

Case No. 17-16168

**IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

STATE OF HAWAII, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs and Appellees,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL.,

Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii, No. 17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC (Watson, J.)

**AMICI CURIAE BRIEF
BY CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES
FOR AFFIRMANCE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

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/s/ Alan R. Kabat
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTEREST OF AMICI	1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT	1
ARGUMENT	2
Social Categorization and Stereotyping Creates Dangerous Conditions for Members of Minority Groups	2
A. Stereotyping Minorities Creates a Climate for Discrimination	2
B. The Executive Order Is the Product of Centuries of Discriminatory Stereotypes About Muslims	5
C. The Executive Order Is Based on Stereotypes About Muslims as “Anti-American” and “Terrorists”	9
D. Government Legitimization of Muslim Stereotypes Has Encouraged Violence Against Muslims, and Inhibited Millions of Muslims in the Practice of Their Religion	17
1. Government Stereotyping Leads to Violence and Discrimination	18
2. The President’s Statements Have Encouraged Violence	19
3. Stereotyping and Discrimination Harms All Americans, Not Just Those Directly Affected by Specific Acts	23
CONCLUSION	24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page
CASES	
<i>Ahmed v. Johnson</i> , 752 F.3d 490 (1st Cir. 2014)	4
<i>Aziz v. Trump</i> , 234 F. Supp. 3d 724 (E.D. Va. 2017)	13
<i>Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka</i> , 347 U.S. 483 (1954)	5
<i>City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.</i> , 473 U.S. 432 (1985)	3, 18
<i>Darweesh v. Trump</i> , No. 1:17-cv-00480, Temporary Restraining Order, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017)	13
<i>Glassroth v. Moore</i> , 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003)	11-12
<i>Griggs v. Duke Power Co.</i> , 401 U.S. 424 (1971)	3-4
<i>Hassan v. City of New York</i> , 804 F.3d 277 (2d Cir. 2016)	4
<i>Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump</i> , 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (<i>en banc</i>), <i>vacated as moot</i> , 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017)	10, 14
<i>International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump</i> , __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2017 WL 4674314 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017)	14-15
<i>James Madison Project v. Dep’t of Justice</i> , No. 1:17-cv-00144, Def. Supp. Mem. (ECF No. 29) (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2017)	13

<i>Lawrence v. Texas</i> , 539 U.S. 558 (2003)	19
<i>Loving v. Virginia</i> , 388 U.S. 1 (1967)	5
<i>Lynch v. Donnelly</i> , 465 U.S. 668 (1984)	19
<i>McCreary County v. Amer. Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky</i> , 545 U.S. 844 (2005)	14
<i>Miller-El v. Dretke</i> , 545 U.S. 231 (2005)	3
<i>Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins</i> , 490 U.S. 228 (1989)	3
<i>Reynolds v. City of Chicago</i> , 296 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2002)	4
<i>Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe</i> , 530 U.S. 290 (2000)	18
<i>Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.</i> , 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015)	2-3
<i>Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co.</i> , 183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999)	4
<i>Tootkaboni v. Trump</i> , No. 1:17-cv-10154, Temporary Restraining Order, 2017 WL 386550 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2017)	13
<i>Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project</i> , 138 S. Ct. ___, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017).	14
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<i>United States v. Perez</i> , No. 6:17-cr-00035, Superseding Indictment (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2017)	21
<i>United States v. Purinton</i> , No. 2:17-cr-20028, Indictment (D. Kan. June 9, 2017)	20
<i>United States v. Stephens</i> , 421 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2005)	4
<i>United States v. Windsor</i> , 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)	3
<i>United States v. Yonkers Board of Educ.</i> , 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987)	11
<i>Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel. Corp.</i> , 429 U.S. 252 (1977)	12
<i>Washington v. Trump</i> , No. 2:17-cv-141, Temporary Restraining Order, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), <i>motion for stay denied</i> , 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017)	13

EXECUTIVE ORDERS

Executive Order No. 13,769, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” 82 FED. REG. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017)	12-13
Executive Order No. 13,780, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” 82 FED. REG. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017)	13
Executive Proclamation 9,645, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats,” 82 FED. REG. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017)	1, 14

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

HEARINGS BEFORE COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 61st Cong. 383 (1910) (statement of Rep. John L. Burnett, Alabama)	6-7
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(statement of Sen. John McCain) 24

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Robert J. Allison, THE CRESCENT OBSCURED: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MUSLIM WORLD 1776-1815 (1995)	6
Sahar F. Aziz, <i>Losing the ‘War of Ideas:’ A Critique of Countering Violent Extremism Programs</i> , 52 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 255 (2017)	8, 9
Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, <i>Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes about Adolescent Offenders</i> , 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483 (2004)	5
Sheryll Cashin, <i>To Be Muslim or Muslim-Looking in America: A Comparative Exploration of Racial and Religious Prejudice in the 21st Century</i> , 2 DUKE FORUM L. & SOC. CHANGE 125 (2010)	8
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Todd H. Green, THE FEAR OF ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE WEST (2015)	9
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U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report, HATE CRIMES REPORTED BY VICTIMS AND POLICE (2005)	9

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE

Amici, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Advocates for Youth, Center for Reproductive Rights, Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Mississippi Center for Justice, National Center for Lesbian Rights, National Urban League, Southern Coalition for Social Justice, and Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, are national and regional civil rights groups interested in the promotion of civil liberties throughout the country, and the elimination of discrimination in any form.¹

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In promotion of their interests, *amici* respectfully submit this brief to advance a key argument in support of affirming the district court's ruling. *Amici* submit that the balance of equities and public interest weigh heavily in favor of enjoining President Trump's September 24, 2017 Executive Order, "Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats" (the "Executive Order"), as it improperly promotes social categorization and stereotyping that endangers the

¹ *Amici* submit this brief pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2); all parties have consented to its filing. No counsel for any party participated in the authoring of this document, in whole or in part; no party or party's counsel contributed any money that was intended to fund preparation or submission of the brief; and no person, other than *amici curiae*, their members and their counsel, contributed money that was intended to fund preparation or submission of the brief.

lives and well-being of individuals of the Muslim faith. The Executive Order is the product of several centuries of Muslim stereotyping in this country, and harms even those who are not the direct victims of specific attacks on immigrants. Here, the evidence demonstrates that, regardless of the Government's *post-hoc* explanations, the Executive Order was motivated by animus toward Muslims and singled out, as a proxy, those born in the targeted majority-Muslim countries.

ARGUMENT

Social Categorization and Stereotyping Creates Dangerous Conditions for Members of Minority Groups.

A. Stereotyping Minorities Creates a Climate for Discrimination.

The balance of equities and public interest in this case weigh in favor of enjoining the Executive Order due to the discrimination it promotes. As the courts have long recognized, laws such as the Executive Order improperly promote social categorization and stereotyping of Muslims that lead to the endangerment of the lives of those who practice Islam, a minority religion.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that discriminatory stereotypes can improperly affect decision making. Most recently, the Court recognized that disparate impact liability prevents segregated housing patterns that might otherwise result from the role of “covert and illicit stereotyping.” *Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015);

see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 268 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (recognizing that “subtle forms of bias are automatic, unconscious, and unintentional and escape notice, even the notice of those enacting the bias”).

In *Price Waterhouse*, the Supreme Court recognized the role that sex stereotyping plays in discrimination cases, explaining that “stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part” in an adverse employment decision. *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins*, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).

In *Windsor*, the Supreme Court emphasized that laws whose “purpose and effect” is “disapproval of” a “class” of people “impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma” on the targeted group. *United States v. Windsor*, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). The law at issue in that case, the federal Defense of Marriage Act, targeted same-sex couples for discrimination and stigma, just as the challenged Executive Order today singles out Muslim individuals for ill-treatment.

Similarly, in *Cleburne*, the Supreme Court explained that “race, alienage, and national origin” are “so seldom relevant” to state interests, meaning that “such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others.” *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). In *Griggs*, the Supreme Court held that the “absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority

groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.” *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).

The courts in other circuits also recognize that social categorization and stereotyping create fertile grounds for discrimination, including in housing, employment decisions, and police actions. *See, e.g., Hassan v. City of New York*, 804 F.3d 277, 306 (3d Cir. 2015) (rejecting “appeals to ‘common sense’ which might be infected by stereotypes” as insufficient to justify police surveillance of Muslim individuals, businesses, and institutions) (quoting *Reynolds v. Chicago*, 296 F.3d 524, 526 (7th Cir. 2002)); *Ahmed v. Johnson*, 752 F.3d 490, 503 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding “lack of explicitly discriminatory behaviors” does not preclude a finding of “unlawful animus” in employment discrimination because “unlawful discrimination can stem from stereotypes and other types of cognitive biases, as well as from conscious animus”) (quoting *Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co.*, 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999)); *United States v. Stephens*, 421 F.3d 503, 515 (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that racial stereotyping continues to play a role in jury selection and the outcome of trials); *Thomas*, 183 F.3d at 42 (holding that Title VII’s ban on “disparate treatment because of race” includes “acts based on conscious racial animus” and “employer decisions that are based on stereotyped thinking”).

Relevant research shows that a psychological triggering phenomenon known as “priming” exacerbates stereotyping and makes it more extreme. Priming occurs

when “subtle influences . . . increase the ease with which certain information comes to mind.” Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, *NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS* 69 (2008). In the case of racial stereotyping, which shares many attributes with stereotyping of Muslims, priming an individual with race-based stereotypes can influence later decisions by that individual. Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, *Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes about Adolescent Offenders*, 28 *L. & HUM. BEHAV.* 483, 489 (2004).

Social science research repeatedly demonstrates that individuals have a persistent tendency to defer blindly to priming from authority figures. *See* Stanley Milgram, *Behavioral Study of Obedience*, 67 *J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL.* 371, 375-76 (1963). Therefore, as the Supreme Court’s decisions in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) and *Loving v. Virginia*, 388 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1967), demonstrate, discrimination with the sanction of law raises unique and particular dangers.

B. The Executive Order Is the Product of Centuries of Discriminatory Stereotypes About Muslims.

This country has had a long history of official stereotyping of Muslims as un-American and unworthy of becoming Americans. During the Colonial era, two of the most outspoken public figures who disseminated stereotypes of Muslims (then known as “Mahometans”) were Cotton Mather and Aaron Burr – they consistently referred to “Mahometans” in highly derogatory terms, including

denouncing “that false Prophet and great Imposter Mahomet.”²

Even after this country became independent, prejudice against Muslims, as expressed through consistent stereotyping, continued throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century.³ For example, in discussing immigration legislation in 1910, Representative Burnett of Alabama repeatedly referred to “Syrians” – then a catch-all term for Middle Eastern immigrants who were Muslims – in derogatory terms, and made clear that he and his colleagues viewed those immigrants as “the dirty Syrian[s] of today,” and among “the least desirable” aliens, because “the Syrians are the same way, mixed up with the Arabians and the people of African and western Asiatic countries, until they are not our kind of people; and they are not the kind of people from which those who settled this

² Thomas S. Kidd, *AMERICAN CHRISTIANS AND ISLAM: EVANGELICAL CULTURE AND MUSLIMS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE AGE OF TERRORISM* 12 (2009); Thomas S. Kidd, “*Is It Worse to Follow Mahomet than the Devil?*” *Early American Uses of Islam*, 72 *CHURCH HISTORY* 766, 771-73, 779-80 (2003).

³ See, e.g., Erik Love, *ISLAMOPHOBIA AND RACISM IN AMERICA* 41, 86-89 (2017); Jeffrey L. Thomas, *SCAPEGOATING ISLAM: INTOLERANCE, SECURITY, AND THE AMERICAN MUSLIM* 1-14 (2015); Peter Gottschalk & Gabriel Greenberg, *Common Heritage, Uncommon Fear: Islamophobia in the United States and British India, 1687-1947*, in *ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF INTOLERANCE* (Carl W. Ernst ed. 2013); Robert J. Allison, *THE CRESCENT OBSCURED: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MUSLIM WORLD 1776-1815* (1995).

country sprang.”⁴ As set forth in Section C, *infra*, these are the same kind of statements recently made about Muslims.

In this century, the stereotyping of Muslims has continued unabated, leading to increased discrimination against Muslims, rising to the level of violence. Even prior to the Executive Orders in 2017, commentators documented and denounced the ongoing stereotyping of Muslims and the ensuing discrimination and violence.

Professor Perry recognized that “many commentators have suggested that Arabs generally and Muslims specifically may represent the last ‘legitimate’ subjects of slanderous imagery and stereotypes.” Barbara Perry, *Anti-Muslim Violence in the Post-9/11 Era: Motive Forces*, 4 HATE CRIMES 172, 176 (Barbara Perry & Randy Blazak, eds. 2009). Political leaders have an outsized impact in fostering this stereotyping and its ensuing discrimination and violence: “Even more powerful in providing justifications for anti-Muslim violence is the explicit exploitation of public images and related fears by political leaders. To the extent that this is so, there emerges a climate that bestows ‘permission to hate.’” *Id.* at 181. Thus, she concluded that:

[S]tate practices provide a context and a framework for the broader demonization and marginalization of minority groups. Through its rhetoric and policies, the state absorbs and reflects back onto the public

⁴ HEARINGS BEFORE COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 61st Cong. 383, 386, 393, 396 (1910) (statement of Rep. John L. Burnett, Alabama).

hostile and negative perceptions of the Other – in this case, Muslims. Public expressions of racism by state actors are constituted of and by public sentiments of intolerance, dislike, or suspicion of particular groups. **Thus, the state seems to reaffirm the legitimacy of such beliefs, while at the same time giving them public voice.**

Id. at 185 (emphasis added).

Professor Aziz, who testified to Congress on this issue, wrote, “In the United States, numerous polls show a rise in anti-Muslim bias that is manifesting into tangible hate crimes, mosque vandalism, employment discrimination, and bullying of Muslim kids in schools.” Sahar F. Aziz, *Losing the “War of Ideas:” A Critique of Countering Violent Extremism Programs*, 52 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 255, 265 (2017).

Professor Cashin wrote that “Explicit, public anti-Muslim comments do not appear to engender similar widespread outrage” as do racist remarks, and instead “appear to be on the rise,” because of the lack of public rejection of such views. Sheryll Cashin, *To Be Muslim or Muslim-Looking in America: A Comparative Exploration of Racial and Religious Prejudice in the 21st Century*, 2 DUKE FORUM L. & SOC. CHANGE 125, 127-28 (2010). “In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, it is more socially acceptable to express explicit bias against Arabs or Muslims than against blacks or other racial/ethnic groups.” *Id.* at 132.

Muslim stereotyping has manifested in the form of violence against Muslims, or even those who are erroneously perceived as being Muslims (such as Sikhs). Although the serious under-reporting of such crimes causes the available

statistics to understate the actual prevalence of anti-Muslim violence,⁵ it is well-documented throughout 2016,⁶ and continuing into 2017. *See* Section D.2, *infra*.

Thus, from Colonial times to the present, this country has had a long and deliberate political tradition of officially stereotyping Muslims – a history that created an atmosphere that legitimizes and encourages discrimination and violence against Muslims.

C. The Executive Order Is Based on Stereotypes About Muslims as “Anti-American” and “Terrorists.”

As in the cases cited above, the Muslim ban bears the imprimatur of the Executive Branch and engenders precisely the type of discriminatory harms that the Supreme Court has held cannot withstand constitutional muster. Since December 7, 2015, when then-candidate Donald Trump issued a written statement calling for a “total and complete shutdown on Muslims entering the United States” in the wake of the terror attack in San Bernardino, California, a “Muslim ban” has

⁵ Todd H. Green, *THE FEAR OF ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMOPHOBIA IN THE WEST* 282-84 (2015) (discussing statistics on crimes against Muslims and problems with underreporting); *see generally* U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report, *HATE CRIME VICTIMIZATION, 2004-2015* (2017) (noting problems with underreporting and different methodologies for categorizing these crimes); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report, *HATE CRIMES REPORTED BY VICTIMS AND POLICE* (2005) (same).

⁶ *See, e.g.,* Aziz, 52 *TEXAS INT’L L.J.*, *supra*, at 266-68 & nn. 65-80 (collecting examples from 2015 and 2016 of violence against Muslims).

been a major item on his policy agenda.⁷ At that time, his campaign characterized a bar on Muslim entry into the United States as a way to stop this country from being the “victims of the horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad.”⁸ He did so with no evidence other than extensive stereotyping.

Mr. Trump’s labeling of Muslims as “terrorists” has been relentless. On January 4, 2016, the Trump campaign premiered its first television advertisement, in which Trump “call[ed] for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” until doubts about “radical Islamic terrorism” can be “figure[d] out.”⁹ The link the Presidential candidate drew between “radical Islamic terrorism” and all individual Muslims entering the United States was stated with no supporting evidence. Subsequently, candidate Trump, in a major foreign policy speech on April 27, 2016, stated that “The struggle against radical Islam also takes place in our homeland. . . . We must stop importing extremism through senseless

⁷ *Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump*, 857 F.3d 554, 575-76 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2017) (*en banc*), *vacated as moot*, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017)); *see also* Christine Wang, “Trump Website Takes Down Muslim Ban Statement After Reporter Grills Spicer in Briefing,” CNBC.COM (May 8, 2017), <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/08/trump-website-takes-down-muslim-ban-statement-after-reporter-grills-spicer-in-briefing.html>.

⁸ *Int’l Refugee Assistance Project*, 857 F.3d at 575 n.5.

⁹ Jeremy Diamond, *Donald Trump: Ban all Muslim Travel to United States*, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 8, 2015), <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-muslim-ban-immigration>; *see also* Jill Colvin and Steve Peoples, “Trump’s First TV Ad Pushes Proposal to Ban Muslims from Entering U.S.,” *The Globe and Mail (Toronto)*, Jan. 5, 2016, at A-9.

immigration policies.”¹⁰ Again, he made these statements, relying entirely on stereotypes, and presenting no evidence or facts to support these claims.¹¹

As a matter of law, this Court can rely on campaign statements as part of its analysis of whether the Executive Orders reflect illegal stereotyping and bias against Muslims. For example, the Second Circuit held that campaign statements by the successful candidate for Mayor of Yonkers – in which he “promised ... to impose a moratorium on all subsidized housing in Yonkers” – was evidence of the “intent to preserve the existing racial imbalance” in that city. *United States v. Yonkers Board of Educ.*, 837 F.2d 1181, 1191, 1222 (2d Cir. 1987). Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held that campaign promises by Roy Moore, made while running for the position of Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, *i.e.*, that he would install the Ten Commandments monument in the courthouse rotunda, could be used as evidence of his intent to violate the Establishment Clause. *Glassroth v. Moore*, 335 F.3d 1282, 1285-87, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003). More generally, “the

¹⁰ N.Y. TIMES, *Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech* (April 27, 2016), <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html>.

¹¹ Although President Trump has publicly labeled Muslims as dangerous “terrorists,” he has failed to condemn the hate crimes perpetuated *against* them over the past year. *See, e.g.*, Jack Moore, *Trump’s Failure to Condemn Minnesota Mosque Attacks Stirs Social Media Anger*, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 17, 2017), <http://www.newsweek.com/trump-failure-condemn-minnesota-mosque-attack-stirs-social-media-anger-647694> (President Trump’s silence following a January 2017 shooting at a Quebec mosque, June 2017 attacks in Virginia and London, and an August 2017 bomb attack at a mosque in Minnesota).

historical background of the decision [to discriminate] is one evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.” *Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel. Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977) (citations omitted). Here, as in *Yonkers*, *Glassroth*, and *Village of Arlington Heights*, evidence of candidate-Trump’s campaign statements and campaign promises is probative evidence of the intent to discriminate against Muslims – an intent that was implemented just one week after the Inauguration, when he issued the first of a series of Executive Orders that all shared the same goals: to fulfill his campaign pledge.

On January 27, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13,769, entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” 82 FED. REG. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017). Among other immigration restrictions, Executive Order 13,769 temporarily banned all nationals from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the United States: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Libya, and Somalia.

While many surrogates of the current Administration pushed back at the characterization of E.O. 13,769 as a “Muslim ban,” the President embraced it. He told the public via Twitter, “[c]all it what you want, [E.O. 13,769] is about keeping

bad people (with bad intentions) out of country!”¹² Throughout his campaign, and now in office, President Trump has consistently labeled Muslims as “bad people” who must be kept out of America in the interest of national security.

After multiple lower courts enjoined enforcement of E.O. 13,769,¹³ the Trump Administration announced plans to revise the order. On March 6, 2017, the Administration issued Executive Order 13,780, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” 82 FED. REG. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017). The revised Executive Order preserved several core provisions of the prior Order: it suspended the United States Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days, and it suspended the entry into the United States of nationals of six of the seven majority-Muslim countries designated in E.O. 13,769 for 90 days. *See* E.O. 13,780, §§ 6(a); 2(c). As did E.O. 13,769, the redrafted Order targeted only majority-Muslim countries, as proxies for all Muslims. This Court upheld the

¹² Jane Onyanga-Omara, *British PM Criticizes Trump’s Travel Ban; Theresa May Calls Controversial Move “Divisive and Wrong,”* USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 2017, at 5A. The Department of Justice recently informed a district court that Trump’s tweets (Twitter postings) are “official statements of the President of the United States,” since “a tweet can be the equivalent of a public statement or speech.” *James Madison Project v. Dep’t of Justice*, No. 1:17-cv-00144, Def. Supp. Mem., at 2, 5-6 & n.4 (ECF No. 29) (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2017).

¹³ *Washington v. Trump*, No. 2:17-cv-141, Temporary Restraining Order, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), *motion for stay denied*, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017); *Tootkaboni v. Trump*, No. 1:17-cv-10154, Temporary Restraining Order, 2017 WL 386550 (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2017); *Darweesh v. Trump*, No. 1:17-cv-480, Temporary Restraining Order, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017); *Aziz v. Trump*, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724 (E.D. Va. 2017) (preliminary injunction).

district court's decision enjoining the second Executive Order. *Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump*, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (*en banc*). The Supreme Court vacated this Court's decision as moot in light of the expiration of the second Executive Order. *Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project*, 138 S. Ct. ___, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2017).

President Trump then issued the third iteration of the Executive Order on September 24, 2017. *See* 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017). Although that order purported to expand its scope into non-Muslim countries by including North Korea and Venezuela, this country has hardly any visitors from North Korea, and the order as to Venezuela was limited to certain high-level officials. *Id.*

The third version of the Executive Order continues to target Muslims. Judge Chuang of the District of Maryland correctly found that "the inclusion of two non-majority Muslim nations, North Korea and Venezuela, does not persuasively show a lack of religious purpose behind the Proclamation," requiring the court to "assess whether, as has occurred in other Establishment Clause cases, the insertion of these countries was 'a litigating position' rather than an earnest effort to 'cast off' the prior 'unmistakable' objective." *See International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump*, 2017 WL 4674314, at *33 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017) (quoting *McCreary County v. Amer. Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky*, 545 U.S. 844, 871-72 (2005)). The district court thus granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction as to

this third iteration of the travel ban. *Id.* at *41. The district court reviewed the record of Trump’s campaign statements, *id.* at *30, and the statements that he made after taking office, *id.* at *30, *31, *33, *36, to conclude that the “primary purpose” of the travel ban was “the desire to impose a Muslim ban.” *Id.* at *37.

Thus, “approximately 80 percent of all the Muslim refugees who resettled in the United States over the past two years were from the [nine] targeted countries. Perhaps more tellingly, of the refugees who came to the U.S. over the last two years from all of the other countries . . . approximately 70 percent were Christian and just 16 percent were Muslim.”¹⁴

The government’s intent to ban Muslims will exacerbate widespread discrimination that Muslims already face. The official action of marking a group, Muslims, as a dangerous “fifth column,” drives societal biases against them and creates conditions where violence against them is seen as more acceptable because they are perceived, in President Trump’s words, to be “bad people.”

In 2011, the Pew Research Center surveyed Western cultures to determine which characteristics Western populations associate with people in the Muslim world. That survey found that about half of the respondents characterized Muslims

¹⁴ Dalia Lithwick & Jeremy Stahl, *Sneak Attack: Trump Is Trying to Secretly Push Through Another Muslim Ban*, SLATE, JURISPRUDENCE (Nov. 10, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/11/trump_is_trying_to_secretly_sneak_through_another_muslim_ban.html.

as “violent,” and more than half characterized Muslims as “fanatical.”¹⁵

Thus, it is no surprise that the Pew Research Center’s 2017 survey of Muslims in this country found that discrimination against them was increasing, and that they are even more concerned in light of the President’s Executive Orders.¹⁶

In a recent news analysis discussing ongoing social science research relating to stereotyping against the most recent Muslim immigrants in this country and Canada, *Science* magazine recognized that “Prejudice of course can be directed against any group by any other. But immigrants, and even more so refugees and asylum seekers, may be especially vulnerable because of their tenuous place in a larger society.” Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, *Battling Bias: How Can We Blunt Prejudice Against Immigrants?*, 350 *SCIENCE* 687, 688 (May 19, 2017). This applies with even greater force to child immigrants and refugees, who are even more vulnerable than their parents. (The recent escalation of deportation orders similarly harms child immigrants and refugees.)

Recent social science research demonstrates both the already-existing

¹⁵ Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, *Muslim-Western Tensions Persist* (July 21, 2011), <http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/21/muslim-western-tensions-persist/#>.

¹⁶ Pew Research Center, *U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, but Continue to Believe in the American Dream* (July 26, 2017) <http://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/findings-from-pew-research-centers-2017-survey-of-us-muslims/>; see also Abigail Hauslohner, *Anti-Muslim Discrimination on Rise in U.S., Study Finds*, *WASHINGTON POST*, July 26, 2017, at A-3.

climate of prejudice against Muslims and Arabs and the unconscious nature of that bias. “Non-Arab and non-Muslim test takers manifested strong implicit bias against Muslims. These results are in sharp contrast to self-reported attitudes.” Carol Izumi, *Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality*, 34 WASH. U. J. L. & POL. 71, 93 (2010). A “sample of U.S. citizens on average viewed Muslims and Arabs as not sharing their interests and stereotyped them as not especially sincere, honest, friendly, or warm.” Susan T. Fiske, et al., *Policy Forum: Why Ordinary People Torture Enemy Prisoners*, 206 SCIENCE 1482-83 (Nov. 26, 2004).

D. Government Legitimization of Muslim Stereotypes Has Encouraged Violence Against Muslims, and Inhibited Millions of Muslims in the Practice of Their Religion.

There can be no doubt that, given its origin and history, the Executive Order is based on the social categorization of Muslims as “anti-American,” “terrorists,” those with “hatred for Americans,” and “bad people.” In this case, President Trump’s repeated, unsubstantiated claims that Muslims are dangerous, and should be barred from entering the country, are just the “cue” needed to release otherwise suppressed and legally prohibited violence against Muslims. The President’s deliberate stereotyping of Muslims as “dangerous” and “terrorists” and his ban on the immigration of Muslims, place an official “imprimatur” on those stereotypes, magnifying their effect.

The Supreme Court, in *Cleburne*, held that a city council’s insistence that a

group home for individuals with intellectual disabilities obtain a special-use permit to operate was premised on unsubstantiated “negative attitudes or fears” of nearby property owners, which were impermissible bases for disparate treatment. *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985). Although “[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law . . . the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.” *Id.* (quoting *Palmore v. Sidoti*, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)). Here, too, the law cannot give effect to private biases against Muslims.

1. Government Stereotyping Leads to Violence and Discrimination.

When someone in a position of authority, as President Trump, categorizes Muslims as dangerous and terrorists, he communicates that they are “outsiders” and not full members of the political community. By way of comparison, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a school-sponsored religious message, delivered over the school’s public address system, by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of the faculty, and pursuant to a school policy. *Santa Fe Indep. School Dist. v. Doe*, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000). The Supreme Court’s reasoning was based on its view that the school policy created two classes of people—those who adhered to the favored religion, and those who did not. *Id.*

The President’s steadfast support of what he calls a “Muslim ban” similarly sends the message that those who adhere to Islam are not part of American society, as opposed to Christians and other non-Muslims, who are favored by the ban. In

doing so, he “sends a message to non-adherents [to the Christian faith] that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” *Lynch v. Donnelly*, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J. concurring); *see also Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination in both the public and in the private spheres.”). The Executive Order and the President’s statements characterize Muslims as homogenous and a national threat and thereby engender a climate conducive to violence against Muslims.

2. The President’s Statements Have Encouraged Violence.

This Administration tolerated, if not encouraged, crimes against Muslims, through its determination to implement the travel ban affecting them – in effect telling all Muslims (whether born here or abroad) – that they do not belong here.

Starting in February 2016, only two months after then-candidate Trump’s December 7, 2015 and January 4, 2016 statements (*supra*), three nationalists in Kansas (the “Crusaders,” a militia group) engaged in a conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction “to carry out a violent attack against Muslims in their community” through “destroy[ing] an apartment complex in Garden City, Kansas,

which contains a mosque and is home to many Muslims.”¹⁷ They openly discussed going to apartment buildings known to house refugees to “start kicking in the doors of the Somali apartments, and kill them one by one,” and then expanded their target to include “city/county commission meetings, local public officials, landlords who rent property to Muslim refugees, and organizations providing assistance to Muslim refugees,” since “the only good Muslim is a dead Muslim.”¹⁸

The February 22, 2017 shooting of Srinivas Kuchibhotla, Alok Madasani, and Ian Grillot in Olathe, Kansas is the most horrifying example of the social categorization of Muslims as enemies of the American people.¹⁹ Kuchibhotla and Madasani, two engineers at a local technology company, and both Indian immigrants, had gathered with co-workers at a bar near their office to watch a local college basketball game. Also at that bar was Adam Purinton, who mistook both Kuchibhotla and Madasani as Iranians (which is one of the nationalities targeted by the Executive Order and its predecessor as barred from entry into the United

¹⁷ *United States v. Allen, et al.*, No. 6:16-cr-10141, Criminal Complaint, at ¶¶ 2, 9 (ECF No. 1) (D. Kan. Oct. 14, 2016); *see also* Second Superseding Indictment (ECF No. 89) (D. Kan. Mar. 16, 2017).

¹⁸ *United States v. Allen, et al.*, No. 6:16-cr-10141, Criminal Complaint, at ¶¶ 13, 19 (ECF No. 1) (D. Kan. Oct. 14, 2016).

¹⁹ Audra D. S. Burch, *Facing a Void Left by Hate*, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2017, at A1, A12-A13; Matt Stevens, *Justice Dept. Calls Killing in Kansas a Hate Crime*, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2017, at A18; John Eligon, et al., *Drinks at a Bar, Ethnic Insults, then Gunshots*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2017, A1, A17; *see also United States v. Purinton*, No. 2:17-cr-20028, Indictment (D. Kan. June 9, 2017).

States). Purinton approached and shot at Kuchibhotla and Madasani, telling them to “get out of our country!” Kuchibhotla was killed, and Madasani was wounded. Ian Grillot, a patrolman present at the scene, was wounded while attempting to intervene. Purinton fled across the state border into Missouri and told a bartender in a second bar that he needed to hide out because he had just shot two “Iranians.” Putting aside Purinton’s stereotyped view that his victims were Iranians simply because they were foreign-born immigrants, his actions demonstrate the danger that social categorization can cause by exaggerating both the distance between in-groups (“real Americans”) and out-groups (“Iranians”), as well the homogeneity of the out-group. The Administration’s travel ban against Muslims does just that.

In addition, a rash of arsons and vandalism at mosques has occurred following the issuance of E.O. 13,769. On January 28, 2017, one day after the first Order, a fire destroyed the Islamic Center of Victoria, Texas.²⁰ On February 24, 2017, a blaze broke out at the Daarus Salaam Mosque near Tampa, Florida.²¹

²⁰ U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, *Victoria Man Charged with Hate Crime in Burning of Mosque* (June 22, 2017), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/victoria-man-charged-hate-crime-burning-mosque>; Anonymous, *Fire Destroys Texas Mosque in Early Hours*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2017, at A4; see also *United States v. Perez*, No. 6:17-cr-00035, Superseding Indictment (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2017).

²¹ Tony Marrero, *Mosque Fire Deliberately Set*, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Feb. 25, 2017, at 1; Anonymous, *2nd Florida Mosque Hit by Arson in Past 6 Months*, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 25, 2017, at A6.

Combined with two arsons of mosques shortly before President Trump's inauguration, the United States has seen an unprecedented surge of hate crimes against the Muslim community.²²

Other recent attacks on mosques in the United States include an explosion at a mosque in Bloomington, Minnesota in August 2017.²³

On March 3, 2017, a Sikh man was shot in his Kent, Washington driveway when a man approached him and said "go back to your own country."²⁴

It is undeniable that the public interest in this country is best served by tolerance of different religions as the Constitution requires, and tolerance of both foreign-born and American-born adherents of different religions. The public interest is not served by discriminatory stereotyping against Muslims that legitimizes or encourages discrimination and violence in our country, or by a law which gives effect to private biases.

²² Albert Samaha & Talal Ansari, *Four Mosques Have Burned in Seven Weeks – Leaving Many Muslims and Advocates Stunned*, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Feb. 28, 2017), <https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertsamaha/four-mosques-burn-as-2017-begins>; Taylor Goldenstein, *Blaze Completely Destroys Islamic Center's Building*, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Jan. 8, 2017, at B1.

²³ Nick Corasaniti, *Minnesota Mosque Shaken by an Early-Morning Blast*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2017, at A-19; Kurtis Lee, *U.S. Muslims on Edge after Bombing; the FBI Is Leading the Investigation into an Attack that Damaged a Minnesota Mosque*, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2017, at A-10.

²⁴ Ellen Barry, *U.S. and Indian Officials Condemn Shooting of Sikh*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2017, at A-9; Cleve R. Wootson, *Sikh Man, 39, Shot in Suspected Hate Crime*, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2017, at A-3.

The insidious effect of the Muslim ban does not impact only those persons seeking to enter the United States from the seven designated countries. Instead, by promoting social stereotypes and priming individuals to act on those stereotypes, the ban creates fertile grounds for violence against all minorities. The Executive Order fundamentally threatens the American ideal of a diverse society working across divisions for the greater societal good.

3. Stereotyping and Discrimination Harms All Americans, Not Just Those Directly Affected by Specific Acts.

Social science research has consistently demonstrated that stereotyping of any group harms all individuals in that group, even those who are not directly affected by specific acts of violence or discrimination. For example, Professor McDevitt and several other researchers recognized that:

Because bias crimes have the unique impact of reaching far beyond the primary victim, due to the dimension of victim interchangeability, every member of the minority group who is aware of the crime is affected by a solitary crime against one individual minority member.

Jack McDevitt, et al., *Consequences for Victims: A Comparison of Bias- and Non-Bias-Motivated Assaults*, 45 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 697, 712 (2001).

Similarly, violent crimes on the basis of religious stereotypes, *i.e.*, against Muslims, have the same broader impact as do terrorist crimes:

Nonetheless, terrorism and violent hate crimes . . . have at least one basic characteristic in common: the violence inflicted on the victims is

also aimed at a larger community. . . . hate crimes directly target individual members of a social group but indirectly send a message of intolerance to the entire group. The victims of hate crimes are selected because of their symbolic value as representatives of the entire social group.

Jeffrey Thomas, *SCAPEGOATING ISLAM: INTOLERANCE, SECURITY, AND THE AMERICAN MUSLIM* 137 (2015).

Senator John McCain recently recognized this fundamental principle when he criticized several fellow members of Congress who had made *ad hominem* attacks on a former government official due to that person’s Muslim heritage:

When anyone—not least a member of Congress—launches specious and degrading attacks against fellow Americans on the basis of nothing more than fear of who they are and ignorance of what they stand for, it defames the spirit of our Nation, and we all grow poorer because of it.

158 CONG. REC. S5106 (daily ed. July 18, 2012) (statement of Sen. John McCain).

Here, too, the latest Executive Order and the underlying statements by the President have only encouraged stereotyping of Muslims, which has adversely affected all Muslims, young and old, natives and recent immigrants, and has harmed our society as a whole.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in the briefs of the Appellees, *amici curiae* respectfully request that this Court affirm the district court’s ruling and uphold the preliminary injunction.

Respectfully submitted on November 20, 2017,

/s/ Lynne Bernabei

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because it uses a proportionally spaced typeface (Times New Roman) in 14-point. It was prepared using Microsoft Word. It complies with the type-volume limits of Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(5) because it contains 5,877 words, which is less than half of the 13,000 words allowed for principal briefs under Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(i).

/s/ Alan R. Kabat

Alan R. Kabat

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on November 20, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

/s/ Alan R. Kabat
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