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 CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA
 BY

The Honorable Robert J. Bryan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
 AT TACOMA

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JAMES HORTON, JAMES BARNHART,
 JEROME PAYTON, J.B., through his
 next friend, LORRAINE WEST, and
 K.M., through his mother DEBBIE
 MOORE, on behalf of themselves
 and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

BOB WILLIAMS, in his official
 capacity as Superintendent of
 Green Hill School; JEAN SOLIZ,
 in her official capacity as
 Secretary of the Department of
 Social and Health Services; and
 SID SIDOROWICZ, in his official
 capacity as Assistant Secretary
 of the Juvenile Rehabilitation
 Administration; and the Chehalis
 School District,

Defendants.

CLASS ACTION
 NO. C94-5428 RJB
 AMENDED
 MEMORANDUM OPPOSING MOTION
 FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

This memorandum is filed by defendants Williams, Soliz, and Sidorowicz (state defendants) in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction to prevent them from authorizing the use of pepper spray on residents at Green Hill School.

I. FACTS

Green Hill is the state institution which houses the oldest and most violent juvenile offenders in Washington. Att. 1 at 2. In such an institution, it is inevitable that some residents will

30

1 engage in threatening and violent behavior. Att. 2 at 2-5. In
2 October 1990 Green Hill instituted a policy allowing the use of
3 pepper spray against threatening residents. Att. 1 at 2-4. Many
4 law enforcement agencies and correctional facilities use it. Att.
5 1 at 4. Pepper spray temporarily incapacitates the person
6 sprayed. The point of using the spray is to take control of a
7 defiant and threatening resident without the need to physically
8 subdue the resident which creates a serious risk of injury to both
9 the resident and staff. Att. 1 at 4. The numbers of assaults and
10 injuries at Green Hill in fact is down since the introduction of
11 pepper spray. Att. 1 at 4. Spraying has occurred 103 times or
12 about twice per month, and about six percent of the residents have
13 been sprayed. Att 1 at 4.

14 Oleoresin capsicum (pepper spray) is a naturally occurring
15 substance found in the oily resin of cayenne and other varieties
16 of pepper. Att. 3 at 2-3. Pepper spray temporarily
17 incapacitates a person by inducing an almost immediate burning
18 sensation of the skin, and a burning, tearing, and swelling of the
19 eyes. Att. 3 at 3. These sensations quickly diminish, and
20 generally disappear completely within 15 to 45 minutes once a
21 person receives fresh air, and showers to flush the eyes and skin
22 with soap and water. Att. 3 at 3. Oleoresin capsicum, moreover,
23 is biodegradable and, unlike chemical irritants, does not linger
24 in ventilated affected areas or in clothing. Att. 3 at 4-5.
25 Studies have discovered no known long-term health risks or deaths
26 caused by exposure to pepper spray. Att. 3.

1 At Green Hill, residents generally are showered within 10 to
2 15 minutes of being sprayed (Att. 1 at 18), and receive prompt
3 medical attention. Att. 4 at 2-3. Residents have experienced no
4 medical problems caused by being sprayed. Att. 4.

5 After this lawsuit was filed, Green Hill modified its pepper
6 spray policy to address plaintiffs' concerns. Most importantly,
7 the new policy more exactly defines the situations in which pepper
8 spray may be used.

9 [1] The resident fails to follow a staff directive, and use
10 of other physical restraint methods to gain compliance,
11 without the use of pepper spray, likely would result in
12 bodily injury to resident, staff, and others.

13 [2] The resident is engaging in disruptive behavior in his
14 room which creates a serious disturbance and threatens
15 institutional security by inciting serious misbehavior by
16 other residents.

17 Att. 1 at 5-7. The new policy also more exactly prescribes
18 warnings given prior to use (Att. 1 at 7); does away with spraying
19 "pre-authorized" by the superintendent (Att. 1 at 7-8); enhances
20 the training of staff authorized to use pepper spray (Att. 1 at 9-
21 10); and requires administrative reviews of all pepper spray
22 incidents (Att. 1 at 9). Green Hill also now uses only the 5%
23 spray concentration, as opposed to the 10% that plaintiffs believe
24 is more potent. Att. 1 at 7.

25 Since the new policy was implemented on October 1, 1994,
26 pepper spray has been used at Green Hill in two incidents
involving a total of three residents. Att. 1 at 18-24.

By no means does Green Hill rely on the use of pepper spray
to control the behavior of residents. Instead, there is a "point"

1 system to reward good behavior by granting special privileges.
2 Att. 1 at 13-14. Room confinement for limited periods is used as
3 a consequence for misbehaving. Att. 1 at 14. Residents who
4 engage in serious misbehavior are placed in an "intensive
5 management unit" (IMU) to provide them more intensive supervision
6 and programming designed to correct their behavior. Att. 1 at 14,
7 Att. 2. In addition, behavior is managed through extensive mental
8 health services, counseling, and group therapy. Att. 1 at 11-13,
9 Att. 2.

10 While plaintiffs believe the use of pepper spray is
11 emotionally damaging and harms the rehabilitative environment,
12 Green Hill's experienced psychologist and psychiatrist believe the
13 use of pepper spray is a much better alternative to using physical
14 force on a resident, and actually results in a better treatment
15 environment by removing the risk of injury and discouraging
16 assaultive behavior. Att 2.

17 Staff views Green Hill as a dangerous place to work, and
18 believes pepper spray in an essential tool in avoiding physical
19 confrontations that too often result in injury. They believe
20 pepper spray is safe, effective, and does not harm the treatment
21 environment. Att. 5.

22 II. ARGUMENT

23 To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must show either
24 (1) likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of
25 irreparable injury, or (2) the existence of serious questions
26 going to the merits, tipping the balance of hardships in favor of

1 the moving party. Diamondiney v. Borg, 918 F.2d 793, 795 (9th
2 Cir. 1990). A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy,
3 and the burden is on the moving party to make a clear showing that
4 money damages or other remedies are not adequate under the
5 circumstances. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 785 F.Supp.
6 826, 831 (N.D.Cal. 1992).

7 A. Use of pepper spray under the new policy is a legitimate
8 tool for maintaining institutional security.

9 There are no state or federal decisions on the
10 constitutionality of using pepper spray on a threatening suspect
11 or inmate.¹ However, in Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307
12 (1982), involving the use of restraints against a person civilly-
13 committed to a mental institution, the court set out the following
14 test:

15 In determining whether a substantive right protected by the
16 due process clause has been violated, it is necessary to
17 balance 'the liberty interest of the individual' and the
18 'demands of an organized society'... In seeking this balance
19 in other cases, the Court has weighed an individual's
20 interest in liberty against the state's asserted reasons for
21 restraining the individual.

19 Id. at 320. In applying this test, the court ruled that it will
20 uphold:

21
22 ¹ To the state's knowledge, there is only one decision
23 (unreported) in which pepper spray is discussed. Roy v. City of
24 Lewiston, 1994 WL 129774 (D.Me.) In that case, plaintiff who was
25 shot by a policeman argued the city was negligent in failing to
26 use pepper mace to avoid the need to use deadly force. Plaintiff
contended that in 1991, when the shooting occurred, the city
should have known about a 1989 FBI study which found pepper spray
to be safe and effective in incapacitating threatening suspects.
In finding for the city, the court held that not knowing about
pepper spray did not constitute "deliberate indifference".

1 those restrictions on liberty that were reasonably related to
2 legitimate government objectives, and not tantamount to
punishment.

3 Id. The Youngberg test applies to challenges to conditions of
4 confinement of juvenile offenders who, as in Washington, have not
5 been convicted of a crime. Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430,
6 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). In this case, therefore, use of pepper spray
7 at Green Hill under the terms of the new policy must be upheld if
8 it is (1) reasonably related to legitimate government objectives,
9 and (2) not tantamount to punishment.

10 1. The new policy is related to legitimate government
11 objectives.

12 Maintaining the security of an institution is a legitimate
13 government objective. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). In
14 pursuing this objective, prison officials may use tear gas. Spain
15 v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979). There, the court
16 noted:

17 We think the record further indicates, however, that use of
18 the substance in small amounts may be a necessary prison
19 technique if a prisoner refuses after adequate warning to
move from a cell or upon other provocation presenting a
reasonable possibility that slight force will be required.

20 Id. at 195. The court further held:

21 where there are safeguards to insure that tear gas is not
22 used in dangerous quantities, we think use can be justified
23 in situations which are reasonably likely to result in injury
to persons or a substantial amount of valuable property.

24 Id. at 196.² In a later case, Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d

25 ² The court in Procunier was concerned that "small" amounts be
used because tear gas can be "extremely dangerous". 600 F.2d at
193⁶ There is no evidence, on the other hand, that pepper spray is

1 328 (9th Cir. 1988), the court upheld the use of a taser gun in
2 potentially dangerous prison situations because:

3 The taser was used to enforce compliance with a search that
4 had a reasonable security purpose, not as punishment. The
legitimate intended result of shooting is incapacitation of
5 a dangerous person...

6 Id. at 335. Use of the taser gun, the court held, was not
7 enjoined because, while it may produce nausea and headaches, the
8 prisoner failed to meet his burden of showing that there were
9 adverse long-term health effects. Id. at 336. The
10 appropriateness of its use, the court concluded, depends on the
11 facts and circumstances of the particular case. Id.

12 Although Procunier and Michenfelder were decided under the
13 Eighth Amendment, they are relevant. That is because in judging
14 conditions of confinement at a juvenile institution, a court must
15 apply "the due process clause which implicitly incorporates the
16 (Eighth Amendment) cruel and unusual clause standards as a
17 constitutional minimum." Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d at 1432.
18 The differences between adult and juvenile institutions "should be
19 accounted for in the liability stage, not the remedy stage." Id.

20 Indeed, when it comes to the need to prevent injury and
21 maintain institutional security, there cannot be a lesser standard
22 of safety in a juvenile institution than in an adult institution.
23 Those who work and reside in a juvenile institution are entitled
24 to the same level of safety.

25
26 dangerous.

1 Under the cases discussed above, Green Hill's new pepper
2 spray policy is constitutionally-permissible because it is
3 reasonably related to a legitimate government objective.³ This
4 conclusion is supported by the following:

5 1. Pepper spray is effective in incapacitating a resident to
6 allow staff to safely take control of him.

7 2. Use of pepper spray is appropriate only in two
8 situations. First, it may be used when necessary to take
9 control of a resident, and failure to use pepper spray likely
10 would result in injury. Second, it may be used when a
11 resident's conduct in his room causes a serious disturbance
12 outside the room. These two circumstances both are directly
13 related to preventing injury and maintaining security.

14 3. Staff receives training on de-escalation skills, and how
15 to properly use pepper spray.

16 4. Prior to using spray, staff is required to attempt to
17 resolve the situation verbally, and to give advance warnings,
18 in a process that generally continues for 30 minutes.

19 ³ Plaintiffs misleadingly cite to the dispositions of staff
20 members in an attempt to discredit how pepper spray was used
21 under the former policy. For example, while cursing could lead
22 to spraying of a resident, there also had to be a security
23 threat. Beaver Dep., p. 116, 1. 13-17. While on-the-job
24 experience taught staff de-escalation skills, there also was
25 formal training on this subject. Beaver Dep., p 133, 1. 10-11.
26 In singling out an incident in which they felt an allegedly
disturbed resident should not have been sprayed, plaintiffs fail
to mention he had a claw hammer. Beaver Dep., pp. 106-108.
Plaintiffs quote staff as saying incident reports on spraying
often are not filed, when in fact this failure very rarely
occurs. Beaver Dep. p. 36, 1. 5.

In fact deposed staff agreed that pepper spray was needed
only a small percentage of the time when a disturbance occurs
(Beaver Dep. p. 135-36, Eberle Dep., p 97-98, Rondo Dep., p.
101); that the purpose of pepper spray is to prevent injury
(Beaver Dep. p. 134, 1. 14-17, Eberle Dep., p. 96-97, Rondo Dep.,
p. 100, 1. 19-20); that staff's goal is having to use peppery
spray as little as possible (Beaver Dep., p. 133, 2. 13-19,
Eberle Dep., p. 97, 1. 12, Rondo Dep., p. 102, 1. 14-17); and
that pepper spray is an important tool in preventing injury to
staff and residents (Beaver Dep., p. 136, 1. 4, Eberle Dep., p.
98, 1. 14-25, Rondo Dep., p. 101, 1. 13.)

1 5. Although pepper spray, in incapacitating an individual,
2 causes discomfort for 30 to 45 minutes, it does not have any
long-term effects.

3 6. Sprayed residents receive prompt medical attention to
4 alleviate the symptoms.

5 7. Green Hill does not rely on pepper spray to control the
6 behavior of residents. Instead, there is an incentive
program for good behavior, room confinement, counseling, and
sundry special programs.

7 Plaintiffs seek to prohibit altogether the use of pepper
8 spray at Green Hill. Except to recommend that staff become better
9 at verbal de-escalation, they offer no alternative method of
10 safely controlling a threatening resident. Their leading
11 behavioral expert, Mr. DeMuro, also criticizes both "room
12 confinement" as a punishment for misbehavior, and "intensive
13 management units" to treat residents with serious behavior
14 problems. He claims there are better methods of controlling
15 threatening residents, but fails to say what they are. The
16 weakness of plaintiffs' position is exposed by their inability to
17 offer specific alternative methods for controlling threatening
18 residents.

19 2. Pepper spray is not used as punishment.

20 The second part of the Youngberg test is that the restraint
21 not be used as punishment. As stated in Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at
22 336.

23 A legitimate prison policy of carrying tasers to enforce
24 discipline and security would not warrant their use when
unnecessary, or 'for the role purpose of punishment or
25 infliction of pain.'

26 In that case, the court held that use of a taser gun to

1 discipline and security would not warrant their use when
2 unnecessary, or 'for the role purpose of punishment or
3 infliction of pain.'

4 In that case, the court held that use of a taser gun to
5 enforce a requirement that inmates submit to a security search was
6 permissible, because the use had a legitimate security objective,
7 and was not used merely to inflict pain or punishment. By
8 contrast, a stun gun may not be used as punishment for an inmate
9 failing to sweep out his cell. Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754 (8th
10 Cir. 1993).

11 Plaintiffs repeatedly allege pepper spray is used at Green
12 Hill simply to punish non-compliance with a staff directive.
13 Certainly, every spray incident begins with a resident failing to
14 follow a staff directive. There must be more, however: there must
15 a threat to security, which is defined in the pepper spray policy.
16 Under the reasoning in Procunier and Michenfelder, the policy is
17 constitutional because spraying has a security objective (i.e.,
18 preventing injury), and therefore is not punishment. ⁴

19 Plaintiffs contend that using pepper spray is improper
20 because there are no mental health services provided. The point
21 of pepper spray is to prevent injury and maintain security. When
22 an incident is occurring, the policy is to diffuse the situation
23 as quickly as possible through verbal negotiation. An array of
24 services to address mental health issues is available at Green

25 ⁴ By contrast, under Green Hill procedures, when a resident
26 simply fails to follow a staff directive, and security is not
threatened, staff may "punish" the resident by taking away
privileges or imposing temporary room confinement.

1 institution may take steps to prevent injury and maintain
2 security, regardless of their effects on the treatment
3 environment. Green Hill, however, is convinced that use of pepper
4 spray actually improves the treatment environment by reducing the
5 risk of injury, and by discouraging threatening behavior.

6 B. Cases cited by plaintiffs do not support their argument.

7 Plaintiffs cite a host of cases in support of their request
8 for a complete ban on the use of pepper spray at Green Hill. Pl.
9 Brief at 18-19. These cases do not support their argument.

10 In several of the cases, harsh disciplinary practices were
11 held unconstitutional. Stewart v. Rhodes, 473 F.Supp. 1185, 1193
12 (S.D.Ohio 1979) ("acting out" is not grounds for putting a
13 prisoner in a "four-point" restraint in which he is chained on his
14 back to a metal bed frame by means of handcuffs and leg irons);
15 Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 1993) (prisoner who failed
16 to sweep out his cell may not be shot with a stun gun); Nelson v.
17 Heyne, 355 F.Supp. 451, 454 (N.D.Ind. 1972) (a juvenile offender
18 may not receive "beating by use of a thick board" for violating
19 institutional rules); Morales v. Turman, 364 F.Supp. 166, 173
20 (E.D.Tex. 1973) (struck down "widespread practices of beating,
21 slapping, kicking, and otherwise physically abusing juvenile
22 inmates, in the absence of any exigent circumstances"); Milonas v.
23 Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 942 (10 Cir. 1982) ("hair dances", whereby
24 juveniles were restrained by the hair, may not be used where
25 "physical violence" or "physical control" is not at issue). These
26 cases involved situations in which force was applied without a

1 showing of any legitimate security objective. By contrast, under
2 Green Hill's policy, pepper spray may be used only in two specific
3 circumstances when necessary to prevent injury and maintain
4 institutional security.

5 The other cases cited by plaintiffs involved the use of tear
6 gas. Soto v. Cady, 566 F.Supp. 773, 779 (E.D.Wisc. 1983) (tear gas
7 may be used "to subdue an inmate who poses an immediate threat of
8 injury" which means at least "making physically threatening
9 gestures"); Greear v. Loving, 538 F.2d 578, 579 (4th Cir.
10 1978) (summary judgment against plaintiff improper when he alleges
11 tear gas was used to punish him for destroying property); McCargo
12 v. Mister, 462 F.Supp. 813, 819 (D.Md. 1978) (because tear gas is
13 potentially dangerous, and affects persons who are not targets, it
14 may be used only in situations posing the utmost degree of danger
15 and loss of control); Morris v. Travisono, 528 F.2d 856, 858 (1st
16 Cir. 1976) (tear gas may not be used to punish non-threatening
17 behavior). These cases hold that there must be security reasons
18 for using tear gas. The courts are especially cautious about
19 approving the use of tear gas because it is a potentially
20 dangerous substance. Spain v. Proconier, 600 F.2d at 194.

21 What plaintiffs request is a complete ban on the use of
22 pepper spray. Cases cited by plaintiffs underscore the fact there
23 is simply no precedence for banning a substance, such as pepper
24 spray, which is non-dangerous and can control a threatening
25 person.

26 C. The Court must show deference to the Green Hill policy.

1 In Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1126 (5th Cir. 1982), the
2 court noted the limited role of the judiciary in challenges to
3 prison conditions:

4 The duty to protect inmates' constitutional rights does not
5 confer the power to manage prisons, for which courts are ill-
6 equipped, or the capacity to second-guess prison
7 administrators. Federal courts should not, in the name of the
8 constitution, become enmeshed in the minutiae of prison
9 operations. Our task is limited to enforcing constitutional
10 standards and does not embrace superintending prison
11 administration.

12 The court stated further:

13 As a matter of respect for the state's role and for the
14 allocation of functions in our federal system, as well as
15 comity towards the state, the relief ordered by the federal
16 court must be consistent with the policy of minimum intrusion
17 into the affairs of state prison administration...

18 Id. The Ninth Circuit expressly adopts the Ruiz view of the
19 limited role of the federal judiciary. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801
20 F.2d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 1986). This deference extends with
21 special force to security matters. A prison's "internal security
22 is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison
23 administrators." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).
24 Prison administrators "should be accorded wide-ranging deference
25 in the adoption and execution of policies and practice that in
26 their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and to
maintain institutional security." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at
547.

This deference applies to juvenile institutions as well as
adult prisons. As stated in a juvenile institution case, Gary H.
v. Hegstad, 831 F.2d at 1433:

1 The court should defer to the policy choices made by prison
2 officials and order a remedy consistent with the basic
3 approach taken by prison officials, unless that approach
4 itself is inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment.

5 Quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir.1982).

6 Youngberg v. Romero, 407 U.S. at 324, held:

7 Decisions made by the appropriate professionals are entitled
8 to a presumption of correctness. Such a presumption is
9 necessary to enable institutions of this type -- often,
10 unfortunately overcrowded and understaffed -- to continue to
11 function.

12 Based on these cases, Green Hill's pepper spray policy is
13 entitled to deference by the court, and to a presumption of
14 correctness. Deference is due because it was formulated by
15 professionals at Green Hill, who are best equipped to judge
16 security needs of the institution. For reasons discussed in
17 Section II(A) of this memorandum, the pepper spray policy should
18 be upheld, and the security decisions of Green Hill officials
19 should not be second-guessed. Plaintiffs have not overcome the
20 presumption of correctness that attaches to the policy. Granting
21 the injunction would be an impermissible intrusion into the
22 internal security affairs of a state correctional institution.

23 D. The current pepper spray policy does not warrant the
24 court granting a preliminary injunction.

25 Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Milan, offers conclusory opinions
26 that many of the prior sprays were of residents who presented no
immediate danger. Green Hill disputes this conclusion, although
admits two sprays were improper because the residents were
handcuffed at the time. While the number of inappropriate past

1 | sprays is in dispute, the fact is that since the time this lawsuit
2 | was filed, Green Hill adopted a new pepper spray policy that
3 | addresses all plaintiffs' concerns. Infra. at 2-3.

4 | Regardless of what allegedly happened in the past, a
5 | plaintiff must demonstrate a "credible threat" of specific injury.
6 | Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 (1983). There must be an
7 | individualized showing of a "very significant possibility" that
8 | future harm will incur. Nelson v. King Cy., 895 F.2d 1248, 1950
9 | (9th Cir. 1990). Past exposure to harm is largely irrelevant when
10 | ruling on injunctive relief predicated on the threat of future
11 | harm, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.
12 | O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974). In denying a
13 | claim for injunctive relief, the court in Rodriguez v. Kincheloe,
14 | 763 F.Supp. 463, 468 (E.D.Wash. 1991) held:

15 | Mr. Rodriguez has presented no evidence of continuing,
16 | present adverse effects from the alleged unconstitutional
17 | conduct. Thus, he must show a threat of future harm. 'The
18 | burden (of) showing a likelihood of recurrence (is) firmly on
19 | the plaintiff.'

20 | On October 1, 1994, Green Hill implemented a new pepper spray
21 | policy. Since that time, pepper spray has been used three times,
22 | and clearly was justified in each circumstance. There is
23 | absolutely no reason to believe that the policy will not be
24 | followed in the future. Green Hill's willingness to adopt a new
25 | policy addressing all of plaintiffs' concerns, and its record of
26 | adhering to that policy, demonstrate plaintiffs cannot meet their
27 | burden of showing a very significant probability of future harm.


1 For the sake of argument, if Green Hill in the future uses
2 spray in violation of the policy, plaintiffs may have a claim for
3 damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They also may have a claim for
4 injunctive relief if they can show a very significant probability
5 of additional violations in the future. However, under the
6 current situation, there are no grounds for injunctive relief
7 because Green Hill has adopted a constitutional policy for using
8 pepper spray, is abiding by it, and intends to keep abiding by it.

9 III. CONCLUSION

10 Based on the foregoing, the state defendants respectively
11 request that plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction be
12 denied.

13 DATED this 31 day of November, 1994.

14 CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE
15 Attorney General

16 
17 RICHARD A. McCARTAN, WSBA #8323
18 Assistant Attorney General
19 Attorneys for Defendants
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