

1 BRADLEY S. PHILLIPS (State Bar No. 85263)
bradley.phillips@mto.com
2 GREGORY D. PHILLIPS (State Bar No. 118151)
gregory.phillips@mto.com
3 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
350 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
4 Los Angeles, CA 90071
T: (213) 683-9100
5 F: (213) 687-3702
Brad.Phillips@mto.com

6 *Counsel for Amici Curiae*
7
8

9 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
10 **EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
11 **SACRAMENTO DIVISION**

11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

12 Plaintiff,

13 vs.

14 THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, EDMUND
15 GERALD BROWN JR., Governor of
16 California, in his official capacity; and
17 XAVIER BECERRA, Attorney General of
the State of California, in his official
capacity,

18 Defendants.
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Case No. 2:18-cv-00490-JAM-KJN

**PROPOSED BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
OF IMMIGRATION, LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW SCHOLARS IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION RE: AB 450**

Date: None

Time: None

Judge: Hon. John A. Mendez

Complaint Filed: March 6, 2018
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IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF AMICI

Amici curiae are 26 scholars of immigration, labor and/or employment law who have an interest in the proper construction of federal immigration law and its interaction with labor and employment law. Amici, who are listed in Appendix A, respectfully submit this brief to address critical issues of statutory interpretation and the resolution of alleged conflicts between federal immigration law and state and local efforts to protect workers.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Policymakers today face significant challenges balancing the demands of a changing economy with the promotion of the health, safety and security of a diverse workforce. State and local governments have long been regulatory pioneers in this area, to the benefit of the nation. In California, where immigrants comprise one-third of the labor force, legislators have enacted AB 450 (the “Immigrant Worker Protection Act”) out of a concern that employer participation in anticipated immigration round-ups would unacceptably threaten the State’s ability to realize its labor and employment goals. Though the specific provisions of AB 450 are far from radical, they have drawn the ire of the current administration. Alleging that AB 450 offends the Supremacy Clause, the United States has moved this Court to preliminarily enjoin California’s new law.

The “touchstone in every pre-emption case” is Congress’s purpose, *Wyeth v. Levine*, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (citation omitted), not that of the Executive Branch. In this brief, amici have compiled important information about the purposes and objectives of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of (1986) (“IRCA”). Our research shows that IRCA was a “carefully crafted political compromise,” *Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights v. I.N.S.*, 913 F.2d 1350, 1366 (9th Cir. 1990), *rev’d on other grounds*, 502 U.S. 183 (1991), designed to balance a range of interests, including the protection of undocumented workers, whose exploitation up to that point had had a “depressing effect on working conditions” for all, H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8-9 (1986).

1 By reducing the power disparity between employers and employees when it comes
2 to dealing with immigration authorities, AB 450 ensures that immigrant workers are
3 better able to enforce their labor rights. In this way, AB 450’s provisions are not
4 anathema to Congress’s objectives, but rather reconcilable with them.

5 To prevail on a claim of conflict preemption, the United States must do more than
6 suggest that AB 450 makes the job of immigration authorities “more difficult.” *Baker &*
7 *Drake, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Nev. (In re Baker & Drake, Inc.)*, 35 F.3d 1348,
8 1354 (9th Cir. 1994). Preemption is found only in “those situations where conflicts will
9 necessarily arise.” *Goldstein v. California*, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973). AB 450 is a
10 legitimate exercise of California’s police powers. The federal scheme does not rely on
11 immigration authorities having voluntary access to workplaces. The Court should find
12 that the United States has not met its burden to show a likelihood of success on its
13 preemption claim.

14 Further, the Court should not expand the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity
15 in the way the United States requests. States need room to innovate to meet the labor and
16 employment challenges of our time. A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and
17 drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing,
18 carries the burden of persuasion,” *Mazurek v. Armstrong*, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per
19 curiam) (quoting 11A C. quoting 11A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, *Federal Practice*
20 *and Procedure* 2948 (2d ed. 1995)). The Court should deny the United States’ motion.

21 ARGUMENT

22 I. The United States’ Presentation of the Legislative Purposes and Objectives of 23 IRCA Is Incomplete

24 In order to succeed on a claim that AB 450 is preempted because it conflicts with
25 federal law, the United States must show that it “stands as an obstacle to the
26 accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” *Arizona*
27 *v. United States*, 567 U.S. 387, 399-400 (2012) (citation omitted). The United States
28 would have the Court believe that IRCA’s purpose—like that of the current

1 administration’s—is singularly focused on maximizing immigration enforcement in the
2 workplace. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 11-2, ECF No. 2-1 (“PI Motion”). However, as amici
3 explain below, Congress’s purpose in enacting IRCA was far more nuanced than the
4 United States suggests, reflecting a balance of a range of interests. *Arizona*, 567 U.S. at
5 405. Notably, Congress focused its sanctions on *employers* and deliberately did not
6 impose additional penalties on employees; it recognized that marginalizing
7 undocumented workers “who already face the possibility of employer exploitation”
8 would incentivize employers to hire them and depress working conditions generally,
9 thereby undermining IRCA’s success. *Id.* at 399. To evaluate the United States’ claim
10 properly, the Court must assess these “purposes and objectives of Congress” by engaging
11 in an examination of IRCA’s text and legislative history. *Id.* at 399 (citation omitted).

12 Congress enacted IRCA in 1986 to “combat[] the employment of [unauthorized
13 immigrants][.]” *Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB*, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).
14 The measure was the product of a lengthy legislative process dating back to 1971. S. Rep.
15 No. 99-132, at 18-26 (1985) (discussing the 15-year history of IRCA). Upon signing the
16 bill, President Reagan described IRCA as “one of the longest and most difficult
17 legislative undertakings of recent memory.” Statement of President Reagan Upon
18 Signing S. 1200, Nov. 10, 1986, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5856-1, 5856-1.

19 A primary goal of IRCA was to reduce the economic incentives for employers to
20 hire undocumented workers. One way in which IRCA sought to achieve this goal was to
21 impose a graduated series of civil and criminal sanctions on employers who knowingly
22 employ undocumented workers. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)-(f). Congress also believed,
23 however, that it was important to allocate funds to vigorous enforcement of labor
24 standards in workplaces where undocumented workers were employed. IRCA, Pub. L.
25 No. 99-603 § 111(d) (appropriating funds for enforcement activities of Department of
26 Labor’s Wage and Hour Division to “deter the employment of unauthorized [immigrants]
27 and remove the economic incentive for employers to exploit and use such
28 [immigrants]”). Congress made clear that it was also not displacing state and federal

1 power “to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented employees for . . .
2 engaging in [protected] activit[y].” H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8-9 (1986).

3 An empirical analysis of IRCA’s legislative history by an amicus confirms that
4 labor concerns were at the center of the debate. *See* Kati L. Griffith, *When Federal*
5 *Immigration Exclusion Meets Subfederal Workplace Inclusion: A Forensic Approach to*
6 *Legislative History*, 17 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 881, 909-14 (2014) (finding that a
7 “systematic review of IRCA’s legislative history supports the . . . view that labor
8 concerns were a main tenet of IRCA’s purposes”). Legislators had concerns about the
9 impact of unauthorized migration on authorized workers as well as about the treatment of
10 unauthorized workers. *Id.* They “more often than not linked the treatment of unauthorized
11 workers with their concern for authorized workers,” *id.* at 910, noting the harmful effects
12 of the existence of an “exploitable underclass . . . fearful of reporting job-related abuse
13 and who have virtually nowhere to turn,” *id.* at 915 (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-132, at 108
14 (1985)).

15 Consistent with this understanding, when designing the federal scheme, Congress
16 deliberately chose not to impose additional penalties on workers for unauthorized work
17 or commit to unyielding enforcement of the immigration laws against workers.
18 Congress’s decision not to impose criminal penalties on undocumented workers
19 “reflect[ed] a considered judgment that making criminals out of [noncitizens] . . . who
20 already face the possibility of employer exploitation because of their removable status”
21 would exacerbate their weak bargaining position and “be inconsistent with federal policy
22 and objectives.” *Arizona*, 567 U.S. at 405. Congress also made the federal scheme
23 versatile, allowing for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to accommodate, among
24 other interests, the legislative goals of IRCA. *See* Amicus Brief of the United States in
25 *Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio*, Nos. 15-15211, 15-15213, 15-215, 2016 WL 1181917, at *19 (9th
26 Cir. filed Mar. 2, 2016).¹ Finally, Congress limited the uses to which the new system of

27 _____
28 ¹ For example, in 2011, the Department of Homeland Security entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the U.S. Department of Labor to reduce the

1 employment verification could be put, to prevent the verification system from being
 2 utilized as a “paper trail . . . for the purpose of apprehending undocumented
 3 [immigrants].” *Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio*, No. CV-14-01356-PHX-DGC, 2017 WL 1133012,
 4 at *6-8 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 2017) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 8-9 (1986)).

5 Congress intended through IRCA to “balance[] specifically chosen measures
 6 discouraging illegal employment with measures to protect those who might be adversely
 7 affected.” *Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights*, 913 F.2d at 1366. Congress adopted this
 8 approach in lieu of a “massive increase[] in enforcement—in neighborhoods and work
 9 places,” an approach legislators believed would be unacceptably “intrusive[.]” S. Rep.
 10 No. 99-132, at 8 (1985); *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986) (employer
 11 sanctions “most humane, credible and effective way to respond”). IRCA is a “political
 12 compromise . . . at every level.” *Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights*, 913 F.2d at 1366.

13 **II. AB 450 Is Not Conflict Preempted**

14 AB 450 was enacted to promote the health, safety, and well-being of workers,
 15 particularly those at the margins of the economy. In this way, its provisions can be
 16 harmonized with the objectives of IRCA. Moreover, because AB 450 is an exercise of
 17 California’s historic police powers, the Court should hesitate to disturb it. *See Rice v.*
 18 *Santa Fe Elevator Corp.*, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Even if the Court finds some tension
 19

20 risk that unscrupulous employers could inappropriately use immigration enforcement to
 21 undermine efforts to enforce labor standards. Revised Memorandum of Understanding
 22 Between the Departments of Homeland Security and Labor Concerning Enforcement
 23 Activities at Worksites (Dec. 7, 2017), <https://www.dol.gov/asp/media/reports/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf>. A separate memorandum from 2011 provided that immigrants engaged in
 24 a protected activity to vindicate labor rights or who “may be in a non-frivolous dispute
 25 with an employer” would be considered for the favorable exercise of prosecutorial
 26 discretion. Memorandum of John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs
 27 Enforcement on Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June
 28 17, 2011), <https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf>. That memorandum has been revoked by the current administration. Memorandum of John
 Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to
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https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf (rescinding all prior existing
 conflicting directives, memoranda or field guidance re: prosecutorial discretion).

1 between AB 450 and federal law, that is not a sufficient basis to invalidate the measure.
2 *Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.*, 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984); *In re Baker & Drake*, 35 F.3d
3 at 1354 (conflict preemption requires more than showing that state law makes realization
4 of federal objectives “more difficult”). Rather, the United States must show that AB 450
5 actually obstructs the legislative purposes of IRCA. *See Arizona*, 567 U.S. at 399-400;
6 *Goldstein*, 412 U.S. at 554 (preemption only available in “those situations where
7 conflicts will necessarily arise”); *Total TV v. Palmer Commc’ns, Inc.*, 69 F.3d 298, 304
8 (9th Cir.1995) (“hypothetical conflict is not a sufficient basis for preemption”). Because
9 the United States has not demonstrated that AB 450 obstructs the operation of federal law
10 or IRCA’s purposes, its preemption challenge should fail.

11 **A. AB 450’s Purpose Is to Ensure Workers Are Aware of Their Rights**
12 **and Feel Safe Exercising Them**

13 AB 450’s purpose is “to ensure that all California workers, regardless of
14 immigration status, enjoy the protections afforded them under state law[.]” Assembly
15 Committee on Appropriations, Analysis of AB 450 (May 17, 2017), Request for Judicial
16 Notice (“RJN”) Ex. I, ECF No. 78. When enacting AB 450, legislators were aware that
17 California law extends labor protections, rights and remedies to all workers in the State,
18 regardless of immigration status. *See* Senate Committee on Labor and Industrial
19 Relations, Analysis of AB 450 (June 28, 3017), RJN Ex. J. At the time, California law
20 also prohibited employers from engaging in unfair immigration-related practices, such as
21 contacting immigration authorities about workers in retaliation for exercising their labor
22 rights or re-verifying their employment authorization. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1019-1019.1.
23 Concerned about reports of recent worksite immigration round-ups and their impact on
24 undocumented workers’ practical ability to enforce their labor rights, California sought to
25 fortify its regime by introducing greater parity in the relationship between employers and
26 employees when dealing with immigration authorities and ensuring that “affected
27 workers . . . [are] cognizant of their rights during [federal enforcement] actions.”
28 Assembly Committee on Appropriations, Analysis of AB 450, RJN Ex. I.

1 It is not a new revelation that the specter of immigration enforcement against
2 workers can severely undercut the integrity of labor and employment laws. As one of the
3 amici has explained, undocumented workers “play an important role [as private attorneys
4 general] in the furtherance of substantive legal norms and societal values.” Kathleen
5 Kim, *The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model for Enforcing the*
6 *Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers*, 2009 U. Chi. Legal F. 247, 300-04 (2009)
7 (describing cases in which undocumented workers have come forward to report
8 violations of workplace laws to the benefit of the broader public). Courts have recognized
9 the *in terrorem* effect that the exposure to immigration enforcement action can have on
10 noncitizen workers’ willingness to play this role. *See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc.*, 364
11 F.3d 1057, 1064-66 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding protective order prohibiting discovery
12 into plaintiffs’ immigration status on grounds that such discovery would undermine the
13 “public interest in enforcing Title VII and [the California Fair Employment and Housing
14 Act]”); *Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp.*, 214 F.3d 1058, 1068-69, 1073 (9th
15 Cir. 2000) (permitting plaintiffs to proceed anonymously and recognizing the public
16 interest in plaintiffs enforcing their statutory rights). Nevertheless, recent shifts in federal
17 policy have increased the vulnerability of undocumented workers at the workplace.²
18 Reports of retaliation by employers against workers on the basis of their immigration
19 status are on the rise.³ In enacting AB 450, California has attempted to alleviate some of
20 the *in terrorem* effect of worksite immigration operations and reduce the ability of
21 employers to use immigration enforcement as a tool for retaliation by working within the
22 confines of the law to insist that employers not affirmatively facilitate the arrest and
23 detention of their employees while they are at work.

24
25 ² See Justin Miller, *Trump’s Immigration Crackdown Is Dangerous for Workers*
26 *(Not Just Immigrants)*, Am. Prospect (Jan. 31, 2017),
<http://prospect.org/article/trump%E2%80%99s-immigration-crackdown-dangerous-workers-not-just-immigrants>.

27 ³ *See, e.g.,* Andrew Khouri, *More Workers Say Their Bosses Are Threatening to*
28 *Have Them Deported*, L.A. Times (Jan. 3, 2018), <http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-immigration-retaliation-20180102-story.html>.

1 **B. California Possesses Expansive Authority to Regulate the Employment**
2 **Relationship to Protect Workers**

3 As the Supreme Court observed before the enactment of IRCA in *DeCanas v.*
4 *Bica*, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), there is a strong tradition of states acting within their police
5 powers to “regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the state.” *Id.*
6 at 356. California’s “interest in reducing immigration status effects on state [] workplace
7 protections undoubtedly emanates” from these historic police powers. Kati L. Griffith,
8 *The Power of a Presumption: California as a Laboratory for Unauthorized Immigrant*
9 *Workers’ Rights*, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1279, 1295-96 (2017) (considering preemption
10 dimensions of California measures that seek to protect unauthorized immigrant workers,
11 among others). In preemption cases, courts “start with the assumption that the historic
12 police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
13 the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” *Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr*, 518 U.S. 470, 485
14 (1996) (quoting *Rice*, 331 U.S. at 230). This is particularly true where, as here, the
15 “field” at issue is one “which the States have traditionally occupied.” *Id.*

16 Even after the passage of IRCA, numerous courts have rejected the claim that
17 federal law preempts state labor and employment laws that offer protections to
18 unauthorized workers. See Griffith, *A Forensic Approach to Legislative History*, at 890
19 (identifying 21 cases where judges did not find any conflict between subfederal
20 workplace protections and IRCA). For example, in *Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co.*, 59 Cal.
21 4th 407 (2014), the California Supreme Court upheld a state statute extending employee
22 protections to unauthorized workers, including lost pay compensation for the period
23 predating an employer’s discovery of an employee’s ineligibility to work. Addressing the
24 issue of obstacle preemption, the court found that permitting unauthorized workers to
25 enjoy the protections of state law was in keeping with IRCA’s purpose of “eliminating
26 employers’ economic incentives to hire such workers.” *Id.* at 425-26 (citing *Sure-Tan,*
27 *Inc. v. NLRB*, 467 U.S.884 (1984)). In the court’s judgment, “[i]t would frustrate rather
28 than advance the policies underlying federal immigration law to leave unauthorized

1 workers so bereft of state labor law protections that employers have a strong incentive to
2 ‘look the other way’ and exploit a black market for illegal labor.” *Id.* at 426.

3 In the workers’ compensation context, “courts have exhaustively discussed the
4 interplay of their jurisdiction’s workers’ compensation laws and IRCA” and found, based
5 on similar reasoning, that IRCA does not bar unauthorized workers from receiving
6 benefits. *Del. Valley Field Servs. v. Ramirez*, 105 A.3d 396, 405 (Del. Super. Ct. 2012),
7 *aff’d sub nom. Del. Valley Field Servs. v. Melgar-Ramirez*, 61 A.3d 617 (Del. 2013). The
8 Minnesota Supreme Court thus observed that compliance with a workers’ compensation
9 anti-retaliation statute would not obstruct federal law since “IRCA is premised on the
10 conclusion that ‘[e]mployment is the magnet that attracts [immigrants] here illegally’”
11 and “enforcing labor laws . . . furthers . . . IRCA’s goal of discouraging employers from
12 hiring unauthorized [immigrants].” *Sanchez v. Dahlke Trailer Sales, Inc.*, 897 N.W.2d
13 267, 277 (Minn. 2017) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986)) (emphasis in
14 original). Similarly, Delaware Superior Court explained in *Ramirez*, workers’
15 compensation or other labor and employment protections could not be considered
16 prohibited “sanction[s]” under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) simply because they extended to
17 undocumented workers. *Ramirez*, 105 A.3d at 406.⁴

18 In sum, courts are hesitant to find that state laws protecting workers are preempted
19 by IRCA, even where they apply to or are specifically designed to protect undocumented
20 workers. *See Grocers Supply, Inc. v. Cabello*, 390 S.W.3d 707, 718-24 (Tex. App. 2012)
21 (“To conclude otherwise . . . would be a ‘freewheeling’ judicial inquiry that would
22 undercut the principle that it is Congress . . . that preempts state law.”) (quoting *Chamber*
23 *of Commerce v. Whiting*, 563 U.S. 582, 607 (2011)). The main situations in which courts
24 have found state action to be in conflict with IRCA have involved employee

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26 ⁴ According to the court, “[t]o construe [the statute] . . . otherwise” would have
27 absurd results, precluding “state and local officials [from even] being [able to impose
28 even a traffic fine upon a person who has employed an undocumented [immigrant].” *Id.*
For a penalty “to fall within the purview of § 1324a(h)(2), the benefits must have been
awarded . . . as a means of penalizing employers for employing [undocumented
immigrants].” *Id.* (emphasis in original).

1 reinstatement or lost pay compensation for the period after an employer has discovered a
2 worker’s unauthorized status, *see* Griffith, *A Forensic Approach to Legislative History*, at
3 889; Michael J. Wishnie, *Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers*, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. &
4 Emp. L. 497, 505 (2004), or state law attempts to impose penalties on *workers* for
5 unauthorized work, *see Arizona*, 567 U.S. at 402-06.

6 There is another reason why state and local efforts to protect undocumented
7 workers should be given special solicitude on a preemption challenge. As an amicus has
8 argued, the “employee-protective purpose” of local laws that extend to immigrant
9 workers “should restrain courts from deciding that federal law preempts local laws[.]”
10 Catherine Fisk, *The Anti-Subordination Principle of Labor and Employment Law*
11 *Preemption*, 5 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 17, 19 (2011). This is because IRCA does not
12 operate in a vacuum, but against a backdrop of protective labor legislation, including at
13 the federal level. Thus, any preemption analysis should consider not only federal
14 immigration law, but the policies reflected in federal labor law as well. *Id.* at 625-27.

15 **C. AB 450 Does Not Pose an Obstacle to IRCA**

16 *1. IRCA Provides Immigration Authorities with a Comprehensive Set*
17 *of Investigatory Tools and Does Not Rely on Voluntary Access to*
Implement the Federal Scheme

18 In its motion, the United States makes an unsupported claim that Congress
19 designed a federal scheme for immigration enforcement, “including in the context of
20 worksite inspections, that is *premised on* the private property owner’s ability to consent
21 to inspections of their property and employee records.” PI Motion at 11-12 (emphasis
22 added). There is a vast difference between stating that immigration agents are *permitted*
23 to rely on consent to access private property and records and suggesting that the federal
24 scheme *needs* or *is based on* such consent. A closer examination of the federal scheme
25 reveals that voluntary consent is in fact not necessary; Congress’s full intent can be
26 realized through the many tools that immigration authorities have been given.

27 As discussed above, IRCA’s primary regulatory focus was on *employers*, not
28 employees. With respect to employers, IRCA requires employers to verify the

1 employment eligibility of employees and to maintain a record of the Form I-9 and related
2 documents for a specified period of time. *See, e.g.*, 8 C.F.R. § 274.2. When federal
3 authorities conduct an inspection, they typically do so by serving a Notice of Inspection
4 (NOI).⁵ AB 450 contains no restriction on employers providing I-9 and other documents
5 in response to a NOI—in fact, AB 450 specifically exempts such documents from its
6 subpoena or warrant requirement. Cal. Gov’t Code § 7285.2(a)(2). AB 450 simply
7 requires employers to provide notice to employees of a NOI—something that employers
8 have always been authorized to do—and provide employees for whom a deficiency has
9 been identified an opportunity to correct the deficiency. Cal. Lab. Code § 90.2.⁶

10 When immigration authorities need to conduct an inspection of a place of business
11 unrelated to I-9 documents and without prior notice, they may seek a subpoena or
12 warrant. The United States claims that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
13 provides no procedure for procuring a judicial warrant, PI Motion at 13, but federal law
14 actually *does* allow immigration authorities to obtain a judicial warrant for a worksite
15 operation. In fact, to obtain a warrant, immigration authorities need not even meet the
16 relatively more stringent requirements for obtaining a search warrant in the criminal law
17 context. They can obtain a judicial warrant by meeting a more relaxed “hybrid standard
18 of probable cause.” *Int’l Molders’ Allied Workers’ Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson*, 799
19 F.2d 547, 552 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing standard for “*Blackie’s* warrant”). In the main
20 case cited by the United States for the proposition that immigration authorities should be
21 able to obtain unfettered access to worksites without a warrant, *the INS had a warrant*.
22 *See I.N.S. v. Delgado*, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984) (stating that worksite surveys INS

23 ⁵ *I-9 Central: Inspections*, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services,
24 <https://www.uscis.gov/i-9-central/retain-store-form-i-9/inspection/inspections> (last
25 visited May 14, 2018). Alternatively, they may utilize subpoenas or warrants to inspect
26 documents without providing three-days notice. *Id.*

26 ⁶ With respect to employees for whom a deficiency has been identified, ICE
27 already instructs employers to provide them with notice and an opportunity to respond.
28 *See Form I-9 Inspection Process*, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Jan. 8,
2018), <https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/i9-inspection> (“The employer should provide the
employee with a copy of the notice, and give the employee an opportunity to present ICE
with additional documentation to establish their work eligibility.”).

1 conducted in January and September 1977 were conducted “pursuant to two warrants”).
2 That federal authorities would prefer not to have to make the necessary showing to get a
3 warrant before descending upon a business is unsurprising. But there is no doubt that
4 they can obtain warrants with relative ease.

5 2. *Limiting Voluntary Access Will Help Ensure Bona Fide*
6 *Investigations and Reduce Retaliation*

7 The United States appears to be less concerned with AB 450’s impact on its ability
8 to investigate *employers* and more concerned with maximizing its ability to enter
9 worksites so that it can engage in routine immigration enforcement against *workers*. PI
10 Motion at 11-12 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357 and citing *Delgado* and *Zepeda*, both pre-IRCA
11 cases). Those activities fall under a different part of the INA that regulates immigration
12 officers and agents, not employers or their employees. *See, e.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1357.

13 When immigration authorities enter workplaces to apprehend workers, they
14 sometimes do so with non-judicial administrative warrants or no warrant at all. Unlike a
15 judicial warrant, an administrative warrant does not authorize immigration officials to
16 enter non-public parts of a business. *See, e.g., ICE Administrative Removal Warrants*
17 *(MP3)*, Fed. Law Enforcement Training Ctr., [https://www.fletc.gov/audio/ice-](https://www.fletc.gov/audio/ice-administrative-removal-warrants-mp3)
18 [administrative-removal-warrants-mp3](https://www.fletc.gov/audio/ice-administrative-removal-warrants-mp3) (last visited May 15, 2018) (“primary difference”
19 between criminal warrant and administration warrant “is that, unlike a criminal warrant . .
20 ., a removal warrant does not authorize the ICE officer to enter . . . an REP [reasonable
21 expectation of privacy] area to execute the warrant”). However, administrative warrants
22 can be confused with criminal warrants. AB 450 helps to ensure that employers do not
23 provide voluntary access to authorities in the mistaken belief that an administrative
24 warrant authorizes them to enter nonpublic areas of a business.

25 When immigration officials have no warrant, commentators have observed that
26 the consent doctrine may be “insufficiently protective” because individuals from whom
27 consent is sought, such as the front desk clerk at a business, may lack knowledge of the
28 ability to refuse the request. Bernard Bell, *United States v. California: A Preliminary*

1 *Assessment of the Challenge to California’s “Immigrant Worker Protection Act,”* Yale J.
 2 on Reg. Notice & Comment Blog (Mar. 31, 2018), [http://yalejreg.com/nc/united-states-v-](http://yalejreg.com/nc/united-states-v-california-a-preliminary-assessment-of-the-challenge-to-californias-immigrant-worker-protection-act-by-bernard-w-bell/)
 3 [california-a-preliminary-assessment-of-the-challenge-to-californias-immigrant-worker-](http://yalejreg.com/nc/united-states-v-california-a-preliminary-assessment-of-the-challenge-to-californias-immigrant-worker-protection-act-by-bernard-w-bell/)
 4 [protection-act-by-bernard-w-bell/](http://yalejreg.com/nc/united-states-v-california-a-preliminary-assessment-of-the-challenge-to-californias-immigrant-worker-protection-act-by-bernard-w-bell/). “Consent doctrine is even more problematic [where, as
 5 here] the person who consents is not the target of the search.” *Id.* (citing *Illinois v.*
 6 *Rodriguez*, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 186 (1990) and *United States v. Matlock*, 415 U.S. 164,
 7 171 (1974)). Employers “may have no interest in ensuring that the government has an
 8 adequate justification for conducting a search . . . confident that any untoward effects will
 9 not be directed at the company.” *Id.*

10 By extending its protections to all “places of labor,”⁷ AB 450 benefits some of the
 11 most vulnerable workers in the state, i.e., those whose employers would not otherwise be
 12 aware of their procedural rights or be inclined to exercise them.⁸ It ensures that
 13 investigations by immigration authorities have adequate justification and reduces the *in*
 14 *terrorem* effect of exploitative or haphazard immigration enforcement on the
 15 enforcement of labor and employment laws in the state.

16 **III. AB 450 Is Not Barred by the Intergovernmental Immunity Doctrine**

17 The United States also argues that AB 450 violates the doctrine of
 18 intergovernmental immunity. PI Motion at 14-18. This Court should decline the United
 19 States’ invitation to expand intergovernmental immunity beyond conventional
 20 understandings of its reach.

21
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 23 ⁷ The United States suggests that “places of labor” could be read to include
 24 locations within 25 miles of the international border, where immigration authorities can
 25 have access to “private lands, but not dwellings, for the purpose of patrolling the border,”
 26 or locations that authorities must be able to enter in the event of exigent circumstances.
 27 ECF No. 2-1 at 14 n.8. But in both of those cases, authorities need neither a warrant *nor*
 28 “voluntary consent” to enter. Cal. Gov’t Code § 7285.1(a). AB 450 is therefore irrelevant.

⁸ The United States’ argument that AB 450 will impede investigations into human
 smuggling or trafficking, PI Motion at 16-17, is misplaced. Those involved in smuggling
 or trafficking are unlikely to consent to a search even without AB 450, and to the extent
 that authorities learn of criminal activity, they may enter private property with a search
 warrant.

1 In the modern era, “[t]he Court has . . . adopted a functional approach to claims of
 2 governmental immunity, accommodating of the full range of each sovereign’s legislative
 3 authority and respectful of the primary role of Congress in resolving conflicts between
 4 the National and State governments.” *North Dakota v. United States*, 495 U.S. 423, 435
 5 (1990). The federal government can assert immunity only from regulation that
 6 discriminates against the federal government directly or, in the case of contractors or
 7 suppliers, indirectly through those “with whom [the federal government] deals.” *Id.* at
 8 435-38. AB 450 plainly does not regulate the federal government directly. *Cf. United*
 9 *States v. City of Arcata*, 629 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2009). AB 450 also does not regulate the
 10 federal government indirectly. Employers subject to AB 450 are not being regulated
 11 because of their status as government contractors or suppliers, *North Dakota*, 495 U.S. at
 12 438; they are being regulated because of California’s desire to improve the condition of
 13 all workers, which necessarily implicates all employers in the state. *Cf. Boeing Co. v.*
 14 *Movassaghi*, 768 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2014).⁹

15 “Claims to any further degree of immunity must be resolved under principles of
 16 congressional pre-emption.” *North Dakota*, 495 U.S. at 435. That is because it is
 17 Congress, not the courts, that plays the “primary role” in deciding whether the
 18 accomplishment of federal purposes requires displacing state law today. *Id.*; Gillian E.
 19 Metzger, *Federalism and Federal Agency Reform*, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 57 (2011)
 20 (“Much of the resultant doctrine of federal intergovernmental immunity has been cut
 21 back over time, with such concerns now addressed largely under the aegis of
 22 preemption.”). Since Congress was well aware of how to preempt state law and chose not

23
 24 ⁹ The United States suggests that employers subject to AB 450 are like the
 25 contractor in *Boeing Co.* because AB 450 “imposes penalties on private employers . . . to
 26 the extent they voluntarily cooperate with the United States,” and therefore,
 27 intergovernmental immunity should extend to them. PI Motion at 14-15. But AB 450
 28 clearly applies to all employers. Compliance with AB 450 imposes no special hardship
 on them. Even those who would prefer not to follow AB 450 cannot be compared to
 government contractors or suppliers because, unlike contractors or suppliers, they have
 no legal relationship to or obligation to perform functions for the federal government
 absent a NOI, subpoena, or warrant.

1 to do so here, no further elaboration of the implications of the Supremacy Clause is
2 necessary. *See generally* Lawrence Tribe, *Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation,*
3 *Taxation and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies about*
4 *Federalism*, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 682, 701-11 (1976) (expressing doubt about judicial
5 branch’s ability to determine when a tax or regulation is “really” a burden on a federal
6 instrumentality and calling for “attention to the question of who should decide”—to
7 which he answers: Congress).

8 **CONCLUSION**

9 AB 450 was crafted to promote the well-being of workers in California without
10 conflicting with federal law. Amici urge the Court to decline the United States’ request
11 for a preliminary injunction.

12
13 Dated: May 18, 2018

MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP

14
15 By: /s/ Bradley S. Phillips

16 Bradley S. Phillips
17 350 South Grand Avenue, 50th Floor
18 Los Angeles, CA 90071
19 T: (213) 683-9100
20 F: (213) 687-3702
21 Brad.Phillips@mto.com

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Counsel for Amici Curiae

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 18th day of May, 2018, I electronically transmitted the foregoing document to the Clerk's Office using the CM/ECF System for filing. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court's electronic filing system or by mail as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing.

Dated: May 18, 2018
Los Angeles, CA

/s/ Bradley S. Phillips
Bradley S. Phillips

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APPENDIX A¹

1
2 Annie Lai
3 Assistant Clinical Professor of Law
4 UC Irvine School of Law

5 Kathleen Kim
6 Professor of Law
7 Loyola Law School

8 Emily Robinson
9 Co-Director, Immigrant Justice Clinic
10 Loyola Law School

11 Catherine L. Fisk
12 Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong Professor of Law
13 University of California, Berkeley School of Law

14 William B. Gould IV
15 Charles A. Beardsly Professor of Law, Emeritus
16 Stanford Law School

17 Bill Ong Hing
18 Professor of Law and Migration Studies
19 University of San Francisco School of Law

20 Sameer Ashar
21 Clinical Professor of Law
22 UC Irvine School of Law

23 Caitlin Barry
24 Assistant Professor of Law
25 Director, Farmworker Legal Aid Clinic
26 Villanova University, Charles Widger School of Law

27 Kristina M. Campbell
28 Jack and Lovell Olender Professor of Law
Co-Director, Immigration and Human Rights Clinic
UDC David A. Clarke School of Law

Scott Cummings
Professor of Law
UCLA School of Law

Keith Cunningham-Parmeter
Professor of Law
Willamette University College of Law

Ruben J. Garcia
Professor of Law
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

¹ Amici curiae appear in their individual capacities; institutional affiliations and titles are provided here for identification purposes only.

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Shannon Gleeson, PhD
Associate Professor of Labor Relations, Law and History
Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations

Jennifer Gordon
Professor of Law
Fordham University School of Law

Kati Griffin
Associate Professor
Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations

Stephen Lee
Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development
Professor of Law
UC Irvine School of Law

Jennifer J. Lee
Assistant Clinical Professor of Law
Temple University Beasley School of Law

Beth Lyon
Clinical Professor of Law
Cornell Law School

Angela D. Morrison
Associate Professor of Law
Texas A&M University School of Law

Maria L. Ontiveros
Professor of Law
University of San Francisco School of Law

James Gray Pope
Professor of Law
Rutgers Law School

Nina Rabin
Clinical Professor of Law
University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law

Leticia M. Saucedo
Professor of Law
UC Davis School of Law

Hina Shah
Director, Women's Employment Rights Clinic
Associate Professor of Law
Golden Gate University School of Law

Noah D. Zatz
Professor of Law
UCLA School of Law

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28

Michael J. Wishnie
William O. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law
Yale Law School