's "ruling in
3 Halkin I that evidence of the fact of acquisition of plaintiffs'
4 communications by NSA cannot be obtained from the government, nor
5 can such fact be presumed from the submission of watchlists to that
6 Agency." Id at 999 (emphasis omitted).

7 In Ellsberg v Mitchell, 709 F2d 51 (DC Cir 1983), the
8 District of Columbia Circuit addressed the state secrets privilege
9 in another wiretapping case. Former defendants and attorneys in
10 the "Pentagon Papers" criminal prosecution sued individuals who
11 allegedly were responsible for conducting warrantless electronic
12 surveillance. Id at 52-53. In response to plaintiffs'
13 interrogatories, defendants admitted to two wiretaps but refused to
14 answer other questions on the ground that the requested information
15 was privileged. Id at 53. The district court sustained the
16 government's formal assertion of the state secrets privilege and
17 dismissed plaintiffs' claims pertaining to foreign communications
18 surveillance. Id at 56.

19 On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit noted that
20 "whenever possible, sensitive information must be disentangled from
21 nonsensitive information to allow for the release of the latter."
22 Id at 57. The court generally affirmed the district court's
23 decisions regarding the privilege, finding "a 'reasonable danger'
24 that revelation of the information in question would either enable
25 a sophisticated analyst to gain insights into the nation's
26 intelligence-gathering methods and capabilities or would disrupt
27 diplomatic relations with foreign governments." Id at 59. The
28 court disagreed with the district court's decision that the

1 privilege precluded discovery of the names of the attorneys general
2 that authorized the surveillance. Id at 60.

3 Additionally, responding to plaintiffs' argument that the
4 district court should have required the government to disclose more
5 fully its basis for asserting the privilege, the court recognized
6 that "procedural innovation" was within the district court's
7 discretion and noted that "[t]he government's public statement need
8 be no more (and no less) specific than is practicable under the
9 circumstances." Id at 64.

10 In considering the effect of the privilege, the court
11 affirmed dismissal "with regard to those [individuals] whom the
12 government ha[d] not admitted overhearing." Id at 65. But the
13 court did not dismiss the claims relating to the wiretaps that the
14 government had conceded, noting that there was no reason to
15 "suspend the general rule that the burden is on those seeking an
16 exemption from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to show the
17 need for it." Id at 68.

18 In Kasza v Browner, 133 F3d 1159 (9th Cir 1998), the
19 Ninth Circuit issued its definitive opinion on the state secrets
20 privilege. Former employees at a classified United States Air
21 Force facility brought a citizen suit under the Resource
22 Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 USC § 6972, alleging the
23 Air Force violated that act. Id at 1162. The district court
24 granted summary judgment against plaintiffs, finding discovery of
25 information related to chemical inventories impossible due to the
26 state secrets privilege. Id. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that an
27 exemption in the RCRA preempted the state secrets privilege and
28 even if not preempted, the privilege was improperly asserted and

1 too broadly applied. Id at 1167-69. After characterizing the
2 state secrets privilege as a matter of federal common law, the
3 Ninth Circuit recognized that "statutes which invade the common law
4 * * * are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of
5 long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory
6 purpose to the contrary is evident." Id at 1167 (omissions in
7 original) (citations omitted). Finding no such purpose, the court
8 held that the statutory exemption did not preempt the state secrets
9 privilege. Id at 1168.

10 Kasza also explained that the state secrets privilege can
11 require dismissal of a case in three distinct ways. "First, by
12 invoking the privilege over particular evidence, the evidence is
13 completely removed from the case. The plaintiff's case then goes
14 forward based on evidence not covered by the privilege. * * * If,
15 after further proceedings, the plaintiff cannot prove the *prima*
16 *facie* elements of her claim with nonprivileged evidence, then the
17 court may dismiss her claim as it would with any plaintiff who
18 cannot prove her case." Id at 1166. Second, "if the privilege
19 deprives the defendant of information that would otherwise give the
20 defendant a valid defense to the claim, then the court may grant
21 summary judgment to the defendant." Id (internal quotation
22 omitted) (emphasis in original). Finally, and most relevant here,
23 "notwithstanding the plaintiff's ability to produce nonprivileged
24 evidence, if the 'very subject matter of the action' is a state
25 secret, then the court should dismiss the plaintiff's action based
26 solely on the invocation of the state secrets privilege." Id
27 (quoting Reynolds, 345 US at 11 n26). See also Reynolds, 345 US at
28 11 n26 (characterizing Totten as a case "where the very subject

1 matter of the action, a contract to perform espionage, was a matter
2 of state secret. The action was dismissed on the pleadings without
3 ever reaching the question of evidence, since it was so obvious
4 that the action should never prevail over the privilege.").

5 According the "utmost deference" to the government's
6 claim of privilege and noting that even "seemingly innocuous
7 information" could be "part of a classified mosaic," *id* at 1166,
8 Kasza concluded after *in camera* review of classified declarations
9 "that release of such information would reasonably endanger
10 national security interests." *Id* at 1170. Because "no protective
11 procedure" could salvage plaintiffs' case, and "the very subject
12 matter of [her] action [was] a state secret," the court affirmed
13 dismissal. *Id*.

14 More recently, in Tenet v Doe, 544 US 1 (2005), the
15 Supreme Court reaffirmed Totten, holding that an alleged former
16 Cold War spy could not sue the government to enforce its
17 obligations under a covert espionage agreement. *Id* at 3.
18 Importantly, the Court held that Reynolds did not "replac[e] the
19 categorical Totten bar with the balancing of the state secrets
20 evidentiary privilege in the distinct class of cases that depend
21 upon clandestine spy relationships." *Id* at 9-10.

22 Even more recently, in El-Masri v Tenet, 2006 WL 1391390,
23 05-cv-01417 (ED Va May 12, 2006), plaintiff sued the former
24 director of the CIA and private corporations involved in a program
25 of "extraordinary rendition," pursuant to which plaintiff was
26 allegedly beaten, tortured and imprisoned because the government
27 mistakenly believed he was affiliated with the al Qaeda terrorist
28 organization. *Id* at *1-2. The government intervened "to protect

1 its interests in preserving state secrets." Id at *3. The court
2 sustained the government's assertion of the privilege:

3 [T]he substance of El-Masri's publicly available
4 complaint alleges a clandestine intelligence
5 program, and the means and methods the foreign
6 intelligence services of this and other countries
7 used to carry out the program. And, as the public
8 declaration makes pellucidly clear, any admission
9 or denial of these allegations by defendants * * *
10 would present a grave risk of injury to national
11 security.

12 Id at *5. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument "that
13 government officials' public affirmation of the existence" of the
14 rendition program somehow undercut the claim of privilege because
15 the government's general admission provided "no details as to the
16 [program's] means and methods," which were "validly claimed as
17 state secrets." Id. Having validated the exercise of privilege,
18 the court reasoned that dismissal was required because "any answer
19 to the complaint by the defendants risk[ed] the disclosure of
20 specific details [of the program]" and special discovery procedures
21 would have been "plainly ineffective where, as here, the entire aim
22 of the suit [was] to prove the existence of state secrets." Id at
23 *6.

24 B

25 Relying on Kasza, the government advances three reasons
26 why the state secrets privilege requires dismissing this action or
27 granting summary judgment for AT&T: (1) the very subject matter of
28 this case is a state secret; (2) plaintiffs cannot make a *prima*
facie case for their claims without classified evidence and (3) the
privilege effectively deprives AT&T of information necessary to
raise valid defenses. Doc #245-1 (Gov Reply) at 3-5.

1 In support of its contention that the very subject matter
2 of this action is a state secret, the government argues: "AT&T
3 cannot even confirm or deny the key factual premise underlying
4 [p]laintiffs' entire case — that AT&T has provided any assistance
5 whatsoever to NSA regarding foreign-intelligence surveillance.
6 Indeed, in the formulation of Reynolds and Kasza, that allegation
7 is 'the very subject of the action.'" Id at 4-5.

8 Additionally, the government claims that dismissal is
9 appropriate because plaintiffs cannot establish a *prima facie* case
10 for their claims. Contending that plaintiffs "persistently confuse
11 speculative allegations and untested assertions for established
12 facts," the government attacks the Klein and Marcus declarations
13 and the various media reports that plaintiffs rely on to
14 demonstrate standing. Id at 4. The government also argues that
15 "[e]ven when alleged facts have been the 'subject of widespread
16 media and public speculation' based on '[u]nofficial leaks and
17 public surmise,' those alleged facts are not actually established
18 in the public domain." Id at 8 (quoting Afshar v Dept of State,
19 702 F2d 1125, 1130-31 (DC Cir 1983)).

20 The government further contends that its "privilege
21 assertion covers any information tending to confirm or deny (a) the
22 alleged intelligence activities, (b) whether AT&T was involved with
23 any such activity, and (c) whether a particular individual's
24 communications were intercepted as a result of any such activity."
25 Gov MTD at 17-18. The government reasons that "[w]ithout these
26 facts * * * [p]laintiffs ultimately will not be able to prove
27 injury-in-fact and causation," thereby justifying dismissal of this
28 action for lack of standing. Id at 18.

1 The government also notes that plaintiffs do not fall
2 within the scope of the publicly disclosed "terrorist surveillance
3 program" (see *infra* I(C)(1)) because "[p]laintiffs do not claim to
4 be, or to communicate with, members or affiliates of [the] al Qaeda
5 [terrorist organization] -- indeed, [p]laintiffs expressly exclude
6 from their purported class any foreign powers or agent of foreign
7 powers * * *." *Id* at 18 n9 (citing FAC, ¶ 70). Hence, the
8 government concludes the named plaintiffs "are in no different
9 position from any other citizen or AT&T subscriber who falls
10 outside the narrow scope of the [terrorist surveillance program]
11 but nonetheless disagrees with the program." *Id* (emphasis in
12 original).

13 Additionally, the government contends that plaintiffs'
14 Fourth Amendment claim fails because no warrant is required for the
15 alleged searches. In particular, the government contends that the
16 executive has inherent constitutional authority to conduct
17 warrantless searches for foreign intelligence purposes, *id* at 24
18 (citing *In re Sealed Case*, 310 F3d 717, 742 (For Intel Surv Ct of
19 Rev 2002)), and that the warrant requirement does not apply here
20 because this case involves "special needs" that go beyond a routine
21 interest in law enforcement, *id* at 26. Accordingly, to make a
22 *prima facie* case, the government asserts that plaintiffs would have
23 to demonstrate that the alleged searches were unreasonable, which
24 would require a fact-intensive inquiry that the government contends
25 plaintiffs could not perform because of the asserted privilege. *Id*
26 at 26-27.

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1 The government also argues that plaintiffs cannot
2 establish a *prima facie* case for their statutory claims because
3 plaintiffs must prove "that any alleged interception or disclosure
4 was not authorized by the Government." The government maintains
5 that "[p]laintiffs bear the burden of alleging and proving the lack
6 of such authorization," *id* at 21-22, and that they cannot meet that
7 burden because "information confirming or denying AT&T's
8 involvement in alleged intelligence activities is covered by the
9 state secrets assertion." *Id* at 23.

10 Because "the existence or non-existence of any
11 certification or authorization by the Government relating to any
12 AT&T activity would be information tending to confirm or deny
13 AT&T's involvement in any alleged intelligence activity," Doc #145-
14 1 (Gov 5/17/06 Br) at 17, the government contends that its state
15 secrets assertion precludes AT&T from "present[ing] the facts that
16 would constitute its defenses." Gov Reply at 1. Accordingly, the
17 government also argues that the court could grant summary judgment
18 in favor of AT&T on that basis.

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20 C

21 The first step in determining whether a piece of
22 information constitutes a "state secret" is determining whether
23 that information actually is a "secret." Hence, before analyzing
24 the application of the state secrets privilege to plaintiffs'
25 claims, the court summarizes what has been publicly disclosed about
26 NSA surveillance programs as well as the AT&T documents and
27 accompanying Klein and Marcus declarations.

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2 Within the last year, public reports have surfaced on at
3 least two different types of alleged NSA surveillance programs,
4 neither of which relies on warrants. The New York Times disclosed
5 the first such program on December 16, 2005. Doc #19 (Cohn Decl),
6 Ex J (James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, *Bush Lets US Spy on Callers*
7 *Without Courts*, The New York Times (Dec 16, 2005)). The following
8 day, President George W Bush confirmed the existence of a
9 "terrorist surveillance program" in his weekly radio address:

10 In the weeks following the [September 11, 2001]
11 terrorist attacks on our Nation, I authorized the
12 National Security Agency, consistent with US law
13 and the Constitution, to intercept the
14 international communications of people with known
15 links to Al Qaeda and related terrorist
16 organizations. Before we intercept these
17 communications, the Government must have
18 information that establishes a clear link to these
19 terrorist networks.

20 Doc #20 (Pl Request for Judicial Notice), Ex 1 at 2, available at
21 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051217.html>
22 (last visited July 19, 2006). The President also described the
23 mechanism by which the program is authorized and reviewed:

24 The activities I authorized are reviewed
25 approximately every 45 days. Each review is based
26 on a fresh intelligence assessment of terrorist
27 threats to the continuity of our Government and the
28 threat of catastrophic damage to our homeland.
During each assessment, previous activities under
the authorization are reviewed. The review
includes approval by our Nation's top legal
officials, including the Attorney General and the
Counsel to the President. I have reauthorized this
program more than 30 times since the September the
11th attacks, and I intend to do so for as long as
our Nation faces a continuing threat from Al Qaeda
and related groups.

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1 The NSA's activities under this authorization are
2 thoroughly reviewed by the Justice Department and
3 NSA's top legal officials, including NSA's General
4 Counsel and Inspector General. Leaders in Congress
5 have been briefed more than a dozen times on this
6 authorization and the activities conducted under
7 it. Intelligence officials involved in this
8 activity also receive extensive training to ensure
9 they perform their duties consistent with the
10 letter and intent of the authorization.

11 Id.

12 Attorney General Alberto Gonzales subsequently confirmed
13 that this program intercepts "contents of communications where * * *
14 one party to the communication is outside the United States" and
15 the government has "a reasonable basis to conclude that one party
16 to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al
17 Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or
18 working in support of al Qaeda." Doc #87 (AT&T Request for
19 Judicial Notice), Ex J at 1 (hereinafter "12/19/05 Press
20 Briefing"), available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
21 2005/12/print/20051219-1.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051219-1.html) (last visited July 19, 2005). The
22 Attorney General also noted, "This [program] is not about
23 wiretapping everyone. This is a very concentrated, very limited
24 program focused at gaining information about our enemy." Id at 5.
25 The President has also made a public statement, of which the court
26 takes judicial notice, that the government's "international
27 activities strictly target al Qaeda and their known affiliates,"
28 "the government does not listen to domestic phone calls without
court approval" and the government is "not mining or trolling
through the personal lives of millions of innocent Americans." The
White House, *President Bush Discusses NSA Surveillance Program* (May
11, 2006) (hereinafter "5/11/06 Statement"), [http://www.whitehouse.](http://www.whitehouse)

1 gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060511-1.html (last visited July 19,
2 2005).

3 On May 11, 2006, USA Today reported the existence of a
4 second NSA program in which BellSouth Corp, Verizon Communications
5 Inc and AT&T were alleged to have provided telephone calling
6 records of tens of millions of Americans to the NSA. Doc #182
7 (Markman Decl), Ex 5 at 1 (Leslie Cauley, *NSA Has Massive Database*
8 *of Americans' Phone Calls*, USA Today (May 11, 2006)). The article
9 did not allege that the NSA listens to or records conversations but
10 rather that BellSouth, Verizon and AT&T gave the government access
11 to a database of domestic communication records that the NSA uses
12 "to analyze calling patterns in an effort to detect terrorist
13 activity." Id. The report indicated a fourth telecommunications
14 company, Qwest Communications International Inc, declined to
15 participate in the program. Id at 2. An attorney for Qwest's
16 former CEO, Joseph Nacchio, issued the following statement:

17 In the Fall of 2001 * * * while Mr Nacchio was
18 Chairman and CEO of Qwest and was serving pursuant
19 to the President's appointment as the Chairman of
20 the National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee, Qwest was approached to permit the
Government access to the private telephone records
of Qwest customers.

21 Mr Nacchio made inquiry as to whether a warrant or
22 other legal process had been secured in support of
23 that request. When he learned that no such
24 authority had been granted and that there was a
25 disinclination on the part of the authorities to
26 use any legal process, including the Special Court
27 which had been established to handle such matters,
28 Mr Nacchio concluded that these requests violated
the privacy requirements of the Telecommunications
[sic] Act. Accordingly, Mr Nacchio issued
instructions to refuse to comply with these
requests. These requests continued throughout Mr
Nacchio's tenure and until his departure in June of
2002.

1 Markman Decl, Ex 6.

2 BellSouth and Verizon both issued statements, of which
3 the court takes judicial notice, denying their involvement in the
4 program described in USA Today. BellSouth stated in relevant part:

5 As a result of media reports that BellSouth
6 provided massive amounts of customer calling
7 information under a contract with the NSA, the
8 Company conducted an internal review to determine
9 the facts. Based on our review to date, we have
10 confirmed no such contract exists and we have not
11 provided bulk customer calling records to the NSA.

9 News Release, BellSouth Statement on Governmental Data Collection
10 (May 15, 2006), available at [http://bellsouth.mediaroom.com/](http://bellsouth.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press_releases&item=2860)
11 [index.php?s=press_releases&item=2860](http://bellsouth.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press_releases&item=2860) (last visited July 19, 2006).

12 Although declining to confirm or deny whether it had any
13 relationship to the NSA program acknowledged by the President,
14 Verizon stated in relevant part:

15 One of the most glaring and repeated falsehoods in
16 the media reporting is the assertion that, in the
17 aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Verizon was
18 approached by NSA and entered into an arrangement
19 to provide the NSA with data from its customers'
20 domestic calls.

21 This is false. From the time of the 9/11 attacks
22 until just four months ago, Verizon had three major
23 businesses - its wireline phone business, its
24 wireless company and its directory publishing
25 business. It also had its own Internet Service
26 Provider and long-distance businesses. Contrary to
27 the media reports, Verizon was not asked by NSA to
28 provide, nor did Verizon provide, customer phone
records from any of these businesses, or any call
data from those records. None of these companies
— wireless or wireline — provided customer
records or call data.

25 See News Release, Verizon Issues Statement on NSA Media Coverage
26 (May 16, 2006), available at [http://newscenter.verizon.com/](http://newscenter.verizon.com/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=93450)
27 [proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=93450](http://newscenter.verizon.com/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=93450) (last visited July 19,
28 2006). BellSouth and Verizon's denials have been at least somewhat

1 substantiated in later reports. Doc #298 (DiMuzio Decl), Ex 1
2 (*Lawmakers: NSA Database Incomplete*, USA Today (June 30, 2006)).
3 Neither AT&T nor the government has confirmed or denied the
4 existence of a program of providing telephone calling records to
5 the NSA. Id.

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8 Although the government does not claim that the AT&T
9 documents obtained by Mark Klein or the accompanying declarations
10 contain classified information (Doc #284 (6/23/06 Transcript) at
11 76:9-20), those papers remain under seal because AT&T alleges that
12 they contain proprietary and trade secret information.
13 Nonetheless, much of the information in these papers has already
14 been leaked to the public or has been revealed in redacted versions
15 of the papers. The summary below is based on those already
16 disclosed facts.

17 In a public statement, Klein explained that while working
18 at an AT&T office in San Francisco in 2002, "the site manager told
19 me to expect a visit from a National Security Agency agent, who was
20 to interview a management-level technician for a special job." Doc
21 #43 (Ericson Decl), Ex J at 1. While touring the Folsom Street
22 AT&T facility in January 2003, Klein "saw a new room being built
23 adjacent to the 4ESS switch room where the public's phone calls are
24 routed" and "learned that the person whom the NSA interviewed for
25 the secret job was the person working to install equipment in this
26 room." Id. See also Doc #147 (Redact Klein Decl), ¶ 10 ("The NSA
27 agent came and met with [Field Support Specialist (FSS)] #2. FSS
28 #1 later confirmed to me that FSS #2 was working on the special

1 job."); id, ¶ 16 ("In the Fall of 2003, FSS #1 told me that another
2 NSA agent would again visit our office * * * to talk to FSS #1 in
3 order to get the latter's evaluation of FSS #3's suitability to
4 perform the special job that FSS #2 had been doing. The NSA agent
5 did come and speak to FSS #1.").

6 Klein then learned about the AT&T documents in October
7 2003, after being transferred to the Folsom Street facility to
8 oversee the Worldnet Internet room. Ericson Decl, Ex J at 2. One
9 document described how "fiber optic cables from the secret room
10 were tapping into the Worldnet circuits by splitting off a portion
11 of the light signal." Id. The other two documents "instructed
12 technicians on connecting some of the already in-service circuits
13 to [a] 'splitter' cabinet, which diverts some of the light signal
14 to the secret room." Id. Klein noted the secret room contained "a
15 Narus STA 6400" and that "Narus STA technology is known to be used
16 particularly by government intelligence agencies because of its
17 ability to sift through large amounts of data looking for
18 preprogrammed targets." Id. Klein also "learned that other such
19 'splitter' cabinets were being installed in other cities, including
20 Seattle, San Jose, Los Angeles and San Diego." Id.

21
22 D

23 Based on the foregoing, it might appear that none of the
24 subject matter in this litigation could be considered a secret
25 given that the alleged surveillance programs have been so widely
26 reported in the media.

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1 The court recognizes, however, that simply because a
2 factual statement has been publicly made does not necessarily mean
3 that the facts it relates are true and are not a secret. The
4 statement also must come from a reliable source. Indeed, given the
5 sheer amount of statements that have been made in the public sphere
6 about the alleged surveillance programs and the limited number of
7 permutations that such programs could take, it would seem likely
8 that the truth about these programs has already been publicly
9 reported somewhere. But simply because such statements have been
10 publicly made does not mean that the truth of those statements is a
11 matter of general public knowledge and that verification of the
12 statement is harmless.

13 In determining whether a factual statement is a secret
14 for purposes of the state secrets privilege, the court should look
15 only at publicly reported information that possesses substantial
16 indicia of reliability and whose verification or substantiation
17 possesses the potential to endanger national security. That
18 entails assessing the value of the information to an individual or
19 group bent on threatening the security of the country, as well as
20 the secrecy of the information.

21 For instance, if this litigation verifies that AT&T
22 assists the government in monitoring communication records, a
23 terrorist might well cease using AT&T and switch to other, less
24 detectable forms of communication. Alternatively, if this
25 litigation reveals that the communication records program does not
26 exist, then a terrorist who had been avoiding AT&T might start
27 using AT&T if it is a more efficient form of communication. In
28 short, when deciding what communications channel to use, a

1 terrorist "balanc[es] the risk that a particular method of
2 communication will be intercepted against the operational
3 inefficiencies of having to use ever more elaborate ways to
4 circumvent what he thinks may be intercepted." 6/23/06 Transcript
5 at 48:14-17 (government attorney). A terrorist who operates with
6 full information is able to communicate more securely and more
7 efficiently than a terrorist who operates in an atmosphere of
8 uncertainty.

9 It is, of course, an open question whether individuals
10 inclined to commit acts threatening the national security engage in
11 such calculations. But the court is hardly in a position to
12 second-guess the government's assertions on this matter or to
13 estimate the risk tolerances of terrorists in making their
14 communications and hence at this point in the litigation eschews
15 the attempt to weigh the value of the information.

16 Accordingly, in determining whether a factual statement
17 is a secret, the court considers only public admissions or denials
18 by the government, AT&T and other telecommunications companies,
19 which are the parties indisputably situated to disclose whether and
20 to what extent the alleged programs exist. In determining what is
21 a secret, the court at present refrains from relying on the
22 declaration of Mark Klein. Although AT&T does not dispute that
23 Klein was a former AT&T technician and he has publicly declared
24 under oath that he observed AT&T assisting the NSA in some capacity
25 and his assertions would appear admissible in connection with the
26 present motions, the inferences Klein draws have been disputed. To
27 accept the Klein declaration at this juncture in connection with
28 the state secrets issue would invite attempts to undermine the

1 privilege by mere assertions of knowledge by an interested party.
2 Needless to say, this does not reflect that the court discounts
3 Klein's credibility, but simply that what is or is not secret
4 depends on what the government and its alleged operative AT&T and
5 other telecommunications providers have either admitted or denied
6 or is beyond reasonable dispute.

7 Likewise, the court does not rely on media reports about
8 the alleged NSA programs because their reliability is unclear. To
9 illustrate, after Verizon and BellSouth denied involvement in the
10 program described in USA Today in which communication records are
11 monitored, USA Today published a subsequent story somewhat backing
12 down from its earlier statements and at least in some measure
13 substantiating these companies' denials. See *supra* I(C) (1).

14 Finally, the court notes in determining whether the
15 privilege applies, the court is not limited to considering strictly
16 admissible evidence. FRE 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning
17 * * * the existence of a privilege * * * shall be determined by the
18 court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its
19 determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those
20 with respect to privileges."). This makes sense: the issue at bar
21 is not proving a question of liability but rather determining
22 whether information that the government contends is a secret is
23 actually a secret. In making this determination, the court may
24 rely upon reliable public evidence that might otherwise be
25 inadmissible at trial because it does not comply with the technical
26 requirements of the rules of evidence.

27 With these considerations in mind, the court at last
28 determines whether the state secrets privilege applies here.

E

1
2 Because this case involves an alleged covert relationship
3 between the government and AT&T, the court first determines whether
4 to apply the categorical bar to suit established by the Supreme
5 Court in Totten v United States, 92 US 105 (1875), acknowledged in
6 United States v Reynolds, 345 US 1 (1953) and Kasza v Browner, 133
7 F3d 1159 (9th Cir 1998), and reaffirmed in Tenet v Doe, 544 US 1
8 (2005). See *id* at 6 ("[A]pplication of the Totten rule of
9 dismissal * * * represents the sort of 'threshold question' we have
10 recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction."). The
11 court then examines the closely related questions whether this
12 action must be presently dismissed because "the very subject matter
13 of the action" is a state secret or because the state secrets
14 privilege necessarily blocks evidence essential to plaintiffs'
15 *prima facie* case or AT&T's defense. See Kasza, 133 F3d at 1166-67.

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18 Although the principles announced in Totten, Tenet,
19 Reynolds and Kasza inform the court's decision here, those cases
20 are not strictly analogous to the facts at bar.

21 First, the instant plaintiffs were not a party to the
22 alleged covert arrangement at issue here between AT&T and the
23 government. Hence, Totten and Tenet are not on point to the extent
24 they hold that former spies cannot enforce agreements with the
25 government because the parties implicitly agreed that such suits
26 would be barred. The implicit notion in Totten was one of
27 equitable estoppel: one who agrees to conduct covert operations
28 impliedly agrees not to reveal the agreement even if the agreement

1 is breached. But AT&T, the alleged spy, is not the plaintiff here.
2 In this case, plaintiffs made no agreement with the government and
3 are not bound by any implied covenant of secrecy.

4 More importantly, unlike the clandestine spy arrangements
5 in Tenet and Totten, AT&T and the government have for all practical
6 purposes already disclosed that AT&T assists the government in
7 monitoring communication content. As noted earlier, the government
8 has publicly admitted the existence of a "terrorist surveillance
9 program," which the government insists is completely legal. This
10 program operates without warrants and targets "contents of
11 communications where * * * one party to the communication is
12 outside the United States" and the government has "a reasonable
13 basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a member
14 of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an
15 organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al
16 Qaeda." 12/19/05 Press Briefing at 1.

17 Given that the "terrorist surveillance program" tracks
18 "calls into the United States or out of the United States," 5/11/06
19 Statement, it is inconceivable that this program could exist
20 without the acquiescence and cooperation of some telecommunications
21 provider. Although of record here only in plaintiffs' pleading, it
22 is beyond reasonable dispute that "prior to its being acquired by
23 SBC, AT&T Corp was the second largest Internet provider in the
24 country," FAC, ¶ 26, and "AT&T Corp's bundled local and long
25 distance service was available in 46 states, covering more than 73
26 million households," id, ¶ 25. AT&T's assistance would greatly
27 help the government implement this program. See also id, ¶ 27
28 ("The new AT&T Inc constitutes the largest telecommunications

1 provider in the United States and one of the largest in the
2 world."). Considering the ubiquity of AT&T telecommunications
3 services, it is unclear whether this program could even exist
4 without AT&T's acquiescence and cooperation.

5 Moreover, AT&T's history of cooperating with the
6 government on such matters is well known. AT&T has recently
7 disclosed that it "performs various classified contracts, and
8 thousands of its employees hold government security clearances."
9 FAC, ¶ 29. More recently, in response to reports on the alleged
10 NSA programs, AT&T has disclosed in various statements, of which
11 the court takes judicial notice, that it has "an obligation to
12 assist law enforcement and other government agencies responsible
13 for protecting the public welfare, whether it be an individual or
14 the security interests of the entire nation. * * * If and when
15 AT&T is asked to help, we do so strictly within the law and under
16 the most stringent conditions." News Release, AT&T Statement on
17 Privacy and Legal/Security Issues (May 11, 2006) (emphasis added),
18 available at [http://www.sbc.com/gen/press-room?pid=4800&cdvn=news](http://www.sbc.com/gen/press-room?pid=4800&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=22285)
19 [&newsarticleid=22285](http://www.sbc.com/gen/press-room?pid=4800&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=22285). See also Declan McCullagh, CNET News.com,
20 *Legal Loophole Emerges in NSA Spy Program* (May 19, 2006) ("Mark
21 Bien, a spokesman for AT&T, told CNET News.com on Wednesday:
22 'Without commenting on or confirming the existence of the program,
23 we can say that when the government asks for our help in protecting
24 national security, and the request is within the law, we will
25 provide that assistance.'"), available at [http://news.com.com/](http://news.com.com/Legal+loophole+emerges+in+NSA+spy+program/2100-1028_3-6073600.html)
26 [Legal+loophole+emerges+in+NSA+spy+program/2100-1028_3-6073600.html](http://news.com.com/Legal+loophole+emerges+in+NSA+spy+program/2100-1028_3-6073600.html);
27 Justin Scheck, *Plaintiffs Can Keep AT&T Papers in Domestic Spying*
28 *Case*, The Recorder (May 18, 2006) ("Marc Bien, a spokesman for

1 AT&T, said he didn't see a settlement on the horizon. 'When the
2 government asks for our help in protecting American security, and
3 the request is within the law, we provide assistance,' he said."),
4 available at <http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1147856734796>.
5 And AT&T at least presently believes that any such assistance would
6 be legal if AT&T were simply a passive agent of the government or
7 if AT&T received a government certification authorizing the
8 assistance. 6/23/06 Transcript at 15:11-21:19. Hence, it appears
9 AT&T helps the government in classified matters when asked and AT&T
10 at least currently believes, on the facts as alleged in plaintiffs'
11 complaint, its assistance is legal.

12 In sum, the government has disclosed the general contours
13 of the "terrorist surveillance program," which requires the
14 assistance of a telecommunications provider, and AT&T claims that
15 it lawfully and dutifully assists the government in classified
16 matters when asked.

17 A remaining question is whether, in implementing the
18 "terrorist surveillance program," the government ever requested the
19 assistance of AT&T, described in these proceedings as the mother of
20 telecommunications "that in a very literal way goes all the way
21 back to Alexander Graham Bell summoning his assistant Watson into
22 the room." Id at 102:11-13. AT&T's assistance in national
23 security surveillance is hardly the kind of "secret" that the
24 Totten bar and the state secrets privilege were intended to protect
25 or that a potential terrorist would fail to anticipate.

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1 The court does not "balanc[e the] ultimate interests at
2 stake in the litigation." Halkin II, 690 F2d at 990. But no case
3 dismissed because its "very subject matter" was a state secret
4 involved ongoing, widespread violations of individual
5 constitutional rights, as plaintiffs allege here. Indeed, most
6 cases in which the "very subject matter" was a state secret
7 involved classified details about either a highly technical
8 invention or a covert espionage relationship. See, e g, Sterling v
9 Tenet, 416 F3d 338, 348 (4th Cir 2005) (dismissing Title VII racial
10 discrimination claim that "center[ed] around a covert agent's
11 assignments, evaluations, and colleagues"); Kasza, 133 F3d at 1162-
12 63, 1170 (dismissing RCRA claim regarding facility reporting and
13 inventory requirements at a classified Air Force location near
14 Groom Lake, Nevada); Zuckerbraun v General Dynamics Corp, 935 F2d
15 544, 547-48 (2d Cir 1991) (dismissing wrongful death claim
16 implicating classified information about the "design, manufacture,
17 performance, functional characteristics, and testing of [weapons]
18 systems and the rules of engagement"); Fitzgerald v Penthouse Intl,
19 776 F2d 1236, 1242-43 (4th Cir 1985) (dismissing libel suit
20 "charging the plaintiff with the unauthorized sale of a top secret
21 marine mammal weapons system"); Halpern v United States, 258 F2d
22 36, 44 (2d Cir 1958) (rejecting government's motion to dismiss in a
23 case involving a patent with military applications withheld under a
24 secrecy order); Clift v United States, 808 F Supp 101, 111 (D Conn
25 1991) (dismissing patent dispute over a cryptographic encoding
26 device).

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28 //

1 By contrast, the very subject matter of this action is
2 hardly a secret. As described above, public disclosures by the
3 government and AT&T indicate that AT&T is assisting the government
4 to implement some kind of surveillance program. See *supra* I(E)(1).

5 For this reason, the present action is also different
6 from El-Masri v Tenet, the recently dismissed case challenging the
7 government's alleged "extraordinary rendition program." In El-
8 Masri, only limited sketches of the alleged program had been
9 disclosed and the whole object of the suit was to reveal classified
10 details regarding "the means and methods the foreign intelligence
11 services of this and other countries used to carry out the
12 program." El-Masri, 2006 WL 1391390, *5. By contrast, this case
13 focuses only on whether AT&T intercepted and disclosed
14 communications or communication records to the government. And as
15 described above, significant amounts of information about the
16 government's monitoring of communication content and AT&T's
17 intelligence relationship with the government are already non-
18 classified or in the public record.

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20 3

21 The court also declines to decide at this time whether
22 this case should be dismissed on the ground that the government's
23 state secrets assertion will preclude evidence necessary for
24 plaintiffs to establish a *prima facie* case or for AT&T to raise a
25 valid defense to the claims. Plaintiffs appear to be entitled to
26 at least some discovery. See *infra* I(G)(3). It would be premature
27 to decide these issues at the present time. In drawing this
28 conclusion, the court is following the approach of the courts in

1 Halkin v Helms and Ellsberg v Mitchell; these courts did not
2 dismiss those cases at the outset but allowed them to proceed to
3 discovery sufficiently to assess the state secrets privilege in
4 light of the facts. The government has not shown why that should
5 not be the course of this litigation.

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8 In sum, for much the same reasons that Totten does not
9 preclude this suit, the very subject matter of this action is not a
10 "secret" for purposes of the state secrets privilege and it would
11 be premature to conclude that the privilege will bar evidence
12 necessary for plaintiffs' *prima facie* case or AT&T's defense.
13 Because of the public disclosures by the government and AT&T, the
14 court cannot conclude that merely maintaining this action creates a
15 "reasonable danger" of harming national security. Accordingly,
16 based on the foregoing, the court DENIES the government's motion to
17 dismiss.

18
19 F

20 The court hastens to add that its present ruling should
21 not suggest that its *in camera*, *ex parte* review of the classified
22 documents confirms the truth of the particular allegations in
23 plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs allege a surveillance program of
24 far greater scope than the publicly disclosed "terrorist
25 surveillance program." The existence of this alleged program and
26 AT&T's involvement, if any, remain far from clear. And as in
27 Halkin v Helms, it is certainly possible that AT&T might be
28 entitled to summary judgment at some point if the court finds that

1 the state secrets privilege blocks certain items of evidence that
2 are essential to plaintiffs' *prima facie* case or AT&T's defense.
3 The court also recognizes that legislative or other developments
4 might alter the course of this litigation.

5 But it is important to note that even the state secrets
6 privilege has its limits. While the court recognizes and respects
7 the executive's constitutional duty to protect the nation from
8 threats, the court also takes seriously its constitutional duty to
9 adjudicate the disputes that come before it. See Hamdi v Rumsfeld,
10 542 US 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("Whatever power the
11 United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its
12 exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times
13 of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three
14 branches when individual liberties are at stake."). To defer to a
15 blanket assertion of secrecy here would be to abdicate that duty,
16 particularly because the very subject matter of this litigation has
17 been so publicly aired. The compromise between liberty and
18 security remains a difficult one. But dismissing this case at the
19 outset would sacrifice liberty for no apparent enhancement of
20 security.

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The government also contends the issue whether AT&T received a certification authorizing its assistance to the government is a state secret. Gov 5/17/06 Br at 17.

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The procedural requirements and impact of a certification under Title III are addressed in 18 USC § 2511(2)(a)(ii):

Notwithstanding any other law, providers of wire or electronic communication service, their officers, employees, and agents, * * * are authorized to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance to persons authorized by law to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications or to conduct electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of [FISA] * * * if such provider, its officers, employees, or agents, * * * has been provided with — * * *

(B) a certification in writing by a person specified in section 2518(7) of this title [18 USCS § 2518(7)] or the Attorney General of the United States that no warrant or court order is required by law, that all statutory requirements have been met, and that the specified assistance is required * * *.

Although it is doubtful whether plaintiffs' constitutional claim would be barred by a valid certification under section 2511(2)(a)(ii), this provision on its face makes clear that a valid certification would preclude the statutory claims asserted here. See 18 USC § 2511(2)(a)(ii) ("No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of wire or electronic communication service * * * for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a * * * certification under this chapter.").

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As noted above, it is not a secret for purposes of the state secrets privilege that AT&T and the government have some kind of intelligence relationship. See *supra* I(E)(1). Nonetheless, the court recognizes that uncovering whether and to what extent a certification exists might reveal information about AT&T's assistance to the government that has not been publicly disclosed. Accordingly, in applying the state secrets privilege to the certification question, the court must look deeper at what information has been publicly revealed about the alleged electronic surveillance programs. The following chart summarizes what the government has disclosed about the scope of these programs in terms of (1) the individuals whose communications are being monitored, (2) the locations of those individuals and (3) the types of information being monitored:

	Purely domestic communication content	Domestic-foreign communication content	Communication records
General public	Government DENIES	Government DENIES	Government NEITHER CONFIRMS NOR DENIES
al Qaeda or affiliate member/agent	Government DENIES	Government CONFIRMS	

As the chart relates, the government's public disclosures regarding monitoring of "communication content" (i.e., wiretapping or listening in on a communication) differ significantly from its disclosures regarding "communication records" (i.e., collecting ancillary data pertaining to a communication, such as the telephone

1 numbers dialed by an individual). See *supra* I(C)(1). Accordingly,
2 the court separately addresses for each alleged program whether
3 revealing the existence or scope of a certification would disclose
4 a state secret.

5
6 3

7 Beginning with the warrantless monitoring of
8 "communication content," the government has confirmed that it
9 monitors "contents of communications where * * * one party to the
10 communication is outside the United States" and the government has
11 "a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication
12 is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of
13 an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of
14 al Qaeda." 12/19/05 Press Briefing at 1. The government denies
15 listening in without a warrant on any purely domestic
16 communications or communications in which neither party has a
17 connection to al Qaeda or a related terrorist organization. In
18 sum, regarding the government's monitoring of "communication
19 content," the government has disclosed the universe of
20 possibilities in terms of whose communications it monitors and
21 where those communicating parties are located.

22 Based on these public disclosures, the court cannot
23 conclude that the existence of a certification regarding the
24 "communication content" program is a state secret. If the
25 government's public disclosures have been truthful, revealing
26 whether AT&T has received a certification to assist in monitoring
27 communication content should not reveal any new information that
28 would assist a terrorist and adversely affect national security.

1 And if the government has not been truthful, the state secrets
2 privilege should not serve as a shield for its false public
3 statements. In short, the government has opened the door for
4 judicial inquiry by publicly confirming and denying material
5 information about its monitoring of communication content.

6 Accordingly, the court concludes that the state secrets
7 privilege will not prevent AT&T from asserting a certification-
8 based defense, as appropriate, regarding allegations that it
9 assisted the government in monitoring communication content. The
10 court envisions that AT&T could confirm or deny the existence of a
11 certification authorizing monitoring of communication content
12 through a combination of responses to interrogatories and *in camera*
13 review by the court. Under this approach, AT&T could reveal
14 information at the level of generality at which the government has
15 publicly confirmed or denied its monitoring of communication
16 content. This approach would also enable AT&T to disclose the non-
17 privileged information described here while withholding any
18 incidental privileged information that a certification might
19 contain.

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21 4

22 Turning to the alleged monitoring of communication
23 records, the court notes that despite many public reports on the
24 matter, the government has neither confirmed nor denied whether it
25 monitors communication records and has never publicly disclosed
26 whether the NSA program reported by USA Today on May 11, 2006,
27 actually exists. Although BellSouth, Verizon and Qwest have denied
28 participating in this program, AT&T has neither confirmed nor

1 denied its involvement. Hence, unlike the program monitoring
2 communication content, the general contours and even the existence
3 of the alleged communication records program remain unclear.

4 Nonetheless, the court is hesitant to conclude that the
5 existence or non-existence of the communication records program
6 necessarily constitutes a state secret. Confirming or denying the
7 existence of this program would only affect a terrorist who was
8 insensitive to the publicly disclosed "terrorist surveillance
9 program" but cared about the alleged program here. This would seem
10 unlikely to occur in practice given that the alleged communication
11 records program, which does not involve listening in on
12 communications, seems less intrusive than the "terrorist
13 surveillance program," which involves wiretapping. And in any
14 event, it seems odd that a terrorist would continue using AT&T
15 given that BellSouth, Verizon and Qwest have publicly denied
16 participating in the alleged communication records program and
17 would appear to be safer choices. Importantly, the public denials
18 by these telecommunications companies undercut the government and
19 AT&T's contention that revealing AT&T's involvement or lack thereof
20 in the program would disclose a state secret.

21 Still, the court recognizes that it is not in a position
22 to estimate a terrorist's risk preferences, which might depend on
23 facts not before the court. For example, it may be that a
24 terrorist is unable to avoid AT&T by choosing another provider or,
25 for reasons outside his control, his communications might
26 necessarily be routed through an AT&T facility. Revealing that a
27 communication records program exists might encourage that terrorist
28 to switch to less efficient but less detectable forms of

1 communication. And revealing that such a program does not exist
2 might encourage a terrorist to use AT&T services when he would not
3 have done so otherwise. Accordingly, for present purposes, the
4 court does not require AT&T to disclose what relationship, if any,
5 it has with this alleged program.

6 The court stresses that it does not presently conclude
7 that the state secrets privilege will necessarily preclude AT&T
8 from revealing later in this litigation information about the
9 alleged communication records program. While this case has been
10 pending, the government and telecommunications companies have made
11 substantial public disclosures on the alleged NSA programs. It is
12 conceivable that these entities might disclose, either deliberately
13 or accidentally, other pertinent information about the
14 communication records program as this litigation proceeds. The
15 court recognizes such disclosures might make this program's
16 existence or non-existence no longer a secret. Accordingly, while
17 the court presently declines to permit any discovery regarding the
18 alleged communication records program, if appropriate, plaintiffs
19 can request that the court revisit this issue in the future.

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22 Finally, the court notes plaintiffs contend that
23 Congress, through various statutes, has limited the state secrets
24 privilege in the context of electronic surveillance and has
25 abrogated the privilege regarding the existence of a government
26 certification. See Doc #192 (Pl Opp Gov MTD) at 16-26, 45-48.
27 Because these arguments potentially implicate highly complicated
28 separation of powers issues regarding Congress' ability to abrogate

1 what the government contends is a constitutionally protected
2 privilege, the court declines to address these issues presently,
3 particularly because the issues might very well be obviated by
4 future public disclosures by the government and AT&T. If
5 necessary, the court may revisit these arguments at a later stage
6 of this litigation.

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9 The government also asserts two statutory privileges in
10 its motion to dismiss that it contends apply "to any intelligence-
11 related information, sources and methods implicated by
12 [p]laintiffs' claims and the information covered by these privilege
13 claims are at least co-extensive with the assertion of the state
14 secrets privilege by the DNI." Gov MTD at 14. First, the
15 government relies on 50 USC § 402 note, which provides:

16 [N]othing in this Act or any other law * * * shall
17 be construed to require the disclosure of the
18 organization or any function of the National
19 Security Agency, of any information with respect to
the activities thereof, or of the names, titles,
salaries, or number of the persons employed by such
agency.

20 The government also relies on 50 USC § 403-1(i)(1), which states,
21 "The Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence
22 sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

23 Neither of these provisions by their terms requires the
24 court to dismiss this action and it would be premature for the
25 court to do so at this time. In opposing a subsequent summary
26 judgment motion, plaintiffs could rely on many non-classified
27 materials including present and future public disclosures of the
28 government or AT&T on the alleged NSA programs, the AT&T documents

1 and the supporting Klein and Marcus declarations and information
2 gathered during discovery. Hence, it is at least conceivable that
3 some of plaintiffs' claims, particularly with respect to
4 declaratory and injunctive relief, could survive summary judgment.
5 After discovery begins, the court will determine step-by-step
6 whether the privileges prevent plaintiffs from discovering
7 particular evidence. But the mere existence of these privileges
8 does not justify dismissing this case now.

9 Additionally, neither of these provisions block AT&T from
10 producing any certification that it received to assist the
11 government in monitoring communication content, see *supra* I(G) (3).
12 Because information about this certification would be revealed only
13 at the same level of generality as the government's public
14 disclosures, permitting this discovery should not reveal any new
15 information on the NSA's activities or its intelligence sources or
16 methods, assuming that the government has been truthful.

17 Accordingly, the court DENIES the government's motion to
18 dismiss based on the statutory privileges and DENIES the privileges
19 with respect to any certification that AT&T might have received
20 authorizing it to monitor communication content.

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II

AT&T moves to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on multiple grounds, contending that (1) plaintiffs lack standing, (2) the amended complaint fails to plead affirmatively the absence of immunity from suit and (3) AT&T is entitled to statutory, common law and qualified immunity. Because standing is a threshold jurisdictional question, the court addresses that issue first. See Steel Company v Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 US 83, 94, 102 (1998).

A

"[T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560 (1992). To establish standing under Article III, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (1) "the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact -- an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical," (2) "there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of" and (3) "it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." *Id* at 560-61 (internal quotation marks, citations and footnote omitted). A party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing its standing to sue. *Id* at 561.

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1 In the present case, AT&T contends plaintiffs have not
2 sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact and their complaint relies on
3 "wholly conclusory" allegations. AT&T MTD at 20-22. According to
4 AT&T, "Absent some concrete allegation that the government
5 monitored their communications or records, all plaintiffs really
6 have is a suggestion that AT&T provided a means by which the
7 government could have done so had it wished. This is anything but
8 injury-in-fact." Id at 20 (emphasis in original). AT&T compares
9 this case to United Presbyterian Church v Reagan, 738 F2d 1375 (DC
10 Cir 1984) (written by then-Judge Scalia), in which the court found
11 that plaintiffs' allegations of unlawful surveillance were "too
12 generalized and nonspecific to support a complaint." Id at 1380.

13 As a preliminary matter, AT&T incorrectly focuses on
14 whether plaintiffs have pled that the government "monitored
15 [plaintiffs'] communications or records" or "targeted [plaintiffs]
16 or their communications." Instead, the proper focus is on AT&T's
17 actions. Plaintiffs' statutory claims stem from injuries caused
18 solely by AT&T through its alleged interception, disclosure, use,
19 divulgence and/or publication of plaintiffs' communications or
20 communication records. FAC, ¶¶ 93-95, 102-05, 113-14, 121, 128,
21 135-41. Hence, plaintiffs need not allege any facts regarding the
22 government's conduct to state these claims.

23 More importantly, for purposes of the present motion to
24 dismiss, plaintiffs have stated sufficient facts to allege injury-
25 in-fact for all their claims. "At the pleading stage, general
26 factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's
27 conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we 'presume that
28 general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary

1 to support the claim.'" Lujan, 504 US at 561 (quoting Lujan v
2 National Wildlife Federation, 497 US 871, 889 (1990)). Throughout
3 the complaint, plaintiffs generally describe the injuries they have
4 allegedly suffered because of AT&T's illegal conduct and its
5 collaboration with the government. See, e g, FAC, ¶ 61 ("On
6 information and belief, AT&T Corp has provided the government with
7 direct access to the contents of the Hawkeye, Aurora and/or other
8 databases that it manages using Daytona, including all information,
9 records, [dialing, routing, addressing and/or signaling
10 information] and [customer proprietary network information]
11 pertaining to [p]laintiffs and class members, by providing the
12 government with copies of the information in the databases and/or
13 by giving the government access to Daytona's querying capabilities
14 and/or some other technology enabling the government agents to
15 search the databases' contents."); id, ¶ 6 ("On information and
16 belief, AT&T Corp has opened its key telecommunications facilities
17 and databases to direct access by the NSA and/or other government
18 agencies, intercepting and disclosing to the government the
19 contents of its customers' communications as well as detailed
20 communications records about millions of its customers, including
21 [p]laintiffs and class members.").

22 By contrast, plaintiffs in United Presbyterian Church
23 alleged they "ha[d] been informed on numerous occasions" that mail
24 that they had sent never reached its destination, "ha[d] reason to
25 believe that, for a long time, [their] officers, employees, and
26 persons associated with [them had] been subjected to government
27 surveillance, infiltration and disruption" and "discern[ed] a long-
28 term pattern of surveillance of [their] members, disruption of

1 their speaking engagements in this country, and attempts at
2 character assassination." See 738 F2d at 1380 n2. Because these
3 allegations were more attenuated and less concrete than the
4 specific injuries alleged here, United Presbyterian Church does not
5 support dismissing this action.

6 AT&T also contends "[p]laintiffs lack standing to assert
7 their statutory claims (Counts II-VII) because the FAC alleges no
8 facts suggesting that their statutory rights have been violated"
9 and "the FAC alleges nothing to suggest that the named plaintiffs
10 were themselves subject to surveillance." AT&T MTD at 24-25
11 (emphasis in original). But AT&T ignores that the gravamen of
12 plaintiffs' complaint is that AT&T has created a dragnet that
13 collects the content and records of its customers' communications.
14 See, e g, FAC, ¶¶ 42-64. The court cannot see how any one
15 plaintiff will have failed to demonstrate injury-in-fact if that
16 plaintiff effectively demonstrates that all class members have so
17 suffered. This case is plainly distinguishable from Halkin II, for
18 in that case, showing that plaintiffs were on a watchlist was not
19 tantamount to showing that any particular plaintiff suffered a
20 surveillance-related injury-in-fact. See Halkin II, 690 F2d at
21 999-1001. As long as the named plaintiffs were, as they allege,
22 AT&T customers during the relevant time period (FAC, ¶¶ 13-16), the
23 alleged dragnet would have imparted a concrete injury on each of
24 them.

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1 This conclusion is not altered simply because the alleged
2 injury is widely shared among AT&T customers. In FEC v Akins, 524
3 US 11 (1998), the Supreme Court explained:

4 Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential
5 limit on standing, the Court has sometimes
6 determined that where large numbers of Americans
7 suffer alike, the political process, rather than
8 the judicial process, may provide the more
9 appropriate remedy for a widely shared grievance.

10 [This] kind of judicial language * * * however,
11 invariably appears in cases where the harm at issue
12 is not only widely shared, but is also of an
13 abstract and indefinite nature.

14 Id at 23. The Court continued:

15 [W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared,
16 the Court has found "injury in fact." Thus the
17 fact that a political forum may be more readily
18 available where an injury is widely shared (while
19 counseling against, say, interpreting a statute as
20 conferring standing) does not, by itself,
21 automatically disqualify an interest for Article
22 III purposes. Such an interest, where sufficiently
23 concrete, may count as an "injury in fact."

24 Id at 24.

25 Here, the alleged injury is concrete even though it is
26 widely shared. Despite AT&T's alleged creation of a dragnet to
27 intercept all or substantially all of its customers'
28 communications, this dragnet necessarily inflicts a concrete injury
that affects each customer in a distinct way, depending on the
content of that customer's communications and the time that
customer spends using AT&T services. Indeed, the present situation
resembles a scenario in which "large numbers of individuals suffer
the same common-law injury (say, a widespread mass tort)." Id.

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1 AT&T also contends that the state secrets privilege bars
2 plaintiffs from establishing standing. Doc #244 (AT&T Reply) at
3 16-18. See also Gov MTD 16-20. But as described above, the state
4 secrets privilege will not prevent plaintiffs from receiving at
5 least some evidence tending to establish the factual predicate for
6 the injury-in-fact underlying their claims directed at AT&T's
7 alleged involvement in the monitoring of communication content.
8 See *supra* I(G) (3). And the court recognizes that additional facts
9 might very well be revealed during, but not as a direct consequence
10 of, this litigation that obviate many of the secrecy concerns
11 currently at issue regarding the alleged communication records
12 program. Hence, it is unclear whether the privilege would
13 necessarily block AT&T from revealing information about its
14 participation, if any, in that alleged program. See *supra* I(G) (4).
15 The court further notes that the AT&T documents and the
16 accompanying Klein and Marcus declarations provide at least some
17 factual basis for plaintiffs' standing. Accordingly, the court
18 does not conclude at this juncture that plaintiffs' claims would
19 necessarily lack the factual support required to withstand a future
20 jurisdictional challenge based on lack of standing.

21 Because plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they
22 suffered an actual, concrete injury traceable to AT&T and
23 redressable by this court, the court DENIES AT&T's motion to
24 dismiss for lack of standing.

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1 B

2 AT&T also contends that telecommunications providers are
3 immune from suit if they receive a government certification
4 authorizing them to conduct electronic surveillance. AT&T MTD at
5 5. AT&T argues that plaintiffs have the burden to plead
6 affirmatively that AT&T lacks such a certification and that
7 plaintiffs have failed to do so here, thereby making dismissal
8 appropriate. Id at 10-13.

9 As discussed above, the procedural requirements for a
10 certification are addressed in 18 USC § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B). See
11 *supra* I(G)(1). Under section 2511(2)(a)(ii), "No cause of action
12 shall lie in any court against any provider of wire or electronic
13 communication service * * * for providing information, facilities,
14 or assistance in accordance with the terms of a * * * certification
15 under this chapter." This provision is referenced in 18 USC §
16 2520(a) (emphasis added), which creates a private right of action
17 under Title III:

18 Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii), any
19 person whose wire, oral, or electronic
20 communication is intercepted, disclosed, or
21 intentionally used in violation of this chapter [18
22 USCS §§ 2510 et seq] may in a civil action recover
from the person or entity, other than the United
States, which engaged in that violation such relief
as may be appropriate.

23 A similar provision exists at 18 USC § 2703(e) (emphasis added):

24 No cause of action shall lie in any court against
25 any provider of wire or electronic communication
26 service, its officers, employees, agents, or other
27 specified persons for providing information,
28 facilities, or assistance in accordance with the
terms of a court order, warrant, subpoena,
statutory authorization, or certification under
this chapter.

1 The court recognizes that the language emphasized above
2 suggests that to state a claim under these statutes, a plaintiff
3 must affirmatively allege that a telecommunications provider did
4 not receive a government certification. And out of the many
5 statutory exceptions in section 2511, only section 2511(2)(a)(ii)
6 appears in section 2520(a), thereby suggesting that a lack of
7 certification is an element of a Title III claim whereas the other
8 exceptions are simply affirmative defenses. As AT&T notes, this
9 interpretation is at least somewhat supported by the Senate report
10 accompanying 18 USC § 2520, which states in relevant part:

11 A civil action will not lie [under 18 USC § 2520]
12 where the requirements of sections 2511(2)(a)(ii) of
13 title 18 are met. With regard to that exception,
the Committee intends that the following procedural
standards will apply:

14 (1) The complaint must allege that a wire or
15 electronic communications service provider (or
one of its employees) (a) disclosed the
16 existence of a wiretap; (b) acted without a
facially valid court order or certification;
17 (c) acted beyond the scope of a court order or
certification or (d) acted on bad faith.
18 Acting in bad faith would include failing to
19 read the order or collusion. If the complaint
fails to make any of these allegations, the
20 defendant can move to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.

21 ECPA, S Rep No 99-541, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 26 (1986) (reprinted in
22 1986 USCCAN 3555, 3580) (emphasis added).

23 Nonetheless, the statutory text does not explicitly
24 provide for a heightened pleading requirement, which is in essence
25 what AT&T seeks to impose here. And the court is reluctant to
26 infer a heightened pleading requirement into the statute given that
27 in other contexts, Congress has been explicit when it intended to
28 create such a requirement. See, e g, Private Securities Litigation

1 Reform Act of 1995, § 101, 15 USC § 78u-4(b)(1), (2) (prescribing
2 heightened pleading standards for securities class actions).

3 In any event, the court need not decide whether
4 plaintiffs must plead affirmatively the absence of a certification
5 because the present complaint, liberally construed, alleges that
6 AT&T acted outside the scope of any government certification it
7 might have received. In particular, paragraphs 81 and 82, which
8 are incorporated in all of plaintiffs' claims, state:

9 81. On information and belief, the
10 above-described acts [by defendants] of
11 interception, disclosure, divulgence and/or use of
12 Plaintiffs' and class members' communications,
13 contents of communications, and records pertaining
14 to their communications occurred without judicial
15 or other lawful authorization, probable cause,
16 and/or individualized suspicion.

17 82. On information and belief, at all
18 relevant times, the government instigated, directed
19 and/or tacitly approved all of the above-described
20 acts of AT&T Corp.

21 FAC, ¶¶ 81-82 (emphasis added).

22 Plaintiffs contend that the phrase "occurred without
23 judicial or other lawful authorization" means that AT&T acted
24 without a warrant or a certification. Doc #176 (Pl Opp AT&T MTD)
25 at 13-15. At oral argument, AT&T took issue with this
26 characterization of "lawful authorization":

27 The emphasis there is on the word 'lawful[.]' When
28 you read that paragraph in context, it's clear that
what [plaintiffs are] saying is that any
authorization [AT&T] receive[s] is, in
[plaintiffs'] view, unlawful. And you can see that
because of the other paragraphs in the complaint.
The very next one, [p]aragraph 82, is the paragraph
where [plaintiffs] allege that the United States
government approved and instigated all of our
actions. It wouldn't be reasonable to construe
Paragraph 81 as saying that [AT&T was] not
authorized by the government to do what [AT&T]
allegedly did when the very next paragraph states
the exact opposite.

1 6/23/06 Transcript at 10:21-11:6. Indeed, the court does not
2 question that it would be extraordinary for a large, sophisticated
3 entity like AT&T to assist the government in a warrantless
4 surveillance program without receiving a certification to insulate
5 its actions.

6 Nonetheless, paragraph 81 could be reasonably interpreted
7 as alleging just that. Even if "the government instigated,
8 directed and/or tacitly approved" AT&T's alleged actions, it does
9 not inexorably follow that AT&T received an official certification
10 blessing its actions. At the hearing, plaintiffs' counsel
11 suggested that they had "information and belief based on the news
12 reports that [the alleged activity] was done based on oral
13 requests" not a written certification. Id at 24:21-22.
14 Additionally, the phrase "judicial or other lawful authorization"
15 in paragraph 81 parallels how "a court order" and "a certification"
16 appear in 18 USC §§ 2511(2)(a)(ii)(A) and (B), respectively; this
17 suggests that "lawful authorization" refers to a certification.
18 Interpreted in this manner, plaintiffs are making a factual
19 allegation that AT&T did not receive a certification.

20 In sum, even if plaintiffs were required to plead
21 affirmatively that AT&T did not receive a certification authorizing
22 its alleged actions, plaintiffs' complaint can fairly be
23 interpreted as alleging just that. Whether and to what extent the
24 government authorized AT&T's alleged conduct remain issues for
25 further litigation. For now, however, the court DENIES AT&T's
26 motion to dismiss on this ground.

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C

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2 AT&T also contends that the complaint should be dismissed
3 because it failed to plead the absence of an absolute common law
4 immunity to which AT&T claims to be entitled. AT&T MTD at 13-15.
5 AT&T asserts that this immunity "grew out of a recognition that
6 telecommunications carriers should not be subject to civil
7 liability for cooperating with government officials conducting
8 surveillance activities. That is true whether or not the
9 surveillance was lawful, so long as the government officials
10 requesting cooperation assured the carrier that it was." Id at 13.
11 AT&T also argues that the statutory immunities do not evince a
12 "congressional purpose to displace, rather than supplement, the
13 common law." Id.

14 AT&T overstates the case law when intimating that the
15 immunity is long established and unequivocal. AT&T relies
16 primarily on two cases: Halperin v Kissinger, 424 F Supp 838 (DDC
17 1976), revd on other grounds, 606 F2d 1192 (DC Cir 1979) and Smith
18 v Nixon, 606 F2d 1183 (DC Cir 1979). In Halperin, plaintiffs
19 alleged that the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company (C&P)
20 assisted federal officials in illegally wiretapping plaintiffs'
21 home telephone, thereby violating plaintiffs' constitutional and
22 Title III statutory rights. 424 F Supp at 840. In granting
23 summary judgment for C&P, the district court noted:

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1 Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, argues
2 persuasively that it played no part in selecting
3 any wiretap suspects or in determining the length
4 of time the surveillance should remain. It
5 overheard none of plaintiffs' conversations and was
6 not informed of the nature or outcome of the
7 investigation. As in the past, C&P acted in
8 reliance upon a request from the highest Executive
9 officials and with assurances that the wiretap
10 involved national security matters. Under these
11 circumstances, C&P's limited technical role in the
12 surveillance as well as its reasonable expectation
13 of legality cannot give rise to liability for any
14 statutory or constitutional violation.

15 Id at 846.

16 Smith v Nixon involved an allegedly illegal wiretap that
17 was part of the same surveillance program implicated in Halperin.

18 In addressing C&P's potential liability, the Smith court noted:

19 The District Court dismissed the action against
20 C&P, which installed the wiretap, on the ground
21 cited in the District Court's opinion in Halperin:
22 'C&P's limited technical role in the surveillance
23 as well as its reasonable expectation of legality
24 cannot give rise to liability for any statutory or
25 constitutional violation. * * *.' We think this
26 was the proper disposition. The telephone company
27 did not initiate the surveillance, and it was
28 assured by the highest Executive officials in this
29 nation that the action was legal.

30 606 F2d at 1191 (citation and footnote omitted) (omission in
31 original).

32 The court first observes that Halperin, which formed the
33 basis for the Smith decision, never indicated that C&P was "immune"
34 from suit; rather, the court granted summary judgment after it
35 determined that C&P played only a "limited technical role" in the
36 surveillance. And although C&P was dismissed in Smith on a motion
37 to dismiss, Smith never stated that C&P was immune from suit; the
38 only discussion of "immunity" there related to other defendants who
39 claimed entitlement to qualified and absolute immunity.

1 At best, the language in Halperin and Smith is equivocal:
2 the phrase "C&P's limited technical role in the surveillance as
3 well as its reasonable expectation of legality cannot give rise to
4 liability for any statutory or constitutional violation" could
5 plausibly be interpreted as describing a good faith defense. And
6 at least one court appears to have interpreted Smith in that
7 manner. See Manufacturas Intl, Ltda v Manufacturers Hanover Trust
8 Co, 792 F Supp 180, 192-93 (EDNY 1992) (referring to Smith while
9 discussing good faith defenses).

10 Moreover, it is not clear at this point in the litigation
11 whether AT&T played a "mere technical role" in the alleged NSA
12 surveillance programs. The complaint alleges that "at all relevant
13 times, the government instigated, directed and/or tacitly approved
14 all of the above-described acts of AT&T Corp." FAC, ¶ 82. But
15 given the massive scale of the programs alleged here and AT&T's
16 longstanding history of assisting the government in classified
17 matters, one could reasonably infer that AT&T's assistance here is
18 necessarily more comprehensive than C&P's assistance in Halperin
19 and Smith. Indeed, there is a world of difference between a single
20 wiretap and an alleged dragnet that sweeps in the communication
21 content and records of all or substantially all AT&T customers.

22 AT&T also relies on two Johnson-era cases: Fowler v
23 Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co, 343 F2d 150 (5th Cir 1965),
24 and Craska v New York Telephone Co, 239 F Supp 932 (NDNY 1965).
25 Fowler involved a Georgia state claim for invasion of right of
26 privacy against a telephone company for assisting federal officers
27 to intercept plaintiff's telephone conversations. Fowler noted
28 that a "defense of privilege" would extend to the telephone company

1 only if the court determined that the federal officers acted within
2 the scope of their duties:

3 If it is established that [the federal officers]
4 acted in the performance and scope of their
5 official powers and within the outer perimeter of
6 their duties as federal officers, then the defense
7 of privilege would be established as to them. In
8 this event the privilege may be extended to
9 exonerate the Telephone Company also if it appears,
10 in line with the allegations of the complaint, that
11 the Telephone Company acted for and at the request
12 of the federal officers and within the bounds of
13 activity which would be privileged as to the
14 federal officers.

15 343 F2d at 156-57 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Fowler does not
16 absolve AT&T of any liability unless and until the court determines
17 that the government acted legally in creating the NSA surveillance
18 programs alleged in the complaint.

19 Craska also does not help AT&T. In that case, plaintiff
20 sued a telephone company for violating her statutory rights by
21 turning over telephone records to the government under compulsion
22 of state law. Craska, 239 F Supp at 933-34, 936. The court
23 declined to ascribe any liability to the telephone company because
24 its assistance was required under state law: "[T]he conduct of the
25 telephone company, acting under the compulsion of State law and
26 process, cannot sensibly be said to have joined in a knowing
27 venture of interception and divulgence of a telephone conversation,
28 which it sought by affirmative action to make succeed." Id at 936.
By contrast, it is not evident whether AT&T was required to help
the government here; indeed, AT&T appears to have confirmed that it
did not have any legal obligation to assist the government
implement any surveillance program. 6/23/06 Transcript at 17:25-
18:4 ("The Court: Well, AT&T could refuse, could it not, to

1 provide access to its facilities? [AT&T]: Yes, it could. Under
2 [18 USC §] 2511, your Honor, AT&T would have the discretion to
3 refuse, and certainly if it believed anything illegal was
4 occurring, it would do so.").

5 Moreover, even if a common law immunity existed decades
6 ago, applying it presently would undermine the carefully crafted
7 scheme of claims and defenses that Congress established in
8 subsequently enacted statutes. For example, all of the cases cited
9 by AT&T as applying the common law "immunity" were filed before the
10 certification provision of FISA went into effect. See § 301 of
11 FISA. That provision protects a telecommunications provider from
12 suit if it obtains from the Attorney General or other authorized
13 government official a written certification "that no warrant or
14 court order is required by law, that all statutory requirements
15 have been met, and that the specified assistance is required." 18
16 USC § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B). Because the common law "immunity" appears
17 to overlap considerably with the protections afforded under the
18 certification provision, the court would in essence be nullifying
19 the procedural requirements of that statutory provision by applying
20 the common law "immunity" here. And given the shallow doctrinal
21 roots of immunity for communications carriers at the time Congress
22 enacted the statutes in play here, there is simply no reason to
23 presume that a common law immunity is available simply because
24 Congress has not expressed a contrary intent. Cf Owen v City of
25 Independence, 445 US 622, 638 (1980) ("[N]otwithstanding § 1983's
26 expansive language and the absence of any express incorporation of
27 common-law immunities, we have, on several occasions, found that a
28 tradition of immunity was so firmly rooted in the common law and

1 was supported such strong policy reasons that 'Congress would have
2 specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.'"
3 (quoting Pierson v Ray, 386 US 547, 555 (1967)).

4 Accordingly, the court DENIES AT&T's motion to dismiss on
5 the basis of a purported common law immunity.

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7 D

8 AT&T also argues that it is entitled to qualified
9 immunity. AT&T MTD at 16. Qualified immunity shields state actors
10 from liability for civil damages "insofar as their conduct does not
11 violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
12 which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v Fitzgerald,
13 457 US 800, 818 (1982). "Qualified immunity strikes a balance
14 between compensating those who have been injured by official
15 conduct and protecting government's ability to perform its
16 traditional functions." Wyatt v Cole, 504 US 158, 167 (1992).
17 "[T]he qualified immunity recognized in Harlow acts to safeguard
18 government, and thereby to protect the public at large, not to
19 benefit its agents." Wyatt v Cole, 504 US 158, 168 (1992).
20 Compare AT&T MTD at 17 ("It would make little sense to protect the
21 principal but not its agent."). The Supreme Court does not "draw a
22 distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought
23 against state officials under [42 USC] § 1983 and suits brought
24 directly under the Constitution [via Bivens v Six Unknown Named
25 Agents, 403 US 388 (1971)] against federal officials." Butz v
26 Economou, 438 US 478, 504 (1978).

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1 At the pleadings stage, qualified immunity analysis
2 entails three steps. First, the court must determine whether,
3 taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts
4 alleged show a violation of the plaintiffs' statutory or
5 constitutional rights. Saucier v Katz, 533 US 194, 201 (2001). If
6 a violation has been alleged, the court next determines whether the
7 right infringed was clearly established at the time of the alleged
8 violation. Finally, the court assesses whether it would be clear
9 to a reasonable person in the defendant's position that its conduct
10 was unlawful in the situation it confronted. *Id* at 202, 205. See
11 also Frederick v Morse, 439 F3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir 2006)
12 (characterizing this final inquiry as a discrete third step in the
13 analysis). "This is not to say that an official action is
14 protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question
15 has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the
16 light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Hope
17 v Pelzer, 536 US 730, 739 (2002) (citation omitted).

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20 When a private party seeks to invoke qualified immunity,
21 the court must first decide whether qualified immunity is
22 "categorically available," which "requires an evaluation of the
23 appropriateness of qualified immunity given its historical
24 availability and the policy considerations underpinning the
25 doctrine." Jensen v Lane County, 222 F3d 570, 576 (9th Cir 2000).
26 This inquiry is distinct from the question whether a nominally
27 private party is a state actor for purposes of a section 1983 or
28 Bivens claim.

1 In Wyatt v Cole, 504 US 158 (1992), the Supreme Court
2 laid the foundation for determining whether a private actor is
3 entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiff there sued under
4 section 1983 to recover property from a private party who had
5 earlier obtained a writ of replevin against the plaintiff. See
6 Lugar v Edmondson Oil Co, 457 US 922 (1982) (holding that a private
7 party acted under color of law under similar circumstances). After
8 determining that the common law did not recognize an immunity from
9 analogous tort suits, the court "conclude[d] that the rationales
10 mandating qualified immunity for public officials are not
11 applicable to private parties." Wyatt, 504 US at 167. Although
12 Wyatt purported to be limited to its facts, *id* at 168, the broad
13 brush with which the Court painted suggested that private parties
14 could rarely, if ever, don the cloak of qualified immunity. See
15 also Ace Beverage Co v Lockheed Information Mgmt Servs, 144 F3d
16 1218, 1219 n3 (9th Cir 1998) (noting that "[i]n cases decided
17 before [the Supreme Court's decision in Richardson v McKnight, 521
18 US 399 (1997)]," the Ninth Circuit had "adopted a general rule that
19 private parties are not entitled to qualified immunity").

20 Applying Wyatt to a case involving section 1983 claims
21 against privately employed prison guards, the Supreme Court in
22 Richardson v McKnight, 521 US 399 (1997), stated that courts should
23 "look both to history and to the purposes that underlie government
24 employee immunity in order to" determine whether that immunity
25 extends to private parties. *Id* at 404. Although this issue has
26 been addressed by the Ninth Circuit in several cases, the court has
27 yet to extend qualified immunity to a private party under McKnight.
28 See, e g, Ace Beverage, 144 F3d at 1220; Jensen, 222 F3d at 576-80.

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2 The court now determines whether the history of the
3 alleged immunity and purposes of the qualified immunity doctrine
4 support extending qualified immunity to AT&T.

5 As described in section II(C), *supra*, no firmly rooted
6 common law immunity exists for telecommunications providers
7 assisting the government. And presently applying whatever immunity
8 might have previously existed would undermine the various statutory
9 schemes created by Congress, including the certification defense
10 under 18 USC § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B).

11 Turning to the purposes of qualified immunity, they
12 include: "(1) protecting the public from unwarranted timidity on
13 the part of public officials and encouraging the vigorous exercise
14 of official authority; (2) preventing lawsuits from distracting
15 officials from their governmental duties; and (3) ensuring that
16 talented candidates are not deterred by the threat of damages suits
17 from entering public service." Jensen, 222 F3d at 577 (citations,
18 quotations and alterations omitted). See also Harlow, 457 US at
19 816 (recognizing "the general costs of subjecting officials to the
20 risks of trial -- distraction of officials from their governmental
21 duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able
22 people from public service"). AT&T contends that national security
23 surveillance is "a traditional governmental function of the highest
24 importance" requiring access to the "critical telecommunications
25 infrastructure" that companies such as AT&T would be reluctant to
26 furnish if they were exposed to civil liability. AT&T MTD at 17.

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1 AT&T's concerns, while relevant, do not warrant extending
2 qualified immunity here because the purposes of that immunity are
3 already well served by the certification provision of 18 USC §
4 2511(2)(a)(ii). As noted above, although it is unclear whether a
5 valid certification would bar plaintiffs' constitutional claim,
6 section 2511(2)(a)(ii) clearly states that a valid certification
7 precludes the statutory claims asserted here. See *supra* I(G)(1).
8 Hence, but for the government's assertion of the state secrets
9 privilege, the certification provision would seem to facilitate
10 prompt adjudication of damages claims such as those at bar. And
11 because section 2511(2)(a)(ii)'s protection does not appear to
12 depend on a fact-intensive showing of good faith, the provision
13 could be successfully invoked without the burdens of full-blown
14 litigation. Compare Tapley v Collins, 211 F3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir
15 2000) (discussing the differences between qualified immunity and
16 good faith defense under Title III, 18 USC § 2520(d)).

17 More fundamentally, "[w]hen Congress itself provides for
18 a defense to its own cause of action, it is hardly open to the
19 federal court to graft common law defenses on top of those Congress
20 creates." Berry v Funk, 146 F3d 1003, 1013 (DC Cir 1998) (holding
21 that qualified immunity could not be asserted against a claim under
22 Title III). As plaintiffs suggest, the Ninth Circuit appears to
23 have concluded that the only defense under Title III is that
24 provided for by statute — although, in fairness, the court did not
25 explicitly address the availability of qualified immunity. See
26 Jacobson v Rose, 592 F2d 515, 522-24 (9th Cir 1978) (joined by
27 then-Judge Kennedy). But cf Doe v United States, 941 F2d 780, 797-
28 99 (9th Cir 1991) (affirming grant of qualified immunity from

1 liability under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act without
2 analyzing whether qualified immunity could be asserted in the first
3 place). Nonetheless, at least two appellate courts have concluded
4 that statutory defenses available under Title III do not preclude a
5 defendant from asserting qualified immunity. Blake v Wright, 179
6 F3d 1003, 1013 (6th Cir 1999) (The court "fail[ed] to see the logic
7 of providing a defense of qualified immunity to protect public
8 officials from personal liability when they violate constitutional
9 rights that are not clearly established and deny them qualified
10 immunity when they violate statutory rights that similarly are not
11 clearly established."); accord Tapley, 211 F3d at 1216. But see
12 Mitchell v Forsyth, 472 US 511, 557 (1985) (Brennan concurring in
13 part and dissenting in part) ("The Court's argument seems to be
14 that the trial court should have decided the legality of the
15 wiretap under Title III before going on to the qualified immunity
16 question, since that question arises only when considering the
17 legality of the wiretap under the Constitution.").

18 With all due respect to the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits,
19 those courts appear to have overlooked the relationship between the
20 doctrine of qualified immunity and the schemes of state and federal
21 official liability that are essentially creatures of the Supreme
22 Court. Qualified immunity is a doctrinal outgrowth of expanded
23 state actor liability under 42 USC § 1983 and Bivens. See Monroe v
24 Pape, 365 US 167 (1961) (breathing new life into section 1983);
25 Scheuer v Rhodes, 416 US 232, 247 (1974) (deploying the phrase
26 "qualified immunity" for the first time in the Supreme Court's
27 jurisprudence); Butz v Economou, 438 US 478 (1978) (extending
28 qualified immunity to federal officers sued under Bivens for

1 federal constitutional violations); Maine v Thiboutot, 448 US 1
2 (1980) (holding that section 1983 could be used to vindicate non-
3 constitutional statutory rights); Harlow, 457 US at 818 (making the
4 unprecedented reference to "clearly established statutory" rights
5 just two years after Thiboutot (emphasis added)). These causes of
6 action "were devised by the Supreme Court without any legislative
7 or constitutional (in the sense of positive law) guidance."
8 Crawford-El v Britton, 93 F3d 813, 832 (DC Cir 1996) (en banc)
9 (Silberman concurring), vacated on other grounds, 523 US 574
10 (1998). "It is understandable then, that the Court also developed
11 the doctrine of qualified immunity to reduce the burden on public
12 officials." Berry, 146 F3d at 1013.

13 In contrast, the statutes in this case set forth
14 comprehensive, free-standing liability schemes, complete with
15 statutory defenses, many of which specifically contemplate
16 liability on the part of telecommunications providers such as AT&T.
17 For example, the Stored Communications Act prohibits providers of
18 "electronic communication service" and "remote computing service"
19 from divulging contents of stored communications. See 18 USC §
20 2702(a)(1), (a)(2). Moreover, the Stored Communications Act
21 specifically contemplates carrier liability for unauthorized
22 disclosure of subscriber records "to any governmental entity." See
23 id § 2702(a)(3). It can hardly be said that Congress did not
24 contemplate that carriers might be liable for cooperating with the
25 government when such cooperation did not conform to the
26 requirements of the act.

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1 Similarly, Congress specifically contemplated that
 2 communications carriers could be liable for violations of Title
 3 III. See Jacobson, 592 F2d at 522. And in providing for a "good
 4 faith" defense in Title III, Congress specifically sought "'to
 5 protect telephone companies or other persons who cooperate * * *
 6 with law enforcement officials.'" Id at 522-23 (quoting Senate
 7 debates). See also id at 523 n 13. Cf 18 USC § 2511(2)(a)(ii)
 8 (providing a statutory defense to "providers of wire or electronic
 9 communication service").

10 In sum, neither the history of judicially created
 11 immunities for telecommunications carriers nor the purposes of
 12 qualified immunity justify allowing AT&T to claim the benefit of
 13 the doctrine in this case.

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16 The court also notes that based on the facts as alleged
 17 in plaintiffs' complaint, AT&T is not entitled to qualified
 18 immunity with respect to plaintiffs' constitutional claim, at least
 19 not at this stage of the proceedings. Plaintiffs' constitutional
 20 claim alleges that AT&T provides the government with direct and
 21 indiscriminate access to the domestic communications of AT&T
 22 customers. See, e g, FAC, ¶ 42 ("On information and belief, AT&T
 23 Corp has provided and continues to provide the government with
 24 direct access to all or a substantial number of the communications
 25 transmitted through its key domestic telecommunications facilities,
 26 including direct access to streams of domestic, international and
 27 foreign telephone and Internet communications."); id, ¶ 78
 28 (incorporating paragraph 42 by reference into plaintiffs'

1 constitutional claim). In United States v United States District
2 Court, 407 US 297 (1972) (Keith), the Supreme Court held that the
3 Fourth Amendment does not permit warrantless wiretaps to track
4 domestic threats to national security, id at 321, reaffirmed the
5 "necessity of obtaining a warrant in the surveillance of crimes
6 unrelated to the national security interest," id at 308, and did
7 not pass judgment "on the scope of the President's surveillance
8 power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or
9 without this country," id. Because the alleged dragnet here
10 encompasses the communications of "all or substantially all of the
11 communications transmitted through [AT&T's] key domestic
12 telecommunications facilities," it cannot reasonably be said that
13 the program as alleged is limited to tracking foreign powers.
14 Accordingly, AT&T's alleged actions here violate the constitutional
15 rights clearly established in Keith. Moreover, because "the very
16 action in question has previously been held unlawful," AT&T cannot
17 seriously contend that a reasonable entity in its position could
18 have believed that the alleged domestic dragnet was legal.

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21 Accordingly, the court DENIES AT&T's instant motion to
22 dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. The court does not
23 preclude AT&T from raising the qualified immunity defense later in
24 these proceedings, if further discovery indicates that such a
25 defense is merited.

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III

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2 As this case proceeds to discovery, the court flags a few
3 procedural matters on which it seeks the parties' guidance. First,
4 while the court has a duty to the extent possible to disentangle
5 sensitive information from nonsensitive information, see Ellsberg,
6 709 F2d at 57, the court also must take special care to honor the
7 extraordinary security concerns raised by the government here. To
8 help perform these duties, the court proposes appointing an expert
9 pursuant to FRE 706 to assist the court in determining whether
10 disclosing particular evidence would create a "reasonable danger"
11 of harming national security. See FRE 706(a) ("The court may on
12 its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show
13 cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request
14 the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any
15 expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert
16 witnesses of its own selection."). Although other courts do not
17 appear to have used FRE 706 experts in the manner proposed here,
18 this procedural innovation seems appropriate given the complex and
19 weighty issues the court will confront in navigating any future
20 privilege assertions. See Ellsberg, 709 F2d at 64 (encouraging
21 "procedural innovation" in addressing state secrets issues);
22 Halpern, 258 F2d at 44 ("A trial *in camera* in which the privilege
23 relating to state secrets may not be availed of by the United
24 States is permissible, if, in the judgment of the district court,
25 such a trial can be carried out without substantial risk that
26 secret information will be publicly divulged").

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1 The court contemplates that the individual would be one
2 who had a security clearance for receipt of the most highly
3 sensitive information and had extensive experience in intelligence
4 matters. This individual could perform a number of functions;
5 among others, these might include advising the court on the risks
6 associated with disclosure of certain information, the manner and
7 extent of appropriate disclosures and the parties' respective
8 contentions. While the court has at least one such individual in
9 mind, it has taken no steps to contact or communicate with the
10 individual to determine availability or other matters. This is an
11 appropriate subject for discussion with the parties.

12 The court also notes that should it become necessary for
13 the court to review additional classified material, it may be
14 preferable for the court to travel to the location of those
15 materials than for them to be hand-carried to San Francisco. Of
16 course, a secure facility is available in San Francisco and was
17 used to house classified documents for a few days while the court
18 conducted its *in camera* review for purposes of the government's
19 instant motion. The same procedures that were previously used
20 could be employed again. But alternative procedures may also be
21 used and may in some instances be more appropriate.

22 Finally, given that the state secrets issues resolved
23 herein represent controlling questions of law as to which there is
24 a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
25 immediate appeal may materially advance ultimate termination of the
26 litigation, the court certifies this order for the parties to apply
27 for an immediate appeal pursuant to 28 USC § 1292(b). The court
28 notes that if such an appeal is taken, the present proceedings do

1 not necessarily have to be stayed. 28 USC § 1292(b)
2 ("[A]pplication for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings
3 in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of
4 Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order."). At the very least,
5 it would seem prudent for the court to select the expert pursuant
6 to FRE 706 prior to the Ninth Circuit's review of this matter.

7 Accordingly, the court ORDERS the parties to SHOW CAUSE
8 in writing by July 31, 2006, why it should not appoint an expert
9 pursuant to FRE 706 to assist in the manner stated above. The
10 responses should propose nominees for the expert position and
11 should also state the parties' views regarding the means by which
12 the court should review any future classified submissions.
13 Moreover, the parties should describe what portions of this case,
14 if any, should be stayed if this order is appealed.

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IV

In sum, the court DENIES the government's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment on the basis of state secrets and DENIES AT&T's motion to dismiss. As noted in section III, *supra*, the parties are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing by July 31, 2006, why the court should not appoint an expert pursuant to FRE 706 to assist the court. The parties' briefs should also address whether this action should be stayed pending an appeal pursuant to 28 USC § 1292(b).

The parties are also instructed to appear on August 8, 2006, at 2 PM, for a further case management conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.



VAUGHN R WALKER
United States District Chief Judge