

1 Larry J. Wulkan (021404)  
2 **STINSON LLP**  
3 Firm Identification Number 00462400  
4 1850 North Central Avenue, Suite 2100  
5 Phoenix, Arizona 85004-4584  
6 Telephone: (602) 279-1600  
7 Fax: (602) 240-6925  
8 Email: larry.wulkan@stinson.com

9 Counsel for Plaintiffs  
10 *Additional counsel listed on following page*

11 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
12 **DISTRICT OF ARIZONA**

13 Jason Fenty, Brian Stepter, Douglas  
14 Crough, Edward Reason, Jesus Tequida,  
15 Ramon Avenenti, Anthony Scroggins,  
16 Dale Perez, and Tamara Ochoa on behalf  
17 of themselves and those similarly situated,  
18 Plaintiff-Petitioners,

19 Puente Human Rights Movement,  
20 Plaintiff,

21 v.

22 Sheriff Paul Penzone, in his official  
23 capacity, and Maricopa County, a  
24 municipal entity,  
25 Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-01192-SPL-JZB

**PLAINTIFF-PETITIONERS' EX**  
**PARTE APPLICATION FOR**  
**TEMPORARY RESTRAINING**  
**ORDER**

1 Ethan J. Sanders\* (MO 71151)  
2 **STINSON LLP**  
3 1201 Walnut Street, Suite 2900  
4 Kansas City, MO 64106  
5 Telephone: (816) 691-2628  
6 ethan.sanders@stinson.com

7 Brian Raphel\* (NY 5592308)  
8 Pat Andriola\* (NY 5406327)  
9 Timothy Ly\* (NY 5478540)  
10 **DECHERT LLP**  
11 Three Bryant Park  
12 1095 Avenue of the Americas  
13 New York, NY 10036  
14 Telephone: (212) 698-3500  
15 brian.raphel@dechert.com  
16 pat.andriola@dechert.com  
17 timonty.ly@dechert.com

18 Jared G. Keenan (AZ 027068)  
19 Victoria Lopez\*\* (AZ 330042)  
20 Casey Arellano (AZ 031242)  
21 **ACLU FOUNDATION OF ARIZONA**  
22 P.O. Box 17148  
23 Phoenix, AZ 85011  
24 Telephone: (602) 650-1854  
25 jkeenana@acluaz.org  
26 vlopez@acluaz.org  
27 casey.arellano@acluaz.org

28 Olga Akselrod (NY 4132825) *Pro Hac Vice*  
Hugh Handeyside (NY 5394002)  
*Pro Hac Vice*  
Clara Spera (NY 5590229) *Pro Hac Vice*  
Somil Trivedi\* (NY 4834495)  
**AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION**  
**FOUNDATION**  
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor  
New York, NY 10014  
Telephone: (212) 549-2569  
oakselrod@aclu.org  
hhandeyside@aclu.org  
cspera@aclu.org  
strivedi@aclu.org

Shari Ross Lahlou\* (DC 476630)  
**DECHERT LLP**  
1900 K Street, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20006 - 1110  
Telephone: (202) 261-3300  
shari.lahlou@dechert.com

Benjamin M. Sadun\* (CA 287533)  
Allison Ozurovich\* (CA 312797)  
**DECHERT LLP**  
633 West 5th Street, Suite 4900  
Los Angeles, CA 90071  
Telephone: (213) 808-5700  
benjamin.sadun@dechert.com  
allie.ozurovich@dechert.com

Eric Balaban (Admitted to Maryland Bar)  
*Pro Hac Vice*  
**AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES**  
**UNION FOUNDATION**  
915 15th St. NW, 7<sup>th</sup> Floor  
Washington, DC 20005  
Telephone: (202) 393-4930  
ebalaban@aclu.org

Zoe Brennan-Krohn (CA 324912)  
*Pro Hac Vice*  
**AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES**  
**UNION FOUNDATION**  
39 Drumm Street  
San Francisco CA 94111  
Telephone: (415) 343-0769  
Zbrennan-krohn@aclu.org

\*Application for *pro hac vice* forthcoming

\*\*Admitted pursuant to Ariz. Sup. Ct. R. 38(f)

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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**Page**

MOTION ..... 1

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ..... 1

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS ..... 3

A. COVID-19 Poses a Significant Risk of Serious Illness and Death. .... 3

B. People in Congregate Environments—Like the Maricopa County Jails—Are Particularly Vulnerable to COVID-19. .... 5

C. The Maricopa County Jails Have Not Implemented Adequate Measures to Protect Incarcerated Persons from the Risk of Infection. .... 6

II. ARGUMENT ..... 16

A. Absent Relief, Plaintiffs are Certain to Suffer Irreparable Harm. .... 17

B. Plaintiffs Have a Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983..... 18

1. Defendants’ Unconstitutional Punishment of Pretrial Detainees Violates Due Process Rights. .... 18

2. Defendants’ Deliberate Indifference to the Risks of COVID-19 Also Violates The Right to Constitutional Conditions of Confinement. .... 20

3. Defendants Have a Policy, Custom, and Practice of Violating Plaintiffs’ Rights. .... 26

C. The Medically Vulnerable Subclasses Are Likely To Succeed on Their Habeas Claims. .... 27

1. No Set of Conditions Will Reduce the Risk of Serious Harm for the Medically Vulnerable Subclass. .... 28

2. The Medically Vulnerable Subclass Members Are Also Entitled to Release or Enlargement Under § 1983..... 29

D. Defendants Have A Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits of Their ADA and Section 504 Claims..... 29

E. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Weigh Heavily in Plaintiffs’ Favor..... 33

III. CONCLUSION ..... 34

1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, Petitioners-Plaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”)  
2 hereby apply for a temporary restraining order, commanding Respondents-Defendants  
3 (“Defendants”) to (1) immediately improve conditions at the Maricopa County jails,  
4 including through social distancing, educate the incarcerated about COVID-19, administer  
5 universal testing, develop protocols for intake cohorting, testing, and monitoring, develop  
6 protocols for quarantine, testing, and monitoring people who are suspected to have been  
7 exposed to COVID-19, develop protocols for protecting incarcerated medically vulnerable  
8 people, develop protocols for housing people who have tested positive for COVID-19,  
9 distribute meals safely, require PPE, and distribute cleaning supplies and PPE to Plaintiffs;  
10 (2) immediately release or enlarge custody of the members of the Pretrial Medically  
11 Vulnerable and Pretrial Disability Subclasses who are incarcerated solely due to their  
12 inability to afford a financial condition of release, or whose release Defendants do not object  
13 to; and (3) engage in the process set forth in the proposed order to evaluate for release other  
14 members of the Medically Vulnerable and Disability Subclasses from the Maricopa County  
15 jails. This Application is based upon Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities;  
16 Petitioners’ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Injunctive and  
17 Declaratory Relief (Dkt. 1); and all supporting documents filed concurrently herewith.  
18 Plaintiffs have also lodged a proposed Order with the Court. Due to the immediate and  
19 irreparable injury to Plaintiffs as described below, Plaintiffs are not required to provide  
20 notice. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A), (B). Plaintiffs also request that the Court waive any  
21 security requirement. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).

### 22 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

23 In one month, the number of COVID-19-positive cases at the Maricopa County jails  
24 has skyrocketed from four to 565—a more than 14,000 percent increase. Though  
25 Defendants have adopted a plan purportedly designed to ameliorate the spread of COVID-  
26 19, including SOP J-02-023, the policy and its implementation are woefully lacking. Chief  
27 among the many shortcomings of Defendants’ response to COVID-19 is that they altogether  
28 fail to adopt any measures targeted at preventing the medically vulnerable and disabled

1 from getting infected, placing them at acute risk of physical harm.

2 By any measure, the conditions at the Maricopa County jails—4th Avenue, Saguario,  
3 Estrella, Lower Buckeye, and Towers—are dangerous. As Plaintiffs’ declarations show, the  
4 jails’ practices and procedures have made it all but impossible for detainees to practice the  
5 requisite social distancing or personal hygiene necessary to minimize the threat of the virus.  
6 Plaintiffs and others cannot maintain six-foot distance from other individuals: they sleep,  
7 eat, shower, and engage in other activities in close proximity with each other. Cleaning  
8 standards are inadequate, and cleaning supplies are frequently insufficient. Nor have  
9 Defendants implemented universal testing—a key measure to help ensure that infected  
10 incarcerated persons and jail staff do not infect the remaining jail population, and that timely  
11 monitoring and treatment is initiated for infected persons. In sum, the current conditions at  
12 the Maricopa County jails are “so grave”—especially for the medically vulnerable and  
13 disabled—that they “violate[] contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone  
14 unwillingly to such a risk” and therefore violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. *See Helling*  
15 *v. McKinney*, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). The jails’ failure to take reasonable measures to  
16 protect people with disabilities at high risk of COVID-19 complications or death is also a  
17 violation of their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504  
18 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504).

19 This Court has already recognized the need to protect incarcerated people from  
20 COVID-19. *See generally Urdaneta, et al. v. Keeton, et. al.*, 2020 WL 2319980 (D. Ariz.  
21 May 11, 2020). In *Urdaneta*, this Court held that the plaintiffs, detainees at two federal  
22 immigration detention facilities, established a likelihood of success on the merits and  
23 irreparable harm for the same reason Plaintiffs seek relief here: the facilities “fostered  
24 conditions that pose an objectively unreasonable risk of transmission of COVID-19 and a  
25 resulting substantial risk of serious harm to Petitioner’s health and ultimate safety.” *Id.* at  
26 \*12. Critically, at the time of the Court’s order, neither facility at issue had **any new cases**—  
27 and one facility had **none at all**. At this point, the explosion of cases currently plaguing the  
28 Maricopa County jails presents a significantly more dangerous situation than was the case

1 at the time of this Court's order.

2 Accordingly, Plaintiffs ask this Court to certify the classes and subclasses described  
 3 in the Complaint<sup>1</sup> and issue an order requiring Defendants to: (1) immediately improve  
 4 conditions at the Maricopa County jails, including through those measures identified in the  
 5 proposed Order; (2) immediately release or enlarge custody of the members of the Pretrial  
 6 Medically Vulnerable and Pretrial Disability Subclasses who are incarcerated solely due to  
 7 their inability to afford a financial condition of release, or whose release Defendants do not  
 8 object to; and (3) engage in the process set forth in the proposed Order to evaluate for release  
 9 and/or enlargement other members of the Medically Vulnerable and Disability Subclasses  
 10 from the Maricopa County jails.

## 11 **I. STATEMENT OF FACTS**

### 12 **A. COVID-19 Poses a Significant Risk of Serious Illness and Death.**

13 COVID-19 is a deadly and rapidly spreading global pandemic. As of June 26, 2020,  
 14 the outbreak has resulted in over 9 million confirmed cases worldwide, with more than  
 15 484,000 deaths.<sup>2</sup> These numbers are growing exponentially; on June 26, 2020, the World  
 16 Health Organization reported more than 177,000 new infections worldwide in the preceding  
 17 24 hours.<sup>3</sup> The United States has seen more than 2 million cases to date and more than  
 18 121,000 deaths.<sup>4</sup>

19 The consequences of contracting COVID-19 can be severe. COVID-19 can result in  
 20 respiratory failure, kidney failure, and death. To date, 5.1% of people in the United States  
 21 with a confirmed COVID-19 diagnosis died from the virus.<sup>5</sup> Infected individuals who do

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22  
 23 <sup>1</sup> The parties, classes, and subclasses identified herein refer to those classes and subclasses  
 24 set forth in the Complaint. *See* Dkt No. 1, ¶¶ 22-41. In support of their request for  
 25 certification of the classes or provisional certification in the alternative, Plaintiff-Petitioners  
 26 respectfully refer the Court to their motion for class certification, filed concurrently  
 27 herewith.

28 <sup>2</sup> *Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) Situation Report - 92*, WHO, June 26, 2020,  
 available at [https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200626-covid-19-sitrep-158.pdf?sfvrsn=1d1aae8a\\_2](https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200626-covid-19-sitrep-158.pdf?sfvrsn=1d1aae8a_2).

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*

<sup>4</sup> *Id.*

<sup>5</sup> *Coronavirus Resource Center, Mortality Analysis*, Johns Hopkins Univ. (June 27, 2020),  
 available at <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality>.

1 not die from the disease can face serious damage to the lungs, heart, liver, or other organs,  
2 resulting in prolonged recovery periods, or, in the most severe cases, acute respiratory  
3 disease syndrome (“ARDS”), which has a 30% mortality rate even under ideal medical  
4 care.<sup>6</sup> The risk posed by COVID-19 is especially grave to persons 50 years of age and over,  
5 as well as persons of any age with certain underlying medical conditions, including chronic  
6 diseases and health conditions, such as lung disease, heart disease, chronic liver or kidney  
7 disease (including hepatitis and dialysis patients), diabetes, hypertension, compromised  
8 immune systems (such as from cancer, HIV, or autoimmune disease), blood disorders  
9 (including sickle cell disease), developmental disability, severe obesity, and moderate to  
10 severe asthma. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 4.<sup>7</sup> People with all of these risk factors (except age  
11 or obesity alone) are people with disabilities as defined under federal law.

12 COVID-19 is highly contagious, spreading from person to person through  
13 respiratory droplets, close personal contact, and from contact with contaminated surfaces  
14 and objects.<sup>8</sup> There is no vaccine against COVID-19, nor is there any known medication to  
15 prevent or cure infection. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 16. A large percentage of COVID-19-  
16 infected persons are asymptomatic, or only display certain of the associated symptoms, and  
17 yet are still contagious. *Id.* ¶ 18. Thus, the most effective measures to prevent infection are  
18 through social distancing—that is, keeping at least six feet between persons to avoid  
19 transmission—comprehensive testing, the wearing of masks, and vigilant hygiene.<sup>9</sup> Ex. 15

20 \_\_\_\_\_  
21 <sup>6</sup> Letter from Faculty at Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, School of Nursing, and  
22 Bloomberg School of Public Health to Hon. Larry Hogan, Gov. of Maryland, Mar. 25, 2020,  
23 *available at* [https://bioethics.jhu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Johns-Hopkins-faculty-  
letter-on-COVID-19-jails-and-prisons.pdf](https://bioethics.jhu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Johns-Hopkins-faculty-letter-on-COVID-19-jails-and-prisons.pdf).

24 <sup>7</sup> WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, *Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) advice for the public: Myth busters*, <https://cutt.ly/dtEiCyc> (“Older people, and people with pre-existing medical conditions (such as asthma, diabetes, heart disease) appear to be more vulnerable to becoming severely ill with the virus.”); CDC, *Groups at Higher Risk of Severe Illness*, <https://cutt.ly/AtJDxSv>; CDC, *Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities*, <https://cutt.ly/8uzZfqC> (“Note that incarcerated/detained populations have higher prevalence of infectious and chronic diseases and are in poorer health than the general population, even at younger ages.”).

26 <sup>8</sup> *Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients with Suspected or Confirmed Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Healthcare Settings*, CDC, Apr. 13, 2020, *available at* <https://cutt.ly/ztRAo0X>.

28 <sup>9</sup> *Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in*

1 (Cohen Decl.) ¶¶ 16, 19.

2 **B. People in Congregate Environments—Like the Maricopa County**  
 3 **Jails—Are Particularly Vulnerable to COVID-19.**

4 Scientists estimate that, under normal circumstances, one person with COVID-19  
 5 will typically infect between two and three people without social distancing, and about one  
 6 person if maintaining strong social distancing and quarantining.<sup>10</sup> By contrast, scientists  
 7 estimate that, in confined settings like prisons and cruise ships, one person with COVID-19  
 8 will infect about 11 people, each of whom will in turn infect up to 11 other people.<sup>11</sup> As a  
 9 result, the Legal Aid Society in New York has reported that the infection rate for COVID-  
 10 19 at local jails is more than seven times higher than the rate citywide and 87 times higher  
 11 than the country at large.<sup>12</sup>

12 The current COVID-19 crisis in Maricopa County tracks this pattern. Maricopa  
 13 County has reported more than 42,000 confirmed COVID-19 cases as of June 26, 2020.<sup>13</sup>  
 14 Close to 750 Maricopa County residents have died from COVID-19.<sup>14</sup> But the county-wide  
 15 emergency comes nowhere close to the crisis within the Maricopa County jails. Indeed, the  
 16 rate of cases amongst the tested population at the jails is more than three times higher than  
 17 the rate across the County: whereas county-wide 9.5 percent of those tested for COVID-19

18  
 19 *Correctional and Detention Facilities*, supra note 7.

20 <sup>10</sup> Adam J. Kucharski et al., *Early dynamics of transmission and control of COVID-19: a*  
 21 *mathematical modelling study*, *The Lancet*, Mar. 11, 2020, available at  
 22 [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099\(20\)30144-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30144-4).

23 <sup>11</sup> Kenji Mizumoto & Gerardo Chowell, *Transmission potential of the novel coronavirus*  
 24 *(COVID-19) onboard the Diamond Princess Cruises Ship, 2020*, 5 *Infectious Disease*  
 25 *Modelling* 264, Feb. 2, 2020 (evaluating the transmission rate on a cruise ship, and  
 26 comparing that infection rate to similarly confined spaces like hospitals, prisons, and  
 27 churches), available at  
 28 <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2468042720300063>.

<sup>12</sup> *Coronavirus Update: Rikers Island Rate of Infection 7 Times Higher than Citywide, Legal*  
 29 *Aid Says*, CBS New York, Mar. 26, 2020, available at  
 30 <https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2020/03/26/coronavirus-rikers-island/>.

<sup>13</sup> *Data Dashboard: Summary*, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES (accessed  
 31 June 26, 2020), [https://www.azdhs.gov/preparedness/epidemiology-disease-](https://www.azdhs.gov/preparedness/epidemiology-disease-control/infectious-disease-epidemiology/covid-19/dashboards/index.php)  
 32 [control/infectious-disease-epidemiology/covid-19/dashboards/index.php](https://www.azdhs.gov/preparedness/epidemiology-disease-control/infectious-disease-epidemiology/covid-19/dashboards/index.php).

<sup>14</sup> *Data Dashboard: COVID-19 Deaths*, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES  
 33 (accessed June 26, 2020), [https://www.azdhs.gov/preparedness/epidemiology-disease-](https://www.azdhs.gov/preparedness/epidemiology-disease-control/infectious-disease-epidemiology/covid-19/dashboards/index.php)  
 34 [control/infectious-disease-epidemiology/covid-19/dashboards/index.php](https://www.azdhs.gov/preparedness/epidemiology-disease-control/infectious-disease-epidemiology/covid-19/dashboards/index.php).



1 have tested positive,<sup>15</sup> 28.9 percent of those tested for COVID-19 among the Maricopa  
 2 County jail population have tested positive as of June 25, 2020.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, the number of  
 3 COVID-19-positive cases at the Maricopa County jails has skyrocketed in the past month.  
 4 Though the Maricopa County jails have seen a reduction in the incarcerated population, the  
 5 number of cases nevertheless continues to rise. As of June 25, 565 incarcerated persons at  
 6 the Maricopa County jails have tested positive—up from just four cases one month prior.<sup>17</sup>  
 7 That number does not include the 65 patients awaiting their test results.<sup>18</sup> Despite this  
 8 exponential increase, Defendants have not sufficiently changed their policies or practices  
 9 to stop the spread of the virus. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 36.

10 **C. The Maricopa County Jails Have Not Implemented Adequate Measures**  
 11 **to Protect Incarcerated Persons from the Risk of Infection.**

12 A litany of conditions at the Maricopa County jails place the incarcerated population  
 13 at a heightened and growing risk of contracting COVID-19, including:

14 ***Inadequate Testing.*** Originally, Defendants only provided testing to some  
 15 “symptomatic patients, at provider discretion.”<sup>19</sup> The Maricopa County jails’ Medical  
 16 Director has now stated that they are testing asymptomatic people who have had contact  
 17 with COVID-positive people.<sup>20</sup> Despite these changes, Defendants’ customs and practices  
 18 are inadequate by all accounts. First, Defendants’ new policy has not been implemented  
 19 consistently, as some persons were not tested even after being housed in a pod that was  
 20 quarantined due to direct contact with a COVID-19-positive person. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.)

21 \_\_\_\_\_  
 22 <sup>15</sup> *Data Dashboard: Deaths*, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES (accessed  
 23 June 26, 2020), <https://www.azdhs.gov/preparedness/epidemiology-disease-control/infectious-disease-epidemiology/covid-19/dashboards/index.php>; Ex. 18 (MCSO Testing Data).

24 <sup>16</sup> *COVID-19 in County Jails*, MARICOPA COUNTY (accessed June 28, 2020),  
 25 <https://www.maricopa.gov/5574/COVID-19-in-County-Jails>.

26 <sup>17</sup> *See id.*; *see also* Ex. 18 (MCSO Testing Data).

27 <sup>18</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>19</sup> Ex. 17 SOP J-B-02-23, Management Plan for Novel/Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), C(f)(iii).

<sup>20</sup> Lauren Castle, *ACLU demands Maricopa County test all inmates for COVID-19, release results*, AZ CENTRAL (June 5, 2020), <https://cutt.ly/SuxGR0n>; *see also* Press Statement of Grant Phillips (June 5, 2020), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GzogmTMA8mA> (containing video clip of statement made by Dr. Phillips).

1 ¶¶ 7-11; Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶ 4. Defendants are also not testing people in some housing  
2 units that went to recreation with other housing units in which someone appears to have  
3 tested positive for COVID-19. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 12; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶ 9.  
4 Moreover, other asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic incarcerated persons who unknowingly  
5 had contact with a COVID-19-positive person can carry the virus but would not be  
6 accounted for in Defendants' testing regime. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶¶ 67. Thus, absent  
7 universal testing, Defendants cannot identify those who are infected and timely initiate  
8 isolation, medical monitoring, and treatment for them. *Id.* Defendants' limited testing is  
9 also problematic in light of Defendants' failure to consider the full scope of COVID-19  
10 symptoms. *Id.* ¶ 72. Incarcerated persons have informed staff they were suffering from  
11 known symptoms of COVID-19, but were not tested, is an outcome of Defendants' limited  
12 criteria. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 6; Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶¶ 5-6; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶ 5;  
13 Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶ 5; Ex. 10 (Reason Decl.) ¶¶ 5-6; *see also* Ex. 4 (Dupont Decl.) ¶ 4.  
14 There are other reports of exposure to incarcerated persons with COVID-19 symptoms or  
15 known cases of COVID-19, and yet likewise not being tested. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 6;  
16 Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶¶ 5, 9; Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶ 8; Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶ 6; Ex. 12  
17 (Stepter Decl.) ¶ 7. Finally, the failure to conduct universal testing is problematic because  
18 the jails' symptoms-based testing program fails to take into account that incarcerated people  
19 are deterred from coming forward and reporting symptoms due to fear of being placed into  
20 medical isolation, which at the Maricopa County jails is a punitive setting akin to  
21 disciplinary segregation. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 112.

22 ***No Protections for the Medically Vulnerable.*** Despite clear guidance from public  
23 health authorities about the risks of COVID-19 for the medically vulnerable, *see* Ex. 15  
24 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 82, most of whom are people with disabilities under the ADA and  
25 Section 504, Defendants have taken no specific steps targeting the medically vulnerable  
26 population to reduce the potential for their infection. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 86. Defendants  
27 continue to cohort people who are medically vulnerable with persons who were in direct  
28 contact with COVID-19-positive persons and with insufficient measures to abate the risk of

1 transmission. Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.) ¶¶ 4-6, 15-20; Ex. 10 (Reason Decl.) ¶¶ 7, 15; Ex. 5  
2 (Fenty Decl.) ¶¶ 17-18. Medically vulnerable persons are also housed in the same units and  
3 under the same conditions as non-medically vulnerable people, including the same lack of  
4 social distancing, proper cleaning and hygiene, and PPE. Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.) ¶¶ 6-14; Ex. 5  
5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶¶ 8-14; Ex. 10 (Reason Decl.) ¶¶ 6-12, 17; Ex. 12 (Stepter Decl.) ¶¶ 8-17;  
6 Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶¶ 11-23; *see also* Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶ 6. Medically vulnerable  
7 persons have also been denied testing notwithstanding displaying symptoms consistent with  
8 COVID-19. Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶¶ 5-7; Ex. 10 (Reason Decl.) ¶ 4. Further, Defendants have  
9 not regularly screened medically vulnerable persons for symptoms, even after exposure to  
10 someone with COVID-19. Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶¶ 7-8. And even when housed in the  
11 infirmary, medically vulnerable persons endure conditions similar to those constitutionally  
12 inadequate conditions in the general population units, including a lack of social distancing,  
13 lack of sufficient hygiene and cleaning supplies, insufficient PPE for incarcerated people,  
14 and inconsistency in detention officers wearing masks. Crough Decl. ¶¶ 11-17.

15 ***No Social Distancing.*** Even with a recent reduction of the incarcerated population,  
16 social distancing has not been noticeably implemented in the Maricopa County jails. Ex. 2  
17 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 14; Ex. 3 (Crough Decl.) ¶¶ 13-14; Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶ 8; Ex. 7 (Ochoa  
18 Decl.) ¶¶ 7-8. At each jail, anywhere between 40-100 persons are housed in pods or open  
19 dormitories. Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶ 8; Ex. 1 (Avenenti Decl.) ¶ 12; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶¶ 7-  
20 8; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶ 16; Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶¶ 7-8; Ex. 12 (Stepter Decl.) ¶ 8;  
21 Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶ 11. Some incarcerated persons continue to sleep in units that are  
22 nearly full. *See* Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 16; Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶ 8; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶ 21;  
23 Ex. 12 (Stepter Decl.) ¶ 8; Ex. 13 (Suggs Decl.) ¶ 12. The pods at each jail house individuals  
24 in close quarters, well under six feet apart, with two to three persons in each cell or in large  
25 open dorms with dozens of others on beds inches apart. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 15; Ex. 9  
26 (Player Decl.) ¶ 10; Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.) ¶ 8; Ex. 4 (Dupont Decl.) ¶ 7; Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.)  
27 ¶ 8; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶ 8; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶ 21; Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶ 8; Ex. 12  
28 (Stepter Decl.) ¶ 8; Ex. 13 (Suggs Decl.) ¶ 12. Some units are increasingly placed on

1 lockdown, some for security overrides due to staffing shortages, which means that persons  
2 housed there are then stuck in their sleeping area without social distancing. Ex. 12 (Stepter  
3 Decl.) ¶ 14; Ex. 13 (Suggs Decl.) ¶ 12; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶ 12; Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.)  
4 ¶ 13. Despite all this, there is no policy for social distancing.

5 Defendants do not operate common areas such as dining rooms and recreational  
6 spaces such that persons can practice social distancing. *See* Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶¶ 16, 18;  
7 Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶ 8; Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.) ¶¶ 6, 8; Ex. 4 (Dupont Decl.) ¶ 7; Ex. 5 (Fenty  
8 Decl.) ¶¶ 9, 10; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶¶ 9-12; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶¶ 16-18, 20; Ex. 10  
9 (Reason Decl.) ¶¶ 7, 9-10; Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶¶ 8-10; Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶¶ 14-  
10 15; Ex. 13 (Suggs Decl.) ¶¶ 11, 15. Defendants do not stagger mealtimes, so persons  
11 frequently stand close together in lines and sit at tables elbow-to-elbow. Ex. 2 (Boykins  
12 Decl.) ¶¶ 15, 17; Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶¶ 8, 9; Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.) ¶ 9; Ex. 4 (Dupont Decl.)  
13 ¶¶ 6, 7; Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶¶ 9, 11; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶¶ 9, 12; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶¶ 11,  
14 17, 20; Ex. 10 (Reason Decl.) ¶¶ 8, 9; Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶ 9; Ex. 12 (Stepter Decl.)  
15 ¶ 9; Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶¶ 13-15; Ex. 13 (Suggs Decl.) ¶¶ 13-14. Defendants have  
16 meals delivered by incarcerated persons who travel from pod to pod, furthering the risk of  
17 spreading the virus. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 17. In some circumstances, Defendants have  
18 incarcerated people take food out of bins themselves with bare hands and return unwanted  
19 items to those bins, which results in multiple persons touching the same food. Ex. 2  
20 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 17; Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶ 8; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶ 9; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.)  
21 ¶ 17; Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶ 9; Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶ 14. Defendants keep recreation  
22 spaces packed, with multiple units sometimes sharing the facilities at the same time,  
23 allowing for quicker transmission of the virus among different housing units. Ex. 2  
24 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 18; Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶ 8; Ex. 4 (Dupont Decl.) ¶ 6; Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.)  
25 ¶ 8; Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶ 10; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶ 19; Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶ 9; Ex. 12  
26 (Stepter Decl.) ¶ 10. When receiving medication, incarcerated persons are required to line  
27 up side-by-side in their housing units. Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶ 5; Ex. 1 (Avenenti Decl.) ¶ 20;  
28 Ex. 4 (Dupont Decl.) ¶ 6; Ex. 12 (Stepter Decl.) ¶ 12; Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶ 13.

1           ***Inadequate Sanitization.*** The Maricopa County jails rely heavily on incarcerated  
2 persons to clean facilities. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 20; Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶ 11; Ex. 1  
3 (Avenenti Decl.) ¶ 18; Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.) ¶ 11; Ex. 4 (Dupont Decl.) ¶ 8; Ex. 5 (Fenty  
4 Decl.) ¶ 13; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶ 23; Ex. 10 (Reason Decl.) ¶ 7; Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.)  
5 ¶ 15; Ex. 12 (Stepter Decl.) ¶ 15; Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶ 17; Ex. 13 (Suggs Decl.) ¶ 17.  
6 Critically, the post-COVID-19 cleaning routine appears nearly identical to the pre-COVID-  
7 19 routine. Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶ 23; Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶ 17; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶ 13.  
8 Jail staff generally do not ensure that cleaning is done at all, let alone that it is done safely  
9 and adequately to kill the virus. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 21; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶¶ 11-12;  
10 Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶ 22. Defendants do not normally provide incarcerated persons with  
11 gloves or other sufficient protective equipment to conduct such cleaning. Ex. 5 (Fenty  
12 Decl.) ¶ 13; Ex. 12 (Stepter Decl.) ¶ 16. Defendants task incarcerated persons with cleaning  
13 cells where infected persons or persons quarantined at intake were located, and without any  
14 gloves. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶¶ 7-8; Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶ 4; Ex. 1 (Avenenti Decl.) ¶ 5;  
15 Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.) ¶ 10; Ex. 10 (Reason Decl.) ¶ 13. Incarcerated persons share numerous  
16 high-touch surfaces, such as telephones, tablets, tables, chairs, and railings, for which the  
17 jails have not implemented any system to ensure that they are properly cleaned. Ex. 3  
18 (Crough Decl.) ¶ 16; Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶¶ 11, 13; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶¶ 10, 12; Ex. 8  
19 (Perez Decl.) ¶¶ 17-19; Ex. 12 (Stepter Decl.) ¶¶ 11, 15. Some persons wrap socks or a  
20 personal bathing towel around phones to protect themselves against catching COVID-19.  
21 Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 25; Ex. 13 (Suggs Decl.) ¶ 22; *see also* Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.)  
22 ¶ 14.

23           Twice a day, Defendants provide entire housing units one bottle each of watered-  
24 down disinfectant and glass cleaner and potentially one other substance to clean the  
25 common surfaces and individual cells. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 21; Ex. 9 (Player Decl.)  
26 ¶ 11; Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.) ¶ 11; Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶ 13; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶ 22; Ex. 11  
27 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶¶ 14, 15; Ex. 12 (Stepter Decl.) ¶ 15; Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶ 18; Ex. 13  
28 (Suggs Decl.) ¶ 18. The supplies often run out, and the staff oftentimes refuse additional

1 supplies. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 21; Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶ 11; Ex. 1 (Avenenti Decl.) ¶ 18;  
2 Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.) ¶ 11; Ex. 4 (Dupont Decl.) ¶ 8; Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶ 13; Ex. 8 (Perez  
3 Decl.) ¶ 22; Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶ 14; Ex. 12 (Stepter Decl.) ¶ 15; Ex. 14 (Tequida  
4 Decl.) ¶ 18; Ex. 13 (Suggs Decl.) ¶ 18. Defendants generally do not provide individuals  
5 with access to personal hygiene products such as paper towels or hand sanitizer. Ex. 2  
6 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 23; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶¶ 12, 14-15. Having no paper towels,  
7 incarcerated persons are forced to use bathing towels Defendants provide only once per  
8 week to wipe down surfaces and dry their hands. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 23; Ex. 9 (Player  
9 Decl.) ¶ 11; Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.) ¶¶ 11-12; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶¶ 13-15; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.)  
10 ¶¶ 23-24; Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶ 15; Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶¶ 18-20; Ex. 13 (Suggs  
11 Decl.) ¶ 20. No incarcerated person is required to wear a mask, but incarcerated persons  
12 who do want masks generally only get one or perhaps two disposable paper masks over a  
13 period of months, even if this mask is subsequently lost, soiled, or broken and even if the  
14 person is housed in a unit that has been quarantined due to exposure to COVID-19. Ex. 2  
15 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 24; Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶ 12; Ex. 1 (Avenenti Decl.) ¶ 19; Ex. 6 (Lewis  
16 Decl.) ¶ 13; Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶ 14; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶ 16; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶ 25;  
17 Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶ 17; Ex. 12 (Stepter Decl.) ¶ 16; Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶ 22;  
18 Ex. 13 (Suggs Decl.) ¶ 21.

19 ***Inadequate Quarantining and Isolation.*** Where a person is symptomatic (at least  
20 with the limited subset of symptoms for which Defendants screen), Defendants' policy is  
21 to remove such people from their housing units, test them for COVID-19, and place them  
22 in isolation while they await test results.<sup>21</sup> For those asymptomatic people who are in the  
23 housing unit where the COVID-19-positive person was housed or who otherwise had close  
24 contact with a confirmed COVID-19-positive person, Defendants' policy is to place the  
25 entire housing unit on quarantine status.<sup>22</sup> As discussed above, Defendants recently  
26

27 <sup>21</sup> See Ex. 17 (SOP J-02-023), §§ C(b), (g)(i).

28 <sup>22</sup> *COVID-19 in County Jails*, MARICOPA COUNTY (accessed June 28, 2020),  
<https://www.maricopa.gov/5574/COVID-19-in-County-Jails>.

1 announced a policy to test asymptomatic people who were exposed to or housed with people  
2 with COVID-19, which has been implemented inconsistently. *See supra* at 6. Defendants  
3 have not taken other protective measures to ensure that infected people do not transmit the  
4 virus to uninfected people with whom they are quarantined together, which are necessary  
5 because COVID-19 testing has a significant false negative rate as high as 29%. Ex. 15  
6 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 77. Medical staff generally do not visit quarantined pods to check people  
7 for symptoms indicative of COVID-19 in order to remove symptomatic people from the  
8 unit, and on the rare occasions they do visit, fail to take basic precautions to limit the spread  
9 of the virus such as changing gloves between each person they examine and sterilizing oral  
10 thermometers between uses. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶¶ 8-9; Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶ 5. There  
11 is no social distancing in the quarantined units. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 28; Ex. 9 (Player  
12 Decl.) ¶¶ 7, 16. There are no specific cleaning procedures or PPE for quarantined units, and  
13 Defendants do not take steps to ensure that cells or bed spaces are cleaned—let alone  
14 properly or safely—after removal of people with confirmed or suspected COVID-19. Ex. 2  
15 (Boykins Decl.) ¶¶ 7-8, 19-24; Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶¶ 12-13. Finally, some quarantine units  
16 are directly across from non-quarantined units, allowing for the virus to potentially transmit  
17 through air flowing freely between the units. Ex. 4 (Dupont Decl.) ¶¶ 3-4; Ex. 14 (Tequida  
18 Decl.) ¶ 11; *see also* Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶ 19.

19 Defendants also have created and maintain punitive conditions in the units that house  
20 those who are removed from their general population housing due to suspected or known  
21 COVID-19 infection. These conditions deter those with symptoms of COVID-19 from  
22 reporting those symptoms to staff out of fear that they will then end up in housing akin to  
23 disciplinary segregation (called “the hole”) without proper medical care. Ex. 2 (Boykins  
24 Decl.) ¶ 5; Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.) ¶ 4; Ex. 13 (Suggs Decl.) ¶¶ 6-9. As a result, symptomatic  
25 people will potentially remain in general population units, thus risking the further spread of  
26 the disease. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 116. For people who test positive, the only difference  
27 between these punitive isolation units and punitive segregation units at the jails is that,  
28 unlike the hole, COVID-19-positive persons were placed in cells together. Ex. 6 (Lewis

1 Decl.) ¶ 19. Defendants house people who have tested positive for COVID-19 in filthy,  
2 uncleaned cells in which they are locked 24 hours per day, except for minimal shower time  
3 (one hour every three days for one person and once in a week for another) and for legal  
4 video visits. *Id.*; Ex. 1 (Avenenti Decl.) ¶ 14. The staff have taken all of their property, and  
5 require persons to wear the same clothes, despite being sick with the virus. Ex. 6 (Lewis  
6 Decl.) ¶ 19; Ex. 1 (Avenenti Decl.) ¶ 14. Access to commissary to supplement the two  
7 meals served per day is denied. Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.) ¶ 19. Incarcerated persons who are  
8 awaiting test results are housed in isolation but encounter otherwise similar conditions while  
9 awaiting the results of their COVID test. Ex. 13 (Suggs Decl.) ¶¶ 6-7. This stands in contrast  
10 to Defendants' written policy for housing people who test positive or who are in medical  
11 observation while awaiting test results, which states that they will be housed individually,  
12 that they will have ample cleaning supplies, that cells will be cleaned before use (by  
13 incarcerated people as they are leaving medical isolation), that the incarcerated persons'  
14 property in their possession will be cleaned on their departure, and that they will be provided  
15 with clean clothing when departing isolation. Ex. 21 (4/7/2020 Email re Medical  
16 Observation).

17 The medical care for prisoners who test positive for COVID-19 is also inadequate—  
18 staff who are not necessarily medically trained visit once per day for a symptom and  
19 temperature check, normally do not conduct pulse oximeter testing necessary to monitor the  
20 impact that COVID-19 is having on oxygen intake, and when medicine is requested, it can  
21 take up to three and a half days to receive even the most basic of medications like Tylenol.  
22 Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 113; Ex. 1 (Avenenti Decl.) ¶¶ 8-13; Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.) ¶¶ 19, 20,  
23 22. But all patients with known or suspected COVID-19 diagnoses require close clinical  
24 monitoring of their condition twice daily to assess whether they are clinically deteriorating  
25 and require more assertive treatment. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶¶ 16, 111. Defendants are also  
26 failing to provide sufficient medical monitoring to the medically vulnerable who have  
27 contracted COVID-19, notwithstanding that the medically vulnerable face higher  
28 hospitalization and death rates and that adequate medical monitoring is particularly critical



1 for this population. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 88; Ex. 6 (Lewis Decl.) ¶ 20.<sup>23</sup>

2 ***Hazardous Intake Processes.*** Defendants currently process 100-150 new  
 3 individuals every day.<sup>24</sup> This is in stark contrast to detention facilities—like those at issue  
 4 in *Urdaneta*—that have discontinued accepting new detainees. Ex. 20 (*Urdaneta* Opp.) at  
 5 8. According to Defendants’ policy, individuals are only isolated and tested for COVID-19  
 6 during booking if they exhibit certain symptoms or report direct contact with someone  
 7 COVID-positive. *See* Ex. 17 (SOP J-02-023). Non-tested individuals then go through  
 8 booking procedures and a court appearance, and are held throughout that time in various  
 9 holding “tanks” with between 10-20 people in each with no ability to socially distance.  
 10 Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶¶ 30-31. Masks are the exception, not the rule. *Id.* People who are not  
 11 tested are then placed directly into a housing pod and are then supposed to begin a 14-day  
 12 cohorting period once the pod reaches a certain capacity. Ex. 19 (Ltr. from Penzone to  
 13 Keenan). But in practice, that has not happened consistently and some new intakes who  
 14 have not gone through the 14-day cohorting process are placed directly into the general  
 15 population. Ex. 4 (Dupont Decl.) ¶ 15; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶ 7; Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.)  
 16 ¶ 7; Ex. 1 (Avenenti Decl.) ¶ 6. Several people incarcerated in their general population dorm  
 17 have been rebooked on new charges and taken to the 4th Avenue booking facility, where  
 18 they spent about 24 hours in a holding cell with new intakes who were recently arrested,  
 19 before they were returned back to their original dorm. Ex. 4 (Dupont Decl.) ¶ 15; Ex. 7  
 20 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶ 7. Even for those who are placed into the 14-day intake cohort, the process  
 21 is not sufficient to stop the spread of the virus. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶¶ 92-93. As a result  
 22 of Defendants’ failure to test all persons at intake, they do not identify pre-symptomatic or  
 23 asymptomatic people who may have COVID-19 and who can then unknowingly infect other  
 24

25 <sup>23</sup> Defendants have also failed to waive fees associated with seeking care or diagnosis for  
 26 COVID-19 symptoms. Suggs Decl. ¶ 10. Especially in light of the failure to provide  
 27 adequate medical care for persons who become infected, failure to waive medical fees can  
 28 deter people from reporting symptoms and decrease the ability of the jails to identify  
 people who have been infected with COVID-19. Fenty Decl. ¶ 5; Reason Decl. ¶ 5.

<sup>24</sup> Lauren Castle, *Maricopa County considers mass testing in jails after confirmed COVID-19 cases spike*, AZ CENTRAL (June 10, 2020), <https://cutt.ly/luxS6Gk>.

1 incarcerated persons or staff. *Id.* By placing untested new intakes in housing cohorts,  
2 Defendants combine people who may be asymptomatic carriers of COVID-19 with  
3 individuals who may not yet be infected, thereby furthering the risk. *Id.* Pre-symptomatic  
4 or asymptomatic people with COVID-19 may infect others at any point during that 14-day  
5 period, and people who are infected during the intake cohort may remain asymptomatic yet  
6 infectious at the time that they are placed into the general population. *Id.* Moreover, persons  
7 in the 14-day intake cohort are sometimes in contact with people from units that have been  
8 quarantined due to exposure to COVID-19, wholly undermining any benefit from the 14-  
9 day cohorting. Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶ 17. Indeed, this is in direct contravention to CDC  
10 guidance, which states to “avoid mixing individuals quarantined due to exposure to a  
11 COVID-19 case with individuals undergoing routine intake quarantine.”<sup>25</sup>

12 ***No Information.*** Defendants have also failed to provide incarcerated persons with  
13 basic information about COVID-19. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 27; Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶ 14;  
14 Ex. 1 (Avenenti Decl.) ¶ 4; Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶ 20; Ex. 3 (Crough Decl.) ¶ 25; Ex. 7  
15 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶ 18; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶¶ 14, 27; Ex. 10 (Reason Decl.) ¶ 18; Ex. 11  
16 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶ 19; Ex. 12 (Stepter Decl.) ¶ 18; Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶ 24.  
17 Incarcerated persons have not been provided with information on what symptoms to look  
18 for or instructions on social distancing. *Id.*<sup>26</sup> Defendants have not taken steps to ensure that  
19 incarcerated persons with psychiatric or intellectual disabilities are educated about the  
20 disease and able to take the steps necessary to protect themselves. Cohen Decl. ¶¶ 4 n.3;  
21 133. Aside from basic hand washing and instructions on how to preserve single use, paper  
22 masks, individuals have learned about the coronavirus through their attorneys, families, or  
23 persons other than Defendants’ employees. Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 27; Ex. 9 (Player Decl.)  
24 ¶ 14; Ex. 1 (Avenenti Decl.) ¶ 4; Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶ 20; Ex. 3 (Crough Decl.) ¶ 25; Ex. 7

25  
26 <sup>25</sup> CDC, *Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities*, *supra* note 7, at 19.

27 <sup>26</sup> Since the filing of this lawsuit, Defendants appear to have now provided information on  
28 tablets distributed to some incarcerated people on the symptoms of COVID-19. Suggs Decl.  
¶ 24. There is still no information provided regarding the need for social distancing. *Id.*

1 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶ 18; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.) ¶¶ 14, 27; Ex. 10 (Reason Decl.) ¶ 18; Ex. 11  
 2 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶ 19; Ex. 12 (Stepter Decl.) ¶ 18; Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶ 24. This is  
 3 despite the fact that Defendants publicly claim to have posted information on COVID-19 in  
 4 the jails.

5 ***Lack of Testing or Screening of Staff.*** Finally, staff who work at the Maricopa  
 6 County jails, who travel to and from their homes and communities for work, are at risk of  
 7 contracting the virus and further transmitting it to people incarcerated in the jails, to fellow  
 8 staff, and to persons in their communities. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 73. There is no policy to  
 9 test all staff or to even check staff for symptoms upon entering the facility. Instead, staff  
 10 continue to be “instructed to stay home if they are sick with fever, cough, or difficulty  
 11 breathing and contact their healthcare provider.”<sup>27</sup> Staff who are unknowingly infected but  
 12 are not symptomatic will not be identified and can spread the virus. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.)  
 13 ¶ 73. This is especially problematic as staff at the jails do not consistently wear masks or  
 14 wear their masks below their chin—defeating the purpose of a mask in the first instance.  
 15 Ex. 2 (Boykins Decl.) ¶ 26; Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶ 13; Ex. 1 (Avenenti Decl.) ¶ 20; Ex. 6  
 16 (Lewis Decl.) ¶ 14; Ex. 4 (Dupont Decl.) ¶ 11; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶ 17; Ex. 8 (Perez Decl.)  
 17 ¶ 26; Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶ 18; Ex. 13 (Suggs Decl.) ¶ 23.<sup>28</sup> They also do not change  
 18 gloves between inspecting individual incarcerated persons. Ex. 9 (Player Decl.) ¶ 13; Ex. 1  
 19 (Avenenti Decl.) ¶ 20; Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶ 10; Ex. 7 (Ochoa Decl.) ¶ 17; Ex. 8 (Perez  
 20 Decl.) ¶ 26; Ex. 10 (Reason Decl.) ¶ 16; Ex. 11 (Scroggins Decl.) ¶¶ 11, 18; Ex. 14  
 21 (Tequida Decl.) ¶ 23.

## 22 **II. ARGUMENT**

23 A movant is entitled to a temporary restraining order when (1) they are likely to  
 24 suffer irreparable harm; (2) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (3) the balance of  
 25 equities favors them; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.*

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
 27 <sup>27</sup> *COVID-19 FAQ*, MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE (June 15, 2020),  
<https://www.mcso.org/Multimedia/PressRelease/FAQ%20Covid-19-6.15.20.pdf>.

28 <sup>28</sup> Defendants appear to have altered their policy to require staff to wear masks, but there is  
 no evidence that this policy has been enforced. Cohen Decl. ¶ 121.

1 *Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).<sup>29</sup> The Ninth Circuit applies a sliding scale approach,  
2 under which a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.  
3 *See Pimentel v. Dreyfus*, 670 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs plainly meet each  
4 element.

5 This Court has already granted preliminary relief in analogous circumstances. In  
6 *Urdaneta*, this Court held that people detained at a federal immigration detention facility  
7 with similar conditions to those present at the Maricopa County jails established a likelihood  
8 of success on the merits and irreparable harm for the same reasons that Plaintiffs seek relief  
9 here: that the facility “fostered conditions that pose an objectively unreasonable risk of  
10 transmission of COVID-19 and a resulting substantial risk of serious harm to Petitioner’s  
11 health and ultimate safety.” *Urdaneta*, at \*12. Importantly, the Court made this  
12 determination at a time in which the detention facilities had *no new cases*. Ex. 20 (*Urdaneta*  
13 *Opp.*). Indeed, one facility had *no cases at all*. *Id.* Here, in contrast, cases are rapidly  
14 increasing. Thus, judicial action is especially warranted and needed.

15 Because Plaintiffs meet the requirements for a temporary restraining order, Plaintiffs  
16 seek the same remedy this Court has already required, *i.e.* “constitutionally adequate  
17 conditions”<sup>30</sup> for all class members, including social distancing measures and improved  
18 cleaning practices. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek the limited release of individuals in the  
19 Pretrial Medically Vulnerable and Disability Subclasses who are in custody solely because  
20 they cannot afford bail. Plaintiffs further seek a process by which to consider for release or  
21 enlargement other persons who are medically vulnerable or disabled, as detailed in the  
22 proposed Order.

23 **A. Absent Relief, Plaintiffs are Near Certain to Suffer Irreparable Harm.**

24 The Ninth Circuit recently recognized that dangerous conditions of detention  
25

26 <sup>29</sup> Though *Winter* sets forth the standard for a preliminary injunction, the legal standard for  
27 issuing a temporary restraining order is the same. *Doe v. McAleenan*, 415 F. Supp. 3d 971,  
28 976 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (“The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to  
the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.”).

<sup>30</sup> *Urdaneta*, at \*12.

1 constitute irreparable harm supporting injunctive relief. *Padilla v. U.S. Immigration &*  
2 *Customs Enforcement*, 953 F.3d 1134, 1147 (9th Cir. 2020).

3 All detained persons at the Maricopa County jails—and especially the Medically  
4 Vulnerable and Disability Subclass members—face a heightened risk of serious injury or  
5 death due to COVID-19. Absent immediate steps, the continuing spread of COVID-19  
6 throughout the facility is virtually inevitable, and subclass members are likely to experience  
7 serious injury or death. Given these grave risks, this factor weighs heavily in favor of  
8 injunctive relief.

9 **B. Plaintiffs Have a Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits Under**  
10 **42 U.S.C. Section 1983.**

11 To establish a likelihood of success on the merits, “the moving party must  
12 demonstrate a fair chance of success on the merits, or questions serious enough to require  
13 litigation.” *Guzman v. Shewry*, 552 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Here,  
14 Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their claims under § 1983 and have certainly raised  
15 questions serious enough to require further litigation.

16 Defendants have failed to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the  
17 inmates.” *See Hudson v. Palmer*, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). Defendants are liable for  
18 depriving Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to adequate treatment and safety, having a  
19 policy, custom, or practice that is the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation,  
20 endorsing unconstitutional conduct, and failing to adequately supervise employees who  
21 commit constitutional violations. *See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik*, 485 U.S. 112, 139-40  
22 (1988); *Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n*, 541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008); *Gibson*  
23 *v. County of Washoe*, 290 F.3d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir. 2002); *Starr v. Baca*, 652 F.3d 1202,  
24 1206-08 (9th Cir. 2011).

25 *I. Defendants’ Unconstitutional Punishment of Pretrial Detainees*  
26 *Violates Due Process Rights.*

27 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits punishment of detained persons prior to “a  
28 formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” *Bell v. Wolfish*, 441

1 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). Thus, the government violates the rights of a person incarcerated  
2 pretrial if the conditions of confinement amount to punishment. *See Doe v. Kelly*, 878 F.3d  
3 710, 720 (9th Cir. 2017).

4 A punitive condition exists “(1) where the challenged restrictions are expressly  
5 intended to punish, or (2) where the challenged restrictions serve an alternative, non-  
6 punitive purpose but are nonetheless excessive in relation to the alternative purpose, or are  
7 employed to achieve objectives that could be accomplished in so many alternative and less  
8 harsh methods.” *Jones v. Blanas*, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and quotation  
9 marks omitted); *Kelly*, 878 F.3d at 720.

10 Given the rampant spread of COVID-19 cases at the Maricopa County jails, and  
11 Defendants’ failure to implement adequate protective measures, further transmission of the  
12 virus is inevitable. This poses an imminent threat to the Medically Vulnerable and Disability  
13 Subclass members, as well as to all detained persons at the Maricopa County jails, facility  
14 employees, and members of the surrounding community. The consequences of further  
15 spread of COVID-19 are dire; once contracted, there is no known treatment or cure, and the  
16 risks of serious illness or injury are substantial. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 16. Staff members  
17 enter the jails every day, risk exposure, and then take that exposure back to their families  
18 and communities when they leave the jails. The relief requested herein lays out an available  
19 alternative to confinement under the current conditions that offers a meaningful way to  
20 prevent death and mitigate the proliferation of the virus among those in custody at the  
21 Maricopa County jails, and ultimately to the community at large. Thus, the current  
22 conditions are unconstitutional and, in some instances, require release.

23 Indeed, one purpose of pretrial confinement is to ensure a defendant’s presence for  
24 trial and the security and order of its detention facilities, as well as public safety. *Bell*, 441  
25 U.S. at 540. Those purposes are not served if a pretrial detainee is rendered incapable of  
26 appearing at trial due to serious illness, hospitalization, or death from COVID-19, or an  
27 infectious disease is allowed to spread, endangering detained people and staff and making  
28 that facility more hazardous and difficult to manage.

1           The imminent danger posed by COVID-19 vastly outweighs any government interest  
 2 in maintaining the current conditions. The government has no interest in operating facilities  
 3 that violate public health guidance and place detainees in harm's way. Moreover, for those  
 4 persons to be released, they have locations where they can remain and adhere to guidelines  
 5 for self-quarantine, further undercutting any interest in confinement. The harsh conditions  
 6 and viable alternatives prove that the Maricopa County jails are punishing individuals prior  
 7 to an adjudication of guilt in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

8                               2.       *Defendants' Deliberate Indifference to the Risks of COVID-19 Also*  
 9                               *Violates the Right to Constitutional Conditions of Confinement.*

10           The Constitution imposes an affirmative duty on the government to “provide humane  
 11 conditions of confinement,” including by providing for incarcerated persons’ reasonable  
 12 safety and by addressing their serious medical needs. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825,  
 13 828, 832-33 (1994); *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (requiring corrections  
 14 officials to address prisoners’ serious medical needs). The government violates this  
 15 obligation when it takes a person into its custody but “fails to provide . . . medical care, and  
 16 reasonable safety.” *DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs.*, 489 U.S. 189, 199-  
 17 200 (1989). The government may not act with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk  
 18 of serious harm. *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 828.

19           The Pretrial Class’s claims are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, whereas the  
 20 Post-Conviction Class’s claims are governed by the Eighth Amendment.<sup>31</sup> The Fourteenth  
 21 Amendment’s “objective standard” is violated when: “(i) the defendant made an intentional  
 22 decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
 24 <sup>31</sup> A number of circuits have held that that the due process clause applies to individuals who  
 25 have been convicted and not yet sentenced in addition to pretrial detained persons. *See, e.g.,*  
 26 *Lewis v. Downey*, 581 F.3d 467, 474 (7th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court has further  
 27 suggested that a “formal adjudication” includes both conviction and sentence. *Graham v.*  
 28 *Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 (1986) (“Eighth Amendment[] protections d[o] not attach  
 until after conviction and sentence.”). The Ninth Circuit has addressed this issue only in the  
 context of the standard for determining a due process liberty interest in being free from  
 segregated housing, *see Resnick v. Hayes*, 213 F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 2000). It is thus an  
 open question whether the objective deliberate indifference standard described in *Gordon*,  
 888 F.3d at 1125, also protects those convicted but not yet sentenced to incarceration.

1 conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant  
2 did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable  
3 official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—  
4 making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such  
5 measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.” *Gordon v. Cty. of Orange*, 888 F.3d  
6 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018), *cert. denied*, 139 S. Ct. 794 (2019). This is “akin to reckless  
7 disregard” as the standard is “more than negligence but less than subjective intent.” *Id.* at  
8 1125.

9 Every element is satisfied here. *First*, Defendants have “made an intentional decision  
10 with respect to the conditions under which” Plaintiffs are confined. *See id.* at 1125.  
11 Defendants have confined Plaintiffs to the jails while they either await trial or serve their  
12 terms of incarceration. The conditions of confinement at the jails—including inadequate  
13 social distancing, disinfecting, and PPE—have resulted from Defendants’ deliberate  
14 decisions. Indeed, as this Court has already ruled, when detention centers do not “implement  
15 responsive measures specific to high-risk detainees[,] . . . despite knowledge of the acute  
16 risks posed to them,” then they “have made an intentional decision.” *Urdaneta*, at \*10.

17 *Second*, Defendants also have put Plaintiffs at “substantial risk of suffering serious  
18 harm.” *See Gordon*, 888 F.3d at 1125. Though the risks and spread of COVID-19 are well  
19 known, the record here establishes that Plaintiffs face heightened and unreasonable  
20 exposure to these serious—and often deadly—risks at the jails. In this pandemic, few places  
21 are more dangerous than a jail. Indeed, Dr. Cohen confirms that congregate settings like the  
22 Maricopa County jails are a breeding zone for the spread of COVID-19. Ex. 15 (Cohen  
23 Decl.) ¶ 9. That is especially true because of the lack of social distancing and other  
24 protective measures coupled with the inadequate testing procedures at the jails. *Id.* And it  
25 is especially true for persons who are medically vulnerable and disabled. Ex. 15 (Cohen  
26 Decl.) ¶ 4. But this Court need not take Dr. Cohen’s word for it. The number of cases  
27 alone—skyrocketing at a rate of over 14,000 percent over the past month—establishes that  
28 the spread of COVID-19 across the incarcerated population has already begun and has



1 placed Plaintiffs at substantial risk of suffering serious harm.

2 This Court has already recognized the risk of harm associated at other detention  
3 centers in Arizona, especially for at-risk detainees:

4 Absent specific measures which safeguard high-risk detainees, or other measures  
5 which reasonably prevent and manage detainee exposure to COVID-19, the  
6 unmitigated risk of transmission in detention facilities yields a substantial risk of  
7 severe illness or death to high-risk detainees. Because reasonable measures have not  
8 been implemented in LPCC to limit the risk of Petitioner's exposure . . . and the  
9 parties do not dispute that Petitioner has a medical condition which places him at  
10 high-risk of severe illness or death, the conditions under which Petitioner is detained  
11 poses a substantial risk of serious harm to his health and safety.

12 *Urdaneta*, at \*10.

13 *Third*, Defendants have not “take[n] reasonable available measures to abate risk[s],  
14 even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high  
15 degree of risk involved—making the consequences of [Defendants’] conduct obvious.” *See*  
16 *Gordon*, 888 F.3d at 1125. Even where Defendants take “some action” “to prevent and  
17 mitigate the spread of COVID-19,” when “these actions [do] not include[] reasonable,  
18 necessary, and available measures to abate the risk of harm,” they are objectively  
19 unreasonable. *See Urdaneta*, at \*10; *see also Gutierrez-Lopez v. Figueroa*, 2020 WL  
20 2781722, at \*9 (D. Ariz. May 27, 2020) (“While Respondents have taken some action in  
21 EDC to prevent and mitigate the spread of COVID-19, . . . these actions have not included  
22 reasonable, necessary, and available measures to abate the risk of harm to Petitioner and  
23 other high-risk detainees.”).

24 While Defendants have implemented *some* policies and practices, their efforts have  
25 been insufficient in light of the obvious risks posed by COVID-19 to those incarcerated.  
26 And despite publicly acknowledging the importance of policies to protect those in their  
27 custody, Defendants have not implemented public-health experts’ recommended  
28 measures—measures that are available to them—to abate the risks of COVID-19. For  
example, Defendants have not implemented social distancing or universal testing, both  
extremely effective and reasonable ways to abate COVID-19. Defendants also have not  
provided Plaintiffs sufficient cleaning supplies or taken steps to ensure that cleaning high

1 touch surfaces is in fact being conducted. Defendants have failed to provide sufficient PPE  
2 to Plaintiffs and have failed to ensure that staff are properly using PPE. Defendants have  
3 engaged in haphazard quarantine and intake cohorting procedures. Critically, despite clear  
4 proof that their policies have failed to curb the spread of the COVID-19 across the jails,  
5 Defendants have nevertheless maintained much of their ineffective policies. Ex. 15 (Cohen  
6 Decl.) ¶ 36. Each of these actions and omissions can hardly be described as reasonable.

7 Indeed, Defendants could have instituted a myriad of measures consistent with  
8 public health guidelines, including: immediate release of persons identified in this motion;  
9 improved intake mechanisms to consistently quarantine upon intake and prevent exposure  
10 to people in the general population, testing newly booked people both at the start and at the  
11 end of intake quarantine, and conducting regular symptom screening and temperature  
12 checks; universal testing of all incarcerated persons and staff; providing for the ability of  
13 incarcerated people to maintain six feet distance in booking, housing, recreation, and in  
14 routine movements in the jails; providing proper, twice daily medical monitoring of people  
15 who are symptomatic and awaiting test results or confirmed to have COVID-19 and housing  
16 them in clean, non-punitive conditions; closely monitoring people in quarantined housing  
17 units that have been exposed to COVID-19 to identify symptoms and quickly isolating  
18 anyone who becomes symptomatic, to the extent group quarantine is necessary; closely  
19 monitoring the medical conditions and vital signs of all medically vulnerable incarcerated  
20 persons, including daily temperature and symptom screening; providing adequate cleaning  
21 supplies (and additional cleaning supplies upon request) and ensuring that shared and  
22 individual housing areas are regularly cleaned, particularly high touch areas; providing  
23 adequate PPE (and additional PPE upon request) and ensuring that both staff and  
24 incarcerated people wear masks; providing hand sanitizer with at least 60% alcohol;  
25 increased cleaning of common areas and communal surfaces; housing medically vulnerable  
26 persons to reduce their exposure to others and ensuring that staff who supervise them are  
27 regularly tested; ensuring that staff regularly change gloves between contact with  
28 individuals and sterilize equipment between uses; and offering additional information about

1 CDC guidelines. Critically, many of these measures are recommended by the CDC,<sup>32</sup> yet  
2 Defendants have not instituted any of them.

3 *Fourth*, “by not taking such measures,” Defendants will cause Plaintiffs’ injuries and  
4 perhaps even deaths. *See Gordon*, 888 F.3d at 1125. Without the measures recommended  
5 by public health experts, it is inevitable that the virus—which already has ravaged the  
6 facilities—will continue to spread through the Maricopa County jails. This not only will  
7 infect hundreds of additional individuals, but also threatens to lead to serious illnesses and  
8 potential deaths. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶¶ 160-161. This Court has recognized that a  
9 detention facility’s failure to implement measures to protect the facility’s most vulnerable  
10 causes “an objectively unreasonable risk of transmission of COVID-19 and a resulting  
11 substantial risk of serious harm” to the Petitioner’s safety. There is no reason for the Court  
12 to rule differently here. *See Urdaneta*, at \*12. In sum, the “conditions serve no legitimate  
13 government objective” and “amount to punishment” thereby “violating the Due Process  
14 Clause.” *Id.*

15 While a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment need only meet “objective  
16 deliberate indifference,” a claim under the Eighth Amendment—which protects those who  
17 are incarcerated post-conviction—must show “subjective deliberate indifference.” *Gordon*,  
18 888 F.3d at 1120, 1125 n.4 (citation omitted). To prove a violation of the Eighth  
19 Amendment,<sup>33</sup> “it is enough that the official acted, or failed to act despite his knowledge of  
20 a substantial risk of serious harm.” *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 842. A fact finder may infer that a  
21 prison official had knowledge of a substantial risk by looking to “circumstantial evidence”  
22 or “the very fact that the risk was obvious.” *Id.* at 841-42. For example, that a risk to  
23 incarcerated people is “pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials  
24 in the past” is enough for a fact finder to determine actual knowledge on the part of prison

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>32</sup> *Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in*  
*Correctional and Detention Facilities*, supra note 7.

27 <sup>33</sup> An Eighth Amendment violation must also, be “objectively sufficiently serious.” *Farmer*  
28 *v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The violation here is objectively sufficiently serious  
for the same reason it is sufficiently serious for Fourteenth Amendment liability, as  
discussed above.

1 officials. *Id.* at 842-43.

2 With respect to an impending infectious disease like COVID-19, deliberate  
3 indifference is demonstrated when officials “ignore a condition of confinement that is sure  
4 or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month or  
5 year,” even when “the complaining inmate shows no serious current symptoms.” *Helling*,  
6 509 U.S. 25, 33, 36 (1993) (holding that a prisoner “states a cause of *action*. . . by alleging  
7 that [corrections officials] have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to [conditions]  
8 that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health”). In other words, it  
9 “would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-  
10 threatening condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to them.”  
11 *Id.* at 33-34.

12 Defendants have acted with subjective deliberate indifference. The threat of COVID-  
13 19 is “obvious . . . pervasive, [and] well-documented”—there are 565 COVID-19-positive  
14 cases in the jails to date. *See Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 842-43. Moreover, in enacting a policy,  
15 albeit a terribly ineffective one, to combat the spread of COVID-19, Defendants recognize  
16 the risks associated with the disease. Finally, Defendants have released a series of public  
17 statements acknowledging the risks of COVID-19 and the need for conditions to meet  
18 public health guidelines.<sup>34</sup>

19 Defendants have also consciously disregarded these substantial risks. That  
20 Defendants have made some efforts to address the COVID-19 risk does not immunize them  
21 from liability. Rather, the Eighth Amendment is violated where an official “fail[s] to take  
22 reasonable measures to abate” the risk. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).  
23 Following *Farmer*, the Ninth Circuit has held that even extensive efforts to address  
24 unconstitutional conditions or treatment “do[] not immunize officials from the Eighth  
25 Amendment requirements.” *Edmo v. Corizon, Inc.*, 935 F.3d 757, 793-94 (9th Cir. 2019)  
26 (upholding a deliberate indifference finding despite evidence of “extensive treatment over

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>34</sup> *See, e.g.*, <https://www.mcso.org/Multimedia/PressRelease/FAQ%20Covid-19-6.15.20.pdf>, accessed June 29, 2020.

1 a period of years” for gender dysphoria); *see also LaMarca v. Turner*, 995 F.2d 1526, 1537-  
2 38 (11th Cir. 1993) (deliberate indifference found despite warden’s “good faith efforts to  
3 resolve the dilemmas facing” the prison, including his work to “secure additional funds,  
4 make improvements to GCI’s physical plant, expand recruitment efforts, and institute  
5 policies that would have reduced the risk of violence if his staff had followed them.”);  
6 *De’lonta v. Johnson*, 708 F.3d 520, 526 (4th Cir. 2013) (“But just because Appellees have  
7 provided De’lonta with *some* treatment consistent with the GID Standards of Care, it does  
8 not follow that they have necessarily provided her with *constitutionally adequate*  
9 treatment.”); *Riley v. Olk-Long*, 282 F.3d 592, 597 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Although the record  
10 indicates that defendants investigated the several reports filed against Link, [defendants]  
11 are not shielded from liability because their responses were not adequate given the known  
12 risk.”). As set forth above, there are multiple, available, reasonable steps Defendants have  
13 failed to take that demonstrate their conscious disregard of the risks of COVID-19.

14 3. *Defendants Have a Policy, Custom, and Practice of Violating*  
15 *Plaintiffs’ Rights.*

16 A county is liable under § 1983 when there is a “direct causal link between a  
17 municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” *Collins v. City of*  
18 *Harker Heights, Tex.*, 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992) (quotation marks and citations omitted).  
19 Liability is “founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that  
20 the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” *Trevino v. Gates*, 99  
21 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).

22 The jails’ policies are inadequate to ensure constitutionally adequate conditions of  
23 confinement, including adequate social distancing measures and sufficient PPE. Nor do  
24 Defendants follow the terms of their written policies, which further increases the risk of  
25 spreading the virus. *See Redman v. Cty. of San Diego*, 942 F.2d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991)  
26 (routine failure to follow written policy can be a custom supporting municipal liability).  
27 Moreover, as set forth above, Defendants’ failure to release medically vulnerable and  
28 disabled incarcerated persons while the virus spreads amounts to deliberate indifference.

1 See *Berry v. Baca*, 379 F.3d 764, 768-69 (9th Cir. 2004) (inefficient implementation of  
2 policies concerning timely release of prisoners could amount to a policy of deliberate  
3 indifference). For each of these reasons, municipal liability against Defendants is warranted.

4 **C. The Medically Vulnerable Subclasses Are Likely To Succeed on Their  
Habeas Claims.**

5 Detainees are entitled to habeas relief where they are held “in violation of the  
6 Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 499 & n.14  
7 (1973). Because the Medically Vulnerable Subclasses face a heightened risk of severe  
8 illness and death from COVID-19, there is no set of conditions that would render their  
9 continued confinement constitutional. This Court has already found the requested relief  
10 cognizable under §2241:

11 Because Petitioners claim that their continued detention under the present  
12 conditions is unconstitutional and that their immediate release is the only  
13 effective remedy (see e.g., Doc. 1 ¶ 14), Petitioners’ claims can be viewed as  
14 challenging the fact, not simply the conditions, of their confinement. See  
15 *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (where an individual is  
16 “challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the  
17 relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release,” the  
18 proper remedy is a writ of habeas corpus). The fact that Petitioners’ claims  
19 require consideration of detention conditions does not necessarily preclude  
20 habeas corpus review. Therefore, in the absence of clear or binding authority  
21 to the contrary, these claims are cognizable under § 2241.

22 *Urdaneta*, at \*6.<sup>35</sup> Accordingly, the Court should order that members of the Medically  
23 Vulnerable Subclasses be released or enlarged pursuant to the process set forth in the

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24 <sup>35</sup> See also *Wilson*, 2020 WL 3056217, at \*5 (“[P]etitioners’ claims are properly brought  
25 under § 2241 because they challenge the fact or extent of their confinement by seeking  
26 release from custody.”); *Vazquez Barrera v. Wolf*, 2020 WL 1904497, at \*4 (S.D. Tex.  
27 Apr. 17, 2020) (“Because Plaintiffs are challenging the fact of their detention as  
28 unconstitutional and seek relief in the form of immediate release, their claims fall squarely  
in the realm of habeas corpus. The mere fact that Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge requires  
discussion of conditions in immigration detention does not necessarily bar such a challenge  
in a habeas petition.”); *Bent v. Barr*, 2020 WL 1812850, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2020) (“In  
this case, Bent does not solely challenge the conditions of his confinement. He contests that  
his continued detention during the COVID-19 pandemic violates his substantive due  
process rights. This is patently a ‘challenge[ ] to the validity’ of his confinement.”); *Malam*  
*v. Adducci*, 2020 WL 1672662, at \*3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 2020), as amended (Apr. 6, 2020)  
 (“Petitioner may nonetheless bring her claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because she seeks  
immediate release from confinement as a result of there being no conditions of confinement  
sufficient to prevent irreparable constitutional injury under the facts of her case.”); *Coreas*  
*v. Bounds*, 2020 WL 1663133, at \*7 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2020) (Plaintiffs entitled to seek habeas  
relief where there otherwise would be “no vehicle by which to seek redress for the  
constitutional violation they allege”).

1 proposed order. Plaintiffs seek the immediate release or enlargement of Medically  
2 Vulnerable Subclass members who are only being held due to their inability to pay bail or  
3 whom Defendants agree to release. These persons have already been deemed by their  
4 presiding criminal court to be eligible for release subject to payment of bail, and therefore  
5 do not pose such a substantial public safety or flight risk that there are no conditions under  
6 which they can be released. For all remaining Medically Vulnerable Subclass Members,  
7 Plaintiffs have proposed a process by which public safety objections can be considered in  
8 light of the grave risks of serious illness and death faced by these persons should they remain  
9 jailed, and whether there are alternative conditions short of confinement that could be  
10 imposed.

11 *1. No Set of Conditions Will Reduce the Risk of Serious Harm for the*  
12 *Medically Vulnerable Subclass.*

13 While COVID-19 poses a risk to everyone, there is a “risk of serious consequences  
14 from the COVID-19 virus, up to and including death, because of [] underlying medical  
15 conditions.” Ex. 21 (*Rose v. Baker*, No. 17-15009 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 2020)) at 2 (granting bail  
16 pending resolution of habeas case for medically vulnerable prisoner); Ex. 22 (*Mendoza v.*  
17 *Barr*, No CV-20-00514-PHX-SPL (MTM) (D. Ariz. June 16, 2020)) at 4-5 (finding the  
18 trajectory of COVID-19 infection for diabetic patients “is not only unpredictable, but  
19 potentially deadly,” and that “[a]ll patients with symptomatic COVID-19 and risk factors  
20 for severe disease should be closely monitored [as] the clinical course may rapidly  
21 progress.”). The CDC recently reported that persons who are medically vulnerable are  
22 twelve times more likely to die, and six times more likely to be hospitalized, from COVID-  
23 19 infection.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, while the overall rate of COVID-related hospitalization for those  
24 between the ages of 18-49 is 46.7 per 100,000, that number jumps to 126.2 per 100,000 for  
25 those between 50-64 years old, and a shocking 254.7 per 100,000 for those above 65. Ex. 15  
26

27 <sup>36</sup> See *Coronavirus Disease 2019 Case Surveillance - United States, January 22 - May 30,*  
28 *2020*, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (accessed June 18, 2020),  
<https://cutt.ly/wuAV1MZ>.

1 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 28. These complications can manifest at an alarming pace: Patients can  
2 show the first symptoms of infection in as little as two days after exposure, and their  
3 condition can seriously deteriorate in as little as five days or sooner. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.)  
4 ¶ 22. These problems are magnified by the lack of adequate healthcare present at most jails,  
5 including the Maricopa County jails, which prevents medically vulnerable individuals from  
6 accessing the treatment they would need upon infection. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 13. Thus,  
7 for medically vulnerable detainees, the consequences of COVID-19 are so dire that even a  
8 diminished risk of infection is constitutionally intolerable—for them, the only remedy is  
9 release or enlargement from their current confinement.

10 2. *The Medically Vulnerable Subclass Members Are Also Entitled to*  
11 *Release or Enlargement Under § 1983.*

12 To the extent the Court construes the Medically Vulnerable Subclasses' claim for  
13 release or enlargement as a challenge to the conditions of their confinement, they are  
14 entitled to relief under section § 1983. As set forth above, members of the Medically  
15 Vulnerable Subclasses are incarcerated in conditions that expose them to an unacceptable  
16 risk of harm from COVID-19 infection, and “the courts have a responsibility to remedy the  
17 resulting Eighth Amendment violation.” *See Brown v. Plata*, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011). The  
18 only remedy that will cure the violation for these subclasses is release or enlargement. And  
19 where, as here, the unconstitutional conditions giving rise to a section 1983 claim do not  
20 relate to “overcrowding”—*i.e.*, incarcerated population over a jail’s capacity—then a single  
21 district court judge is empowered to grant the requested relief.<sup>37</sup>

22 **D. Defendants Have A Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits of**  
23 **Their ADA and Section 504 Claims.**

24 Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their claims under the ADA and Section 504  
25 because Defendants have failed to provide reasonable accommodations to protect members  
26

27 <sup>37</sup> To the extent the Court characterizes Plaintiffs’ § 1983 release claim as a request for relief  
28 from “overcrowding,” Plaintiffs reserve the right to request a three-judge court for a  
prisoner release order at the appropriate time. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3).



1 of the Disability Subclasses from the serious dangers posed by COVID-19. To state an ADA  
2 or Section 504 claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) the plaintiff is an individual with a  
3 disability, (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of  
4 some public entity's services, programs, or activities, (3) the plaintiff was either excluded  
5 from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs, or  
6 activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity, and (4) such  
7 exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability.”  
8 *Thompson v. Davis*, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). Section 504 imposes parallel  
9 requirements on entities that receive federal financial assistance. *See Duvall v. Cty. of*  
10 *Kitsap*, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001). Because the ADA and Section 504 claims are  
11 distinct from the constitutional claims, the Disability Subclasses need only show that  
12 Defendants failed to discharge their affirmative obligation to reasonably accommodate  
13 Disability Subclass members in order to be entitled to relief under the statutes. Plaintiffs  
14 readily satisfy each of the elements.

15 *First*, the members of the Disability Subclasses have disabilities under the ADA,  
16 which are disabilities that “substantially limit[] one or more major life activities of such  
17 individual[s].” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).<sup>38</sup> For example, members of the class include  
18 individuals with hypertension, also known as high blood pressure, Ex. 5 (Fenty Decl.) ¶ 4;  
19 Ex. 14 (Tequida Decl.) ¶ 4, and chronic respiratory problems, Ex. 12 (Stepter Decl.) ¶ 4;  
20 Ex. 3 (Crough Decl.) ¶ 4. All of these conditions are disabilities under the ADA and  
21 Section 504, and all significantly increase the risk of serious medical complications or death  
22 upon COVID-19 infection. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶ 4.

23 *Second*, members of the Disability Subclasses are “qualified” for Defendants’  
24

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25 <sup>38</sup> “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing  
26 manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,  
27 speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and  
28 working,” as well as “the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited  
to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder,  
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.” 42  
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a).

1 programs, services, and activities, including adjudication of their cases; safe, constitutional  
2 living conditions during confinement; and medical care and rehabilitative services to  
3 prepare for reentry after release. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104; 28 C.F.R.  
4 § Pt. 35, App. B (“[T]itle II applies to anything a public entity does”). The jails are a “public  
5 entity” for purposes of the ADA and are bound to comply with Title II. *See* 42 U.S.C.  
6 § 12131(B).

7 *Third*, the Maricopa County jails are excluding members of the Disability Subclasses  
8 from equally safe participation in, and benefits of, the jails’ services. Under the ADA and  
9 Section 504, public entities, like the jails,<sup>39</sup> have an affirmative obligation to take steps to  
10 ensure that people with disabilities can participate and benefit equally in all aspects of life  
11 in the jails. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.102(a), 35.130(a), (b). These affirmative obligations include  
12 making reasonable modifications to their policies, practices, or procedures where necessary  
13 to avoid disability discrimination. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). The ADA also prohibits  
14 public entities from “utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration . . . [t]hat have the  
15 effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of  
16 disability” or “[t]hat have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing  
17 accomplishment of the objectives of the public entity’s program with respect to individuals  
18 with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(i)-(ii).

19 Disability Subclass members are medically vulnerable to severe illness or death if  
20 they contract COVID-19. They are entitled to reasonable modifications to avoid exclusion  
21—in the form of inability to participate in programming due to severe illness, or death. But  
22 Defendants have failed to take steps to protect this vulnerable group in particular to prevent  
23 their infection—as discussed in Section I.A.1. above. By failing to account for the specific  
24 needs of people with disabilities, the jails are effectively denying disabled detainees an  
25 equal opportunity to benefit from the jails’ services, including “recreational ‘activities,’  
26 medical ‘services,’ and educational and vocational ‘programs.’” *Penn. Dept. of*

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>39</sup> *See Penn. Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey*, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1952) (holding that state  
prisons are “public entities” under the ADA).

1 *Corrections*, 524 U.S. at 210; *see also United States v. Georgia*, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006)  
2 (plaintiff adequately alleged exclusion where he was deprived of “mobility, hygiene,  
3 medical care, and virtually all other prison programs”); *Ahlman v. Barnes*, 2020 WL  
4 2754938, at \*12 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2020) (jail likely violated ADA by “fail[ing] to make  
5 reasonable accommodation to allow members of the Disability Class to participate safely  
6 in the programs of the Jail” during the COVID-19 crisis).

7 The result of Defendants’ failure to take action to protect and accommodate people  
8 with disabilities is devastating. Persons with disabilities do not participate in jail programs  
9 and services because they fear participation will lead to infection. *See, e.g., Ex. 14* (Tequida  
10 Decl.) ¶ 13 (“During the day, I stay in my cell and read the Bible. The guards tell us to get  
11 in line to take our meds and receive our meals but there is no social distancing in the lines  
12 so I refuse to get in line because of the risk of contracting COVID-19.”). Moreover, since a  
13 purpose of pretrial detention is to ensure appearance at trial, if a pretrial detainee becomes  
14 too sick or, at worst, dies due to COVID-19, they are denied the rights associated with  
15 pretrial detention. Thus, the failure to make basic services accessible to individuals with  
16 disabilities, even if merely out of “thoughtlessness and indifference” rather than “invidious  
17 animus,” is exactly the type of harm that the ADA and Section 504 are meant to prevent.  
18 *Alexander v. Choate*, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985).

19 *Fourth*, a failure to provide the reasonable modifications necessary to ensure equal  
20 access is, itself, discrimination “by reason of” disability. *McGary v. City of Portland*, 386  
21 F.3d 1259, 1265-67 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a defendant’s failure to provide reasonable  
22 accommodations is sufficient to demonstrate discrimination “by reason of” disability, and  
23 noting that “the crux of a reasonable accommodation claim is a facially neutral requirement  
24 that is consistently enforced. . . . [t]he . . . suggestion that *un* equal treatment is required to  
25 state a reasonable accommodation claim eviscerates this fundamental purpose of the  
26 ADA”).

27 In light of Defendants’ inaction and the growing spread of COVID-19 in the jails,  
28 the *only* reasonable accommodation that Defendants can institute to ameliorate continued

1 disability discrimination is release or enlargement of the Disability Subclass—starting with  
2 the members of the Pretrial Subclass who are held due to an inability to afford bail and  
3 using a process to consider release for all others in the Disability Subclasses—and  
4 immediate changes to current conditions at the jails for all who remain incarcerated there.

5 **E. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Weigh Heavily in Plaintiffs’**  
6 **Favor.**

7 Given the “preventable human suffering” at issue in this case, the “balance of  
8 hardships tips decidedly in plaintiffs’ favor.” *See Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 996 (quotation  
9 omitted) (granting preliminary injunction where bond process denied detainees’  
10 constitutional rights). The government “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any  
11 legally cognizable sense” by being compelled to follow the law. *See Zepeda v. I.N.S.*, 753  
12 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). The balance of equities thus favors preventing the violation  
13 of “requirements of federal law.” *Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer*, 757 F.3d 1053, 1069  
14 (9th Cir. 2014). Finally, “it is *always* in the public interest to prevent the violation of a  
15 party’s constitutional rights.” *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (emphasis added  
16 and citations omitted).

17 It is in the interest of the Plaintiffs, the Defendants, and the broader public to improve  
18 the conditions at the jails and release a subset of legally innocent incarcerated persons. As  
19 set forth above, improved conditions will reduce the risk of serious illness and death for all  
20 members of the Medically Vulnerable and Disability Subclasses, as well as the remaining  
21 detained population. *See also* Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶¶ 136-159. These measures will also  
22 be consistent with recommended guidelines from public health experts, including  
23 quarantining where needed and social distancing. *Id.*

24 But improved conditions, alone, will not suffice. Indeed, it is necessary to release  
25 certain members of the Pretrial Medically Vulnerable and Disability Subclasses to minimize  
26 risk not just to the Subclass members, but also for the remaining detained persons and  
27 facility staff at the Maricopa County jails. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶¶ 134-135. Indeed,  
28 because of the severity of the threat posed by COVID-19, and its potential to rapidly spread

1 throughout a correctional setting, public health experts recommend, first and foremost, the  
2 rapid release from custody of people with heightened vulnerability to COVID-19.<sup>40</sup> Ex. 15  
3 (Cohen Decl.) ¶¶ 134-135. Release of medically vulnerable people is especially important  
4 given the heightened risks to their health and safety and given the lack of a viable vaccine  
5 for prevention or effective treatment at this stage. Ex. 15 (Cohen Decl.) ¶¶ 16, 31, 134-135.  
6 Release protects medically vulnerable people from transmission of the virus, and also  
7 allows for greater risk mitigation for people held or working in a prison and the broader  
8 community. *Id.* It also reduces the burden on the region’s health care infrastructure by  
9 reducing the likelihood that an overwhelming number of people will become seriously ill  
10 from COVID-19 at the same time. *Id.*

11 In short, “the impact of [the temporary restraining order],” *i.e.* by improving  
12 conditions at the Maricopa County jails and releasing those persons set forth in this motion,  
13 “reaches beyond the parties, carrying with it a potential for public consequences.”  
14 *Hernandez*, 872 F.3d at 996 (quotation omitted).

### 15 **III. CONCLUSION**

16 Plaintiffs request: (1) the immediate improvement of conditions at the Maricopa  
17 County jails, as detailed in the proposed Order; (2) the immediate release of the Pretrial  
18 Medically Vulnerable and Pretrial Disability Subclasses who are incarcerated solely due to  
19 their inability to afford a financial condition of release, or whose release Defendants do not  
20 object to; and (3) a process to identify and promptly release other members of the Pretrial  
21 Medically Vulnerable and Pretrial Disability Subclasses from the Maricopa County Jails,  
22 as set forth in the Proposed Order.

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27 <sup>40</sup> See, e.g., Josiah Rich, Scott Allen, and Mavis Nimoh, *We must release prisoners to lessen*  
28 *the spread of coronavirus*, Washington Post, Mar. 17, 2020, available at  
<https://wapo.st/2JDVq7Y>.

1 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 29<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2020.

2 **STINSON LLP**

3 */s/ Larry Wulkan*

4 Larry J. Wulkan (021404)

5 **STINSON LLP**

6 Firm Identification Number 00462400  
7 1850 North Central Avenue, Suite 2100  
8 Phoenix, Arizona 85004-4584  
9 Telephone: (602) 279-1600  
10 Fax: (602) 240-6925  
11 Email: larry.wulkan@stinson.com

12 **ETHAN J. SANDERS\*** (MO 71151)  
13 (ethan.sanders@stinson.com)

14 **STINSON LLP**

15 1201 Walnut Street, Suite 2900  
16 Kansas City, MO 64106  
17 Telephone: (816) 691-2628

18 **SHARI ROSS LAHLOU\*** (DC SBN 476630)  
19 (shari.lahlou@dechert.com)

20 **DECHERT LLP**

21 1900 K Street, N.W.  
22 Washington, DC 20006 - 1110  
23 Telephone: (202) 261-3300

24 **BRIAN RAPHEL\*** (NY SBN 5592308)  
25 (brian.raffel@dechert.com)

26 **PAT ANDRIOLA\*** (NY SBN 5406327)  
27 (pat.andriola@dechert.com)

28 **TIMOTHY LY\*** (NY SBN 5478540)  
(timothy.ly@dechert.com)

**DECHERT LLP**

Three Bryant Park, 1095 Avenue of the  
Americas  
New York, NY 10036  
Telephone: (212) 698-3500

**BENJAMIN M. SADUN\*** (CA SBN 287533)  
(benjamin.sadun@dechert.com)

**ALLISON OZUROVICH\*** (CA SBN 312797)  
(allie.ozurovich@dechert.com)

**DECHERT LLP**

633 West 5th Street. Suite 4900  
Los Angeles, CA 90071  
Telephone: (213) 808-5700

**JARED G. KEENAN** (SBN 027068)  
(jkeenan@acluaz.org)

**CASEY ARELLANO** (SBN 031242)  
(carellano@acluaz.org)

**VICTORIA LOPEZ\*\*** (SBN 330042)

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25  
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27  
28

(vlopez@acluaz.org)  
**ACLU FOUNDATION OF ARIZONA**  
P.O. Box 17148  
Phoenix, AZ 85011  
Telephone: (602) 650-1854

**OLGA AKSELROD** (*Admitted Pro Hac Vice*)  
(oakselrod@aclu.org)

**ERIC BALABAN** (*Admitted Pro Hac Vice*)  
(ebalaban@aclu.org)

**ZOE BRENNAN-KROHN** (*Admitted Pro Hac Vice*)  
(ZBrennan-Krohn@aclu.org)

**HUGH HANDEYSIDE** (*Admitted Pro Hac Vice*)  
(hhandeyside@aclu.org)

**CLARA SPERA** (*Admitted Pro Hac Vice*)  
(cspera@aclu.org)

**SOMIL TRIVEDI\*** (NY SBN 4834495)  
(strivedi@aclu.org)

**AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION  
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125 Broad Street, 18th Floor  
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Telephone: (202) 393-4930

39 Drumm Street  
San Francisco CA 94111  
Telephone: (415) 343-0769

\*Application for *pro hac vice* forthcoming  
\*\*Admitted pursuant to Ariz. Sup. Ct. R. 38(f)

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certificate that on June 29, 2020, I caused the foregoing document to be filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court through ECF, and served the counsel of record via the Court’s CM/ECF System:

/s/ Kathleen Kaupke