



JI-WA-0002-0021

✓ 96
5/2/01

The Honorable Robert J. Bryan

ORIGINAL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

JAMES HORTON, JAMES BARNHART,
JEROME PAYTON, J.B., through his
next friend, LORRAINE WEST, and
K.M., through his mother DEBBIE
MOORE, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated,

CLASS ACTION
NO. C94-5428 RJB

MEMORANDUM OPPOSING MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs,

vs.

BOB WILLIAMS, in his official
capacity as Superintendent of
Green Hill School; JEAN SOLIZ,
in her official capacity as
Secretary of the Department of
Social and Health Services; and
SID SIDOROWICZ, in his official
capacity as Assistant Secretary
of the Juvenile Rehabilitation
Administration; and the Chehalis
School District,

FILED RECEIVED
NOV 21 1994
CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA
BY DEPUTY

Defendants.

This memorandum is filed by defendants Williams, Soliz, and Sidorowicz (state defendants) in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction to prevent them from authorizing the use of pepper spray on residents at Green Hill School.

I. FACTS

Green Hill is the state institution which houses the oldest and most violent juvenile offenders in Washington. Att. 1 at 2. In such an institution, it is inevitable that some residents will

37

1 engage in threatening and violent behavior. Att. 2 at 2-5. In
2 October 1990 Green Hill instituted a policy allowing the use of
3 pepper spray against threatening residents. Att. 1 at 2-4. Many
4 law enforcement agencies and correctional facilities use it. Att.
5 1 at 4. Pepper spray temporarily incapacitates the person
6 sprayed. The point of using the spray is to take control of a
7 defiant and threatening resident without the need to physically
8 subdue the resident which creates a serious risk of injury to both
9 the resident and staff. Att. 1 at 4. The numbers of assaults and
10 injuries at Green Hill in fact is down since the introduction of
11 pepper spray. Att. 1 at 4. Spraying has occurred 103 times or
12 about twice per month, and about six percent of the residents have
13 been sprayed. Att 1 at 4.

14 Oleoresin capsicum (pepper spray) is a naturally occurring
15 substance found in the oily resin of cayenne and other varieties
16 of pepper. Att. 3 at 2-3. Pepper spray temporarily
17 incapacitates a person by inducing an almost immediate burning
18 sensation of the skin, and a burning, tearing, and swelling of the
19 eyes. Att. 3 at 3. These sensations quickly diminish, and
20 generally disappear completely within 15 to 45 minutes once a
21 person receives fresh air, and showers to flush the eyes and skin
22 with soap and water. Att. 3 at 3. Oleoresin capsicum, moreover,
23 is biodegradable and, unlike chemical irritants, does not linger
24 in ventilated affected areas or in clothing. Att. 3 at 4-5.
25 Studies have discovered no known long-term health risks or deaths
26 caused by exposure to pepper spray. Att. 3.

1 At Green Hill, residents generally are showered within 10 to
2 15 minutes of being sprayed (Att. 1 at 18), and receive prompt
3 medical attention. Att. 4 at 2-3. Residents have experienced no
4 medical problems caused by being sprayed. Att. 4.

5 After this lawsuit was filed, Green Hill modified its pepper
6 spray policy to address plaintiffs' concerns. Most importantly,
7 the new policy more exactly defines the situations in which pepper
8 spray more be used.

9 [1] The resident fails to follow a staff directive, and use
10 of other physical restraint methods to gain compliance,
11 without the use of pepper spray, likely would result in
12 bodily injury to resident, staff, and others.

13 [2] The resident is engaging in disruptive behavior in his
14 room which creates a serious disturbance and threatens
15 institutional security by inciting serious misbehavior by
16 other residents.

17 Att. 1 at 5-7. The new policy also more exactly prescribes
18 warnings given prior to use (Att. 1 at 7); does away with spraying
19 "pre-authorized" by the superintendent (Att. 1 at 7-8) the
20 training of staff authorized to use pepper spray (Att. 1 at 9-10);
21 and requires administrative reviews of all pepper spray incidents
22 (Att. 1 at 9). Green Hill also now uses only the 5% spray
23 concentration, as opposed to the 10% that plaintiffs believe is
24 more potent. Att. 1 at 7.

25 Since the new policy was implemented on October 1, 1994,
26 pepper spray has been used at Green Hill in two incidents
involving a total of three residents. Att. 1 at 18-24.

By no means does Green Hill rely on the use of pepper spray
to control the behavior of residents. Instead, there is a "point"

1 system to reward good behavior by granting special privileges.
2 Att. 1 at 13-14. Room confinement for limited periods is used as
3 a consequence for misbehaving. Att. 1 at 14. Residents who
4 engage in serious misbehavior are placed in an "intensive
5 management unit" (IMU) to provide them more intensive supervision
6 and programming designed to correct their behavior. Att. 1 at 14,
7 Att. 2. In addition, behavior is managed through extensive mental
8 health services, counseling, and group therapy. Att. 1 at 11-13,
9 Att. 2.

10 While plaintiffs believe the use of pepper spray is
11 emotionally damaging and harms the rehabilitative environment,
12 Green Hill's experienced psychologist and psychiatrist believe the
13 use of pepper spray is a much better alternative to using physical
14 force on a resident, and actually results in a better treatment
15 environment by removing the risk of injury and discouraging
16 assaultive behavior. Att 2.

17 Staff views Green Hill as a dangerous place to work, and
18 believes pepper spray in an essential tool in avoiding physical
19 confrontations that too often insult in injury. They believe
20 pepper spray is safe, effective, and does not harm the treatment
21 environment. Att. 5.

22 II. ARGUMENT

23 To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must show either
24 (1) likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of
25 irreparable injury, and (2) the existence of serious questions
26 going to the merit, tipping the balance of hardships in favor of

1 the moving party. Diamondiney v. Borg, 918 F.2d 793, 795 (9th
2 Cir. 1990). A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy,
3 and the burden is on the moving party to make a clear showing that
4 money damages of other remedies are not adequate under the
5 circumstances. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 785 F.Supp.
6 826, 831 (N.D.Cal. 1992).

7 A. Use of pepper spray under the new policy is a legitimate
8 tool for maintaining institutional security.

9 In that case, plaintiff who was shot by a policeman argued
10 the city was negligent in failing to use pepper mace to avoid the
11 need to use deadly force.¹

12 There are no state or federal decisions on the
13 constitutionality of using pepper spray on a threatening suspect
14 or inmate. (Footnote 1 - see above) However, in Youngberg v.
15 Romero, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), involving the use of restraints
16 against a person civilly-committed to a mental institution, the
17 court set out the following test:

18 In determining whether a substantive right protected by the
19 due process clause has been violated, it is necessary to
20 balance 'the liberty interest of the individual' and the
'demands of an organized society... In seeking this balance

21 ¹ To the state's knowledge, there is only one decision
22 (unreported) in which pepper spray is discussed. Roy v. City
23 of Lewiston, 1994 WL 129774 (D.Me.) In that case, plaintiff
24 who was shot by a policeman argued the city was negligent in
25 failing to use pepper mace to avoid the need to use deadly
26 force. Plaintiff contended that in 1991, when the shooting
occurred, the city should have known about a 1989 FBI study
which found pepper spray to be safe and effective in
incapacitating threatening suspects. In finding for the city,
the court held that not knowing about pepper spray did not
constitute "deliberate indifference".

1 in other cases, the Court has weighed an individual's
2 interest in liberty against the state's asserted reasons for
restraining the individual.

3 Id. at 320. In applying this test, the court ruled that it will
4 uphold:

5 those restrictions on liberty that were reasonably related to
6 legitimate government objectives, and not tantamount to
punishment.

7 Id. The Youngberg test applies to challenges to conditions of
8 confinement of juvenile offenders who, as in Washington, have not
9 been convicted of a crime. Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430,
10 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). In this case, therefore, use of pepper spray
11 at Green Hill under the terms of the new policy must be upheld if
12 it is (1) reasonably related to legitimate government objectives,
13 and (2) not tantamount to punishment.

14 1. The new policy is related to legitimate government
15 objectives.

16 Maintaining the security of an institution is a legitimate
17 government objective. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). In
18 pursuing this objective, prison officials may use tear gas. Spain
19 v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979). There, the court
20 noted:

21 We think the record further indicates, however, that use of
22 the substance in small amounts may be a necessary prison
23 technique if a prisoner refuses after adequate warning to
move from a cell or upon other provocation presenting a
reasonable possibility that slight force will be required.

24 Id. at 195. The court further held:

25 where there are safeguards to insure that tear gas is not
26 used in dangerous quantities, we think use can be justified

1 in situations which are reasonably likely to result in injury
2 to persons or a substantial amount of valuable property.

3 Id. at 196.² In a later case, Michenfelder v. Sumner,
4 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988), the court upheld the use of a taser
5 gun in potentially dangerous prison situations because:

6 The taser was used to enforce compliance with a search that
7 had a reasonable security purpose, not as punishment. The
legitimate intended result of shooting is incapacitation of
a dangerous person...

8 Id. at 335. Use of the taser gun, the court held, was not
9 enjoined because, while it may produce nausea and headaches, the
10 prisoner failed to meet his burden of showing that there were
11 adverse long-term health effects. Id. at 336. The
12 appropriateness of its use, the court concluded, depends on the
13 facts and circumstances of the particular case. Id.

14 Although Procunier and Michenfelder were decided under the
15 Eighth Amendment, they are relevant. That is because in judging
16 conditions of confinement at a juvenile institution, a court must
17 apply "the due process clause which implicitly incorporates the
18 (Eighth Amendment) cruel and unusual clause standards as a
19 constitutional minimum." Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d at 1432.
20 The differences between adult and juvenile institutions "should be
21 accounted for in the liability stage, not the remedy stage." Id.

22 Indeed, when it comes to the need to prevent injury and
23 maintain institutional security, there cannot be a lesser standard

24
25 ² The court in Procunier was concerned that "small" amounts
26 be used because tear gas can be "extremely dangerous". 600 F.2d
at 195. There is no evidence, on the other hand, that pepper
spray is dangerous.

1 of safety in a juvenile institution than in an adult institution.
2 Those who work and reside in a juvenile institution are entitled
3 to the same level of safety.

4 Under the cases discussed above, Green Hill's new pepper
5 spray policy is constitutionally-permissible because it reasonably
6 related to a legitimate government objective.³ This conclusion is
7 supported by the following:

- 8 1. Pepper spray is effective in incapacitating a residents
9 to allow staff to safely take control of him.
- 10 2. Use of pepper spray is appropriate only in two
11 situations. First, it may be used when necessary to take
12 control of a resident, and failure to use pepper spray likely
13 would result in injury. Second, it may be used when a
14 resident's conduct in his room causes residents causes a
15 serious disturbance outside the room. These two

16 ³ Plaintiffs misleadingly cite to the dispositions of staff
17 members in an attempt to discredit how pepper spray was used
18 under the former policy. For example, while cursing could lead
19 to spraying of a resident, there also had to be a security
20 threat. Beaver Dep., p. 116, 1. 13-17. While on-the-job
21 experience taught staff de-escalation skills, there also was
22 formal training on this subject. Beaver Dep., p 133, 1. 10-11.
23 In singling out an incident in which they felt an allegedly
24 disturbed resident should not have been sprayed, plaintiffs fail
25 to mention he had a claw hammer. Beaver Dep., pp. 106-108.
26 Plaintiffs quote staff as saying incident reports on spraying
often are not filed, when in fact this failure very rarely
occurs. Beaver Dept. p. 36, 1. 5.

27 In fact deposed staff agreed that pepper spray was needed
28 only a small percentage of the time when a disturbance occurs
29 (Beaver Dept. p. 135-36, Eberle Dep., p 97-98, Rondo Dept., p.
30 101); that the purpose of pepper spray is to prevent in injury
31 (Beaver Dep. p. 134, 1. 14-17, Eberle Dept., p. 96-97, Ronda
32 Dept., p. 100, 1. 19-20); that staff's goal is having to use
33 peppery spray as little as possible (Beaver Dept., p. 133, 2. 13-
34 19, Eberle Dep., p. 97, 1. 12, Rondo Dept., p. 102, 1. 14-17);
35 and that peppery spray is an important tool in preventing injury
36 to staff and residents (Beaver Dep., p. 136, 1. 4, Eberle Dep.,
p. 98, 1. 14-25, Ronda Dept., p. 101, 1. 13.

1 circumstances both are directly related to preventing injury
2 and maintaining security.

3 3. Staff receives training on de-escalation skills, and how
4 to properly use pepper spray.

5 4. Prior to using spray, staff is required to attempt
6 to resolve the situation verbally, and to give advance
7 warnings, in a process that generally continues for 30
8 minutes.

9 5. Although pepper spray, in incapacitating an individual
10 causes discomfort for 30 to 45 minutes, it does not have any
11 long-term effects.

12 6. Sprayed residents receive prompt medical attention to
13 alleviate the symptoms.

14 7. Green Hill does not rely on pepper spray to control the
15 behavior of residents. Instead, there is an incentive
16 program for good behavior, room confinement, counseling, and
17 sundry special programs.

18 Plaintiffs seek to prohibit altogether the use of pepper
19 spray at Green Hill. Except to recommend that staff become better
20 at verbal de-escalation, they offer no alternative method of
21 safely controlling a threatening resident. Their leading
22 behavioral expert, Mr. DeMuro, also criticizes both "room
23 confinement" as a punishment for misbehavior, and "intensive
24 management units" to treat residents with serious behavior
25 problems. He claims there are better methods of controlling
26 threatening residents, but fails to say what they are. The
weakness of plaintiffs' position is exposed by their inability to
offer specific alternative methods for controlling threatening
residents.

2. Pepper spray is not used as punishment.

1 The second part of the Youngberg test is that the restraint
2 not be used as punishment. As stated in Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at
3 336.

4 A legitimate prison policy of carrying teasers to enforce
5 discipline and security would not warrant their use when
6 unnecessary, or 'for the role purpose of punishment or
7 infliction of pain.'

8 In that case, the court held that use of a taser gun to
9 enforce a requirement that inmates submit to a security search was
10 permissible, because the use had a legitimate security objective,
11 and was not used merely to inflict pain or punishment. By
12 contrast, a stun gun may not be used as punishment for an inmate
13 failing to sweep out his cell. Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754 (8th
14 Cir. 1993).

15 Plaintiffs repeatedly allege pepper spray is used at Green
16 Hill simply to punish non-compliance with a staff directive.
17 Certainly, every spray incident begins with a resident failing to
18 follow a staff directive. There must be more, however: there must
19 to threat to security, which is defined in the pepper spray
20 policy. Under the reasoning in Procunier and Michenfelder, the
21 policy is constitutional because spraying has a security objective
22 (i.e., preventing injury), and therefore is not punishment. ⁴

23 Plaintiffs contend that using pepper spray is improper
24 because there are no mental health services provided. The point

25 ⁴ By contrast, under Green Hill procedures, when a resident
26 simply fails to follow a staff directive, and security is not
threatened, staff may "punish" the resident by taking away
privileges or imposing temporary room confinement.

1 of pepper spray is to prevent injury and maintain security. When
2 an incident is occurring, the policy is to diffuse the situation
3 as quickly as possible through verbal negotiation. An array of
4 services to address mental health issues is available at Green
5 Hill. Plaintiffs also contend that using pepper spray is improper
6 because it harms the treatment environment. Even if such harm did
7 occur, it would not prohibit the use of pepper spray; an
8 institution may take steps to prevent injury and maintain
9 security, regarding of their effects on the treatment environment.
10 Green Hill, however, is convinced that use of pepper spray
11 actually improves the treatment environment by reducing the risk
12 of injury, and by discouraging threatening behavior.

13 B. Cases cited by plaintiffs are do not support their
14 argument.

15 Plaintiffs cite a host of cases in support of their request
16 for a complete ban on the use of pepper spray at Green Hill. Pl.
17 Brief at 18-19. These cases do not support their argument.

18 In several of the cases, harsh disciplinary practices were
19 held unconstitutional. Stewart v. Rhodes, 473 F.Supp. 1185, 1193
20 (S.D.Ohio 1979) ("acting out" is not grounds for putting a
21 prisoner in a "four-point" restraint in which he is chained on his
22 back to a metal bed frame by means of handcuffs and leg irons);
23 Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 1993) (prisoner who failed
24 to sweep out his cell may not be shot with a stun gun); Nelson v.
25 Heyne, 355 F.Supp. 451, 454 (N.D.Ind. 1972) (a juvenile offender
26 may not receive "beating by use of a thick board" for violating

1 institutional rules); Morales v. Turman, 364 F.Supp. 166, 173
2 (E.D.Tex. 1973) (struck down "widespread practices of beating,
3 slapping, kicking, and otherwise physically abusing juveniles
4 inmates, in the absence of any exigent circumstances"); Milonas v.
5 Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 942 (10 Cir. 1982) ("hair dances", whereby
6 juveniles were restrained by the hair, may not be used where
7 "physical violence" or "physical control" is not at issue). These
8 cases involved situations in which force was applied without a
9 showing of any legitimate security objective. By contrast, under
10 Green Hill's policy, pepper spray may be used only in two specific
11 circumstances when necessary to prevent injury and maintain
12 institutional security.

13 The other cases cited by plaintiffs involved the use of tear
14 gas. Soto v. Cady, 566 F.Supp. 773, 779 (E.D.Wisc. 1983) (tear gas
15 may be used "to subdue an inmate who poses an immediate threat of
16 injury" which means at least "making physically threatening
17 gestures"); Greear v. Loving, 538 F.2d 578, 579 (4th Cir.
18 1978) (summary judgment against plaintiff improper when he alleges
19 tear gas was used to punish him for destroying property); McCargo
20 v. Mister, 462 F.Supp. 813, 819 (D.Md. 1978) (because tear gas is
21 potentially dangerous, and effects persons who are not targets, it
22 may be used only in situations posing the utmost degree of danger
23 and loss of control); Morris v. Trivisono, 528 F.2d 856, 858 (1st
24 Cir. 1976) (tear gas may not be used to punish non-threatening
25 behavior). These cases hold that there must be security reasons
26 for using tear gas. The courts are especially cautious about

1 approving the use of tear gas because it is a potentially
2 dangerous substance. Spain v. Procnier, 600 F.2d at 194.

3 What plaintiff request is a complete ban on the use of pepper
4 spray. Cases cited by plaintiffs underscore the fact there is
5 simply no precedence for banning a substance, such as pepper
6 spray, which is non-dangerous and can control a threatening
7 person.

8 C. The Court must show deference to the Green Hill policy.

9 In Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1126 (5th Cir. 1982), the
10 court noted the limited role of the judiciary in challenges to
11 prison conditions:

12 The duty to protect inmates' constitutional rights does not
13 confer the power to manage prisons, for which courts are ill-
14 equipped, or the capacity to second-guess prison
15 administrators. Federal courts should not, in the name of the
16 constitution, become enmeshed in the minutiae of prison
17 operations. Our task is limited to enforcing constitutional
18 standards and does not embrace superintending prison
19 administration.

20 The court stated further:

21 As a matter of respect for the state's role and for the
22 allocation of functions in our federal system, as well as
23 comity towards the state, the relief ordered by the federal
24 court must be consistent with the policy of minimum intrusion
25 into the affairs of state prison administration...

26 Id. The Ninth Circuit expressly adopts the Ruiz view of the
limited role of the federal judiciary. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801
F.2d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 1986). This deference extends to with
special force to security matters. A prison's "internal security
is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison
administrators." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981).

1 Prison administrators "should be accorded wide-ranging deference
2 in the adoption and execution of policies and practice that in
3 their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and to
4 maintain institutional security." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at
5 547.

6 This deference applies to juvenile institutions as well as
7 adult prisons. As stated in a juvenile institution case, Gary H.
8 v. Hegstad, 831 F.2d at 1433:

9 The court should defer to the policy choices made by prison
10 officials and order a remedy consistent with the basic
11 approach taken by prison officials, unless that approach
itself is inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment.

12 Quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir.1982).

13 Youngberg v. Romero, 407 U.S. at 324, held:

14 Decisions made by the appropriate professionals are entitled
15 to a presumption of correctness. Such a presumption is
16 necessary to enable institutions of this type -- often,
unfortunately overcrowded and understaffed -- to continue to
function.

17 Based on these cases, Green Hill's pepper spray policy is
18 entitled to deference by the court, and to a presumption of
19 correctness. Deference is due because it was formulated by
20 professionals at Green Hill, who are best equipped to judge
21 security needs of the institution. For reasons discussed in
22 Section II(A) of this memorandum, the pepper spray policy should
23 be upheld, and the security decisions of Green Hill officials
24 should not be second-guessed. Plaintiffs have not overcome the
25 presumption of correctness that attaches to the policy. Granting
26

1 the injunction would be an impermissible intrusion into the
2 internal security affairs of a state correctional institution.

3 D. The current pepper spray policy does not warrant the
4 court granting a preliminary injunction.

5 Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Milan, offers conclusory opinions
6 that many of the prior sprays were of residents who presented no
7 immediate danger. Green Hill disputes this conclusion, although
8 admits two sprays were improper because the residents were
9 handcuffed at the time. While the number of inappropriate past
10 sprays is in dispute, the fact is that since the time this lawsuit
11 was filed, Green Hill adopted a new pepper spray policy that
12 addresses all plaintiffs' concerns. Infra. at 2-3.

13 Regardless of what allegedly happened in the past, a
14 plaintiff must demonstrate a "credible threat" of specific injury.
15 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 (1983). There must be an
16 individualized showing of a "very significant possibility" that
17 future harm will incur. Nelson v. King Cy., 895 F.2d 1248, 1950
18 (9th Cir. 1990). Past exposure to harm is largely irrelevant when
19 ruling on injunctive relief predicated on the threat of future
20 harm, if unaccompanied on any continuing, present adverse effects.
21 O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974). In denying a
22 claim for injunctive relief, the court in Rodriguez v. Kincheloe,
23 763 F.Supp. 463, 468 (E.D.Wash. 1991) held:

24 Mr. Rodriguez has presented no evidence of continuing,
25 present adverse effects from the alleged unconstitutional
26 conduct. Thus, he must show a threat of future harm. 'The
burden (of) showing a likelihood of recurrence (is) firmly on
the plaintiff.'

1 On October 1, 1994, Green Hill implemented a new pepper spray
2 policy. Since that time, pepper spray has been used three times,
3 and clearly was justified in each circumstance. There is
4 absolutely no reason to believe that the policy will not be
5 followed in the future. Green Hill's willingness to adopt a new
6 policy addressing all of plaintiffs' concerns, and its record of
7 adhering to that policy, demonstrate plaintiffs cannot meet their
8 burden of showing a very significant probability of future harm.


9 For the sake of argument, if Green Hill in the future uses
10 spray in violation of the policy, plaintiffs may have a claim for
11 damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They also may have a claim for
12 injunctive relief if they can show a very significant probability
13 of additional violations in the future. However, under the
14 current situation, there are no grounds for injunctive relief
15 because Green Hill has adopted a constitutional policy for using
16 pepper spray, is abiding by it, and intends to keep abiding by it.

17 III. CONCLUSION

18 Based on the foregoing, the state defendants respectively
19 request that plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction be
20 denied.

21 DATED this 21st day of November, 1994.

22 CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE
23 Attorney General

24 
25 RICHARD A. McCARTAN, WSBA #8323
26 Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants