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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

**IN RE: BORDER  
INFRASTRUCTURE  
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION**

Case No.: 17cv1215-GPC(WVG)  
Consolidated with:  
17cv1873-GPC(WVG)  
17cv1911-GPC(WVG)

**ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’  
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY  
JUDGMENT AND GRANTING  
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR  
SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

**[Dkt. Nos. 18, 28, 29, 30, 35.]**

These three consolidated cases involve challenges to Waiver Determinations made by former Secretaries of the Department of Homeland Security on August 2, 2017 and September 12, 2017 pursuant to section 102 of IIRIRA<sup>1</sup> waiving the legal requirements of

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<sup>1</sup> Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.

1 NEPA,<sup>2</sup> the ESA,<sup>3</sup> the CZMA<sup>4</sup> and more than 30 additional laws not at issue in these  
2 cases. The Waiver Determinations concern two types of border wall construction  
3 projects in San Diego County: (1) the “border wall prototype project”; and (2) the  
4 replacement of fifteen miles of existing border fence in the San Diego Sector and three  
5 miles of existing border fence in the El Centro Sector (“border fence replacement  
6 projects”). The Plaintiffs allege variously that (1) the Waivers are ultra vires acts that  
7 exceed the authority delegated by Congress; and (2) the Waivers are unconstitutional acts  
8 under a variety of legal doctrines.  
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12 The Court is aware that the subject of these lawsuits, border barriers, is currently  
13 the subject of heated political debate in and between the United States and the Republic  
14 of Mexico as to the need, efficacy and the source of funding for such barriers. In its  
15 review of this case, the Court cannot and does not consider whether underlying decisions  
16 to construct the border barriers are politically wise or prudent. As fellow Indiana native  
17 Chief Justice Roberts observed in addressing a case surrounded by political  
18 disagreement: “Court[s] are vested with the authority to interpret the law; we possess  
19 neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are  
20 entrusted to our Nation’s elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people  
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26 <sup>2</sup> National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

27 <sup>3</sup> Endangered Species Act.

28 <sup>4</sup> Coastal Zone Management Act.

1 disagree with them. It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of their  
2 political choices.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 538 (2012).

3  
4 Here, the Court will focus on whether Congress has the power under the Constitution to  
5 enact the challenged law and whether the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security  
6 properly exercised the powers delegated by Congress.

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8 Before the Court are three cross-motions for summary judgment. A hearing was  
9 held on February 9, 2018. (Dkt. No. 44.) Michael Cayaban, Esq. and Noah Golden  
10 Frasner, Esq. appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs People of the State of California and the  
11 California Coastal Commission; Brian Segee, Esq. and Brendan Cummings, Esq.  
12 appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity; and Sarah Hanneken, Esq.  
13 appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs Defenders of Wildlife, Sierra Club, and Animal Legal  
14 Defense Fund. (Id.) Galen Thorp, Esq. appeared on behalf of Defendants. (Id.) The  
15 parties filed supplemental briefs on February 13, 2018. (Dkt. Nos. 46, 47, 48, 49.)

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18 Based on the parties’ briefs, the supporting documentation, the applicable law, the  
19 arguments made at the hearing and the supplemental briefing, the Court DENIES  
20 Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment and GRANTS Defendants’ motions for  
21 summary judgment.  
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1 **I. BACKGROUND**

2 **A. Section 102 of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant**

3 **Responsibility Act**

4  
5 In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant  
6 Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), which, pursuant to Section 102(a), required the Attorney  
7 General to “take such actions as may be necessary to install additional physical barriers  
8 and roads (including the removal of obstacles to detection of illegal entrants) in the  
9 vicinity of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry  
10 into the United States.” Pub. L. No. 104–208, Div. C., Title I, § 102(a), 110 Stat. 3009,  
11 3009–554 (1996), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note. IIRIRA Section 102(c), as originally  
12 enacted, authorized the Attorney General to waive the Endangered Species Act of 1973  
13 (“ESA”) and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”) when he  
14 determined such waiver “was necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers  
15 and roads under this section.” *Id.* § 102(c). The Homeland Security Act of 2002  
16 abolished the Immigration and Naturalization Service and transferred responsibility for  
17 the construction of border barriers from the Attorney General to the Department of  
18 Homeland Security (“DHS”). Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). In 2005, the  
19 REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title I, § 102, 119 Stat. 231, 302, 306 (May  
20 11, 2005), amended the waiver authority of section 102(c) expanding the Secretary of  
21 DHS’ authority to waive “all legal requirements” that the Secretary, in his or her own  
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1 discretion, determines “necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and  
2 roads under this section.” Id. It also added a judicial review provision that limited the  
3 district court’s jurisdiction to hear any causes or action concerning the Secretary’s waiver  
4 authority to solely constitutional claims. Id. § 102(c)(2)(A). Further, the provision  
5 foreclosed appellate court review and directed any review of the district court’s decision  
6 be raised by petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States.  
7 Id. § 102(c)(2)(C).

10 Section 102 consists of three sections: (1) section 102(a) describes the general  
11 purpose of the statute; (2) section 102(b) specifies Congress’ mandate for specific border  
12 barrier construction; and (3) section 102(c) grants the Secretary the discretion to waive  
13 “all legal requirements” he or she “determines necessary to ensure expeditious  
14 construction of the barriers and roads” and provides for limited judicial review of the  
15 Secretary’s waiver decision to solely constitutional violations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note.

18 Since its enactment in 1996, IIRIRA section 102 has been amended three times  
19 although the general purpose of the statute under section 102(a) has remained the same.  
20 When IIRIRA was first enacted in 1996, section 102(b) mandated “construction along the  
21 14 miles of the international land border of the United States, starting at the Pacific  
22 Ocean and extending eastward of second and third fences, in addition to the existing  
23 reinforced fence, and for roads between the fences.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (1996).

1 The Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, § 3, 120 Stat. 2638 (Oct. 26,  
2 2006), amended the specific mandates of section 102(b). It directed the DHS to “provide  
3 for at least 2 layers of reinforced fencing, [and] the installation of additional physical  
4 barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors” in five specific segments along the U.S.-  
5 Mexico border encompassing the states of California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas.  
6 Id. It also set dates of completion for two segments to be completed by certain dates in  
7  
8 2008. Id.

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10 Fourteen months later, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.  
11 110-161, Div. E, Title V § 564, 121 Stat. 2090 (Dec. 26, 2007), again amended the  
12 mandates of section 102(b) and they currently remain the operative version of the statute.  
13

14 In its current version, section 102, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note, provides,

15 **(a) In general.--**The Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such actions  
16 as may be necessary to install additional physical barriers and roads  
17 (including the removal of obstacles to detection of illegal entrants) in the  
18 vicinity of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high  
19 illegal entry into the United States.

20 **(b) Construction of fencing and road improvements along the border.--**

21 **(1) Additional fencing along southwest border.--**

22 **(A) Reinforced fencing.--**In carrying out subsection (a) [of this  
23 note], the Secretary of Homeland Security shall construct reinforced  
24 fencing along not less than 700 miles of the southwest border where  
25 fencing would be most practical and effective and provide for the  
26 installation of additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras,  
27 and sensors to gain operational control of the southwest border.  
28

1           **(B) Priority areas.**--In carrying out this section [Pub. L. 104-208,  
2 Div. C, Title I, § 102, Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-554, which  
3 amended this section and enacted this note], the Secretary of  
4 Homeland Security shall--

5           **(i)** identify the 370 miles, or other mileage determined by the  
6 Secretary, whose authority to determine other mileage shall expire on  
7 December 31, 2008, along the southwest border where fencing would  
8 be most practical and effective in deterring smugglers and aliens  
9 attempting to gain illegal entry into the United States; and

10           **(ii)** not later than December 31, 2008, complete construction of  
11 reinforced fencing along the miles identified under clause (i).

12           **(C) Consultation.--**

13           **(i) In general.**--In carrying out this section, the Secretary of  
14 Homeland Security shall consult with the Secretary of the Interior, the  
15 Secretary of Agriculture, States, local governments, Indian tribes, and  
16 property owners in the United States to minimize the impact on the  
17 environment, culture, commerce, and quality of life for the  
18 communities and residents located near the sites at which such fencing  
19 is to be constructed.

20           **(ii) Savings provision.**--Nothing in this subparagraph may be  
21 construed to—

22           **(I)** create or negate any right of action for a State, local government,  
23 or other person or entity affected by this subsection; or

24           **(II)** affect the eminent domain laws of the United States or of any  
25 State.

26           **(D) Limitation on requirements.**--Notwithstanding subparagraph  
27 (A), nothing in this paragraph shall require the Secretary of Homeland  
28 Security to install fencing, physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras,  
and sensors in a particular location along an international border of  
the United States, if the Secretary determines that the use or  
placement of such resources is not the most appropriate means to

1 achieve and maintain operational control over the international border  
2 at such location.

3 **(2) Prompt acquisition of necessary easements.**--The Attorney General,  
4 acting under the authority conferred in section 103(b) of the Immigration  
5 and Nationality Act (as inserted by subsection (d)) [subsec. (b) of this  
6 section], shall promptly acquire such easements as may be necessary to carry  
7 out this subsection and shall commence construction of fences immediately  
8 following such acquisition (or conclusion of portions thereof).

9 **(3) Safety features.**--The Attorney General, while constructing the  
10 additional fencing under this subsection, shall incorporate such safety  
11 features into the design of the fence system as are necessary to ensure the  
12 well-being of border patrol agents deployed within or in near proximity to  
13 the system.

14 **(4) Authorization of appropriations.**--There are authorized to be  
15 appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this subsection.  
16 Amounts appropriated under this paragraph are authorized to remain  
17 available until expended.

18 **(c) Waiver.--**

19 **(1) In general.**--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary  
20 of Homeland Security shall have the authority to waive all legal  
21 requirements such Secretary, in such Secretary's sole discretion, determines  
22 necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads under  
23 this section. Any such decision by the Secretary shall be effective upon  
24 being published in the Federal Register.

25 **(2) Federal court review.--**

26 **(A) In general.**--The district courts of the United States shall have  
27 exclusive jurisdiction to hear all causes or claims arising from any  
28 action undertaken, or any decision made, by the Secretary of  
Homeland Security pursuant to paragraph (1). A cause of action or  
claim may only be brought alleging a violation of the Constitution of  
the United States. The court shall not have jurisdiction to hear any  
claim not specified in this subparagraph.



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2 **(B) Time for filing of complaint.**--Any cause or claim brought  
3 pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be filed not later than 60 days after  
4 the date of the action or decision made by the Secretary of Homeland  
5 Security. A claim shall be barred unless it is filed within the time  
6 specified.

7 **(C) Ability to seek appellate review.**--An interlocutory or final  
8 judgment, decree, or order of the district court may be reviewed only  
9 upon petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the  
10 United States.”

11 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note (hereinafter “8 U.S.C. § 1103”).

12 **B. Factual Background**

13 On January 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order No.  
14 13767 entitled “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements.” (Dkt.  
15 No. 30-5, Cayaban Decl., Ex. 7, Executive Order, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793.) Section 4 of the  
16 Executive Order No. 13767 concerns “Physical Security of the Southern Border of the  
17 United States” and provides, in part,

18 The Secretary shall immediately take the following steps to obtain complete  
19 operational control, as determined by the Secretary, of the southern border:

20 (a) In accordance with existing law, including the Secure Fence Act and  
21 IIRIRA, take all appropriate steps to immediately plan, design, and construct  
22 a physical wall along the southern border, using appropriate materials and  
23 technology to most effectively achieve complete operational control of the  
24 southern border;

25 . . .

26 (d) Produce a comprehensive study of the security of the southern border, to  
27 be completed within 180 days of this order, that shall include the current  
28 state of southern border security, all geophysical and topographical aspects

1 of the southern border, the availability of Federal and State resources  
2 necessary to achieve complete operational control of the southern border,  
3 and a strategy to obtain and maintain complete operational control of the  
4 southern border.

5 (Id. at §§ 4(a) & (d).) “‘Wall’ shall mean a contiguous, physical wall or other similarly  
6 secure, contiguous, and impassable physical barrier.” (Id. at § 3(e).)

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8 On August 2, 2017, former DHS Secretary John Kelly issued a Determination  
9 Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility  
10 Act of 1996, as Amended (“August 2 Waiver Determination” or “San Diego Waiver”) in  
11 the Federal Register invoking section 102(c)’s waiver of the application of NEPA, the  
12 ESA, the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”) and more than thirty additional laws  
13 not at issue in this lawsuit to “various border infrastructure projects” in the “Project  
14 Area,” which is defined as “an approximately fifteen mile segment of the border within  
15 the San Diego Sector that starts at the Pacific Ocean and extends eastward,” starting at  
16 “the Pacific Ocean and extending to approximately one mile east of Border Monument  
17 251.” (Dkt. No. 30-6, Cayaban Decl., Ex. 11, 82 Fed. Reg. 35,984-85.) Secretary Kelly  
18 determined that the Project Area “is an area of high illegal entry.” (Id. at 35,985.)  
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22 Two projects are specified in the August 2 Waiver Determination. (Id. at 35,984-  
23 85.) One project is the replacement of about 15 miles of existing primary fencing near  
24 San Diego. (Id.) The second project is the construction of prototype border walls on the  
25 eastern end of the secondary barrier near San Diego. (Id. at 35,984; Dkt. No. 18-2, Ds’  
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1 Index of Exs., Ex. 14, Memorandum, Construction and Evaluation of Border Wall  
2 Prototypes, U.S. Border Patrol, San Diego Sector, California (Sept. 25, 2017).)

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4 On September 12, 2017, former DHS Acting Secretary Elaine Duke, issued a  
5 Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant  
6 Responsibility Act of 1996, as Amended (“September 12 Waiver Determination” or  
7 “Calexico Waiver”) in the Federal Register also invoking section 102(c)’s waiver  
8 authority as to compliance with NEPA, the ESA and numerous other statutes not at issue  
9 in this lawsuit to the Project Area in the El Centro Sector. (Dkt. No. 30-6, Cayaban  
10 Decl., Ex. 12, 82 Fed. Reg. 42,829-30.) Secretary Duke determined that the “El Centro  
11 Sector is an area of high illegal entry.” (Id. at 42,830.) The Determination seeks to build  
12 a replacement fence in the El Centro Sector “along an approximately three mile segment  
13 of the border that starts at the Calexico West Land Port of Entry and extends westward.”  
14 (Id.)

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18 Contracts for the prototype project were awarded on August 31 and September 7,  
19 2017. (Dkt. No. 39-1, Cal. Ps’ Response to Ds’ SSUF, No. 10.) Construction for the  
20 prototypes began on September 26, 2017 and was completed on October 26, 2017. (Dkt.  
21 No. 49-4, Enriquez Decl. ¶ 11.) Construction of the Calexico three-mile replacement  
22 fence was set to begin on February 15, 2018 while the San Diego Sector replacement  
23 fence is scheduled for construction in August 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 36.)

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1 On September 20, 2017, People of the State of California (“California”) and the  
2 California Coastal Commission (collectively “California Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint  
3 against United States of America; DHS; Acting Secretary of DHS Elaine Duke; CBP; and  
4 Acting Commissioner of CBP Kevin K. McAleenan. (Dkt. No. 17cv1911, Dkt. No. 1.)  
5 The complaint alleges declaratory and injunctive relief based on numerous violations of  
6 the U.S. Constitution, and statutes relating to the border wall construction projects in the  
7 San Diego and El Centro Sectors based on the two Waiver Determinations.<sup>7</sup>

8  
9 In summary, all Plaintiffs<sup>8</sup> allege the Secretaries’ Waiver Determinations are ultra  
10 vires acts that are not authorized under section 102. Because the Waiver Determinations  
11 are void based on the ultra vires acts of the Secretaries, Plaintiffs also assert violations of  
12 NEPA, ESA, CZMA and the APA. Plaintiffs also allege the following violations of the  
13 U.S. Constitution:  
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19 of the U.S. Constitution; (4) violation of non-delegation doctrine under Article I, Section 1 and Article  
20 II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution; and (5) violations of Article III, the First Amendment right to  
21 petition, the Tenth Amendment by removing concurrent jurisdiction of state courts, and due process  
22 rights under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (Dkt. No. 26.)

23 <sup>7</sup> The California Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks declaratory and/or injunctive relief claiming Defendants (1)  
24 failed to comply with NEPA and the APA; (2) failed to comply with the CZMA and the APA; (3) the  
25 Border Wall Projects are not authorized by section 102 based on ultra vires actions; (4) the Secretary’s  
26 waiver authority expired on December 31, 2008; (5) the Waivers are invalid because they fail to satisfy  
27 section 102’s requirements; (6) violation of Article III of the U.S. Constitution and the due process  
28 clause of the Fifth Amendment; (7) violation of the separation of powers doctrine; (8) violation of Article  
I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution; (9) violation of Article I, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution; (10)  
violation of Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution; and (11) violation of the Tenth Amendment of  
the U.S. Constitution.

<sup>8</sup> Center Plaintiff only challenges the August 2, 2017 Waiver Determination while Coalition Plaintiffs  
and California Plaintiffs challenge both the August 2, and September 12, 2017 Waiver Determinations.

- 1 - Violation of Article I, Section 1 - the Non-Delegation Doctrine/Separation of
- 2 Powers (by all Plaintiffs)
- 3
- 4 - Violation of Article II, Section 3 - Take Care Clause (by Center Plaintiff)
- 5 - Violation of Article I, Sections 2 & 3 (by California Plaintiffs)
- 6 - Violation of Article I, Section 7 - Presentment Clause (by all Plaintiffs)
- 7
- 8 - Violation of Due Process, Article III, and First Amendment right to petition the
- 9 government (by Coalition Plaintiffs and California Plaintiffs)
- 10
- 11 - Violation of the Tenth Amendment - Concurrent State and Federal Jurisdiction
- 12 (by Coalition Plaintiffs)
- 13 - Violation of the Tenth Amendment (by California Plaintiffs)

14 On October 24, 2017, the Court granted the parties' joint motion to consolidate the  
15 three cases and the parties' agreed upon briefing schedule on their cross-motions for  
16 summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 21, 22.)

17  
18 Prior to consolidation, on October 6, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss  
19 Center Plaintiff's second amended complaint which was converted to a motion for  
20 summary judgment in the Court's consolidation order. (Dkt. Nos. 18, 22.) On November  
21 22, 2017, Center Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment<sup>9</sup> and an opposition  
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25 <sup>9</sup> Center Plaintiff notes that its FOIA claim, Claim 7, is not subject to the cross-motions and will be  
26 resolved either via settlement or separate briefing. (Dkt. No. 28-1 at 14 n. 1.) Defendants agree arguing  
27 that the FOIA claim is not yet ripe for adjudication but also argue that the alternative APA claim  
28 regarding the processing of the FOIA requests should be dismissed since FOIA, itself, provides an

1 to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 28.) On December 20, 2017,  
2 Defendants filed an omnibus brief that included their reply in support of their motion for  
3 summary judgment and an opposition to Center Plaintiff’s motion for summary  
4 judgment. (Dkt. No. 35.) On January 5, 2018, Center Plaintiff filed a reply to  
5 Defendants’ opposition. (Dkt. No. 36.)

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8 On November 22, 2017, Coalition Plaintiffs and the California Plaintiffs filed their  
9 motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 29, 30.) On December 20, 2017, all  
10 Defendants filed an omnibus cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition to  
11 Coalition and California Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 35.)

12  
13 On January 5, 2018, the Coalition Plaintiffs and California Plaintiffs separately  
14 filed their oppositions to Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment and replies to  
15 their motions. (Dkt. Nos. 38, 39.) On January 23, 2018, Defendants filed their reply to  
16 their cross-motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 42.)

## 17 18 **II. ANALYSIS**

### 19 20 **A. Legal Standard on Motion for Summary Judgment**

21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the Court to enter summary  
22 judgment on factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just,  
23 speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

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27 adequate remedy. (Dkt. No. 35-1 at 94-95.) The Court declines to address the alternative APA claim  
28 based on the FOIA requests until after the FOIA claim, itself, is resolved.

1 U.S. 317, 325, 327 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings,  
2 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the  
3 affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the  
4 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is  
5 material when it affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477  
6 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier  
7 of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita  
8 Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

11 **B. Article III Standing as to the State of California**

12 The State of California argues it has Article III standing because it will suffer  
13 injury to its real property that it owns and manages adjacent to the border wall projects.<sup>10</sup>  
14 It contends that the Waiver Determinations infringe on California’s procedural and  
15 sovereign rights in creating and enforcing its own laws and obtaining benefits provided  
16 under NEPA and the APA. Defendants respond that California has not carried its burden  
17 to establish standing as to each of its numerous claims and has not demonstrated that the  
18 Waiver Determinations impact state laws which would be enforceable in connection with  
19 the projects at issue.  
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26 <sup>10</sup> Initially, California argued it has a concrete and particularized interest in protecting its natural,  
27 recreational, agricultural, historical, and cultural resources for the use, enjoyment and benefit of its  
28 residents but did not reassert these interests in its reply.



1 Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution requires that a plaintiff have  
2 standing to bring a claim. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  
3  
4 In order “to satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has  
5 suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or  
6 imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the  
7 challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative,  
8 that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.  
9 Laidlaw Env’tl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S.  
10 at 560–61). The party seeking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing its  
11 existence. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. “A plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim  
12 he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Davis v. Fed. Election  
13 Comm’n, 552 U.S. 724, 734 (2008).

17 States have a “procedural right” and “quasi-sovereign interests” in protecting its  
18 natural resources, such as air quality. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007)  
19 (“EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to  
20 Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent.’”). In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper  
21 Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907), the State of Georgia filed an action to protect its citizens  
22 from air pollution originating from outside its borders and the Court asserted that a state,  
23 in its capacity as a quasi-sovereign, has an “interest independent of and behind the titles  
24 of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether  
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1 its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”

2 Id.

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4 Here, the parties dispute whether California has demonstrated an injury in fact,  
5 and whether the injury in fact is traceable to the Waiver Determinations. As held by the  
6 U.S. Supreme Court, California has a procedural right and quasi-sovereign right in the  
7 environmental protections afforded by NEPA and the APA. See id. California provided  
8 declarations from experts detailing the possible harm to the Tijuana Estuary and harm to  
9 rare, threatened or endangered species. (Dkt. No. 30-7, Clark Decl.; Dkt. No. 30-8,  
10 Vanderplank Decl.; Dkt. No. 30:9, Delaplaine Decl.) Eight prototype walls have already  
11 been constructed demonstrating that the injury is actual and the El Centro Sector border  
12 fence replacement project, which is currently undergoing consultation and may have  
13 already begun construction, is also imminent. The Court concludes that California has  
14 demonstrated an injury-in-fact that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent.  
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18 Moreover, California argues it has a legally protected sovereign interest in creating  
19 and enforcing its own laws. The Waiver Determinations will preclude the enforcement of  
20 California’s laws which will affect its sovereign interests. Defendants object because  
21 Plaintiffs merely string cite to eight state code or regulations without explaining how  
22 these provisions apply to the projects at issue. But, as noted by Plaintiff, the Waiver  
23 Determinations do not identify which California law or regulation Defendants are  
24 waiving and as an example it provides some provisions where the waiver would bar  
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1 California's enforcement of its laws as to DHS, its contractors, or to the State's  
2 permitting authority or other legal actions.

3  
4 It is not disputed that the Waiver Determinations waive all legal requirements and  
5 include related state laws. (See Dkt. No. 30-6, Cayaban Decl., Ex. 11, 82 Fed. Reg.  
6 35,984-85; id., Ex. 12, 82 Fed. Reg. 42,829-30.) Defendants do not deny that California  
7 state laws are being waived. The Court agrees with California that a bar to enforcing its  
8 own state laws related to the border wall projects is an injury in fact that supports Article  
9 III standing. The Court concludes that California has Article III standing.  
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12 **C. Whether the Court has Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs' Non-Constitutional**  
13 **Claims based on Ultra Vires Acts of the Secretary of the DHS**

14 Defendants contend that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' non-  
15 constitutional claims, including whether the Secretaries' actions concerning the two  
16 Waiver Determinations are ultra vires. They explain that section 102 explicitly expresses  
17 Congress' intent to bar the district court from exercising jurisdiction over any claims  
18 arising from the Secretary of DHS's waiver determination except for a constitutional  
19 violation. Plaintiffs argue that the Court may consider whether the Waivers exercised by  
20 the Secretaries constitute ultra vires acts as they exceed the authority granted to the  
21 Secretaries under section 102; therefore, they contend section 102(c)(2)'s judicial review  
22 bar on non-constitutional claims does not apply. For the reasons stated below, the Court  
23 finds that it may consider whether the Secretaries have violated any clear and mandatory  
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1 statutory obligations set forth in section 102. Finding that there are no such violations,  
2 the Court upholds the jurisdictional bar and concludes that it does not have the  
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4 jurisdiction to hear any claims other than constitutional claims.

5 Section 102(c)(2)(A) provides that the “district courts of the United States shall  
6 have exclusive jurisdiction to hear all causes or claims arising from any action  
7 undertaken, or any decision made, by the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to  
8 paragraph (1) [the waiver provision]. A cause of action or claim may only be brought  
9 alleging a violation of the Constitution of the United States. The court shall not have  
10 jurisdiction to hear any claim not specified in this subparagraph.” 8 U.S.C. §  
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12 1103(c)(2)(A).  
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14 As a starting point, there is a “strong presumption that Congress intends judicial  
15 review of administrative action.” Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476  
16 U.S. 667, 670 (1986); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 632 F.3d 1272, 1276  
17 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Bowen, 476 U.S. at 670) (“When considering whether a statute  
18 bars judicial review, ‘[w]e begin with the strong presumption that Congress intends  
19 judicial review of administrative action.’”). In order to overcome the strong presumption,  
20 there must be “clear and convincing” evidence of a contrary legislative intent. Bowen,  
21 476 U.S. at 671-72. The strong presumption may be overcome by “specific language or  
22 specific legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent,” or a  
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1 “specific congressional intent to preclude judicial review that is ‘fairly discernible’ in the  
2 detail of the legislative scheme.” Id. at 673.

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4 In this case, the Center Plaintiff does not dispute that the presumption favoring  
5 judicial review has been overcome by the express language of section 102(c)(1) and does  
6 not challenge Defendants’ argument on this issue. Instead, all Plaintiffs argue that the  
7 August 2, 2017 and September 12, 2017 Waiver Determinations constitute ultra vires acts  
8 of the Secretary that do not fall under section 102 because the Waivers are not authorized  
9 by sections 102(a) or (b) and were not decisions made “pursuant to” section 102(c)(1).  
10 Therefore, according to Plaintiffs, section 102(c)(2) does not apply, and the Waiver  
11 Determinations are subject to review by the Court. Defendants respond that Plaintiffs  
12 cannot bypass the jurisdictional bar by framing their claims as ultra vires challenges  
13 when judicial review is expressly prohibited. They argue that the Court should consider  
14 the plain meaning of section 102(c)(2) and that should be the end of the matter.  
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18 Here, Congress expressly barred the district court’s review of non-constitutional  
19 claims under section 102(c)(2), and this provision rebuts the strong presumption favoring  
20 judicial review of administrative actions. However, the United States Supreme Court has  
21 identified a narrow exception to an express statutory bar on judicial review when there is  
22 a claim that an agency acted beyond its statutory authority. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358  
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1 U.S. 184 (1958);<sup>11</sup> Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp. Fin., Inc., 502 U.S.  
2 32 (1991); see also Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

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4 In Kyne, the Supreme Court held that a district court had jurisdiction to review a  
5 non-final agency order “made in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific  
6 prohibition in the [National Labor Relations Act].” Kyne, 358 U.S. at 188. The Kyne  
7 court found that a National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) determination that a unit  
8 involving both professional and non-professional employees was appropriate for  
9 collective bargaining purposes was in excess of delegated powers because it was in direct  
10 conflict with the provisions of § 9(b)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)  
11 dictating that it “shall not” do so “unless a majority of such professional employees vote  
12 for inclusion in such unit.” Kyne, 358 U.S. at 185. Consequently, the district court had  
13 jurisdiction to set aside a certification of the NLRB where that agency had refused to poll  
14 professional employees before combining them in a bargaining unit with non-  
15 professional employees. Id. at 188-89. In the ordinary case, a decision certifying a  
16 bargaining unit is not a final order that can be reviewed but the Court explained that first,  
17 the “suit [was] not one to ‘review,’ in the sense of that term as used in the Act, a decision  
18 of the Board made within its jurisdiction. Rather, it [was] one to strike down an order of  
19 the Board made in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in  
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27 <sup>11</sup> Plaintiffs note that the ability to bring an ultra vires claim was first recognized by the Supreme Court  
28 decades earlier in American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 110 (1902).

1 the Act.” Id. at 188. Second, because, in the ordinary case, only an employer can initiate  
2 an unfair labor practice charge, and ultimately a reviewable final order, by refusing to  
3 bargain after an election, the aggrieved employees in this case had “no other means,  
4 within their control . . . to protect and enforce” their statutory rights. Id. at 190. In other  
5 words, “absence of jurisdiction of the federal courts would mean a sacrifice or  
6 obliteration of a right which Congress has given professional employees.” Id. In  
7 conclusion, the Court stated it “cannot lightly infer that Congress does not intend judicial  
8 protection of rights it confers against agency action taken in excess of delegated powers.”  
9 Id.

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13 MCorp Fin., Inc., relied on by Defendants, involved an express bar on judicial  
14 review, and the Court found the Fifth Circuit erred when it held that it had jurisdiction to  
15 consider the merits of MCorp’s challenge to the Board of Governors of the Federal  
16 Reserve System (“Board”) and held that the Financial Institutional Supervisory Act’s  
17 (“FISA”) preclusion provision barred judicial review of pending Board administrative  
18 actions. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. at 43-44.

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21 In its analysis, the Court distinguished its ruling from Kyne noting two differences.  
22 First, the Court noted that “central” to its decision in Kyne was “the fact that the Board’s  
23 interpretation of the Act would wholly deprive the union of a meaningful and adequate  
24 means of vindicating its statutory right.” Id. at 43. In MCorp. Fin., Inc., FISA provided  
25 MCorp with a meaningful and adequate opportunity for judicial review by challenging  
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1 the Board’s findings. Id. at 43-44. Second, the Court emphasized “the clarity of the  
2 congressional preclusion of review in FISA” where Congress clearly stated: “no court  
3 shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of  
4 any [Board] notice or order under this section, or to review, modify, suspend, terminate,  
5 or set aside any such notice or order.” Id. at 44 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1)). In  
6 Kyne, the statutory provision implied, by its silence, a preclusion of review. Id. In  
7 contrast, FISA provides “clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended to deny  
8 the district court’s jurisdiction to review and enjoin the Board’s ongoing administrative  
9 proceedings.” Id. The Court reversed the decision by the Fifth Circuit and held that it  
10 did not have jurisdiction to consider MCorp’s challenge. Id. at 44-45.

14 Next, in Dart, relied on by Plaintiffs, the D.C. Circuit held that the Secretary of  
15 Commerce’s reversal of the administrative law judge’s decision exceeded his authority  
16 under the Export Administration Act (“EAA”). Dart, 848 F.2d at 231. The EAA  
17 provides two finality clauses that certain “functions exercised under the Act” were  
18 excluded from certain sections of the APA and the “Secretary shall, in a written order,  
19 affirm, modify, or vacate the decision of the administrative law judge. The order of the  
20 Secretary shall be final and is not subject to judicial review.” Id. at 221. Because the  
21 Secretary did not “affirm, modify or vacate” the ALJ’s decision but instead reversed, it  
22 was not among the orders placed beyond review of the finality provision. Id. at 227. The  
23 D.C. Circuit held that review is available when the Secretary exercises functions that are  
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1 not specified in the statute. Id. at 221. In explaining its ruling, it stated the even “where  
2 Congress is understood generally to have precluded review, the Supreme Court has found  
3 an implicit but narrow exception, closely paralleling the historic origins of judicial review  
4 for agency actions in excess of jurisdiction.” Id. The court’s analysis focused on the  
5 plain language of the statute, the structure of the statutory scheme, the legislative history,  
6 and the nature of the administrative action involved. Id. at 224-27. It concluded that the  
7 presumption of judicial review applied in that case, explaining that the finality clause did  
8 not preclude judicial review of facial violations of the statute. Id. at 222 (citing Kyne,  
9 358 U.S. 184).

13 The Dart court recognized that “[w]hen an executive acts *ultra vires*, courts are  
14 normally available to reestablish the limits on his authority.” Id. at 224. However, the  
15 court noted that the “exception for review of facial violations should remain narrow.”  
16 Id. at 231. It also explained that “Congress’ finality clause must be given effect, and an  
17 agency action allegedly ‘in excess of authority’ must not simply involve a dispute over  
18 statutory interpretation or challenged findings of fact.” Id. The court recognized that  
19 invoking the exception is “extraordinary” noting “that to justify such jurisdiction, there  
20 must be a ‘specific provision of the Act which, although it is [ ]clear and mandatory, [ ]’  
21 was nevertheless violated.” Id. (quoting Council of Prison Locals v. Brewer, 735 F.2d  
22 1497, 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citation omitted)). The court in Dart concluded that the  
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1 “requirement that the Secretary of Commerce ‘affirm, modify or vacate’ ALJ  
2 enforcement decisions was ‘clear and mandatory’ and was nevertheless violated.” Id.

3  
4 The exception to the statutory bar on judicial review is an “extremely narrow one”  
5 and “extraordinary.” Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n AFL–CIO v. Fed. Serv.  
6 Impasses Panel, 437 F.3d 1256, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2006); American Airlines, Inc. v.  
7 Herman, 176 F.3d 283, 293 (5th Cir. 1999) (courts “have interpreted Kyne as sanctioning  
8 [review] in a very narrow situation in which there is a ‘plain’ violation of an  
9 unambiguous and mandatory provision of the statute.”). The D.C. Circuit described that  
10 a Kyne claim is “essentially a Hail Mary pass—and in court as in football, the attempt  
11 rarely succeeds.” Nyunt v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors, 589 F.3d 445, 449 (D.C.  
12 Cir. 2009).

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15 In sum, in order for the Kyne exception to apply, a plaintiff must satisfy the  
16 following two factors: 1) that the agency acted “in excess of its delegated powers”  
17 contrary to “clear and mandatory statutory language” and 2) “the party seeking review  
18 must be ‘wholly deprive[d] . . . of a meaningful and adequate means of vindicating its  
19 statutory rights.” Pac. Mar. Ass’n v. NLRB, 827 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2016)  
20 (citations omitted); Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers, 437 F.3d at 1263 (the Kyne exception  
21 can apply to cases involving “either negative or positive statutory commands.”).

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25 Courts have cautioned that “review of an ‘agency action allegedly in excess of  
26 authority must not simply involve a dispute over statutory interpretation.” Herman, 176  
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1 F.3d at 293 (quoting Kirby Corp. v. Pena, 109 F.3d 258, 269 (5th Cir. 1997)); Dart, 848  
2 F.2d at 231 (noting that facial challenges to agency action as allegedly “in excess of  
3 authority’ must not simply involve a dispute over statutory interpretation or challenged  
4 findings of fact.”); see also Nebraska State Legislative Bd., United Transp. Union v.  
5 Slater, 245 F.3d 656, 659-60 (8th Cir. 2001). For example, in Baxter Healthcare Corp. v.  
6 Weeks, 643 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.D.C. 2009), the court explained that Health and Human  
7 Services (“HHS”) has the “authority under the Medicare statute to determine whether a  
8 product is a single source drug, a biological, or a multiple source drug.” Id. at 115 n. 2.  
9 Whether HHS made the correct determination about [the drug] is a “dispute over  
10 statutory interpretation” that does not rise to the level of an ultra vires claim.” Id.

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Contrary to Defendants’ argument that the Court cannot even consider whether the  
two Waivers were ultra vires acts, courts have consistently conducted judicial review of  
facial, ultra vires claims despite a statutory bar on judicial review.<sup>12</sup> See Lindahl v. OPM,  
470 U.S. 768, 789, 791 (1985) (statutory bar did not bar review of alleged errors of law  
or procedure but it did bar review of factual determinations); Dart, 848 F.2d at 225;  
Staacke v. U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 841 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting review is

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<sup>12</sup> The parties dispute the origins of ultra vires review. Coalition Plaintiffs claim courts have inherent authority to review ultra vires jurisdiction, (Dkt. No. 29-1 at 19; Dkt. No. 38 at 7), while Defendants argue that ultra vires review is an application of the rebuttable presumption of congressional intent in favor of judicial review. (Dkt. No. 35-1 at 35; Dkt. No. 42 at 20.) A decision on the origins of ultra vires review is not dispositive and the Court declines to resolve this issue.

1 available “where defendant is charged with violating a clear statutory mandate or  
2 prohibition” even where a statute “absolutely bars judicial review”); Oestereich v.  
3 Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968) (despite an express  
4 preclusion of pre-induction review, the Court reversed the plaintiff’s draft classification);  
5 Spencer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2003) (courts retain  
6 jurisdiction to review whether a particular decision of the Attorney General is ultra vires  
7 despite the discretion granted to the Attorney General).

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10 Even the cases relied upon by Defendants fail to support their position. In Staacke,  
11 the Ninth Circuit stated that on a claim that the defendant violated a clear statutory  
12 mandate or prohibition, the court may consider the claim despite a judicial bar but its  
13 “task is limited to determining whether the statute in question contains a clear command  
14 that the Secretary has transgressed.” Staacke, 841 F.2d at 282. After determining there  
15 was no violation of a clear statutory mandate, the Ninth Circuit upheld the bar on judicial  
16 review. Id. Similarly, in Gebhardt v. Nielson, 879 F.3d 980, 989 (9th Cir. 2018), the  
17 Ninth Circuit affirmed a judgment of the district court, which dismissed an action based  
18 on a judicial bar on the Secretary’s discretion in making “no risk” determinations. Id. at  
19 989. The Secretary of DHS denied the plaintiff’s petitions for permanent resident status  
20 filed on behalf of his wife and his wife’s three children pursuant to the Adam Walsh  
21 Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 based on the plaintiff’s prior state conviction for  
22 committing a “lewd and lascivious act with a child under the age of fourteen.” Id. at 983-  
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1 84. The Ninth Circuit stated that it may review the plaintiff’s claims to the extent he  
 2 challenged the scope of the Secretary’s discretion. Id. After determining that the claimed  
 3 action did not exceed the Secretary’s discretion, the Ninth Circuit, upheld the judicial bar  
 4 on the Secretary’s discretionary “no risk” determination. Id. at 5. These cases  
 5 demonstrate that the Court may consider whether there has been a plain violation of an  
 6 unambiguous and mandatory provision of law despite a statutory bar on judicial review.  
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 9 The Court concludes that it may conduct judicial review of facial, ultra vires  
 10 claims despite a statutory bar on judicial review. Accordingly, the Court next considers  
 11 whether the Secretaries acted in excess of their delegated powers.  
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13 **D. Whether the Waiver Determinations Are Ultra Vires Acts under Section**  
 14 **102(c)’s Waiver Authority**

15 Defendants contend that the DHS Secretaries’ actions are ultra vires only if they  
 16 are in excess of delegated powers that are contrary to “clear and mandatory” statutory  
 17 language as required in Kyne.<sup>13</sup> Plaintiffs reply that the Kyne line of cases do not apply  
 18 and, instead, the Dart test applies so that the government has the burden to show “clear  
 19 and convincing” evidence that Congress foreclosed its jurisdiction over their case. Dart,  
 20 848 F.3d at 224. However, Plaintiffs are confusing the standard that is required to  
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 26 <sup>13</sup> A Ninth Circuit panel has also referred to the “clear and mandatory” standard as “unambiguous and  
 27 mandatory” provision of a statute. See Charlie Rossi Ford, Inc. v. Price, 564 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir.  
 28 1977).

1 overcome the presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative  
2 actions, a “clear and convincing” standard, with the “clear and mandatory” statutory  
3 language requirement for application of the Kyne exception to the statutory bar of  
4 judicial review. In fact, the court in Dart applied the Kyne test when it held that the  
5 Secretary of Commerce facially violated a specific provision of the EAA which was  
6 “clear and mandatory.” Dart, 848 F.2d at 231. An agency’s action is ultra vires if it  
7 contravenes “clear and mandatory” statutory language. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 827 F.3d at  
8 1208 (quoting Kyne, 358 U.S. at 188); Dart, 848 F.2d at 231; Staacke, 841 F.2d at 281.  
9 In order to make that determination, courts look to the language of the statute and its  
10 legislative history. See Int’l Ass’n of Tool Craftsmen v. Leedom, 276 F.2d 514, 516  
11 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (“statutory language itself and the legislative history” support invoking  
12 district court’s equity jurisdiction to consider whether Board violated a “clear and  
13 mandatory” statutory prohibition); Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers and Delivery Drivers,  
14 Local 690 v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 1967) (a court looks to statutory text and  
15 legislative history to determine if the Board violated a “clear and mandatory” statutory  
16 provision).

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18 Here, in order for the narrow exception of Kyne to apply, Plaintiffs must show that  
19 Secretaries Kelly and Duke acted in excess of their delegated powers by showing that the  
20 issuance of the two Waiver Determinations was in contravention of “clear and  
21 mandatory” language contained in section 102. See Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 827 F.3d at 1208;

1 Dart, 848 F.2d at 222 (The question “whether an agency has acted ‘in excess of its  
2 delegated powers’ has alternatively been phrased as whether the agency action ‘on its  
3 face’ violated a statute.”). Plaintiffs must also show that barring judicial review would  
4 deprive them of a “meaningful and adequate means of vindicating [their] statutory  
5 rights.” Id.  
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8 **1. Violation of a “Clear and Mandatory” Statutory Provision**

9 The Court now turns to whether Plaintiffs have established that the Secretaries  
10 facially violated a specific provision of section 102 which was “clear and mandatory.” .  
11

12 **a. Whether Section 102(c) Waiver Provision Applies Only to**  
13 **Projects Identified in Section 102(b)**

14 Plaintiffs argue that that the statutory authority to waive laws under section 102(c)  
15 does not apply to the two border wall projects because they were not specifically  
16 mandated by Congress under section 102(b). Further, when construed as a whole, the  
17 two projects fall outside the limits of the waiver authority because Congress did not  
18 intend section 102(c) to apply to projects beyond those specifically mandated in section  
19 102(b). Defendants disagree arguing that the waiver provision applies to section 102 as a  
20 whole, and is not limited to only Congress’ priorities identified in section 102(b). Upon  
21 review of the statute and legislative history, both interpretations are plausible. As such,  
22 there is no violation of “clear and mandatory” language with respect to the application of  
23 the waiver.  
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1 Statutory construction always begins with the “language of the statute itself” or  
2 “plain meaning of the statute” and if unambiguous, that meaning controls. Brock v.  
3 Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 762 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1985); Transwestern  
4 Pipeline Co., LLC v. 17.19 Acres of Prop. Located in Maricopa Cnty., 627 F.3d 1268,  
5 1271 (9th Cir. 2010). If the language is not clear, then a court looks at the legislative  
6 history. Brock v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 762 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir.  
7 1985); Avendano-Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2004). Legislative  
8 history is also looked at if the statutory language is clear but there is “clearly expressed  
9 legislative intention” which is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. Heppner v.  
10 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 665 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1981).

14 Section 102(c) states,

15 (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of  
16 Homeland Security shall have the authority to waive all legal requirements  
17 such Secretary, in such Secretary’s sole discretion, determines necessary to  
18 ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads **under this section**.  
19 Any such decision by the Secretary shall be effective upon being published  
20 in the Federal Register.

21 8 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (emphasis added).

22 Defendants argue that the words “under this section” refer to section 102 as a  
23 whole and are not limited to subsection 102(b). This includes actions under any part of  
24 section 102 that meet section 102(c)(1)’s criteria. In support, they cite to the Guide to  
25 Legislative Drafting which explains that section 102(a) is a “subsection”; section  
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1 102(b)(1) is a “paragraph” and section 102(b)(1)(A) is a “sub-paragraph.” See House  
2 Office of the Legislative Counsel, Guide to Legislative Drafting. Therefore, “this  
3 section” in section 102(c)(1) cannot be read to refer exclusively to 102(b) but applies to  
4 the entirety of section 102.  
5

6 Plaintiffs respond that the waiver authority must be interpreted as limited to  
7 specific border barriers specified in section 102(b) because Defendants’ reliance on the  
8 standardized format interpretation of “this section” is flawed. They argue that  
9 Defendants’ position produces an absurd result in interpreting sections 102(b)(2)-(4).  
10 These sections address the procedures for obtaining easements and appropriations, and  
11 refer to and apply only to “this subsection” which is section 102(b). According to  
12 Defendants’ interpretation, the procedures and directives regarding easements and  
13 appropriations would not apply to section 102(a) border projects and without those  
14 provisions, a border barrier could not be built. Moreover, the terms “section” and  
15 “subsection” are used inconsistently as section 102(b)(1)(A) uses the phrase “[i]n  
16 carrying out subsection (a)” while section 102(b)(1)(B) & (C) uses the phrase “[i]n  
17 carrying out this section” under section 102(b).  
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22 Defendants reply that “when Congress identifies certain specific applications of a  
23 general grant of authority, those specific requirements cannot generally be understood to  
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1 prohibit all other applications of the general authority.” (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 30.<sup>14</sup>) Second,  
2 a reading that limits section 102(c) to section 102(b) would render section 102(a)  
3 superfluous. Third, the subsequent amendments demonstrate that section 102(b)(1)  
4 merely identified Congress’ shifting priorities and specific areas for action. Finally,  
5 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot overcome the plain meaning of the statute by  
6 pointing out that Congress, in passing section 102 in 1996 and the amendment to section  
7 102(c) in 2005, was primarily focused on portions of fencing near San Diego. Congress  
8 could have limited the provision to construction near San Diego; instead, it established a  
9 broad general mandate in section 102(a) that is not geographically limited and used the  
10 words “under this section” to extend section 102(c) to the entire section.  
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14 Certainly, section 102 is not a model of legislative precision. Given the  
15 inconsistencies in the use of “this section”, the Court looks to the legislative history for  
16 further guidance. The parties rely on the legislative history that supports their respective  
17 positions. Defendants cite to Conference Report 109-72 to support their interpretation  
18 because the Report broadly states it “provides for construction and strengthening of  
19 barriers along U.S. land borders.” (Dkt. No. 18-2, Ds’ Index of Exs., Ex. 2, H.R. Rep.  
20 109-72 at p. 170 (May 3, 2005). However, the Conference Report also references section  
21 102(b) as to the waiver’s application to the 14 miles of barriers and roads, mandated by  
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27 <sup>14</sup> Pages numbers to the docket are based on the CM/ECF pagination.

1 1996 IIRIRA along the border near San Diego that had been halted due to environmental  
2 challenges. Id.

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4 Defendants argue that the breadth of section 102(c) is noted by comments made by  
5 representatives who were opposed to the 2005 REAL ID Act which were not contradicted  
6 by its sponsors. (See Dkt. No. 18-2, Ds' Index of Exs., Ex. 6, 151 Cong. Rec. H459 (Feb.  
7 9, 2005) (statement of Cong. Jackson-Lee) (“[The waiver provision is] so broad that it  
8 would not just apply to the San Diego border fence that is the underlying reason for this  
9 provision. It would apply any other barrier or fence that may come about in the future.”);  
10 id., 151 Cong. Rec. H454 (Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Cong. Conyers) (“waiving all  
11 Federal laws concerning construction of barriers and fences anywhere within the United  
12 States”); id., 151 Cong. Rec. H554 (Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Cong. Harman) (“[T]he  
13 reach is beyond the San Diego border. According to the language in this legislation, it is  
14 all areas along and in the vicinity of our international borders with Mexico and  
15 Canada.”); id., 151 Cong. Rec. H556 (Feb. 10, 2005) (memorandum by Cong. Farr)  
16 (“[waiver authority] seem[s] to apply to all the barriers that may be constructed under the  
17 authority of § 102 of IIRIRA (i.e., barriers constructed in the vicinity of the border and  
18 the barrier that is to be constructed near the San Diego area)”); id., 151 Cong. Rec. H559  
19 (statement of Cong. Udall) (objecting to bill because “the language of the bill is not  
20 limited to the construction of a fence in [San Diego]” but instead includes “all laws for all  
21 U.S. borders”). Defendants note the concerns of the breadth of section 102 repeated by  
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1 opponents at least five times in two days were not merely “fears and doubts of the  
2 opposition” that can be dismissed.

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4 Defendants also point to a comment made by a member of Congress in 1996  
5 addressing concern that section 102(c) extended beyond San Diego. (See Dkt. No. 18-2,  
6 Ds’ Index of Exs., Ex. 4, 142 Cong. Rec. H11076 (Sept. 25, 1996), (statement of Rep.  
7 Saxton) (“[Section 102(c)] is intended to address an issue that has to do with the  
8 California-Texas-Mexico border; however, the way this section is written, the exemption  
9 applies to the entire border of the United States, not just the California-Mexico border  
10 near San Diego.”).

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13 On the other hand, Plaintiffs rely on the legislative history which shows the  
14 sponsor’s and supporters’ intent to limit the expanded waiver authority to the San Diego  
15 fencing under section 102(b). The bill’s author, Representative Sensenbrenner, described  
16 the amendment as “the REAL ID Act will waive Federal laws to the extent necessary to  
17 complete gaps in the San Diego border security fence, which is still stymied 8 years after  
18 congressional authorization. Neither the public safety nor the environment are  
19 benefitting from the current stalemate.” (Dkt. No. 18-2, Ds’ Index of Exs., Ex. 6, 151  
20 Cong. Rec. H454 (Feb. 9, 2005).) Supporters of the bill also made statements limiting  
21 the amendment to the fence in San Diego. (Id., 151 Cong. Rec. H453-471 (Feb. 9, 2005)  
22 (Statement of Rep. Hoekstra) (“H.R. 418 provides the Secretary of Homeland Security  
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1 with authority to waive environmental laws, so that the border fence running 14 miles  
2 east from the Pacific Ocean at San Diego may finally be completed.”.)

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4 “The fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the  
5 construction of legislation. It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the  
6 statutory words is in doubt.” NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964) (citing  
7 Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951)). “In their  
8 zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to overstate its reach.” Id. In this case,  
9 even though the Court has looked at the sponsors’ comments to determine the meaning of  
10 the statute, the sharp contrast in the legislative history statements and plausible  
11 interpretations on both sides do not provide the Court with definitive guidance as to the  
12 breadth of section 102(c).

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16 Each side offers additional plausible interpretations to support their position. For  
17 example, since 2005, the waiver provision has been invoked five times in order to comply  
18 with the specific mandates of the various amendments to section 102(b). See 70 Fed.  
19 Reg. 55,622-02 (Sept. 22, 2005)<sup>15</sup> (concerning completion of section 102(b) mandated in  
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24 <sup>15</sup> In the 2005 waiver determination, former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff noted that nine years had  
25 passed since Congress specifically sought the construction of 14 miles of building second and third  
26 fences to the existing reinforced fence under section 102(b). Therefore, in order to expedite the  
27 completion of section 102(b) of IIRIRA, he invoked the waiver provision in section 102(c) for “all  
28 federal, state, or other laws, regulations and legal requirements” related to the construction. See 70 Fed.  
Reg. 55,622-02 (Sept. 22, 2005). The impetus for broadening section 102(c) to all legal requirements  
was the lengthy delay caused by challenges made by environmental groups.

1 1996); 72 Fed. Reg. 2,535-01 (Jan. 19, 2007); 72 Fed. Reg. 60,870-01 (Oct. 26, 2007); 72  
2 Fed. Reg. 10,077-01 (Apr. 8, 2008); 72 Fed. Reg. 19078-01 (Apr. 8, 2008). These  
3  
4 waivers indicate that their use was limited to the mandates of section 102(b). However,  
5 Defendants point out that section 102(a)'s general mandate is broad and geographically  
6 includes "the United States border." This was confirmed by a district court in Save Our  
7 Heritage where it concluded that even though Congress did not include San Diego when  
8 section 102(b) was amended by the 2006 Fence Act, the Secretary's general authority to  
9 construct border barriers under section 102(a) is broad, does not include any geographical  
10 restrictions and authorized the San Diego barrier project even though it was included in  
11 the prior version of section 102(b) of the 2005 REAL ID Act. Save Our Heritage Org. v.  
12 Gonzalez, 533 F. Supp. 2d 58, 61 (D.D.C. 2008). Even though San Diego was included  
13 in section 102(b) in the REAL ID Act, the district court's reasoning to conclude that the  
14 Secretary had authority to construct the San Diego barrier was based on the broad  
15 provision of section 102(a), not because it was mandated in the prior version. Id.

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20 Plaintiffs also cite to Judge Burns's decision in Sierra Club v. Ashcroft, Case No.  
21 04cv272-LAB(JMA), 2005 WL 8153059 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2005) where the plaintiffs  
22 challenged the Secretary's waiver determination in September 2005 invoked pursuant to  
23 the 2005 REAL ID Act for the border fence construction of the Triple Fence Project.  
24 They note that the court repeatedly emphasized the limitation of the waiver to the  
25 "narrow purpose of expeditious completion of the Triple Fence authorized by the  
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1 IIRIRA.” Id. at 5. However, Plaintiffs were challenging the waiver determination to  
2 complete the project that was specifically authorized in section 102(b), and therefore, the  
3 Court’s language focused on section 102(b). As such, the Sierra Club case is not as  
4 helpful as Plaintiffs propose.

5  
6 The parties’ varying plausible interpretations concerning the scope of section  
7 102(c) demonstrate the lack of a clear statutory mandate. See Staacke, 841 F.2d at 282  
8 (“Where, as here, the statute is capable of two plausible interpretations, the Secretary’s  
9 decision to adopt one interpretation over the other cannot constitute a violation of a clear  
10 statutory mandate.”). In view of the competing plausible interpretations, the Court  
11 cannot conclude that the Secretaries acted in excess of their delegated powers contrary to  
12 a “clear and mandatory” provision in section 102.

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16 **b. Whether Key Statutory Terms Preclude the Waiver**  
17 **Determinations**

18 **i. “additional barriers and roads”**

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20 Section 102(a) grants the Secretary the authority to “to install additional physical  
21 barriers and roads.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a). Coalition Plaintiffs and California Plaintiffs  
22 argue that section 102 only allows for the installation of “additional” barriers and roads  
23 and does not authorize the replacement of existing fences. Plaintiffs cite to the dictionary  
24 that defines “additional” as “more”, “extra” and “added” while “replacement” is defined  
25 as resulting in no net gain or addition and because the new barrier is a substitute or  
26

1 successor to the fence, it is replacing, not adding. Moreover, they argue that the  
2 construction of additional barriers through various amendments since 1996 focused solely  
3 on adding mileage to the existing fencing such as adding fencing where none existed or  
4 adding new layers of fencing to supplement the existing primary fence. Section 102 does  
5 not address on-going maintenance or replacement of existing barriers. They contend that  
6 none of the prior waivers were initiated for the purpose of replacing, repairing, or  
7 enhancing existing barriers.  
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10 In response, the government argues Plaintiffs' narrow interpretation of "additional"  
11 is not supported by the statutory language nor the legislative history. According to  
12 Defendants, the installation of "lighting, cameras and sensors", 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(1)(A),  
13 falls under "additional barriers and roads" under section 102(a) which indicate a broader  
14 definition of "additional." Defendants also cite the legislative history of the 2005 REAL  
15 ID Act where representatives described section 102 as providing for "construction and  
16 strengthening of barriers along U.S. land borders" suggesting a broad definition of  
17 "additional." (Dkt. No. 18-2, Ds' Index of Exs., Ex. 2, H.R. Rep. 109-72 at 170 (May 3,  
18 2005).) In 2006, Senator Kyl discussed section 102 and explained the project as  
19 "replacing the so-called landing mat fencing, which does look like a wall, with chain  
20 link-type fencing that you can see through." (Dkt. No. 18-2, Ds' Index of Exs., Ex. 9,  
21 152 Cong. Rec. S9871 (Sept. 21, 2006).) He explained that the current fencing is  
22 deteriorating and difficult to repair because of its age. (Id.) Moreover, DHS has used  
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1 section 102 to replace fencing in 2011 in Arizona, the Nogales Fence Replacement  
2 Project, and invoked section 102(c)'s waiver authority.<sup>16</sup> (Dkt. No. 42-2, Ds' Index of  
3 Exs., Ex. 23.) The authority for the project was derived from sections 102(a) and  
4 102(b)(1)(A). (Id. at 5.) The Nogales Fence Replacement Project was to remove and  
5 replace about 2.8 miles of existing primary fence along the United States/Mexico  
6 international border, the repair and maintenance of a 20 foot wide construction road  
7 parallel to the fence and replacement of a 20-foot-wide gate at a port of entry. (Id. at 4.)

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9  
10 The legislative history and the prior projects invoking section 102(c) for the  
11 replacement of border fences support the position that building "additional barriers" has a  
12 broad meaning and can include replacement of fencing. To the extent that this  
13 interpretation is plausible, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the replacement fence clearly  
14 falls outside the scope of "additional physical barriers" to show that the Secretary  
15 violated a "clear and mandatory" statutory provision. See, e.g., Staacke, 841 F.2d at 281  
16 (noting that both parties' construction of "in addition" were plausible where one party  
17 asserted it meant "concurrent with" and the other party maintained it meant "subsequent  
18 to").  
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27 <sup>16</sup> 73 Fed. Reg. 19078 (Apr. 8, 2008).

1                                    **ii.     “areas of high illegal entry”**

2                    Plaintiffs argue that the Waiver Determinations’ conclusions that the San Diego  
3 and El Centro sectors are “areas of high illegal entry,” are improperly based on sector-  
4 wide data which are not good indications of whether the Project Areas are areas of high  
5 illegal entry. Moreover, sector wide data are not reliable because the amount of drugs  
6 seized in a sector usually occur far from the Mexican border at highway checkpoints,  
7 during vehicle searches at the points of entry or when border patrol agents discover a  
8 drug-smuggling boat or drone. Sector wide data do not demonstrate that the project areas  
9 themselves are areas of high illegal entry and the data are less probative when the facts  
10 show that the San Diego Project Area has fewer illegal border crossings than the San  
11 Diego Sector as a whole. However, even if the Court were to consider sector-wide data,  
12 Plaintiffs argue DHS’s apprehension records show that these two sectors are no longer  
13 areas of high illegal entry.

14                    Defendants argue that Congress has set no specific threshold for “high illegal  
15 entry” but Congress has expressly stated that one of the statute’s purposes is “to achieve  
16 and maintain operational control over the international border.” 8 U.S.C. §  
17 1103(b)(1)(D). “Operational control” “means the prevention of all unlawful entries into  
18 the United States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of  
19 terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband.” Pub. L. No. 109-367 § 2(b), 120 Stat. 2638  
20 (2006) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1701 note). Moreover, they note that the number of  
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1 apprehensions had fallen from more than 480,000 to less than 150,000 by 2006. But  
2 when Congress amended section 102 in 2006 and 2008, it did not suggest there was no  
3 longer “high illegal entry” along the border. Lastly, Congress frequently refers to sector-  
4 wide data when discussing the needs for such projects; therefore the use of sector-wide  
5 data is not misplaced. (Dkt. No. 35-1 at 65 (citation to legislative history using sector-  
6 wide data).)  
7  
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9       The August 2, 2017 Waiver Determination states that the San Diego Sector is one  
10 of the busiest and in 2016, the CBP apprehended over 31,000 illegal aliens and seized  
11 about 9,167 pounds of marijuana and about 1,317 pounds of cocaine in the San Diego  
12 Sector. (Dkt. No. 30-6, Cayaban Decl., Ex. 11, 82 Fed. Reg. 35984.) Based on this, the  
13 Secretary determined that the San Diego Project Area, “is an area of high illegal entry.”  
14 (Id. at 35985.) The September 12, 2017 Waiver Determination states that the El Centro  
15 Sector is an area of high illegal entry. (Id., Ex. 12, 82 Fed. Reg. 42,830.) In 2016, the  
16 CPB apprehended over 19,000 illegal aliens and seized about 2,900 pounds of marijuana  
17 and about 126 pounds of cocaine. (Id.)  
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21       Congress did not define “area of high illegal entry” so as to provide “clear and  
22 mandatory” metrics. Similarly, the government’s use of sector wide data to support its  
23 “area of high illegal entry” determination is not a clear violation of the statute. See Key  
24 Med. Supply, Inc. v. Burwell, 764 F.3d 955, 964 (8th Cir. 2014) (Congress did not  
25 instruct the Agency as to how to ensure or achieve category-wide cost savings and the  
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1 use of pre-existing scheduled prices as maximum bid caps was not “a clear departure  
2 from [the] statutory mandate”). As a result, the Court cannot conclude the Secretaries  
3 violated their mandate to deter crossings in areas of “high illegal entry” when they  
4 determined that apprehension of 31,000 undocumented aliens in the San Diego Sector in  
5 2016, and 19,000 apprehended illegal entries in El Centro Sector in 2016 “remain[]  
6 area[s] of high illegal entry.” (Dkt. No. 30-6, Cayaban Decl., Ex. 11, 82 Fed. Reg.  
7 35984; *id.*, Ex. 12, 82 Fed. Reg. 42,830.)

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10 The parties present certain facts and data in varying forms, based on geographic  
11 locations or years, to support their respective positions. Plaintiffs focus on the dramatic  
12 improvement over the years on the number of apprehensions. Again, the Court finds that  
13 both sides offer conflicting plausible interpretations of section 102(a). As a result, the  
14 Secretary’s decision to adopt one interpretation over the other cannot constitute an ultra  
15 vires act.  
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18 **iii. “deter illegal crossings”**

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20 Coalition Plaintiffs contend that the border wall prototype project, to evaluate  
21 various design features for potential inclusion in a future border wall, is outside the scope  
22 of section 102 because it has no deterrent effect since there are gaps between each of the  
23 eight prototypes built. They also contend that DHS has already spent more than \$2  
24 billion to install 705 miles of fencing along the border and the two projects are not  
25 “necessary . . . to deter illegal crossings.” (Dkt. No. 29-1 at 17.) The government argues  
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1 that Coalition Plaintiffs cannot second-guess the Secretary’s conclusion that the projects  
2 “will further Border Patrol’s ability to deter and prevent illegal crossings.” (Dkt. No. 35-  
3 1 at 66.)  
4

5 Section 102(a) provides that the Secretary must take actions “necessary to install  
6 additional physical barriers and roads” . . . “to deter illegal crossings.” 8 U.S.C. §  
7 1103(a). In the Waiver Determinations, the Secretaries determined that the prototypes  
8 are “intended to deter illegal crossings” and “necessary for future border wall design and  
9 construction.” (Dkt. No. 30-6, Cayaban Decl., Ex. 11, 82 Fed. Reg. at 35,985, *id.*, Ex. 12,  
10 82 Fed. Reg. at 42,830.)  
11  
12

13 Once again, the issue of what constitutes “deter[ing] illegal crossings” comes down  
14 to statutory interpretation. The Secretary is granted broad discretion in determining how  
15 to “achieve and maintain operational control” of the border. Plaintiffs have not identified  
16 “clear and mandatory” statutory language that the Secretary violated to establish the  
17 claimed *ultra vires* conduct.  
18

19  
20 **iv. “most practical and effective”**

21 California Plaintiffs argue that Defendants exceeded their authority by constructing  
22 fencing where the barriers would not be “most practical or effective.” *See* 8 U.S.C. §  
23 1103(b)(1)(A). The facts show that the project area sites are no longer high priority sites.  
24 According to a CBP document, the California border was rated as “moderate” compared  
25 to “high” or “very high” when it came to geographic/investment priorities. (Dkt. No. 30-  
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1 5, Cayaban Decl., Ex. 9 at 45.) Moreover, in a television interview, Secretary of DHS  
2 Kelly stated that the existing fencing is “very, very effective” and “remarkably effective  
3 in keeping down the amount of illegal movements across” the border. California  
4 Plaintiffs argue that most of California’s 140 miles border already has fencing including  
5 the Project Areas covered by the Waivers. (Dkt. No. 30-4, Cayaban Decl., Ex. 1 at 10-  
6 7  
7 14.)  
8

9 Defendants respond that the Secretary’s decision to assess where fencing “would  
10 be most practical and effective”, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(1)(A), did not limit the broad  
11 mandate of section 102(a). Moreover, section 102 also provides that the Secretary is to  
12 determine whether the “use or placement of such resources is not the most appropriate  
13 means to achieve and maintain operational control over the international border.” 8  
14 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(1)(D). They also argue that the facts to support Plaintiffs’ conclusions  
15 are misplaced as the CBP document relied upon was dated March 27, 2017 which was  
16 five months prior to the Secretary’s first waiver determination. Also, Secretary Kelly’s  
17 comments did not specifically address the San Diego Sector or El Centro Sector.  
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21 The Secretary of DHS has discretion to determine “where fencing would be the  
22 most practical and effective” and California Plaintiffs’ facts do not demonstrate that the  
23 Secretary contravened a “clear and mandatory” provision in the statute.  
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1                                    **v.      “consultation”**

2                                    Coalition Plaintiffs argue that the waiver is unavailable unless the Secretary has  
3 consulted with the parties identified in section 102(b)(1)(C) which she has not done.

4  
5 Defendants argue that the waiver provision does not expressly or implicitly depend on the  
6 completion of the consultation requirement. Nonetheless, Defendants assert that they  
7 have and are still in the process of complying with the consultation provision.  
8

9                                    Based on the parties’ briefing and arguments at the hearing, it did not appear that  
10 the Secretary had complied with the consultation provision as to the border wall  
11 prototype project and the evidence provided did not support compliance with the  
12 consultation provision regarding the two replacement fences. Therefore, at the hearing,  
13 the Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs on the consultation issue and  
14 how the lack of consultation affects ultra vires and the constitutional claims, if at all.<sup>17</sup>  
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16

17                                    The consultation provision states, “[i]n carrying out this section, the Secretary of  
18 Homeland Security shall consult with the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of  
19 Agriculture, States, local governments, Indian tribes, and property owners in the United  
20 States to minimize the impact on the environment, culture, commerce, and quality of life  
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25 <sup>17</sup> Defendants note and the Court recognizes that that Coalition Plaintiffs are the only plaintiffs to have  
26 raised the consultation issue in their summary judgment motion. To the extent all Plaintiffs raise similar  
27 arguments in their supplemental briefs, the Court considers them.

1 for the communities and residents located near the sites at which such fencing is to be  
2 constructed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(1)(C). This provision is mandatory.

3  
4 According to Real Estate and Environmental Branch Chief for the Border Patrol  
5 and Air and Marine Program Management Office (“BPAM”)<sup>18</sup>, an office within the CBP,  
6 the prototype project began on September 26, 2017 and was completed on October 26,  
7 2017. (Dkt. No. 49-4, Ds’ Index of Exs., Ex. 31, Enriquez Decl. ¶ 11.) The prototype  
8 project area is located on Federal government property and used as an enforcement zone  
9 for border security purposes and is heavily disturbed. (Id. ¶ 15.) CBP did not meet with  
10 USDA, the State of California, local government or Indian Tribes as it determined they  
11 were not stakeholders. (Id.) However, CBP met with one adjacent landowner and in  
12 response to the landowner’s concerns, installed temporary fencing to prevent  
13 unauthorized construction access across the landowner’s property. (Id.) Prior to the San  
14 Diego Waiver, on July 13, 2017, CBP met with U.S. Department of Interior, (“DOI”),  
15 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, (“USFWS”), and Bureau of Land Management  
16 (“BLM”)’s staff, toured the project area and discussed potential environmental impacts.  
17 (Id. ¶ 16.) Before the waiver, CBP also met with General Service Administration  
18 (“GSA”) to discuss potential environmental impacts and routing of construction traffic as  
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26 <sup>18</sup> The BPAM is responsible for constructing and maintaining facilities, tactical infrastructure and border  
27 infrastructure which also includes environmental planning and compliance associated with these  
28 activities. (Dkt. No. 49-4, Ds’ Index of Exs., Ex. 31, Enriquez Decl. ¶ 3.)



1 it manages an access road in the project area. (Id. ¶ 17.) CBP also conducted a field  
2 survey concerning natural and biological resources and the results are summarized in a  
3 final Biological Resources Survey Report dated October 2017. (Dkt. No. 49-5, Ds' Index  
4 of Exs., Ex. 31.A, Enriquez Decl., Ex. A.) It also conducted a field survey and records  
5 search to identify any cultural and historical resources in the project area and the results  
6 are summarized in a final Cultural Resources Survey Report dated October 2017. (Dkt.  
7 No. 49-6, Ds' Index of Exs., Ex. 31.B, Enriquez Decl., Ex. B.) After the surveys were  
8 completed, CBP conducted additional consultation with DOI. (Dkt. No. 49-4, Ds' Index  
9 of Exs., Ex. 31, Enriquez Decl. ¶ 19.) In September 2017, CBP sent USFWS the results  
10 of the biological survey and asked for input from USFWS concerning potential impacts  
11 from the project but no response was provided. (Id.) Based on the resource surveys,  
12 CBP prepared a Memorandum for the Record ("MFR") dated September 25, 2017  
13 analyzing the potential environmental impacts. (Id. ¶ 21; Dkt. No. 49-7, Ds' Index of  
14 Exs., Ex. 31.C, Enriquez Decl., Ex. C.) The Memorandum concluded that the prototype  
15 project would have no impact on cultural or historic resources and would not have a  
16 significant impact on any endangered species as there are no threatened and endangered  
17 species in the project area, and no vernal pools, wetlands, or other surface water located  
18 within the project area. (Dkt. No. 49-4, Ds' Index of Exs., Ex. 31, Enriquez Decl. ¶ 22.)  
19 Further, CBP mandated its contractors to follow certain Best Management Practices  
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1 (“BMPs”). (Id. ¶ 23.) CBP made adjustments to the prototype project based on the  
2 results of the resource surveys and consultation with stakeholders. (Id. ¶ 20.)  
3

4 The Calexico fence replacement project is located primarily on federal land that is  
5 managed by CBP or GSA and used primarily for border enforcement or port operations.  
6 (Id. ¶ 37.) The project also includes a Media and First Amendment area on land owned  
7 by the City of Calexico. (Id.)  
8

9 Prior to the Calexico Waiver Determination, on July 13, 2017, CBP met with DOI  
10 representatives including USFWS and BLM to provide information to them, (id. ¶ 38),  
11 and consulted with the California State Historic Preservation Officer (“CASHPO”) and  
12 Native American Tribes to make sure the geo-technical testing did not impact historic or  
13 cultural resources. (Id. ¶ 39.)  
14

15 After the Waiver Determination, CBP conducted field surveys to identify natural  
16 and biological resources which were summarized in a Biological Survey Report dated  
17 January 2018, (Dkt. No. 49-9, Ds’ Index of Exs., Ex. 31.E, Enriquez Decl., Ex. E),  
18 conducted field surveys of cultural and historical resources which are summarized in a  
19 Cultural Resources Survey dated January 5, 2018, (Dkt. No. 49-10, Ds’ Index of Exs.,  
20 Ex. 31.F, Enriquez Decl., Ex. F), and conducted surveys to document and delineate  
21 potential wetlands and waters in the project area which are summarized in a Wetland  
22 Delineation Report dated January 2018. (Dkt. No. 49-11, Ds’ Index of Exs., Ex. 31.G,  
23 Enriquez Decl., Ex. G.) After the surveys were completed, CBP conducted additional  
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1 outreach and sent consultation letters, on January 18 and 19, 2018, to USFWS, the  
2 California Department of Fish and Wildlife, CASHPO, two Native American tribes, the  
3 Colorado River Basin Regional Water Quality Control Board (“CRBRWQCB”), the U.S.  
4 Army Corps of Engineers Regulatory Division (“USACE”), the Imperial Irrigation  
5 District (“IID”), Imperial County Air Pollution Control District, and the City of Calexico.  
6 (Dkt. No. 49-4, Ds’ Index of Exs., Ex. 31, Enriquez Decl. ¶ 41; Dkt. No. 49-12, Ds’  
7 Index of Exs., Ex. 31.H-Q, Enriquez Decl., Exs. H-Q.) To date, CBP received responses  
8 from three entities, IID, CRBRWQCB, and USACE. (Dkt. No. 49-13, Ds’ Index of Exs.,  
9 Ex. 31.R-T, Enriquez Decl., Exs. R-T.) The CBP concluded that the USDA and private  
10 property owners were not stakeholders in the Calexico replacement fence project. (Id.)  
11 Based on this information, CBP prepared the Calexico MFR. (Dkt. No. 49-8, Ds’ Index  
12 of Exs., Ex. 31.D, Enriquez Decl., Ex. D.)

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17 The San Diego fence replacement project will occur on federal land. (Dkt. No. 49-  
18 4, Ds’ Index of Exs., Ex. 31, Enriquez Decl. ¶ 26.) On July 13, 2017, prior to the Waiver,  
19 CBP conducted an on-site meeting with DOI, USFWS and BLM officials to discuss the  
20 project, and USFWS provided CPB with data and information concerning vernal pools  
21 and areas occupied by burrowing owls and the possible presence of habitat for the quino  
22 checkerspot butterfly and the California gnatcatcher. (Id. ¶ 27.)

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24  
25 CBP has conducted resource surveys, including biological, cultural and wetlands  
26 within the project area and is currently preparing these reports. (Id. ¶ 28.) Based on  
27

1 these surveys, CBP has made adjustments to the San Diego fence replacement project.

2 (Id. ¶ 29.) For example, CBP identified two historic sites that will be avoided during

3 construction and is planning on plant and topsoil salvage and making arrangements to

4 have full time environmental and historic/cultural monitors on-site during construction.

5 (Id.) Prior to the start of construction, CBP will send out letters to stakeholders including

6 Federal, State, and local agencies and Native Americans in the Spring of 2018 to solicit

7 more information. (Id. ¶ 30.) Once that is completed, it will prepare an Environmental

8 Stewardship Plan (“ESP”) for public review which will include its assessment of

9 potential impacts, BMP’s, and if necessary, mitigation or conservation measures. (Id.)

10 Because of the project’s location, CBP determined that the USDA and private property

11 owners “are not likely to be stakeholders for this project.” (Id. ¶ 31.)

12 Consistent with Defendants’ prior argument that “carrying out this section” applies

13 to section 102 as a whole, the Court concludes that the consultation provision applies to

14 any border construction project under section 102.

15 As to the prototype project, it appears that the consultation requirement was met.

16 Prior to the Waiver Determinations, CBP met with representatives of the DOI, including

17 USFWS and BLM, as well as GSA, as these are agencies that would be affected by the

18 project. (Dkt. No. 49-4, Ds’ Index of Exs., Ex. 31, Enriquez Decl. ¶¶ 16, 17.) They also

19 met with one landowner but it is not clear when that occurred; however, CBP responded

1 by installing temporary fencing due to the landowner's concern. (Id. ¶ 15.) Defendants  
2 did not believe that any other agencies would be affected by the prototype project. (Id.)  
3

4 Next, as to the Calexico replacement fence which may have begun construction on  
5 February 15, 2018, the CBP met with representatives of DOI, including USFWS and  
6 BLM, as well as the CASHPO and Native American tribes before the Waiver  
7 Determination. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 39.) But it did not consult with the City of Calexico prior to  
8 the Waiver Determination. Instead, it sent a consultation letter on January 19, 2018 with  
9 a requested response date by February 2, 2018. (Dkt. No. 49-12, Ds' Index of Exs., Ex.  
10 31.O, Enriquez Decl., Ex. O at 15.) It also sent consultation letters to nine additional  
11 identified stakeholders. (Id., Exs. H-Q.) To date, only three entities responded with one  
12 entity seeking additional time. (Id., Exs. R-T.) While the consultation letters were sent  
13 less than a month before construction is to begin, it is not clear that the consultation  
14 provision was violated.  
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18 As to the San Diego replacement project, so far, CBP had a meeting with  
19 representatives of DOI, USFWS and BLM, prior to the Waiver Determination and  
20 subsequently conducted surveys but has not yet consulted with other stakeholders.  
21

22 Plaintiffs argue that the consultation should occur prior to any waiver  
23 determinations as that information is critical in determining whether to waive certain  
24 laws. In contrast, Defendants argue the consultation provision does not expressly specify  
25 the subject matter for consultation, when the consultation should happen, or the degree of  
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1 consultation required. Its purpose is to minimize the impact of construction once a  
2 project has been selected. They also assert Congress intended the consultation provision  
3 to be enforced through its appropriations power but then note that for the appropriations  
4 for the projects at issue, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135, 434 (May 5, 2017), Congress  
5 did not require consultation. They further claim that the saving clause precludes a private  
6 right of action concerning the consultation requirement.  
7  
8

9 Plaintiffs' argument that the consultation should occur prior to any waiver  
10 determinations so that the Secretary is fully informed when the determination is made is  
11 logical. In addition, it makes sense that consultation should occur before contracts are  
12 drafted and executed so that the information can have a practical influence on the  
13 decision making process and to permit environmental and mitigation measures to be  
14 incorporated into the contract. The question is whether such timing is mandatory.  
15 Section 102 does not provide any specific limitation or guidance concerning when or how  
16 consultation is to occur except expressly stating who shall be consulted.  
17  
18

19 Consultation on the Calexico replacement wall is on-going and responses may be  
20 forthcoming despite the fact that construction on the project may have already begun. In  
21 the Court's opinion, the belated contact with stakeholders reduces the practical benefit of  
22 the consultation process. But given the lack of a "clear and mandatory" mandate  
23 regarding the timing of consultation, the Court cannot conclude that the Secretaries acted  
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1 in excess of their delegated powers by approving the waivers or executing construction  
2 contracts prior to completing the consultation process.

3  
4 **vi. “necessary to ensure expeditious construction”**

5 Section 102(c) provides that the Secretary of the DHS “shall have the authority to  
6 waive all legal requirements” that the Secretary, in his or her “sole discretion” determines  
7 “necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads under this  
8 section.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1). This mandatory language gives the Secretary of the  
9 DHS discretion to make this determination.  
10

11 Coalition Plaintiffs argue that section 102(c)’s waiver is subject to the Secretary’s  
12 determination that it is “necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and  
13 roads under this section”, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1), but the government has failed to provide  
14 any information or bases to support the conclusion that these waivers are necessary.  
15

16 Meanwhile, Center Plaintiff contends that section 102(c)’s requirement that waivers be  
17 “necessary to ensure expeditious construction” demonstrates that Congress intended to  
18 limit the scope of the section 102(c) waiver to specific border barriers under section  
19 102(b). They contend that a logical interpretation of “expeditious construction” is that  
20 Congress provided the DHS Secretary with the authority to waive laws in order to build  
21 the specific border barriers required under section 102(b) as soon as possible after the  
22 law’s enactment and not to the wall replacement project or the prototype project started a  
23 decade later. Also, the text of the statute indicates that the waiver authority was intended  
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1 to apply only for specific projects mandated by section 102(b) which have long been  
2 completed.

3  
4 Here, the words used by Plaintiffs in their argument such as “logical interpretation”  
5 “intended” and “[i]t is far more reasonable to limit the 102(c) waiver authority to those  
6 barriers that have been specifically mandated by Congress under §102(b) than to adopt  
7 the government’s boundless interpretation”, (Dkt. No. 28-1 at 39), demonstrate that a  
8 determination that a waiver is “necessary to ensure expeditious construction of barriers  
9 and roads” is one of statutory interpretation. The Court cannot conclude that the Waiver  
10 Determinations are in contravention of clear and mandatory language in section 102(c).  
11  
12 See Staacke, 841 F.2d at 282 (where the statute is subject to two plausible interpretations,  
13 the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation cannot constitute a “violation of a clear mandatory  
14 mandate” and noting that the Secretary’s statutory discretion to make policy choices with  
15 disability decisions is “virtually limitless”).  
16  
17

18 **c. Whether Section 102(c)’s Waiver Authority has Expired**

19  
20 Center Plaintiff argues that there is no evidence in the text or the legislative history  
21 that Congress intended the waiver authority to exist in perpetuity or even that Congress  
22 intended the waiver authority to be extended beyond the initial San Diego fence. They  
23 argue that expeditious construction refers solely to section 102(b) projects as there are  
24 time constraints limiting DHS’s authority to determine “other mileage” to expire on  
25 December 31, 2008. California Plaintiffs similarly argue that the 2008 amendment  
26  
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28



1 imposed deadlines for the expedited construction of fencing in priority areas. In 2008,  
2 former Secretary of DHS Chertoff identified more than 370 miles of priority areas and by  
3 April 2013, DHS reported it had completed all but a one-mile stretch of these projects  
4 which involved 705 miles of fencing. (Dkt. No. 30-4, Cayaban Decl, Ex. 5; id., Ex. 6.)

5  
6 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' argument that the December 31, 2008 deadline  
7 in section 102(b)(1)(B) applies generally to section 102(c) or section 102 as a whole is  
8 implausible. Nothing in the statute demonstrates that Congress intended the waiver  
9 authority to sunset and that expeditious construction is limited to section 102(b). When  
10 Congress amended section 102(b) in December 2007, it mandated that about half of the  
11 "not less than 700 miles" be completed within a year, by December 31, 2008. Because  
12 Congress did not provide a deadline for the remaining miles, they argue that there is no  
13 expiration date on building additional fencing. Moreover, they assert that the section  
14 102(c) waivers would be applicable to the remaining miles to be built.

15  
16 In 2008, Congress amended section 102(b) requiring DHS to construct reinforced  
17 fencing "along not less than 700 miles of the southwest border where fencing would be  
18 most practical and effect." 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(1)(A). As to priority areas, section 102(b)  
19 mandated that the DHS Secretary "identify 370 miles, or other mileage determined by the  
20 Secretary" and the authority to determine "other mileage" would expire on December 31,  
21 2008 and Congress imposed a deadline of December 31, 2008 to complete construction  
22 of the fencing. Id. § 1103(b)(1)(B).

1 In United States v. Arizona, No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB, 2011 WL 13137062, at  
2 \*8 (D. Az. Oct. 21, 2011), the district court addressed section 102(b)(1)(A)'s mandate  
3 directing the Secretary to construct 700 miles of fencing. In that decision, the district  
4 court stated that there are no deadlines requiring completion of the fencing and  
5 infrastructure projects by a specific time. Id. at 8. It explained that section 102 uses  
6 mandatory language but grants the Secretary "substantial discretion" in determining  
7 "how, when, and where to complete the construction." Id.

8  
9  
10 This argument is similar to Plaintiffs' earlier argument that section 102(c)'s waiver  
11 provision applies only to projects identified in section 102(b) which was previously  
12 rejected by the Court. The parties' varying plausible interpretations concerning the scope  
13 of section 102(c) demonstrate that the statutory language is not clear and unambiguous  
14 and the parties' argument is essentially a dispute regarding statutory interpretation. As  
15 such, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Secretaries violated a clear and mandatory  
16 statutory provision.  
17  
18

19  
20 **d. Whether Section 102 Requires that the Waiver Determinations**  
21 **Include Findings**

22 California Plaintiffs assert that the Waivers are invalid because the Secretaries  
23 failed to make the requisite findings to demonstrate the requirements of section 102 and  
24 only used boiler plate language copied from section 102 without providing reasons  
25 behind each Waiver Determination. (Dkt. No. 30-2 at 34-35.) Defendants respond that  
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27

1 nothing in section 102(c) requires that the Secretaries explain the factual basis of their  
2 Waiver Determinations in the Federal Register.

3  
4 California Plaintiffs cite to Dickson v. Sec’y of Defense, 68 F.3d 1396, 1404-05  
5 (D.C. Cir. 1995) and Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795 F.3d 956, 967  
6 (9th Cir. 2015) in support of their argument. These cases involve agency determinations  
7 that were found to be arbitrary and capricious under the APA where an agency failed to  
8 provide a reasoned explanation for its decision. Unlike the current case, the challenged  
9 agency rulings in those cases were subject to judicial review. In this case, the APA’s  
10 standard of review and requirement for findings concerning an agency’s decision are  
11 inapplicable.  
12

13  
14 Section 102 only requires that the Secretary’s decision be “published in the Federal  
15 Register.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1). While the Waiver Determinations use predicate terms  
16 in section 102 such as “areas of high illegal entry”, “necessary”, “deter and prevent  
17 illegal crossings” and “most practical and effective”, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated  
18 that more is mandated under section 102 to support an ultra vires claim. Accordingly, the  
19 Court concludes that California Plaintiffs’ argument lacks merit.  
20  
21

22 In view of the foregoing, the Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the waivers  
23 violated a clear and mandatory provision of section 102. Consequently, the Court lacks  
24 jurisdiction to hear any non-constitutional claim.  
25  
26

1           **2. Whether Barring Review Deprives Plaintiffs of a Meaningful and**  
 2                                   **Adequate Means of Violating Their Statutory Rights**

3  
 4           The second step in an ultra vires analysis requires that Plaintiffs demonstrate that  
 5       barring review would deprive them of a “meaningful and adequate means of vindicating”  
 6       their statutory rights. See MCorp., 502 U.S. at 43. Analogizing to 42 U.S.C. § 1983  
 7       cases and private right of actions cases, Defendants argue that California Plaintiffs have  
 8       not identified a statutory right in section 102 as opposed to a statutory obligation. See  
 9       California Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 15cv912 LJO  
 10      BAM, 2015 WL 6167521, at \*11 n. 8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2014) (water quality standards  
 11      are better described as “statutory obligations” rather than “statutory rights.”).

12  
 13           Meanwhile, no Plaintiff has conducted a meaningful analysis on this prong.  
 14  
 15      Instead, California Plaintiffs generally assert that the absence of district court jurisdiction  
 16      will deprive them of adequate means to vindicate their statutory rights. (Dkt. No. 30-2 at  
 17      24.) Assuming for argument’s sake that Plaintiffs satisfied the second prong, they have  
 18      failed to establish the first prong. That is, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not  
 19      established a plain violation of an unambiguous and mandatory provision of section 102,  
 20      and, therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear non-constitutional claims under section  
 21      102(c)(2)(A).

22  
 23      ///

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 25      ///

1           **E.     Whether the Secretaries’ Decisions under Sections 102(a) & (b) are**  
2 **Subject to APA Review**

3  
4           In order to invoke judicial review under the APA, Coalition Plaintiffs present an  
5 alternative argument starting with a strong presumption of judicial review of agency  
6 action.<sup>19</sup> They argue that the judicial review limiting provision of section 102(c) is  
7 distinct from sections 102(a) & (b) because the Secretary must comply with the  
8 requirements of sections 102(a) and (b) prior to invoking the waiver provision.  
9

10 Therefore, because sections 102(a) and (b) are separate determinations from section  
11 102(c), and the waivers constitute final agency decisions reviewable by a district court,  
12 the Secretaries’ decisions on the two projects are subject to APA review and under the  
13 APA, the two Waivers are “arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise  
14 not in accordance with the law.” See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  
15  
16

17           Specifically, Coalition Plaintiffs contend that the language “notwithstanding any  
18 other provision of law” which is contained in section 102(c)(1) “demonstrates an intent to  
19 limit the waiver authority solely to laws other than the one in which the waiver is  
20 contained, meaning the requirements of the section itself are not waivable.” (Dkt. No.  
21 29-1 at 13.) Accordingly, the requirement of “high illegal entry” and the “consultation”  
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26 <sup>19</sup> In contrast, Center Plaintiff conceded that the strong presumption of judicial review is rebutted by the  
27 express statutory language of section 102(c). (Dkt. No. 28-1 at 22.)

1 requirements of sections 102(a) and (b) must be satisfied before the Secretary can invoke  
2 section 102(c)'s waiver authority.

3  
4 Defendants counter that the section 102(c) waiver determination arises from "any  
5 action undertaken" pursuant to section 102(c)(1) and cannot be separated from sections  
6 102(a) or (b). They contend that Plaintiffs improperly seek to challenge findings that are  
7 integral to the waiver determination itself. Even if the phrase "pursuant to paragraph (1)"  
8 in section 102(c)(2)(A), refers to the waiver determination in isolation, the terms "any  
9 action undertaken . . . pursuant to paragraph (1)" and "all clauses or claims arising from"  
10 such actions or decision, broadens the judicial review provision to include more than just  
11 the waiver determination, itself. Next, they contend that Plaintiffs' reading that provides  
12 sections 102(a) and (b) are subject to APA review would frustrate Congress' purpose in  
13 enacting the jurisdictional limitation and waiver provisions which were intended to  
14 prevent litigation delays since any invocation of the waiver would be subject to APA  
15 review to determine whether the waiver was justified in the first place.

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20 In reply, Coalition Plaintiffs argue that the Secretaries' decisions under section  
21 102(c)(1) to waive any laws as "necessary to ensure expeditious construction" do not  
22 address whether there is authority to construct the border projects themselves. The  
23 authority to construct the border projects are in sections 102(a) and (b). They also argue  
24 that these decisions are final agency decisions as they mark the "consummation" of the  
25 agency's decisionmaking and "alter[] the legal regime to which the action agency is  
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28

1 subject”. (Dkt. No. 38 at 13.) “[S]ince subsections 102(a) and (b) are final agency  
2 actions and outside the scope of subparagraph 102(c)(2)(A), the Court may review these  
3 actions pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).” (Id.)  
4

5 Under the APA, “[a] person suffering a legal wrong because of agency action, or  
6 adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of the relevant  
7 statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Court are limited to  
8 review of a final agency action. Or. Nat’l Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d  
9 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2006). Under the APA, the court determines whether the agency  
10 actions are “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  
11 However, judicial review is not available “to the extent that statutes preclude [it].” 5  
12 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1); see also Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 648 F.3d 708, 719  
13 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).  
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17 Section 102(c)(2)(A) provides that

18 The district courts of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction to  
19 hear all causes or claims arising from any action undertaken, or any decision  
20 made, by the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to paragraph (1). A  
21 cause of action or claim may only be brought alleging a violation of the  
22 Constitution of the United States. The court shall not have jurisdiction to  
23 hear any claim not specified in this subparagraph.

24 8 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A). This is an express statutory bar on judicial review of non-  
25 constitutional claims and APA review is not allowed. However, the question is whether  
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1 the express statutory bar applies solely to section 102(c) decisions or to the entirety of  
2 section 102, including sections 102(a) and (b).

3  
4 The judicial review provision under section 102(c)(2)(A) states that the district  
5 courts have exclusive jurisdiction to “hear all causes or claims arising from any action  
6 undertaken” . . . “pursuant to paragraph (1).” While paragraph (1) refers to the  
7 Secretary’s waiver authority, the language “all causes or claims arising from any action  
8 undertaken” is broad enough to encompass the determination under section 102(a) that  
9 the two projects are “necessary” to “deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry  
10 into the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a); U.S. Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S.  
11 607, 626 (1992) (describing “arising under Federal law” in the case as a “broad” and  
12 “seemingly expansive phrase”); Ford Ord Toxics Project, Inc. v. Cal. E.P.A., 189 F.3d  
13 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1999) (statutory language that district courts have exclusive  
14 jurisdiction over “all controversies arising under” CERCLA, indicated “Congress used  
15 language more expansive than would be necessary if it intended to limit exclusive  
16 jurisdiction to ‘those claims created by CERCLA’”); North East Ins. Co. v. Masonmar,  
17 Inc., No. 13cv364 AWI SAB, 2014 WL 1247604, at \*6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014)  
18 (California courts gives terms such as “arising out of” and “arising from” expansive  
19 meanings); Nova Biomedical Corp. v. Moller, 629 F.2d 190, 195 n. 9 (1st Cir. 1980)  
20 (noting that other courts have adopted an expansive view of “arising from” language).



1 Based on the statutory language, the Court declines to adopt Coalition Plaintiffs’  
 2 argument that APA review is available for decisions made solely under sections 102(a)  
 3 and (b). The judicial review bar of non-constitutional challenges applies to any action  
 4 taken to invoke the section 102(c) waiver authority which includes actions under sections  
 5 102(a) and (b).  
 6

7  
 8 In conclusion, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on  
 9 non-constitutional claims alleging violations of NEPA, the ESA, the CZMA and the  
 10 APA, and DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment on these claims. Next, the  
 11 Court considers Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges which are subject to review by this  
 12 Court. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A).  
 13

14 **F. Constitutional Violations**

15 **1. Article I, Section 1 - Non-Delegation Doctrine & Separation of Powers<sup>20</sup>**

16 All Plaintiffs allege a violation of the non-delegation doctrine arguing that section  
 17 102 allows the DHS Secretary to pick and choose among enacted laws and determine,  
 18 with unfettered discretion, which ones shall be waived without specifically stating which  
 19 laws will be waived or why. In essence, Plaintiffs contend, section 102(c) has granted the  
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23  
 24 <sup>20</sup> California Plaintiffs separate their separation of powers and violation of the non-delegation doctrine  
 25 into two causes of action despite similar arguments on both claims. The Court also notes that Coalition  
 26 Plaintiffs have not sufficiently briefed the issue of separation of powers. They raise the issue of  
 27 “separation of powers” in a heading, but their analysis consists of essentially one sentence. (Dkt. No.  
 28 29-1 at 34-35.) Because the non-delegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers,  
 the Court considers the two claims together. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).

1 Executive Branch a blanket waiver which is a violation of the non-delegation doctrine  
2 and separation of powers.

3  
4 “The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that  
5 underlies our tripartite system of Government.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,  
6 371 (1989). Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution vests all legislative powers in  
7 Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. Generally, Congress cannot delegate or transfer the  
8 legislative functions with which it is vested. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.  
9 388, 425-26 (1935). The Supreme Court has recognized, however, “that the separation-  
10 of-powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in particular, do not prevent  
11 Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches.” Mistretta, 488 U.S.  
12 at 372. “In our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more  
13 technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power  
14 under broad general directives.” Id. (citing Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r of Wage and  
15 Hour Div. of Dept. of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941)).

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20 As a result of this broad constitutional standard, the Supreme Court has upheld all  
21 Congressional delegations of power since 1935.<sup>21</sup> See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 (noting

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<sup>21</sup> Notably, although the Court has not since struck down a challenged statute, it has narrowly construed statutory delegations. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (standard promulgated by Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) limiting occupational exposure to benzene held to be invalid); Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974) (challenge to revision of fee schedule by the Federal Communications Commission was remanded to Commission to use the proper standard in setting annual fee).

1 that since 1935, “. . . we have upheld, again without deviation, Congress’ ability to  
2 delegate power under broad standards”); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771  
3 (1996) (affirming that “. . . we have since upheld, without exception, delegations under  
4 standards phrased in sweeping terms”). Meanwhile, in 1935, the Supreme Court struck  
5 down two statutes on delegation grounds. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United  
6 States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating the delegation of code-making authority  
7 contained in the National Industrial Recovery Act as unconstitutional because of the  
8 Act’s failure to impose limitations on discretion); Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 388  
9 (invalidating the delegation of power to the President to “prohibit the transportation . . .  
10 of petroleum” as exceeding constitutional limits because Congress failed to articulate a  
11 policy to limit the President’s discretion).

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15  
16 The Supreme Court has held that Congress may delegate its authority so long as it  
17 provides, by legislative act, “an intelligible principle to which the person or body  
18 authorized to [act] is directed to conform.” Id. (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United  
19 States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)). Under the intelligible principle standard, a statute  
20 delegating authority is constitutional if it “clearly delineates [(1)] the general policy, [(2)]  
21 the public agency which is to apply it, and [(3)] the boundaries of the delegated  
22 authority.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73 (citing American Power & Light Co. v. SEC,  
23 329 U.S. 90, 105, (1946)).  
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1 In addition, while courts have recognized limits on Congress' authority to delegate  
2 its legislative power, those limits are less rigid where the entity "itself possesses  
3 independent authority over the subject matter." Loving, 517 U.S. at 772 (quoting United  
4 States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975)); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright  
5 Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936).

7  
8 Accordingly, there are two inquiries this Court must consider when determining  
9 whether section 102(c) is a constitutional delegation of power: (1) whether section 102  
10 meets the three requirements of the intelligible principle standard; and (2) whether the  
11 degree of discretion granted to the DHS Secretary in section 102(c) is appropriate  
12 considering the Secretary's independent authority over the subject matter. See Mistretta,  
13 488 U.S. at 372-72; Loving, 517 U.S. at 772.

14  
15  
16 **a. Prong One: Whether Section 102 Clearly Delineates a**  
17 **"General Policy"**

18 Coalition Plaintiffs claim that section 102 fails to identify a general policy because  
19 prior courts identified different general policies. They cite to two recent cases, Sierra  
20 Club, 2005 WL 8153059, and Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119  
21 (D.D.C. 2007), cert denied, 554 U.S. 918 (2008), where the courts stated different policy  
22 goals in section 102. Coalition Plaintiffs assert "[w]hen courts cannot identify a common  
23 statutory policy goal, and the policy some did point to was incorrect, the statutory scheme  
24 cannot survive Mistretta scrutiny." (Dkt. No. 29-1 at 30.)

1 Defendants argue that Congress defined a “general policy” to guide the DHS  
2 Secretary on how to exercise its delegated authority, satisfying the first prong of the  
3 intelligible principle standard. That policy is install necessary barriers and roads to “deter  
4 illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United States” through, under  
5 section 102(c) “expeditious construction of barriers and roads under this section.” (Dkt.  
6 No. 35-1 at 71.) Defendants further contend that there is no conflict between the  
7 statements of general policy by the Sierra Club and the Defenders of Wildlife courts.  
8 Rather, one is just more specific than the other. Id. Furthermore, later courts found no  
9 conflict in the prior courts’ conclusions as to the general policy.  
10  
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12

13 Under section 102(a), the general policy states the Secretary of DHS shall take  
14 actions as necessary to “deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the  
15 United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a). To carry out this policy, Congress authorizes the  
16 DHS Secretary to “take such actions as may be necessary to install additional physical  
17 barriers and roads.” Id.  
18  
19

20 The first district court to address whether the amended section 102 contains a  
21 “general policy” was in this district. In Sierra Club, the court held that “improvement of  
22 U.S. border protection is the ‘clearly delineated general policy.’” Sierra Club, 2005 WL  
23 8153059, at \*6. Two years later, the District of Columbia District Court addressed this  
24 same question and similarly found that the general policy was clearly delineated as “to  
25 expeditiously ‘install additional physical barriers and roads . . . to deter illegal crossings  
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1 in areas of high illegal entry.” Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 127. Notably,  
2 the court further held that this identification of the statute’s general policy was not  
3 contrary to that recognized by the Sierra Club court, but rather “in accord with the only  
4 other decision to address the question of whether [IIRIRA’s] waiver provision is a  
5 constitutional delegation.” Id. (citing Sierra Club, 2005 WL 8153059, at \*6).

7  
8 While using slightly different language, both courts identified the general policy as  
9 border protection. Both courts identified deterrence of illegal crossing as a motivating  
10 factor in this policy. And both courts recognized that in articulating this policy, Congress  
11 permitted the construction of physical barriers and roads.

13 Moreover, the District Court for the Western District of Texas noted the general  
14 policy of section 102 to be “construction of a border fence” which is consistent with the  
15 general policy asserted in Sierra Club and Defenders of Wildlife. Cnty. of El Paso v.  
16 Chertoff, No. EP-08-CA-196-FM, 2008 WL 4372693, at \*3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008).

18 Thus, while prior courts have used different language to articulate Congress’s stated  
19 policy goal, they do not provide contradictory interpretations of section 102’s general  
20 policy.  
21

22 Therefore, the Court finds that Congress clearly delineated the “general policy” of  
23 section 102 as deterrence of illegal crossings through construction of additional physical  
24 barriers to improve U.S. border protection, 8 U.S.C. § 1103, and has satisfied the first  
25 prong of the intelligible principle standard.  
26

1                   **b. Prong Two: Whether Section 102 Clearly Delineates a Public**  
2   **Agency**

3  
4                   It is undisputed that IIRIRA satisfies the second prong of the intelligible principle  
5 standard because “the Secretary of Homeland Security” is to apply the general policy.  
6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1).

7  
8                   **c. Prong Three: Whether Section 102 Clearly Delineates “the**  
9   **Boundaries of Delegated Authority”**

10                   All Plaintiffs challenge section 102(c) on the third factor of the intelligible  
11 principle standard, arguing that the boundaries of the delegated authority are not clearly  
12 delineated. They distinguish the Waivers from past waivers found to be constitutional.  
13 Past waivers focused solely on building new fencing pursuant to the specific mandates of  
14 Congress in section 102(b) which limited the DHS Secretary’s waiver authority to the  
15 initial border construction. However, the Waivers at issue concern projects not  
16 previously identified by section 102. Therefore, they argue that the grant of waiver  
17 authority does not apply to these new projects.  
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21                   Defendants argue that Congress provided specific boundaries for its delegated  
22 authority, satisfying the third prong of the intelligible principle standard. This authority  
23 may only be exercised to “waive all legal requirements [the] Secretary . . . determines  
24 *necessary* to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads *under this section.*”  
25 (Dkt. No. 35-1 at 72.) The boundaries, they contend, are both geographic, DHS can only  
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1 waive laws in connection with construction of a physical barrier at the U.S. border, and  
2 temporally necessary, DHS can only waive laws necessary to quickly construct a wall.  
3  
4 Contrary to Plaintiffs' demand for specificity, the boundary need not include specific  
5 criteria or guidelines.<sup>22</sup> In short, Congress has the power to be flexible and broad when  
6 delegating authority.

7  
8 Here, section 102(c) provides boundaries that limit the Secretary's authority to  
9 waive all laws that are "necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and  
10 roads." See Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 127 (boundaries clearly defined by  
11 Congress' requirement that Secretary may only waive laws that he determines are  
12 "necessary to ensure expeditious construction"); Sierra Club, 2005 WL 8153059, at \*6  
13 (boundary of authority was limited to actions "necessary to install additional barriers and  
14 roads" and specifically, the construction of the Triple Fence in San Diego); Cnty. of El  
15 Paso, 2008 WL 43726993, at \*4 (boundaries clearly defined relying on reasoning in  
16 Sierra Club and Defenders of Wildlife).

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22 <sup>22</sup> California Plaintiffs argue that Defendants fail to address their argument that while the non-delegation  
23 doctrine applies to cases where Congress provides the Executive power to decide which laws could be  
24 modified or terminated and under what circumstances, it has not authorized the Secretary to pick and  
25 choose among enacted laws and decide, which legislation to waive. Section 102 does not provide the  
26 Secretary with guidance as to which laws are to be waived or why. Because Defendants failed to  
27 address this argument, California Plaintiffs argue section 102(c) is unconstitutional and must be  
28 invalidated. However, Defendants addressed the boundaries of the Secretary's authority to waive laws  
limited to construction along the U.S. border and only those laws "necessary to ensure expeditious  
construction." (Dkt. No. 42 at 37.)



1 While it is true that section 102(c) contains considerably fewer details than other  
2 challenged statutes,<sup>23</sup> the Supreme Court does not demand that Congress outline specific  
3 factors or criteria when delegating authority.<sup>24</sup> Rather, Congress need only delineate the  
4 boundaries of the delegated authority in broad and general terms. See Opp Cotton Mills,  
5 Inc., 312 U.S. at 145. For example, in upholding Congress’s broad delegation of power  
6 to the EPA Administrator, the Whitman Court noted that “even in sweeping regulatory  
7 schemes we have never demanded . . . that statutes provide a ‘determinate criterion’ for  
8 saying ‘how much [of the regulated harm] is too much.’” Whitman v. American  
9 Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001). This is consistent with prior Supreme Court  
10 precedent holding that “[o]nly if we could say that there is an absence of standards for the  
11 guidance of the Administrator’s action, so that it would be impossible in a proper  
12 proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed, would we be  
13 justified in overriding [Congress’s] choice of means for effecting its declared purpose. . .  
14 .” Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944).

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23 In Mistretta, for example, the statute in question authorized an independent Sentencing Commission to  
24 formulate sentencing guidelines for federal offenses. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367. Congress identified  
25 three goals, four purposes, numerous guidelines, eleven factors for sentencing consideration, a  
26 prohibition on certain factors for sentencing consideration. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374-78.

24 In fact, the Court in Mistretta even recognized that the Act in question set forth “*more than* merely an  
27 ‘intelligible principle.’” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 379 (emphasis added).

1 Section 102 of IIRIRA is easily distinguishable from the statutes in Panama  
2 Refining Co. and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. The statute at issue in Panama  
3 Refining Co. “provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion,” while the  
4 statute challenged in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. “conferred authority to regulate the  
5 entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy  
6 by assuring ‘fair competition.’” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474.  
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9 Here, however, Congress expressly limits the DHS Secretary’s discretion to waive  
10 laws to those “necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads  
11 under this section.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1). Congress’s use of the word “necessary” to  
12 define the scope of discretion is well with the limits of non-delegation precedents. In  
13 Touby, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a provision of the Controlled Substances  
14 Act that permitted the Attorney General to schedule a drug when doing so is “necessary  
15 to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety.” Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160,  
16 165 (1991). Similarly, in Indus. Union Dep’t, the Supreme Court upheld a provision of  
17 the Occupational Safety and Health Act that empowered the Secretary of Labor to  
18 promulgate standards that are “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or  
19 healthful employment and places of employment.” Indus. Union Dep’t., AFL-CIO v.  
20 American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980). Finally, in Whitman, the Supreme  
21 Court upheld a provision of the Clean Air Act that directed the EPA Administrator to set  
22 standards that are “requisite to protect the public health” with “an adequate margin of  
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1 safety.” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475. “Requisite,” in this context, “mean[s] sufficient, but  
2 not more than necessary.” Id. at 473. Furthermore, this limit on authority is the same  
3 limit that was approved by the court in Sierra Club.  
4

5 Both Congress and the Executive share responsibilities in protecting the country  
6 from terrorists and contraband illegally entering at the borders. Border barriers, roads,  
7 and detection equipment help provide a measure of deterrence against illegal entries.  
8 With section 102, Congress delegated to its executive counterpart, the responsibility to  
9 construct border barriers as needed in areas of high illegal entry to detect and deter illegal  
10 entries. In an increasingly complex and changing world, this delegation avoids the need  
11 for Congress to pass a new law to authorize the construction of every border project.  
12 Similarly, Congress enacted a law which attempts to avoid delays caused by lawsuits  
13 challenging the construction of barriers by allowing the Secretary to waive the  
14 application and enforcement of federal, state and local laws during the construction of a  
15 border barrier as necessary. The Court concludes that Congress has clearly delineated the  
16 “boundaries of delegated authority” in terms previously upheld by the Supreme Court,  
17 thereby satisfying the third prong of the intelligible principle standard.  
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22 **d. Whether Congress’s Grant of Authority Constitutes “Unfettered**  
23 **Discretion”**  
24

25 Coalition Plaintiffs cite to Zivotofsky to suggest that the DHS secretary does not  
26 have exclusive control over foreign affairs, and thus the statutory grant of discretion  
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1 should be more limited. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089-90 (2015).  
2 Defendants argue that the Executive Branch has significant, independent control over  
3 immigration, foreign affairs, and national security, and therefore broad waiver authority  
4 is justified. (Dkt. No. 35 at 74.) They attack Coalition Plaintiffs’ reliance on Zivotofsky  
5 and cite to binding precedent in support of their position. See Knauff v. Shaughnessy,  
6 338 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1950) (“The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of  
7 sovereignty . . . [and] is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of  
8 the nation.”).

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11 Congress can confer more discretion to an entity when that entity already has  
12 significant, independent authority over the subject matter. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 772-  
13 73. Here, Congress delegated broad authority to the DHS Secretary, an agent of the  
14 Executive Branch. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(c).

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17 As stated in Sierra Club, the Executive Branch has independent and significant  
18 constitutional authority in the area of “immigration and border control enforcement and  
19 national security.” Sierra Club, 2005 WL 8153059, at \*6 (citing Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542-  
20 43). Additionally, the court in Save Our Heritage confirmed that the construction of San  
21 Diego barriers relate to “foreign affairs and immigration control—areas over which the  
22 Executive Branch traditionally exercises independent authority.” Save Our Heritage, 533  
23 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 129).  
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1 Nothing about DHS's authority has changed since prior rulings. The only  
2 difference between this case and prior cases is the type of barrier being constructed. This  
3 distinction is not relevant under this analysis.  
4

5 Coalition Plaintiffs' reliance on Zivotofsky is not persuasive. The power  
6 contemplated in Zivotofsky was the President's power to recognize foreign nations and  
7 governments and the issue was whether the President has exclusive power to recognize  
8 nations. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084.  
9

10 Here, the issue is not whether the President has exclusive power over foreign  
11 affairs, but whether the DHS Secretary, acting as an agent of the Executive, has  
12 significant, independent control over immigration. Therefore, because the DHS  
13 Secretary, acting as an agent of the Executive Branch, has significant, independent  
14 authority over immigration, Congress is justified in delegating broad authority. The  
15 Court concludes that section 102 does not violate the non-delegation doctrine.  
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18 California Plaintiffs also present a separate argument that the lack of judicial  
19 review under section 102 violates the non-delegation doctrine and essentially imports a  
20 fourth requirement to the intelligible principle standard. (Dkt. No. 30-2 at 45.) By  
21 limiting review to only constitutional challenges, California Plaintiffs argue, Congress is  
22 preventing the judicial branch from reviewing Congress's delegation of authority.  
23  
24 California Plaintiffs further contend that judicial review is the only way to ensure that the  
25 DHS Secretary adheres to the intelligible principle Congress provided. California cites to  
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27

1 three Supreme Court cases in support of this argument.<sup>25</sup> In none of these cases,  
2 however, did the Court strike down the statute for lack of judicial review.<sup>26</sup>  
3

4 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' argument has been expressly rejected by the  
5 Ninth Circuit. United States v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037, 1041-45 (9th Cir. 1992).  
6 In Bozarov, the Ninth Circuit held that the nondelegation doctrine was not violated  
7 because the EAA precluded judicial review. "In sum, we believe that the Supreme Court  
8 cases upholding judicial preclusion of agency decisions, the language of the APA, and  
9 the fact that the EAA involves foreign policy issues support our conclusion that the  
10 EAA's preclusion of judicial review is constitutional." Id. at 1044. Furthermore, the  
11 Ninth Circuit also noted that its conclusion that the preclusion of judicial review did not  
12 violate the nondelegation clause was "bolstered" by the availability of judicial review for  
13 constitutional claims and ultra vires claims. Id. at 1044-45. Similarly, in Cnty. of El  
14 Paso, the same argument concerning whether judicial review was a requirement of the  
15 intelligible principle standard was rejected by the court. Cnty. of El Paso, 2008 WL  
16 4372693 at \*4-6.  
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23 <sup>25</sup> A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 533; American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90,  
106 (1946); and Touby, 500 U.S. at 165.

24 <sup>26</sup> In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry, the Court struck down the statute not on the grounds that it lacked  
25 judicial review, but because of the Act's failure to impose limitations on discretion. 295 U.S. at 533. In  
26 American Power, the plaintiffs challenged the statute not on the grounds that it lacked judicial review,  
27 but rather because it lacked "ascertainable standards," thereby granting the SEC unfettered discretion.  
28 329 U.S. at 104. In Touby, the dispositive issue was not judicial review, rather whether the delegation  
afforded too much discretion. 500 U.S. at 165.

1 It is true that the Supreme Court has recognized that judicial review provides an  
2 important check on the power delegated by Congress. See Touby, 500 U.S. at 167-69;  
3 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 533; Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426 (recognizing  
4 the importance of judicial review by observing that one of the purposes of requiring  
5 Congress to provide intelligible principles was so that a tribunal “in a proper proceeding  
6 [may] ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed.”). These cases recognize  
7 that judicial review allows for the enforcement of the intelligible principle requirement  
8 and the separation of powers. At the same time, a Supreme Court nondelegation doctrine  
9 case has never turned on the presence or absence of judicial review.  
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13 While unlimited judicial review would assure compliance with all legal  
14 requirements, it would defeat the purpose of the law to expedite the construction of  
15 border barriers and roads in areas where they are needed. In this case, as in Bozarov,  
16 section 102 allows judicial review of constitutional claims as well as ultra vires claim  
17 which bolsters the conclusion that section 102 does not violate the nondelegation  
18 doctrine. Accordingly, the California Plaintiffs’ argument concerning violation of the  
19 non-delegation doctrine based on lack of judicial review is unsupported by law.  
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22 In conclusion, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions for summary judgment  
23 and DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment on the Non-Delegation Doctrine  
24 and separation of powers claims.  
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## 2. Article II, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution - Take Care Clause

Center Plaintiff alleges that the August 2 Waiver Determination violates the Take Care Clause contending that it applies to Executive Officers, including the Secretary of DHS. First, it claims that the DHS exceeded the authority delegated to it by issuing the August 2 Waiver under section 102 even though it was not authorized by section 102(b). (Dkt. No. 28-1 at 42-43.) Second, it asserts that even if section 102(c) waiver provision is not limited to those barriers mandated under section 102(b), the August 2 Waiver Determination does not comply with the direction in section 102(a) that the barriers be built in “areas of high illegal entry.” (*Id.* at 43.) Therefore, Center Plaintiff argues, the August 2 Waiver Determination violated the Executive’s duty to faithfully execute the statutory mandate. (*Id.*) The Center Plaintiff’s SAC alleges that “[a]mong the laws the Take Care Clause mandates be ‘faithfully executed’ are NEPA and the ESA, as well as the conditions and limitations of IIRIRA section 102 itself.” (Dkt. No. 16, SAC ¶ 145.)

Defendants argue that the Take Care Clause only applies to the actions of the President and not the Secretary, that no court has treated the Take Care Clause as a basis for affirmative relief, and that it is an improper attempt by Center Plaintiff to recast its ultra vires challenge under the Take Care Clause.

Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution states that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.



1 First, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ argument that the Take Care Clause  
 2 applies only to the President, and not his cabinet members. “The vesting of the executive  
 3 power in the President was essentially a grant of power to execute the laws. But the  
 4 President alone and unaided could not execute the laws. He must execute them by the  
 5 assistance of subordinates.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926); see also  
 6 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (“The Constitution does not leave to  
 7 speculation who is to administer the laws enacted by Congress; the President, it says,  
 8 “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” Art. II, § 3, personally and through  
 9 officers whom he appoints . . . .”) Moreover, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari  
 10 in United States v. Texas, it, *sua sponte*, asked for additional briefing on “Whether the  
 11 Guidance<sup>27</sup> violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, 3.” United States v.  
 12 Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). The issue was whether the Secretary of DHS’ actions  
 13 establishing Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents  
 14 (“DAPA”) violated the Take Care Clause, an issue not addressed by the district court.<sup>28</sup>  
 15 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 607 (2015). Therefore, the Supreme Court’s

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 22  
 23 <sup>27</sup> The government described Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent  
 24 Residents (“DAPA”) as “Deferred Action Guidance.” Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 667  
 25 (2015).

26 <sup>28</sup> The district court in Texas noted that the issue was whether the Secretary of DHS has the power to  
 27 establish DAPA stating that the President had not issued any executive orders or presidential  
 28 proclamation or communicate concerning DAPA but that it was solely established by the Secretary.  
Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 607. In contrast, in this case, President Trump issued an Executive Order on  
 January 25, 2017 directing the Secretary of DHS to take steps to “obtain complete operations control . . .  
 of the southern border.” (Dkt. No. 30-5, Cayaban Decl., Ex. 7, Executive Order, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793.)

1 decision to *sua sponte* address the Take Care clause in relation to an act of the Secretary  
2 of DHS indicates that the Take Care clause applies not only to the President but also his  
3 Executive officers.  
4

5 As to whether the August 2 Waiver Determination violates the Take Care clause,  
6 Center Plaintiff cites to three cases to support the assertion that the Executive is required  
7 to “execute the laws, not make them.” First, it cites to a sentence in the conclusion of  
8 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) stating that the Take Care clause that laws  
9 be faithfully executed requires the Executive to “execute the law, not make them.” Id. at  
10 532. But Medellin dealt with the legal effect of an international treaty on domestic law.  
11 Id. at 504. In fact, the Court mentioned that the Take Care clause did not apply in the  
12 case since the International Court of Justice’s decision was an international judgment. Id.  
13 at 532. Medellin did not concern a statute enacted by Congress and is not helpful in the  
14 Take Care analysis.  
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18 Next, Center Plaintiff cites to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.  
19 579, 587 (1952) in support of its argument that the President’s power is to faithfully  
20 execute the laws, not make them. Due to an impending nation-wide strike of the steel  
21 mills, the President, on his own, issued an Executive Order directing the Secretary of  
22 Commerce to take possession of most of the country’s steel mills and keep them running.  
23 Id. at 583. The steel mill owners filed suit alleging that the seizures were not authorized  
24 by Congress or any other constitutional provision. Id. The Court agreed explaining that  
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1 the President’s power must come from either an act of Congress or from the Constitution.  
2 Id. at 585. However, in the case, the Executive Order “did not direct that a congressional  
3 policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress—it directs that a presidential  
4 policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President.” Id. at 588. Such conduct to  
5 make laws is only delegated to Congress, and not the President. Id. The Supreme Court  
6 affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from  
7 enforcing the Executive Order. Id. at 584. In contrast, in this case, Congress enacted  
8 section 102(c), which grants the Secretary of DHS not only the discretion to waive all  
9 laws when “necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads” but  
10 also discretion to determine whether it is necessary to install barriers to deter “illegal  
11 crossings in areas of high illegal entry.” See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a) & (c). Therefore,  
12 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. does not support Center Plaintiff’s position.

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17 Finally, in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), the question presented to  
18 the Supreme Court was “whether under the Constitution the President has the exclusive  
19 power of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and  
20 with the advice and consent of the Senate.” Id. at 60. The case dealt with the power of  
21 the President to appoint and remove executive officers as opposed to the discretion of the  
22 Secretary of the DHS to carry out section 102, a provision enacted by Congress.  
23  
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25 The cases cited by Center Plaintiff do not address the application of the Take Care  
26 clause. It merely cite to these cases for the assertion that the President’s duty under the  
27

1 Take Care clause is to execute laws, not make them. However, none of the cases cited by  
2 Center Plaintiff address an executive head's exercise of his or her discretionary authority  
3 to carry out the mandates of Congress. As a result, they provide no guidance as to how  
4 the Take Care clause would or should apply in this case. Moreover, given that the  
5 challenged steps taken by the Secretary are ones that are plausibly called for by an act of  
6 Congress, a Take Care challenge in this case would essentially open the doors to an  
7 undisciplined and unguided review process for all decisions made by the Executive  
8 Department.

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12 Consequently, Center Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Take Care clause in  
13 this case has been violated. Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary  
14 judgment and DENIES Center Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the Take  
15 Care Clause claim.

### 16 17 **3. Article I, Sections 2 & 3 of the United States Constitution**

18 California Plaintiffs argue that section 102(c) violates Article I, Sections 2 and 3 of  
19 the U.S. Constitution by allowing the Secretary to waive numerous criminal laws  
20 concerning the border wall projects without providing a specific list of criminal laws that  
21 are waived.<sup>29</sup> Defendants contend that California Plaintiffs have provided no legal  
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25 <sup>29</sup> For example, California Plaintiffs argue the Secretary waived the Resource Conservation Recovery  
26 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928, which makes it a crime to knowingly dump hazardous waste that puts another  
27 person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, and waived the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §  
28 1319(c) making it a crime to knowingly pollute a river, stream or other water.

1 authority to support their argument that Article I, Sections 2 and 3 address Congress'  
2 delegation of power to waive criminal law to the Executive.

3  
4 Article 1 Section 3 provides,

5 Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal  
6 from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office . . . but the  
7 Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,  
8 Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

9 U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. This section concerns impeachment and punishment of  
10 conviction and is “an attempt by the framers to anticipate and respond to questions that  
11 might arise regarding the procedural right of the accused during the impeachment  
12 process.” United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting United  
13 States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 710 (11th Cir. 1982)). California Plaintiffs also cite to  
14 Article I, Section 2 which states that the President “shall have Power to grant Reprieves  
15 and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”  
16 U.S. Const. art I, § 2, cl. 1.

17  
18 California Plaintiffs invoke these two constitutional provisions arguing that  
19 Congress cannot grant the Executive Branch sweeping powers to waive federal criminal  
20 laws without specifically listing the criminal laws to be waived and that it places the  
21 Executive Branch above the law. However, California Plaintiffs provide no legal  
22 authority to support their argument that Article I, Sections 2 & 3 supports their  
23 proposition. None of their cited cases concern the application of Article I, Sections 2 or 3  
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1 of the U.S. Constitution. California Plaintiffs have not demonstrated they are entitled to  
2 judgment as a matter of law that section 102 and the Waiver Determinations violate  
3 Article I, Sections 2 and 3 of the U.S. Constitution. The Court GRANTS Defendant's  
4 motion for summary judgment and DENIES California Plaintiffs' motion for summary  
5 judgment on this claim.  
6

7  
8 **4. Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution - Presentment Clause**

9 All Plaintiffs assert that the DHS Secretaries' waiver of more than thirty  
10 environmental laws through section 102(c) violates Article I, Section 7 of the U.S.  
11 Constitution. They rely heavily on Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)  
12 arguing that allowing DHS to waive laws through section 102(c) amounts to an  
13 amendment or repeal of statutes. Section 102 gives the DHS Secretary "nearly unbridled  
14 discretion" to waive laws and would waive laws in which DHS has no expertise. (Dkt.  
15 No. 30-2 at 49.) Since Congress provides no guidance as to which laws to waive, the  
16 Secretary's actions will solely reflect the Executive's will. (Id. at 50.)  
17  
18

19 Defendants argue that the waiver of the environmental laws through section 102(c)  
20 does not amount to an amendment or repeal of statute and only select statutes are waived  
21 in an effort to build roads and barriers next to portions of the border. Defendants liken  
22 the waiver to an "executive grant of immunity or waiver of claim" which "has never been  
23 recognized as a form of legislative repeal." Id. (quoting In re Nat'l Sec. Agency  
24 Telecomm. Records Litig., 671 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2011)). Defendants argue that here,  
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1 like in Telecomm., there is no constitutional violation of the Presentment Clause because  
2 the partially waived statutes remain the same from when Congress approved the statute  
3 and the President signed it. Defendants contend that here, unlike Clinton, there is no  
4 separation of powers issue because Congress gave DHS authority to partially waive  
5 statutes for a border wall when Congress amended section 102. Defendants distinguish  
6 the situation here from Clinton by noting that DHS Secretary is implementing  
7 congressional intent rather than rejecting it.

8  
9  
10 According to the Presentment Clause, “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the  
11 House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to  
12 the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return  
13 it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the  
14 Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.” U.S. Const. art I., § 7.  
15 The Constitution does not allow the Executive “to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.”  
16 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998). “Amendment and repeal of  
17 statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with’ the bicameralism and presentment  
18 requirements of Article I.” Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 123-24 (quoting  
19 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983)).

20  
21  
22 In Clinton, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the Line Item Veto Act because  
23 “[i]n both legal and practical effect,” the Line Item Veto gave the President the power to  
24 amend “Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each.” Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438. In

1 Clinton, cancellation of legal provisions altered the statute’s “legal force or effect.” Id. at  
2 437. In essence, the Line Item Veto Act replaced the once legally-passed bills with  
3 truncated replacements. Id. at 438. The Supreme Court considered this alteration a  
4 disruption of the bicameralism and presentment requirements of the Presentment Clause.  
5 Id.  
6

7  
8 This situation, however, is distinguishable from Clinton. Here, the Waivers are  
9 narrow in scope and only for the purpose of building border barriers something that is  
10 permitted by section 102(c). In Clinton, the Line Item Veto Act rendered the cancelled  
11 legal provisions powerless and effectively changed the law entirely. Id. at 437. Here, the  
12 statutes largely retain legal force and effect because the §102(c) waivers only disturb the  
13 waived statutes for a specific purpose and for a specific time.  
14

15  
16 In Defenders of Wildlife, the district court addressed the plaintiffs’ presentment  
17 clause challenge to section 102(c) and stated,

18 The REAL ID Act’s waiver provision differs significantly from the Line  
19 Item Veto Act. The Secretary has no authority to alter the text of any  
20 statute, repeal any law, or cancel any statutory provision, in whole or in part.  
21 Each of the twenty laws waived by the Secretary on October 26, 2007,  
22 retains the same legal force and effect as it had when it was passed by both  
houses of Congress and presented to the President.

23 527 F. Supp. 2d at 124; see also Cnty. of El Paso, 2008 WL 4372693, at \*6-7. The court  
24 also explained that the waiver did not constitute an unconstitutional “partial repeal”  
25 because this was not an instance in which “any waiver, no matter how limited in scope,  
26



1 would violate Article I because it would allow the Executive Branch to unilaterally  
 2 ‘repeal’ or nullify the law with respect to the limited purpose delineated by the waiver  
 3 legislation.” Defenders of Wildlife, 527 F. Supp. at 124. The Court concludes that the  
 4 Secretaries’ Waiver Determinations made pursuant section 102(c) do not violate the  
 5 Presentment Clause. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions for summary judgment  
 6 and DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment on this issue.  
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9 **5. Access to the Courts**

10 **a. Due Process/First Amendment Right to Petition/Article III<sup>30</sup>**

11 Coalition Plaintiffs argue in their motion, but not in their reply, in one paragraph,  
 12 that section 102(c)(2) deprives them of their due process rights and impairs their First  
 13 Amendment right to petition the government. (Dkt. No. 29-1 at 36-37.) They argue they  
 14 have a property and liberty interest in ensuring environmental laws and interests are  
 15 protected and section 102(c)(2) removes any procedure that would protect their interests  
 16 from arbitrary and capricious conduct by the Secretary.  
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22 <sup>30</sup> In reply, California Plaintiffs appear to assert a void-for-vagueness challenge under the First  
 23 Amendment in response to an argument made in Defendants’ brief. (Dkt. No. at 25; Dkt. No. 35-1 at 84  
 24 n.53.) The void-for vagueness argument, raised initially in California Plaintiffs’ reply, morphed into a  
 25 claim based on the parties’ argument. California Plaintiffs did not raise the issue of void for vagueness  
 26 under the First Amendment in their moving papers, and in fact, is not a claim alleged in their complaint.  
 27 Instead, their complaint and their moving brief claim that section 102(c) is vague and therefore a  
 28 violation of their due process rights under the Fifth Amendment which is distinct from a void-for-  
 vagueness claim. The Court declines to address the void-for-vagueness challenge, an issue not raised in  
 California Plaintiffs’ complaint or moving brief.

1 California Plaintiffs argue that section 102(c)'s unreasonable procedural hurdles  
2 violate Californians' Article III and due process rights and the rights to potential parties'  
3 ability to petition the Court. They argue that the 2017 Waivers fail to identify the state  
4 laws that are purportedly waived. They also argue that the San Diego Waiver is vague  
5 when it states that DHS intends to install "various border infrastructure projects" within  
6 the "Project Areas" but fails to describe these other projects. Next, they argue that the  
7 San Diego Waiver does not provide reasonable notice as to when undisclosed projects  
8 will be constructed and purports to waive federal and state laws for the on-going  
9 maintenance of these structures. These uncertainties leave California unable to determine  
10 whether the projects will be the types of projects authorized by section 102, whether the  
11 areas will be considered areas of high illegal entry at the time they are installed and  
12 whether California should file a claim to protect their individual rights. Also, by barring  
13 all non-constitutional claims, the California Plaintiffs contend section 102(c)(2)(A)  
14 interferes with its right of access to the courts.<sup>31</sup> California claims it has an interest in  
15 enforcing its own state laws and to preserve state property adjacent to the Projects.  
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24 <sup>31</sup> California Plaintiffs also summarily argue that the 60 day statute of limitations from the date of  
25 publication in the Federal Register creates the risk that Californians will not learn about the full extent of  
26 the 2017 Waivers as it lacks clarity and fails to provide adequate notice which violates Article III of the  
27 U.S. Constitution. Defendants respond that this challenge is an irrelevant hypothetical as their  
28 complaint was timely filed. California Plaintiffs do not reply to Defendants' argument. The Court  
agrees that California Plaintiffs are asserting an argument that has no application to them as they filed  
their complaint timely; moreover, they provide no case law to support their argument.

1 Defendants claim that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they have a cognizable  
2 life, liberty or property interest for a due process violation. They contend that California  
3 Plaintiffs' assertion of Article III standing is distinct from a liberty or property interest  
4 protected by the Fifth Amendment.  
5

6 The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause states “[n]o person shall . . . be  
7 deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V.  
8 As a threshold, a plaintiff must show a liberty or property interest protected by the  
9 Constitution. Ching v. Mayorkas, 725 F.3d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013).  
10

11 Coalition Plaintiffs summarily state they have property and liberty interests in  
12 ensuring environmental laws and interest are protected.<sup>32</sup> California also claims it has an  
13 interest in enforcing its own state laws and to preserve state property adjacent to the  
14 Projects. However, Coalition Plaintiffs and California have not provided any case law  
15 supporting the claim that their property and/or liberty interests are protected by the  
16 Constitution and have failed to provide any meaningful analysis on the due process  
17 violation claim. Moreover, the Court notes that many of California Plaintiffs' arguments  
18 are speculative and concern issues that may arise in the future with future border wall  
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25 <sup>32</sup> In their reply, Coalition Plaintiffs dispute Defendants' argument that they failed to identify a liberty or  
26 property interest to support a due process claim and argued they asserted their right to access the courts  
27 and to enforce environmental and animal-protection laws. (Dkt. No. 38 at 26 n.10.) However, in their  
28 moving papers, Coalition Plaintiffs do not assert an interest in their right to access the courts in their due  
process analysis but solely an interest in “environmental laws and interests.” (Dkt. No. 29-1 at 36-37.)

1 construction projects and do not address the current projects. The Court declines to  
2 address any issues concerning future projects as California Plaintiffs have not provided  
3 legal support for their arguments.  
4

5 California Plaintiffs also claim that the 2017 Waivers do not identify which  
6 specific state laws are purportedly waived as the waiver language waives a specific list of  
7 over 30 federal statutes, “including all federal, state, or other laws, regulations and legal  
8 requirements of, deriving from, or related to the subject of, the following statutes.” (Dkt.  
9 No. 30-6, Cayaban Decl., Ex. 11, 82 Fed. Reg. 35985; *id.*, Ex. 12, 82 Fed. Reg. 42830.)  
10 California Plaintiffs broadly interpret the provision to include numerous state laws which  
11 Defendants argue are inapplicable to the Projects at issue. Once again, California  
12 Plaintiffs fail to provide any legal authority on whether a statute that permits the waiver  
13 of laws requires specificity as to which laws are implicated. The one case cited, FCC v.  
14 Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012), deals with a statute that either  
15 requires or forbids conduct, but does not involve the waiver of laws.  
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20 Lastly, Coalition Plaintiffs, in one paragraph, and not addressed in their reply,  
21 (Dkt. No. 29-1 at 36), and California Plaintiffs, raised in a paragraph, and not in their  
22 reply, (Dkt. No. 30-2 at 41), further claim that their First Amendment Right to Petition  
23 the government has been abridged by the judicial review bar in section 102(c)(2).  
24

25 The First Amendment guarantees “the right of the people . . . to petition the  
26 Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I.  
27  
28

1 A one paragraph argument, by Coalition Plaintiffs and California Plaintiffs, is not  
2 sufficient to meaningfully address a First Amendment challenge. The Court declines to  
3 address an issue not properly briefed by the parties.  
4

5 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and  
6 DENIES Coalition and California Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment on these  
7 issues.  
8

9 **6. Violation of the Tenth Amendment<sup>33</sup> - Concurrent State and**  
10 **Federal Jurisdiction**  
11

12 Coalition Plaintiffs argue that Congress lacks the power to eliminate the concurrent  
13 jurisdiction of state courts unless it vests that power exclusively with a federal court.  
14 (Dkt. No. 29-1 at 35-36.) They contend that section 102 eliminates both federal and state  
15 jurisdiction by “vesting ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ over issues into a federal court only then  
16 to also remove that judicial power from the very federal court it just vested with that  
17 power.” (*Id.* at 36.) Defendants respond that Congress has specifically displaced state  
18 court jurisdiction when it enacted section 102(c)(2)(A), and expressly made federal  
19 jurisdiction exclusive for challenges to the waiver determinations.  
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26 <sup>33</sup> In their papers, Coalition Plaintiffs do not allege whether the concurrent federal and state jurisdiction  
27 argument is premised on a Tenth Amendment violation. However, their complaint alleges a Tenth  
28 Amendment violation based on this argument. (Dkt. No. 26, FAC ¶ 115.)

1           “Under our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of  
2 the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause.  
3 Under this system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have  
4 inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising  
5 under the laws of the United States.” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). “This  
6 deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction is, of course,  
7 rebutted if Congress affirmatively ousts the state courts of jurisdiction over a particular  
8 federal claim.” Id. at 459.

9           Section 102(c)(2)(A) grants the federal court with exclusive jurisdiction to handle  
10 all causes of action arising under section 102(c)(1) alleging a violation of the Constitution  
11 but shall not have jurisdiction over any other claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A). By  
12 enacting section 102(c), Congress’s authority to grant exclusive jurisdiction to review any  
13 waiver determination to the federal district court is undisputed by the parties. Congress  
14 specifically granted federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction of any constitutional  
15 challenges but barred judicial review of any non-constitutional claim. Coalition Plaintiffs  
16 have not provided any legal authority that granting federal court exclusive jurisdiction  
17 over waiver determinations for solely constitutional claims violates the federal system of  
18 concurrent federal and state jurisdiction.  
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25           Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and  
26 DENIES Coalition Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on this issue.  
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28

1           **7. Violation of California’s Equal Sovereignty and Police Powers under**  
2                           **the Tenth Amendment**

3  
4           The Tenth Amendment states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States  
5 by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States  
6 respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend X. The State of California argues that  
7 under the authority of Shelby Cnty., Alabama v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), section  
8 102 violates the Tenth Amendment. California asserts that the Waivers violate the Tenth  
9 Amendment by burdening California, but not other states, when progress has been made  
10 curbing the problem that section 102 seeks to address, i.e. the dramatic reduction in the  
11 number of illegal crossings at the border. California also contends that under City of  
12 Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534-35 (1997), section 102 interferes with California’s  
13 police powers by intruding on its state sovereignty by waiving all state and local laws and  
14 regulations without any parameters and intruding on every level of government under a  
15 grossly broad law. Defendants argue that Shelby and City of Boerne are distinguishable  
16 and do not support California’s argument.

17  
18           Shelby involved a challenge to the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), enacted in 1965.  
19 Shelby, 133 S. Ct. at 2619. The Court held that the coverage formula contained in § 4(b)  
20 of the VRA, identifying jurisdictions covered by § 5’s preclearance requirement, was  
21 unconstitutional. Id. at 2620. If a state was a covered jurisdiction, § 5 required that no  
22 changes could be made to a state’s voting procedures unless approved by federal  
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1 authorities. Id. These provisions were originally meant to be temporary as they were to  
2 expire in five years but Congress subsequently reauthorized the Act several times. Id.  
3  
4 While the Court recognized the Supremacy Clause, it also noted the States' broad  
5 autonomy "in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative objectives" and that  
6 the framers of the Constitution "intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in  
7 the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections." Id. at 2623 (citations omitted)  
8 (noting that while the Federal Government has significant control over federal elections,  
9 states have "broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage  
10 may be exercised."). The Court also noted the "fundamental principle of *equal*  
11 'sovereignty' among the States." Id. (emphasis in original).

14 The VRA restriction only applied to nine States and some additional counties  
15 thereby violating the principal of equal sovereignty. Id. at 2624. In order to justify  
16 violating the equal sovereignty of states, the Court required that the statute's requirement  
17 be "sufficiently related to the problem that it targets." Id. at 2622. The Court found that  
18 the conditions that originally justified the VRA's passage, entrenched racial  
19 discrimination in voting, no longer existed in the covered states and counties as African-  
20 American voter turnout exceeded white voter turnout in the majority of the states covered  
21 by § 5. Id. at 2618-19. When a law treats one state differently from another, the  
22 Supreme Court "requires a showing that a statute's disparate geographic coverage is  
23 sufficiently related to the problem that it targets." Id. at 2622 (quoting Nw. Austin  
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1 Municipal Util. Dist. Number One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203-04 (2009)). The court  
2 held that the coverage formula under § 4 was unconstitutional. Id. at 2631.

3  
4 Relying on the principles in Shelby, California argues that section 102 violates the  
5 Tenth Amendment because it disparately treats California in imposing waiver of its laws  
6 to build additional barriers even though the number of “high illegal entry” of aliens has  
7 dramatically decreased in recent years.

8  
9 Here, unlike the State’s power to regulate elections in Shelby, the authority vested  
10 in the Secretary of DHS concerning immigration and border security is broad. See  
11 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395; Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 765. Moreover, a court in this district  
12 concluded that “Section 102 clearly manifests congressional intent to preempt state and  
13 local laws which would interfere with Congress’s objective to expeditiously construct the  
14 border fence.” Cnty. of El Paso, 2005 WL 4372693, at \*10 (concluding that under  
15 section 102(c), state and local laws would be preempted if the state’s enforcement of its  
16 statute interfered with federal objective and waiver statute did not violate the Tenth  
17 Amendment). California has not demonstrated that it has autonomy or authority in  
18 regulating its border with Mexico. Moreover, as to the principal of equal sovereignty,  
19 section 102 applies with equal force to any state that borders the United States.  
20 Inevitably all states are not border states, and section 102 does not single out a particular  
21 state in imposing requirements on state powers in a discriminatory manner as the VRA in  
22 Shelby.

1 Next, California argues that section 102 interferes with its police powers relying on  
2 City of Boerne. In City of Boerne, a local zoning authority denied a church a building  
3 permit, and the Supreme Court held that the Religious Freedom Reformation Act  
4 (“RFRA”) was unconstitutional as applied to the states because it was beyond Congress’s  
5 remedial power to regulate states under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the  
6 Constitution. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment  
7 grants Congress broad authority to remedy and deter constitutional violations. Id. at 518.  
8 The Court noted that RFRA was not remedial or preventive legislation but instead an  
9 attempt at “substantive change in constitutional protections.” Id. at 532. The scope and  
10 reach of RFRA was overly broad, as it applied to every agency and official in federal,  
11 state and local governments and to any federal and state law, and was temporally broad  
12 with no termination date. Id.

13 The Court does not find City of Boerne supportive of California’s argument. First,  
14 City of Boerne did not involve a claim of a Tenth Amendment violation but addressed  
15 Congress’ authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a distinct provision  
16 of the Constitution. California claims its police powers, to legislate for the public good,  
17 is being curtailed by section 102 and that section 102(c) is grossly overbroad as it allows  
18 for the waiver of “all federal and state law.” While the language of section 102(c) is  
19 broad since it applies to a waiver of “all legal requirements” the waiver is circumscribed  
20 to those the Secretary determines are “necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the  
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1 barriers and roads.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(c). The two waivers at issue are limited to the  
2 “construction of roads and physical barriers . . . in the Project Area.” (Dkt. No. 30-6,  
3 Cayaban Decl., Ex. 11, 82 Fed. Reg. at 35985; *id.*, Ex. 12, 82 Fed. Reg. at 42830.)  
4  
5 Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, section 102’s granting the Secretary authority to waive  
6 state laws is not indefinite in duration and unlimited. Moreover, as noted by a district  
7 court, section 102 does not abrogate the validity of state laws but “merely suspend[s] the  
8 effects of the state and local laws.” Cnty. of El Paso, 2008 WL 4372693, at \*8.  
9

10 The Court concludes that California Plaintiff’s Tenth Amendment claim is without  
11 merit, and GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and DENIES California  
12 Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on this issue.  
13

14 **G. Whether Constitutional Avoidance Compels a Ruling that the August 2**  
15 **Waiver is Ultra Vires to section 102**  
16

17 In their reply, Coalition Plaintiffs, for the first time, assert that judicial review of  
18 sections 102(a) and (b) is necessary to avoid serious constitutional problems. They argue  
19 that there are serious constitutional concerns because section 102(c) grants an unelected  
20 cabinet official with unbridled power to waive any law that has any remote connection to  
21 border security projects. Center Plaintiff also raises for the first time in its reply that the  
22 doctrine of constitutional avoidance compels a holding that the August 2 Waiver is ultra  
23 vires to section 102. In their reply, Defendants summarily argue that the canon of  
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1 constitutional avoidance does not apply since the challenges are not serious enough based  
2 on the plain text of section 102.

3  
4 “The so-called canon of constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool, counseling  
5 that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts.”  
6 FCC v. Fox Tel. Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009) (citation omitted). If  
7  
8 “the statute does not raise constitutional concerns, then there is no basis for employing  
9 the canon of constitutional avoidance.” Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1140 (9th  
10 Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Moreover, if there is no ambiguity in the statute,  
11 constitutional avoidance has no application. Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529  
12 (2014) (Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) is not ambiguous).

13  
14 “It is a bedrock principle of statutory interpretation that ‘where an otherwise  
15 acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court  
16 will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly  
17 contrary to the intent of Congress.’” Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 690 (9th Cir. 2017)  
18 (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,  
19 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). The constitutional avoidance doctrine may be invoked only if  
20 the court has “grave doubts” about the statute’s constitutionality. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565  
21 F.3d 1126, 1143 (9th Cir. 2009); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238  
22 (1998) (“those who invoke the doctrine must believe that the alternative is a serious  
23 likelihood that the statute will be held unconstitutional.”).


1 As discussed above, the Court does not have serious constitutional doubts as to the  
2 constitutionality of section 102(c). Moreover, prior challenges to the initial amendment  
3 of section 102(c) broadening its waiver authority in 2005 have been upheld as  
4 constitutional. Accordingly, the Court declines to apply the doctrine of constitutional  
5 avoidance. Accordingly, the Court declines to apply the doctrine of constitutional  
6 avoidance.

7  
8 **CONCLUSION**

9 Based on the reasoning above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motions for summary  
10 judgment and GRANTS Defendants' motions for summary judgment with the exception  
11 of the Center Plaintiff's seventh cause of action for FOIA violations.  
12

13 IT IS SO ORDERED.

14 Dated: February 27, 2018

15   
16 Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel  
17 United States District Judge  
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