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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO/OAKLAND DIVISION

V.L., *et al.*,

Plaintiffs

v.

WAGNER, *et al.*,

Defendants

) Case No.: CV 09-04668 CW

) **REPLY IN SUPPORT OF**
) **PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR**
) **PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

) DATE: October 19, 2009

) TIME: 10:00 a.m.

) PLACE: Courtroom 2, 4th Floor

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INTRODUCTION

1
2 In response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Defendants’ central
3 contention is that the functional ranks and composite Functional Index (“FI”) Score are reasonable
4 measures of need. Defendants never squarely address the objections raised by the county officials
5 who administer the IHSS program – that use of the functional index to determine eligibility is
6 arbitrary and defeats the purpose of the program, which is to keep recipients safely at home. They
7 also never acknowledge the absence of a relationship between functional ranks and scores and
8 criticality or need. Nor do Defendants address the way in which the FI Scores of children and
9 individuals with psychiatric and cognitive disabilities are artificially low, which result in
10 disproportionate terminations. Ignoring these defects does not make them go away. They are
11 evidence of the profound irrationality of the use of the functional index as an eligibility standard.

12 Plaintiffs’ opening brief demonstrated convincingly the irreparable harm that will befall
13 130,000 Californians if ABX4 4 is implemented. Defendants quibble over whether some of the
14 named Plaintiffs will be able to find alternative services, but cannot counter Plaintiffs’ showing of
15 this enormous harm. Before turning to irreparable harm, however, Plaintiffs discuss why
16 functional ranks and FI Scores are not reasonable proxies for need (which is relevant to both harm
17 and the merits), and demonstrate that Plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on the merits.

I. Functional Ranks and Functional Index Scores Were Not Intended to, and Do Not, Measure Recipients’ Need for IHSS in Order to Remain Safely at Home.

18
19
20 Defendants’ arguments, with respect to both Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits
21 and irreparable harm, are premised on one central claim, which is belied by the evidence: that
22 ABX4 4 eliminates and reduces IHSS services on the basis of recipients’ need. *See, e.g.*, Opp. 1-2
23 (arguing comparability, sufficiency, reasonable standards, ADA, and irreparable harm claims fail
24 because functional ranks and FI Scores measure need). If Defendants are wrong about this central
25 point (and they are), their opposition to a preliminary injunction entirely collapses.

26 The extensive record evidence shows that county social workers conduct individualized
27 assessments of applicants’ eligibility for IHSS services, that they may not authorize services unless
28

1 “the recipient would not be able to remain safely in his/her own home without IHSS,” and that they
 2 are required to go beyond functional ranks to determine the level of assistance needed by IHSS
 3 recipients. Pl. Br. 5-6.

4 **A. The FI Score Does Not Bear a Reasonable Relationship to an Individual’s Need for**
 5 **Any Particular IHSS Service.**

6 Defendants fail to refute Plaintiffs’ showing that the FI Score, upon which Plaintiffs’ continued
 7 eligibility for IHSS now depends, is not a reasonable measure of any particular recipient’s need for
 8 any specific IHSS service, because, as the declarations establish, it does not measure criticality of
 9 services, and cannot serve as a reasonable proxy for what would happen to a recipient if services
 10 were eliminated. Pl. Br. at pp. 8-13; *see also, e.g.*, Gardner Supp. Decl. ¶8, Kessler Decl. ¶ 6.

- 11 • The FI Score is a weighted average of functional ranks for 11 IHSS tasks. It does not take
 12 into account whether any one or several of those tasks are critical to an IHSS recipient’s
 13 ability to live safely at home; it looks only at *how many* services the recipient needs, *and*
 14 *the statewide average number of hours needed to perform those tasks*. Individuals who
 15 need fewer discrete services, or services that require fewer hours, will necessarily have
 16 lower FI Scores. Pl. Br. 12.¹
- 17 • The FI Score does not include some IHSS tasks such as medication management and
 18 accompaniment to medical appointments that are medically necessary for many IHSS
 19 recipients. Pl. Br. 12.
- 20 • The functional ranks that are summed and averaged to arrive at the FI Score are themselves
 21 not reliable indicators of need. Pl. Br. 8-10, *infra* at 5-7.
- 22 • The weights used have no external validity. Pl. Br. 12; *see also* Benjamin Decl. ¶12.
- 23 • The FI Scores of children are particularly meaningless because children automatically

24 ¹ It is as if the state is treating a person who has appendicitis *and* symptoms of a heart attack
 25 as “more needy” than a person who only has appendicitis, because one person needs two services
 26 (appendectomy and heart stent) while the other person needs only one service (appendectomy) to
 27 live. If you take the “average” number of surgeries needed, you might determine (as the state has
 28 with respect to the FI Score) that the person with appendicitis but no heart trouble is “less needy”
 than the person with both. But the person with appendicitis needs the appendectomy to live just as
 surely as the person who needs two separate surgeries.

1 receive a rank of 1 for many services. Pl. Br. 12-13.²

- 2 • Individuals with mental impairments are disproportionately likely to have FI Scores below
3 2.0 and thus be terminated from all services. Pl. Br. 13.

4 For example, Plaintiff David Oster has functional ranks of 5 for housework, laundry, and
5 shopping; that is, his social worker has determined he is incapable of performing these tasks, even
6 with substantial assistance. Oster Decl. ¶11. He also has a functional rank of 3 for meal
7 preparation, which means that he needs some human assistance to safely prepare meals. *Id.* But
8 because he does not need other services not typically needed by person with mental disabilities
9 (such as assistance with mobility, toileting and eating) he will be denied services that he cannot
10 safely perform by himself, and without which he cannot live independently. *See* Medina Decl.
11 ¶¶ 3-4 (Oster’s apartment was full of trash and rotten food before he started receiving IHSS). Thus
12 it is not true that “[p]eople who demonstrate the same level of need will receive the same services.”
13 Opp. 14. Plaintiff Oster, with a rank of 5 for housework, laundry, and shopping, will no longer
14 receive IHSS whereas another individual who has similar ranks for those tasks will continue to
15 receive those services if that person also needs assistance with, for example, mobility and toileting.
16 *See also* Supp. Gardner Decl. ¶ 10 (noting “arbitrary nature” of Oster’s FI Score).³

17 Defendants’ assertion that “[t]he FI Score provides a reasonable measure of each recipient’s
18 individual need for service,” Opp. at p. 4,⁴ falsely equates “relative dependence on human
19 assistance for IHSS tasks” (i.e. the number of services or hours needed) with need, without taking

20 ² Defendants’ declarant Janet Nicholson incorrectly contends that children above age 3 may
21 receive a score above 1 for certain domestic and related services, such as meal preparation and
22 clean up. Nicholson Decl. ¶9. However, CDSS training materials state that children up to the age
23 of 17 should be assessed with a functional rank of 1 for meal preparation and clean up. Nicco
24 Supp. Decl. Ex. A at 1.

25 ³ After a recent psychiatric hospitalization, Mr. Oster’s social worker authorized six
26 additional hours per month for accompaniment to medical appointments because his psychiatric
27 condition had worsened. However, his FI Score did not change (because accompaniment to
28 medical appointments is not included in the FI Score), and remains below 2.0. Supp. Gardner
Decl. ¶10.

⁴ *See, e.g.* Carroll Decl. Ex. A at 13 (“Since the FI Score is a measurement of the client’s
relative dependence on human assistance for selected IHSS tasks, there should be a correlation
between each client’s FI Score and his FI Hours.”).

1 into account the fact that even one or two or three services can be critical to maintaining an
2 individual safely in his or her own home. *See* Supp. Gardner Decl. ¶8.

3 Defendants – who have access to all the data on IHSS recipients whose services will be
4 eliminated – have also failed to rebut Plaintiffs’ evidence that the use of the FI score has a
5 particularly detrimental effect upon people with psychiatric and cognitive disabilities. *See* Opp. 26.
6 Defendants have presented no answer to Plaintiffs’ declarations from both experts and county
7 officials that individuals with mental impairments are disproportionately likely to have FI Scores
8 below the eligibility threshold. Pl. Br. 13.⁵

9 Defendants’ reliance on the declaration of Ernest Cowles to support the proposition that the
10 FI Score is a reasonable measure of individual need is misplaced.⁶ Not only does Dr. Cowles
11 provide no support for his opinion, but the opinion is based on a non-sequitur. Benjamin Decl.
12 ¶12. He states that he recalculated the county weights (originally calculated in 1988) in June
13 2009, and “found that the number of individuals that were ranked less than 2.0 did not change
14 substantially from 1988. Therefore, the FI Score is a reasonable measure because it has been
15 consistent over time.” Cowles Decl. ¶3. But consistency over time has no bearing on accuracy:
16 The FI Score could be consistently wrong. Benjamin Decl. ¶12. Nor is the Cowles declaration
17 correct that the FI Score takes criticality into account. *See supra* at 2-4; Benjamin Decl. ¶14
18 (noting that fact that FI Score includes services that are critical to certain people, such as

19 _____
20 ⁵ For example, Joyce McHenry’s severe depression and anxiety disorder mean that she
21 requires verbal assistance in order to dress, bathe and groom, and prepare meals, and has functional
22 ranks of 2 for those services. McHenry Decl. ¶ 2; Kline Supp. Decl., Ex. B. She has been assessed
23 a 3 for housework and shopping—she can do some of this work herself, but often forgets, or cannot
24 muster the energy. *Id.* ¶ 5. These relatively “low” functional ranks, combined with her ability to
25 move, toilet, and eat independently, have resulted in an FI Score of 1.64. Medication management
26 and accompaniment to medical appointments are extremely important for Ms. McHenry. *Id.* at ¶4,
27 6. But these IHSS service are not included in the FI Score. Furthermore, Ms. McHenry is not a
28 regional center client and does not qualify for protective supervision. McHenry Supp. Decl. ¶¶2-4;
Kline Supp. Decl., Ex. B. Ms. McHenry has been hospitalized before due to her depression and
suicide attempt, and is likely to require such services again in the absence of IHSS. McHenry
Decl. ¶ 7. Other individuals with mental disabilities similarly are not authorized for protective
supervision and do not receive regional center services. *See* Supp. Aho Decl. ¶ 2; Love Decl. ¶ 7.

⁶ Although Dr. Cowles has a Ph.D., it is in criminology. Cowles Decl. Ex. A; *see also* Pl.
Obj. Def. Evid.

1 respiration, does not make use of an *average* any less problematic for people who have critical
2 need for some, but not a great number, of services); *see also* Gardner Supp. Decl. ¶¶8-9.

3 Indeed, the final paragraph of the Cowles Declaration and the attached “Summary
4 Statistics” illustrate that the FI Score is not a reasonable measure of need. *See* Benjamin Decl. ¶16.
5 According to the Declaration, if the 2009 weighted average (rather than the 1988 weighted
6 average) were used to determine FI Scores, an additional 1,500 individuals would lose IHSS
7 eligibility due to ABX4 4. Cowles Decl. ¶6. In other words, a change to the complex formula,
8 based on the average hours assigned by 58 counties throughout the state to over 400,000 recipients
9 for 11 tasks, changes the eligibility of specific individuals for those services. Benjamin Decl. ¶16.
10 But a change in mathematical formula does not change those individuals’ specific needs. *Id.*

11 Independent researchers have concluded that the FI Score is not a rational measure of need.
12 A recent study by the UCLA Center for Health Policy Research found that “[t]he assumption made
13 by the state budget cuts that an FIS score below 2 represents someone who needs fewer services is
14 inaccurate.” Benjamin Decl., Ex. B at 24.⁷ Report co-author Dr. A.E. Benjamin, a professor of
15 Social Welfare at UCLA and expert in home care services, explains that, because the FI Score is an
16 average of 11 different tasks, those who need a larger number of services will generally receive
17 higher FI Scores. “The FI Score does not measure, and says nothing about, the nature or intensity
18 of an individual’s need for any particular service, or the risk associated with withdrawing that
19 assistance.” Benjamin Decl. ¶24. Dr. Benjamin concludes, “the Functional Index Score and
20 functional rankings are not reasonable measures of need for IHSS services.” Benjamin Decl. ¶22.

21 **B. The Functional Ranks Do Not Indicate Degree of Need for Services.**

22 Plaintiffs’ opening brief explained that functional ranks 2-5 do not measure whether a
23 recipient needs a particular service, but simply characterize the type or degree of assistance needed.
24 Defendants’ own statutes and regulations show that any recipient with a functional rank of 2 or
25 higher cannot perform the function safely without assistance. Welf. & Inst. Code § 12309(d); MPP

26
27 ⁷ *See also* Barnes, *et al.*, Kline Decl. Ex. D at 68 (inclusion of household help in functional
28 index “probably contributes to the inconsistency with which the scale is applied”).

1 § 30-763.1. It is not true that some individuals are authorized for IHSS services only to “improve
2 their quality of life.” Opp. 4; Nicco Supp. Decl. ¶9. Moreover, Plaintiffs showed that the
3 differences among functional ranks of 2, 3, and 4 are difficult to discern and cannot be determined
4 with precision, and that recipients with cognitive or psychiatric disabilities may correctly be
5 assessed with a functional rank of “2” even though assistance is critical to them. Pl. Br. 8-9.

6 Defendants have not refuted this showing. Their argument that social workers have
7 received training in how to conduct assessments (Opp. 4) is to no avail, as Plaintiffs’ argument
8 does not rest on inaccuracy of assessments, but rests instead on the use of the rankings for
9 inappropriate purposes. Moreover, Defendants fail to note that this training is focused almost
10 entirely on the hourly task guidelines and on the need for accurate and uniform hours authorization,
11 rather than accurate and uniform assessment of functional ranks, which have heretofore never been
12 used to determine eligibility for services. *See* Collins Supp. Decl. ¶3; Kaljian Supp. Decl. ¶2;
13 Kessler Decl. ¶ 5-10. Notably, social workers are required to document exceptions to the hourly
14 task guidelines, but these exceptions are nowhere captured in the functional ranks the State will use
15 to determine eligibility absent a preliminary injunction. Benjamin Decl. ¶28.

16 Defendants also argue that the ranks have been evaluated and validated by state and county
17 review teams, but provide no competent evidence of this. Opp. 4. The only support they cite is
18 Paragraph 13 of the Carroll Declaration. *See* Pl. Obj. Def. Evid. None of the studies supposedly
19 validating the functional ranks is attached to her declaration; instead, she includes only studies
20 from 1988 and 1989 when the system was first enacted. Dr. Benjamin is unaware of any such
21 recent study. Benjamin Decl. ¶29.⁸

22 _____
23 ⁸ There are many reasons to distrust statements in the Carroll Declaration not supported by
24 accompanying evidence. For example, she blatantly misstates the statutory definition for the
25 functional rank of 3, stating that an individual can be ranked a 3 if that individual “requires
26 *minimal* human assistance with the tasks,” when the statute, and the documents she attaches to her
27 declaration, describe rank 3 as indicating a need for “some” human assistance. Welf. & Inst. Code
28 § 12309(d)(3); Carroll Decl. Ex. A & B. Ms. Carroll also states that “ABX4 4 mandates that
Domestic and Related Services will be authorized only to those individuals with a substantial need
for that specific service based on a Rank of at least 4 in that functional area.” A rank of 4 does not
mean that a person has “substantial need” for that service, but, rather, that a person needs
“substantial assistance” to perform that task. Welf. & Inst. Code § 12309(d)(4). As Plaintiffs have

1 Moreover, the recent UCLA Center for Health Policy Research study indicates that there
 2 are unexplained differences between the functional rankings in different counties: In San Diego
 3 County, an estimated one-third of all elderly IHSS recipients will lose one or more domestic
 4 service because of a functional rank below 4, whereas in Santa Clara County, only one-tenth of
 5 elderly recipients will lose eligibility. Benjamin Decl., Ex. B at 12, ¶26. The only other published
 6 study of which Plaintiffs are aware analyzing the reliability of the functional ranks, which was
 7 authored by the Institute for Social Research (with which Dr. Cowles is affiliated), found the
 8 following:

- 9 • Mental functioning is weakly related to functional level. Kline Decl., Ex. D at 8, 16.
- 10 • Use of time-task guidelines, especially for domestic or related services, lessens the
 11 importance to social workers of making precise distinctions in functional ranks. *Id.* at 9,
 12 17.
- 13 • Distinctions among functional ranks on household tasks are difficult to draw. *Id.* at 10, 18.
- 14 • Demands of particular home environments (a required factor in assessments) vary
 15 independently of client functioning. *Id.* at 17.

16 **II. Defendants' Notices Are Not Reasonably Calculated to Inform Plaintiffs of Their Appeal**
 17 **Rights.**

18 The notices Defendants plan to mail to IHSS recipients do not comport with due process
 19 and will not prevent irreparable harm by giving recipients sufficient notice to request a fair hearing
 20 within ten days of receipt so that they can continue to receive IHSS services (“aid paid pending”).
 21 It is well settled that where recipients lack the capacity to understand and act upon a notice of
 22 benefits termination and corresponding appeal rights, and state officials are or should be aware that
 23 recipients lack such capacity, the notices are defective and violate due process. *See* Pl. Br. 21. As
 24 Defendants acknowledge, the notice must be drafted “in terms comprehensible to the client.” *Opp.*
 25 9. Many class members, because of their disabilities and/or limited English, will be unable to
 26 understand and act upon the highly technical and complicated English-only, single-spaced, notice
 27 described, a person may need only “some” human assistance to perform a task, but still have a
 28 “substantial need” for that service. *See* Pl. Obj. Def. Evid.

1 and “stuffer” that explain how the functional index score is calculated. *See* Carroll Decl., Ex. B.⁹

2 Both the notice and “stuffer” will be incomprehensible to most IHSS recipients. Thomson
3 Decl. ¶ 12; *see also* Padilla Decl., ¶ 8. Each is esoteric and highly technical, and they are not
4 readable or accessible to IHSS recipients. *Id.* The complicated description of the formula used to
5 calculate the FI Score requires the recipient to have “knowledge or aptitude beyond that possessed
6 by the average high school graduate.” *Id.* It is replete with perplexing abbreviations. And before
7 now, IHSS recipients have never been told what their FI Score or rankings are, Pl. Br. 11, n. 11, 12,
8 making the notice all the more confusing. And without understanding the stuffer, IHSS recipients
9 will be unable to make an informed decision whether to appeal.

10 Further, elderly or disabled individuals may be assumed to “be unable or disinclined,
11 because of physical handicaps and, in the case of the aged, mental handicaps as well, to take the
12 necessary affirmative action” on the notice. *Vargas v. Trainor*, 508 F.2d 485, 489-90 (7th Cir.
13 1974) (notice that required elderly and disabled individuals to meet with case managers or appeal
14 without knowing basis of termination violated due process). *See also* Thomson Decl., ¶ 12; Ackel
15 Decl. ¶¶ 5(a), (b), 7; Williams Decl. ¶10; K. Good Decl. ¶¶7-8; Kaljian Supp. Decl. ¶9. Many
16 members of the Plaintiff Class will be unable to comply with the 10-day appeal deadlines in order
17 to receive aid paid pending the outcome of their appeals. Ackel Decl., ¶ 7; Williams Decl. ¶18; S.
18 Good Decl. ¶6; Kaljian Supp. Decl. ¶9.

19 Other individuals may not appeal because they will not understand that they could have a
20 “home hearing,” and mistakenly believe they cannot challenge the loss of services because they
21 cannot leave their homes due to their disabilities. Ackel Decl. ¶ 5(c). Some will not appeal
22 because they are afraid that they will lose further services if they request a hearing to challenge the
23 cuts. *Id.* ¶5(d). Some will not appeal simply because they do not or cannot open and read their
24

25 ⁹ The exact contours of the Notice to be sent have been a moving target. The Notice
26 attached to ACL 09-56 (Oct. 1, 2009), RJN Ex. A, is different than the apparently final notice
27 attached to the Carroll Declaration, in that the draft contains a 22-page stuffer while the final
28 contains a one-page stuffer. (And both differ from the draft notice attached to the draft ACL issued
on Sept. 17-18, 2009; *see* RJN, Ex. B.)

1 mail until someone is there to assist them. *Id.* ¶5(e); Williams Decl. ¶12-14; S. Good Decl ¶9.¹⁰

2 Elderly or disabled IHSS recipients who do not speak English will certainly not understand
3 the notice, which is exclusively in English except for one line in Spanish that states, “If you do not
4 understand the information or notice, contact the social worker in your county. The county should
5 provide you with an interpretation service free of charge.” Carroll Decl., Ex. B; Taggares Supp.
6 Decl. ¶4. This does not even warn Spanish-speaking recipients that this is an important notice
7 regarding termination or reduction of benefits. Moreover, there are *no* advisements for other non-
8 English speakers informing them of their right to a free translation of the notice and stuffer.
9 Carroll Decl., Ex. B. Yet IHSS data indicate that 15% of IHSS recipients are monolingual Spanish
10 speakers and 34% of IHSS recipients are monolingual in a language other than English or Spanish.
11 Rich Supp. Decl., Ex. A. Consequently, an extra burden is placed on non-English speaking IHSS
12 recipients (almost half of all IHSS recipients) to (1) realize the importance of the notice; and (2)
13 find someone to translate it. It is not reasonable to expect these individuals to obtain translation of
14 the notice in sufficient time to act upon it within the 10-day aid paid pending timeframe.

15 Finally, the notice and stuffer are not available in alternate formats (*i.e.* large print, Braille,
16 tape), or in more simple language that might be needed by some recipients with disabilities. The
17 notice and stuffer thus violate the ADA and Section 504. *See* Pl. Br. 23, n. 20.

18 **III. Defendants Have Failed to Undermine Plaintiffs’ Showing of Likelihood of Success on**
19 **Their Medicaid Claims.**

20 **A. Defendants Violate the Comparability Requirement.**

21 The parties are in agreement regarding the basic requirements of the Medicaid Act’s
22 comparability requirement, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B). In Defendants’ words, comparability is
23 violated “when some recipients are treated differently from other recipients where each has the

24 ¹⁰ There is no merit to Defendants’ contention that IHSS recipients who are incompetent to
25 understand and act upon the notices will have their due process rights protected because notices
26 will be mailed to authorized representatives of these individuals. Opp. 10. There is no evidence that
27 all, or even most, incompetent IHSS recipients have authorized representatives. And non-legal
28 representatives or family members have no legal duty to act on behalf of the IHSS recipient
receiving the notice. *See Cultbertson v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs.*, 859 F. 2d 319, 324 (4th
Cir. 1988).

1 same level of need.” Opp. 12:19-21.¹¹ In this case, the use of the flawed FI Scores and functional
 2 ranks to distinguish between those who receive IHSS services and those who do not violates the
 3 comparability requirement, because neither is a reasonable measure of the criticality of any
 4 particular service, or a proxy for the effects of eliminating that service. As previously discussed,
 5 an individual with a cognitive or psychiatric disability may need the assistance of an IHSS provider
 6 just as much as one with a physical disability, but because of the way that the functional ranks and
 7 FI scores are calculated, will lose services. *See* Pl. Br. 9-10, 12-13. Similarly, a child with severe
 8 disabilities requiring substantial physical assistance may be cut off while an adult requiring similar
 9 assistance will not be, simply based on automatic low ranks for children. *See, e.g.,* Collins Decl.
 10 ¶¶ 21, 25; Nicco Decl. ¶ 32; *supra* at 2-3.¹² As in *Sobky v. Smoley*, 855 F.Supp. 1123, 1139-40
 11 (E.D. Cal. 1994), where the availability of methadone treatment varied by county in an arbitrary
 12 way and thus violated the comparability requirement, here the availability of IHSS is limited by a
 13 similarly irrelevant standard – recipients’ FI scores and rankings – which do not measure the
 14 criticality of services or the individual’s ability to live safely at home without the services.

15 Defendants fundamentally misapprehend the nature of Plaintiffs’ comparability claim when
 16 they argue that “plaintiffs are essentially contending that because recipients qualified for a certain
 17 level of services at one point, a state may never amend the eligibility requirements as this would
 18 somehow violate the comparability requirement.” Opp. 13.¹³ Not so. Plaintiffs do not contest that

19
 20 ¹¹ Defendants note that comparability “may be waived” as to the State Plan Option (Opp. 12
 n.3), but do not, and cannot, contend that comparability was in fact waived here.

21 ¹² Defendants cite 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c), suggesting that the comparability requirement
 22 applies only to distinctions based on “diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.” The cited regulation
 23 does not address comparability, but rather prohibits states from “arbitrarily deny[ing] or reduc[ing]
 24 the amount, duration, or scope” of certain mandatory Medicaid programs. As defendants
 elsewhere correct concede, the comparability provision requires, more generally, that individuals
 with like needs receive like services. *See, e.g.,* Opp. 13:18-19.

25 ¹³ Further, Defendants point out that a different Medicaid regulation (*not* the comparability
 26 regulation set forth in 42 C.F.R. § 440.240), permits states to “place appropriate limits on a service
 27 based on such criteria as medical necessity or on utilization control procedures.” 42 C.F.R.
 § 440.230(d). This has no relevance here, both because the regulation is not part of the
 28 comparability law, and because FI Scores and ranks do not differentiate between recipients on the
 basis of medical necessity.

1 Defendants could impose limitations on services without violating comparability. But where, as
 2 here, the limitations at issue *result in individuals with similar needs receiving critically different*
 3 *levels of services*, comparability is violated.

4 Defendants' attempt to distinguish *Jenkins v. Washington State Dep't Soc. & Health Servs.*,
 5 157 P.3d 388 (Wash. 2007), is unpersuasive. As in *Jenkins*, here IHSS recipients have been
 6 assessed through an individualized process to determine their needs. As in *Jenkins*, the State has
 7 subsequently imposed a categorical formula to eliminate services, regardless of how or whether
 8 that formula adequately reflects individuals' need for services. And as in *Jenkins*, the State's
 9 introduction of an across-the-board standard that "presumes certain needs of the recipient are met
 10 without an individualized determination" (*id.* at 393-94), violates the comparability requirement.

11 **B. Defendants Violate the Reasonable Standards and Sufficiency Requirements.**

12 **1. Plaintiffs May Enforce the Reasonable Standards and Sufficiency** 13 **Requirements Directly Under the Supremacy Clause.**

14 Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' claims under the Medicaid Act's reasonable standards (42
 15 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)) and sufficiency (42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b)) requirements must fail because
 16 these provisions are not privately enforceable. But Plaintiffs assert these claims directly under the
 17 Supremacy Clause, not under 42 U.S.C. §1983. First Amended Compl. ¶¶ 212-19. *Watson v.*
 18 *Weeks*, 436 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2006), relied on by Defendants, is therefore irrelevant. In that case,
 19 the court held that Section 1396a(a)(17) does not create a Section 1983 private right of action. But
 20 in *Independent Living Ctr. S. Cal. v. Shewry*, 543 F.3d 1050, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2008), *cert. denied*,
 21 129 S.Ct. 2828 (2009), the Ninth Circuit held that such conclusion does not bar a request for
 22 injunctive relief under the Supremacy Clause for violations of the Medicaid Act.

23 Defendants assert that *Independent Living Center* is distinguishable because it involved a
 24 different provision of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A). Opp. 16-17. In fact, the
 25 cases are directly analogous. In *Sanchez v. Johnson*, 416 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth
 26 Circuit had held that the Medicaid Act provision at issue in *Independent Living Center* did not
 27 create a right enforceable under Section 1983. But that was irrelevant to *Independent Living*
 28 *Center's* conclusion regarding the availability of injunctive relief under the Supremacy Clause.

1 Instead, “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly entertained claims for injunctive relief based on
 2 federal preemption, without requiring that the standards for bringing suit under § 1983 be met . . .”;
 3 “a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under the Supremacy Clause on the basis of federal preemption
 4 need not assert a federally created ‘right,’ in the sense that term has been recently used in suits
 5 brought under § 1983.” 543 F.3d at 1055 & 1058.

6 The conclusion in *Watson* regarding Section 1983 is just as irrelevant with respect to the
 7 Supremacy Clause enforceability of Section 1396a(a)(17) as was *Sanchez* with respect to
 8 Supremacy Clause enforcement of Section 1396a(a)(30)(A).¹⁴ Although the Ninth Circuit has not
 9 yet considered Section 1396a(a)(17) in the context of a Supremacy Clause challenge (*Independent*
 10 *Living Center* would dictate the outcome), the Eighth Circuit in *Lankford v. Sherman*, 451 F.3d
 11 496, 509-13 (8th Cir. 2006), addressed this precise issue, holding Section 1396a(a)(17) was not
 12 enforceable under Section 1983 but that the claim may be brought under the Supremacy Clause.¹⁵

13 Defendants are also wrong, and miss the point, with respect to Plaintiffs’ sufficiency claim,
 14 when they argue that private rights of action to enforce federal law can only be created by federal
 15 statute, not regulations. See *Independent Living Ctr. of S. Cal.*, 543 F.3d at 1059 (“A party may
 16 bring a claim under the Supremacy Clause that a local enactment is preempted even if the federal
 17 law at issue does not create a private right of action.” (quotation marks omitted)). Defendants
 18 cannot dispute the *preemptive force* of the regulation under the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., *Geier*
 19 *v. American Honda Motor Co.*, 529 U.S. 861, 884-86 (2000) (state law preempted where it poses
 20 obstacle to objective of federal regulation); *City of New York v. FCC*, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988)
 21 (Supremacy Clause “encompasses both federal statutes themselves and federal regulations that are
 22 properly adopted in accordance with statutory authority.”); cf. *Bank of Am. v. City & County of San*

23 ¹⁴ Just as *Watson* opined that the statute at issue was “too vague and amorphous for judicial
 24 enforcement” (436 F.3d at 1162), the Court in *Sanchez* held that the “‘broad and diffuse’ language
 25 of the statute [was not] amenable to judicial remedy” (416 F.3d at 1060). This did not prevent the
 26 court in *Independent Living Center* from holding that such claims are enforceable under the
 27 Supremacy Clause.

28 ¹⁵ As Defendants’ footnote 6 indicates, their real issue is with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
Independent Living Center. But the Supreme Court has already declined to review that decision,
 129 S.Ct. 2828, and Defendants have no grounds to ask the Court to disregard binding circuit law.

1 *Francisco*, 309 F.3d 551, 560-61 (9th Cir. 2002) (field preemption by regulation).

2 **2. ABX4 4 Does Not Meet the Medicaid Act's Reasonableness Requirement.**

3 As with the comparability analysis, the parties do not differ regarding the applicable law,
4 but merely in how that law applies to the facts of this case. Defendants repeatedly claim that
5 restricting or eliminating IHSS based on FI Scores or functional ranks allows for distinctions based
6 on "need," but, as discussed extensively above and in our opening brief, this is not true: A
7 functional rank of 2 or above for any particular task indicates that the recipient cannot live safely in
8 his or her home without assistance for that task, and signals the nature of that assistance (*i.e.* verbal
9 or physical), but not the number of hours needed or the criticality of the assistance; the FI Score
10 indicates only the number of services/hours needed (if that), and not whether or not a particular
11 service is critical, or whether a person can survive at home without that assistance.

12 As in *Lankford*, here the State has used unreasonable standards for determining eligibility
13 for IHSS services in order to limit access to those services, with nonsensical results. *See supra* at
14 1-7.¹⁶ And as in *Allen v. Mansour*, 681 F. Supp. 1232, 1234 (E.D. Mich. 1986), the State relies on
15 a measurement that is not supported by expert opinion or scientific data. *See* Benjamin Decl. ¶¶15,
16 21-22; Gardner Decl. ¶¶8-9. Further, as in *White v. Beal*, 555 F.2d 1146, 1151-52 (3d Cir. 1977),
17 *Hern v. Beye*, 57 F.3d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 1995), and *Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis*, 591 F.2d 121, 126
18 (1st Cir. 1979), the terminations and reductions based on the FI Score and functional ranks
19 discriminate against people who have different types of diagnosis or conditions (here, mental v.
20 physical disabilities) yet the same need for services. *See supra* at 1-7, Pl. Br. at 10-13, 32-34.

21 While Defendants point to various mechanisms such as carve-out exceptions that
22 supposedly ameliorate the arbitrary nature of the FI scoring system, they do not cure the violation
23 of the reasonable standards requirement. For example, Defendants have presented no evidence that

24 _____
25 ¹⁶ For example, two blind women in Sonoma County are both authorized to receive
26 domestic and related services as well as accompaniment to medical services. Kaljian Supp. Decl. ¶
27 10. Social workers authorized these services because they were necessary for recipients to live
28 safely in their homes. But because of the vagaries of the FI Scoring system, one of these women
has an FI Score of 1.75 and will be terminated from IHSS, while the other (with very similar needs)
has an FI Score of 2.18, and will not be terminated.

1 all of the IHSS recipients fall within an exempted category. Nor does the existence of the federally
2 required fair hearing process, or theoretically available alternative services, cure the legal violation
3 caused by the denial of IHSS based on unreasonable standards.

4 **3. Defendants Do Not Address Plaintiffs' Sufficiency Argument.**

5 Defendants entirely fail to address Plaintiffs' claim that reducing domestic and related
6 services for 97,000 IHSS recipients, while leaving other IHSS services in place for these recipients,
7 will violate federal requirements that the remaining services "be sufficient in amount, duration, and
8 scope to reasonably achieve its purpose." 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b). Plaintiffs' sufficiency argument
9 is directed *only* at the reductions to domestic and related services – a critical point Defendants
10 completely ignore. *See* Pl. Br. 28:4-19; First Amended Compl. at 37 & ¶¶ 212-15 (asserted on
11 behalf of the "Loss of Domestic and Related Services Subclass Only").

12 As a team of UCLA researchers recently noted, "domestic services are in some respects the
13 'glue' that permits older people to stay in their homes. Shopping and meal preparation are
14 especially essential, since they influence how much and how well older people eat." Benjamin
15 Decl. Ex. B at 13. "Weight loss in elders is often the reason that they end up being placed into
16 nursing homes. These domestic and related services are vital." *Id.* ¶ 30.

17 Defendants fail to explain how, with the elimination of domestic and related services, the
18 remaining IHSS services will still fulfill the purpose of the program: to enable recipients to safely
19 remain in their homes. Welf. & Inst. Code § 12300(a). Because currently authorized services have
20 already been deemed *necessary* to permit recipients to remain safely in their homes, MPP § 30-
21 761.1; Crockett Decl. ¶ 9, the elimination of these services cannot possibly leave affected
22 individuals with a level of service sufficient to achieve the purpose of the program. As named
23 plaintiff Dottie Jones explains, without these services "I will not be able to eat regular nutritious
24 meals as I am presently, and my house will quickly become inhabitable for me since I cannot clean
25 it." Supp. Jones Decl. ¶ 7; *see also* Collins Decl. ¶¶ 28-30, Guerra Decl. ¶¶ 12-15 (providing
26 additional examples of individuals who, with the loss of domestic and related services, will suffer
27 substantial harm and potentially be forced their homes).

28 Defendants' characterization notwithstanding, this case is directly analogous to *Mitchell v.*

1 *Johnston*, 701 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1983). *Mitchell* involved Texas' elimination of several previously
 2 available services (such as topical fluoride treatments and porcelain crowns) from its preventive
 3 dental program for children. The court analyzed the impact of these reductions on the ability of the
 4 program to fulfill its goal of preventive dental care and concluded that they undermined that goal.
 5 Here the sufficiency violation is even clearer, since the eliminated services at issue are, *by*
 6 *Defendants' own definition*, necessary components to achieve the purpose of the program.

7 **IV. Defendants Have Failed to Refute Plaintiffs' Likelihood of Prevailing on Their ADA and**
 8 **Section 504 Claims.**

9 **A. Defendants Cannot Defeat Plaintiffs' *Olmstead* Claim.**

10 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' *Olmstead* claim fails because Plaintiffs have allegedly not
 11 shown that "any named plaintiff (or any other recipient) is likely to be significantly harmed by the
 12 reduction in IHSS, much less end up being admitted to a skilled nursing facility or other institution
 13 as a result of ABX4 4." Opp 23:20-21, 26:20-23. However, as recently reaffirmed by this Court in
 14 *Brantley*, "the risk of institutionalization is sufficient to demonstrate a violation of Title II [of the
 15 ADA]." *Brantley v. Maxwell-Jolly*, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2009 WL 2941519, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10,
 16 2009) (emphasis in original); *see also* Pl. Br. 30:24-31:13, 31:18-26. And Plaintiffs have submitted
 17 substantial evidence – unrefuted by Defendants – from experts, county officials, service providers,
 18 and individual recipients and providers showing that class members do face precisely such a risk of
 19 institutional placement in a hospital or care facility. Pl. Br. 2:18-23, 5:26-6:3, 17:7-18:11 & n. 17,
 20 31:14-17; *see also* Jones Decl. ¶¶ 15-17; Love Decl. ¶14; Nicco Supp. Decl. ¶¶9-10; Brent Decl., ¶
 21 9; Brandt Decl., ¶ 9; Gardner Supp. Decl. ¶10.¹⁷ That risk is especially heightened for individuals
 22 with cognitive or psychiatric disabilities, who comprise a large portion of the class. *See* Gardner
 23 Decl., Docket No. 70, ¶¶ 30-33; Castro Decl. ¶10; Crockett Decl. ¶16; Baran Decl. ¶¶12, 24; Nicco
 24 Decl. ¶¶33-34; Navarro Decl. ¶¶15-16.

25
 26 ¹⁷ To the extent Defendants mean to suggest that this Court should consider only the risk of
 27 institutionalization faced by the named Plaintiffs, and not by other class members, they are
 28 mistaken. Because Defendants have conceded that class certification is not necessary, this case
 must be analyzed as if the Court has a certified class in front of it.

1 Next, Defendants blithely assert that Plaintiffs are not at risk of institutionalization because
 2 they are eligible for regional center services, have family members who theoretically could fill the
 3 void left by loss of IHSS, or could secure unspecified community services to meet their needs.
 4 Opp. 24:4-6; 24:10-12; 24:22-23; 25:12; 25:27-26:3, 26:13-19. Similar arguments were recently
 5 rejected in *Brantley*:

6 Defendants concede that they bear the ultimate responsibility for ensuring
 7 compliance with federal disability laws. Nevertheless, they have taken an arguably
 8 cavalier approach to ensuring their continuing compliance with the ADA and
 9 Rehabilitation Act Thus, to the extent that Defendants are claiming that
 alternative services satisfy their obligations under the integration mandate,
 Defendants certainly bear the burden of ensuring more than a ‘theoretical’
 availability of such services.

10 2009 WL 2941519, at *10 (internal cites omitted). In any event, the record establishes that
 11 alternative services are not available for a substantial portion of the Plaintiffs who face the risk of
 12 institutionalization. *See infra* 19-21; *see also* Goldblatt Decl. ¶21; Rosene Decl.¶7-9; Nicco Decl.
 13 ¶36, 38-41; Nicco Supp. Decl. ¶ 3.

14 Finally, the assertion that Plaintiffs are not being denied benefits by reason of their
 15 disabilities ignores *Olmstead*, which held that undue institutionalization *is* discrimination on the
 16 basis of disability. 527 U.S. at 598-601.

17 **B. ABX4 4 Discriminates Based on Type of Disability.**

18 Defendants fail to address Plaintiffs’ authority that, if ABX4 4 has a uniquely detrimental
 19 impact against people with cognitive and psychiatric disabilities, it violates the ADA. Pl. Br.
 20 32:11-34:17. Instead, they argue that any disparate treatment or impact is based on varying levels
 21 of need, not disability (Opp. at 23:14-19), but that is directly refuted by Plaintiffs’ showing that FI
 22 Scores and functional rankings are not reasonable proxies for criticality of need, particularly for
 23 individuals with cognitive and psychiatric disabilities. Pl. Br. at 32; *see also supra* at 3-4; *see also*
 24 Supp. Gardner Decl. ¶ 9. Further, in arguing that social workers are trained to measure need and
 25 that anyone with a “genuine need” will continue to receive services (Opp. 26:8-10) Defendants
 26 misunderstand the nature of Plaintiffs’ criticism of the use of FI Scores and functional ranks.
 27 Plaintiffs’ claims rest not on the notion that social workers are giving recipients the wrong
 28 functional rankings, but on the showing that the *design* of the functional ranks and FI Score will

1 screen people with cognitive and psychiatric disabilities out of the IHSS program. Pl. Br. at 32; see
2 also *supra* at 3-4.

3 Defendants also contend that the functional ranks and FI Score do not discriminate against
4 individuals with cognitive or psychiatric disabilities because their needs will be met in other ways:
5 they will receive alternative services through regional centers (a point addressed *infra* at 19-20),
6 and those “with serious cognitive or psychiatric disabilities will almost certainly be authorized to
7 receive protective supervision” and therefore be exempt from ABX4 4. Opp. 26:13-19; *see also id.*
8 at 4, 28. In fact, many individuals with cognitive or psychiatric disabilities serious enough to
9 require IHSS services do not qualify for protective supervision, either because they do not meet the
10 particular requirements for that service or because they fall into one of a number of exclusions.¹⁸
11 *See* Kaljian Supp. Decl. ¶3 (“Protective supervision is authorized very sparingly” to only 4% of
12 IHSS recipients, while “number of [IHSS] clients with cognitive or psychiatric disabilities who
13 receive IHSS far exceeds” this percentage); Ackel Decl. ¶¶9-10; *see also, e.g.,* Aho Supp. Decl.
14 ¶¶13-14 (no protective supervision). Quite simply, most IHSS recipients with mental disabilities
15 will not be exempt from the terminations and reductions, and the use of functional rankings and an
16 FI Score that exclude them from IHSS violates the ADA.

17 C. Defendants Concede Plaintiffs’ Methods of Administration Claim.

18 Defendants do not address, and appear to concede, Plaintiffs’ claim that ABX4 4 violates
19 the ADA’s methods of administration regulation by thwarting the purpose of the IHSS program
20

21
22 ¹⁸ Protective supervision is available only if “a need exists for twenty four-hours-a-day of
23 supervision in order for the recipient to remain at home safely,” MPP § 30-757.173, and the
24 recipient must be mobile enough to move around the house and be injured, *Calderon v. Anderson*,
25 45 Cal.App.4th 607, 616-18 (1996); *see also Marshall v. McMahon*, 17 Cal.App.4th 1841, 1852-
26 53 (1993). Moreover, those who meet this standard may fall into one of a number of excluded
27 categories. MPP § 30-757.172(e) (excluding, e.g., need to control anti-social behavior or guard
28 against deliberate self-destructive behavior from protective supervision). Defendants’ contention
that “there is no evidence that anyone with significant cognitive or psychological difficulties will
lose any IHSS services” is belied by substantial evidence in the record. *See* Pl. Br. 13:10-22 &
n.13; Aho Decl. ¶4; Aho Supp. Decl. ¶14; Oster Decl. ¶¶4-5; Love Decl. ¶¶2, 12-13; Campbell
Decl. ¶¶2, 8; McHenry Decl. ¶¶2, 10; Syropiatos Decl. ¶¶5-6; Williams Decl. ¶¶10, 21.

1 and screening out individuals with certain types of disabilities. *See* Pl. Br. 34:19-36:4.¹⁹

2
3 **V. Because Defendants Have Failed to Rebut the Risk of Irreparable Harm to Plaintiffs and Others Similarly Situated, the Balance of Equities Strongly Favors an Injunction.**

4 Although Defendants raise claims of fiscal emergency, they ignore settled Ninth Circuit
5 authority and this Court’s preliminary injunction decision in *Martinez* that fiscal problems cannot
6 outweigh the needs of the sick and poor. Pl. Br. at 19. Defendants have not and cannot rebut
7 Plaintiffs’ strong showing of irreparable injury.

8 **A. The Loss of IHSS Benefits is Irreparable Injury Per Se.**

9 Defendants have failed to rebut Plaintiffs’ showing that the loss of Medicaid services such
10 as IHSS constitutes irreparable harm. Pl. Br. 18:13-19:14; *see also Brantley*, 2009 WL 2941519 at
11 *12-*13 (reduction in Medi-Cal-funded Adult Day Health Care services); *Angotti v. Rexam, Inc.*,
12 2006 WL 1646135 *14 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2006) (Medicaid recipients so poor that by definition
13 could not otherwise afford medical care, so irreparable harm could be reasonably inferred without
14 particularized showing by class members).

15 Moreover, Plaintiffs have pointed out – and Defendants do not dispute – that the IHSS
16 statutes and regulations themselves establish the likelihood of irreparable injury, because all IHSS
17 recipients have been assessed by trained county personnel to need the services they receive in order
18 to remain safely in their homes. Pl. Br. 9-10, 25. Indeed, Defendants have specifically stated that
19 “without regular contact with a personal care service worker, individuals will experience isolation
20 and deterioration of chronic conditions that will result in more frequent emergency room visits and
21 higher utilization of acute hospital and nursing facilities” IHSS Plus Demonstration Waiver
22 at 10, Brzovic Decl. Ex. A. Plaintiffs also have provided ample specific evidence of irreparable
23

24 ¹⁹ Defendants fail to raise any fundamental alteration defense, and therefore have waived it.
25 In any event, Plaintiffs have explained why no such defense would have merit. Pl. Br. 31:27-32:8.
26 *Rosen v. Goetz*, 410 F.3d 919 (6th Cir. 2005), cited by Defendants, does not involve an ADA claim
27 and so its discussion of when federal courts may enjoin the elimination of Medicaid programs is
28 not applicable here. And to the extent Defendants mean to argue that individuals who qualify for
IHSS are not “disabled” under the ADA, they are mistaken. *Compare* Welf. & Inst. Code
§ 12300(a), MPP § 30-700.1, *with* 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(A).

1 harm, in the form of declarations from county IHSS officials, and service providers who describe
 2 in great detail the impact the IHSS terminations and reductions will have on thousands of needy
 3 IHSS recipients, as well as numerous declarations from the named Plaintiffs and class members.
 4 Pl. Br. at 14-19; *see also* Shneider Decl. ¶¶4, 9; Brown Decl. ¶3; Love Decl. ¶10.²⁰

5 **B. Plaintiffs and Others Similarly Situated Do Not Have Access to Alternative**
 6 **Services that Will Replace the IHSS They Will Lose.**

7 Defendants' assertion that other reasonable alternatives to IHSS services exist and that
 8 therefore there is no risk of imminent harm is without basis. Defendants make no showing that
 9 these services will be available without interruption following the loss of IHSS services, and as in
 10 *Brantley*, "even temporary gaps in services would present serious consequences for plaintiffs and
 11 place them at great risk of being institutionalized." 2009 WL 2941519 at *10.

12 For example, Defendants suggest (without support) that plaintiffs with developmental
 13 disabilities "need only contact the regional center" and their lost IHSS services will be replaced.²¹
 14 Carroll Decl, ¶ 18; Pl. Obj. Def. Evid. However, named Plaintiffs, other class members, advocates,
 15 and IHSS county officials have already tried contacting regional centers and been told such
 16 replacement services will not be provided. Supp. Oster Decl. ¶¶10-13; Rivera Supp. Decl. ¶ 2;

17
 18 ²⁰ Defendants fail to rebut this showing, but instead complain that some of the declarations
 19 discuss recipients whose benefits will not be reduced or terminated on November 1, because they
 20 fall into a category that the State has tentatively exempted or because their scores or ranks appear
 21 to be above the minimum. Opp. Br. 28:8-20. But this fact does nothing to negate Plaintiffs'
 22 extensive showing that thousands of individuals who *will* face service reductions or terminations
 23 will suffer irreparable injury. Love Decl. ¶¶7, 12 (score of 1.9, not client of regional center or
 24 eligible for protective supervision); Baran Decl. ¶¶13-16 (discussing two women who will lose all
 25 IHSS services); Brent Decl. ¶11 (score of 1.27, will lose all services); Campbell Decl. ¶8 (score of
 26 1.97, will lose all services); Hylton Decl. ¶7 (score of 2.0, will lose some domestic services hours);
 27 Collins Decl. ¶¶7-8 (387 will lose all services because FI score below 2.0 and not covered by
 28 exemption); Crockett Decl. ¶3 (approximately 900 will lose all services and 2500 will lose some);
 Guerra Decl. ¶¶6-8 (195 people will lose all services); Hathaway Decl. ¶ 10 (dozen people will lose
 all services); Kaljian ¶4 (778 will lose all services because FI score below 2.0 and not covered by
 exemption); Nicco Decl. ¶¶8, 10 (1,078 will lose all services, and 6,863 will lose certain domestic
 and related services, numbers exclude those covered by exemptions); Wilson Decl. ¶17 (score of
 1.75, will lose all services).

²¹ Ironically, Defendants' argument that terminated IHSS services will be replaced by
 regional centers, if true, would show that the individual IHSS recipients must need those services.

1 Schneider Decl. ¶10; Drass Decl. ¶¶4-5; Collins Decl. ¶9; Supp. Nicco Decl. ¶5; Kaljian Supp.
 2 Decl. ¶6. And regional centers are unlikely to provide replacement services in a timely manner.
 3 Goldblatt Decl. ¶¶8-19, 21; Rosene Decl. ¶¶8, 9.²² Finally, even assuming that regional centers
 4 could be persuaded to fund replacement services for IHSS, this at most would protect but a few
 5 thousand of the more than 130,000 IHSS recipients who face service reductions and terminations.²³

6 Similarly, Defendants argue that IHSS recipients can turn to other programs and services,
 7 ignoring Plaintiffs' showing that these resources were already overburdened even before recent
 8 budget cuts, and cannot accommodate the needs of tens of thousands of disabled or elderly
 9 individuals who will lose IHSS services. Pl. Br. at 20; Guerra Supp. Decl. ¶¶4, 6-9; Nicco Supp.
 10 Decl. ¶¶3, 5; Baran Decl. ¶26; Kaljian ¶¶20-21; Nicco Decl. ¶¶38-39; Rosene Supp. Decl. ¶7;
 11 Kaljian Supp. Decl. ¶4; Collins Supp. Decl. ¶¶4, 7.²⁴

12 Defendants also argue that family members should provide personal care services to
 13 Plaintiffs such as V.L. for free. Opp. at p. 24. In fact, family members are not available to care for
 14 V.L. (Lagahid Supp. Decl. ¶3), and Defendants' suggestion is illegal under CDSS regulations:

15 Social services staff shall explore with the recipient the willingness of relatives,
 16 housemates, friends or other appropriate persons to provide voluntarily some or all
 17 of the services required by the recipient, . . . [they] *shall not compel* any such
 18 volunteer to provide services.

19 ²² Regional centers themselves have recently sustained deep funding cuts, suggesting that
 20 already existing difficulties in obtaining services will only be exacerbated. Rosene Decl. ¶7;
 21 Kaljian Decl. ¶6; Goldblatt Decl. ¶¶9, 10, 20.

22 ²³ Kline Supp. Decl., Ex. A at 12 (only 10,909 regional center consumers (less than 3% of
 23 all IHSS recipients) receive IHSS); *see also, e.g.,* Aho Decl. ¶2.

24 ²⁴ For example, Defendants suggest that Meals on Wheels could replace Dottie Jones' meal
 25 preparation services. However, that program in Nevada County is not available to recipients under
 26 aged 60. Rossow Decl., Ex. A (Jones Supp. Decl.) ¶8; Guerra Supp. Decl. ¶6. In other counties, if
 27 IHSS recipients are added, the waiting period will be months if not years. Nicco Supp. Decl. ¶7.
 28 Also, because Medi-Cal funding for adult mental health services was eliminated, there is no "extra"
 Proposition 63 funding available to replace services to IHSS recipients with mental illness.
Compare Opp. at pp. 26, 28 with Hill Decl. ¶7. The UCLA report co-authored by Dr. Benjamin
 shows the elimination of or serious cuts to other programs that serve elderly or disabled
 individuals, including the elimination of 36 Alzheimer's program centers, a case management
 program targeted to long-term care recipients, a respite program to assist caregivers facing burn-
 out, and a surplus food and feeding program. Benjamin Decl., Ex. B at 32.

1 MPP 30-763.62 - .622 (emphasis added). Free care from family members is also not an option for
 2 the many IHSS recipients who live alone and do not have family member providers. Rossow
 3 Decl., Ex. A (Jones Supp. Decl.) ¶10; Guerra Decl. ¶10; Oster Decl. ¶7. UCLA researchers
 4 concluded that as many as 40 to 50% of the seniors facing service reductions or terminations are in
 5 this situation. Benjamin Decl., Ex. B at 10.²⁵

6 Similarly, Defendants suggest that overburdened county social workers will somehow be
 7 able to find nonexistent services to replace the IHSS hours that tens of thousands of individuals
 8 across the State will lose. Opp. at 5. Even if such services were available, which they are not,
 9 social workers do not have caseloads that permit such intensive case management and assistance.
 10 Nicco Supp. Decl. ¶6; Guerra Supp. Decl. ¶11. Nor will IHSS social workers likely assist someone
 11 who has already been terminated and is no longer their responsibility. Nicco Supp. Decl. ¶ 6.

12 Defendants have made no effort to identify those recipients who do have alternative
 13 resources; Defendants did not make their eligibility decisions on this basis; and Defendants do not
 14 plan to exempt those *without* alternative resources from the devastating impact of the cutbacks.

15 **C. The Class of Thousands of Recipients Will Suffer Severe Irreparable Harm.**

16 Defendants fail to address the overwhelming majority of Plaintiffs' evidentiary showing,
 17 and instead focus almost exclusively on attempts to rebut the showing by the named plaintiffs.
 18 However, Plaintiffs' declarations amply establish irreparable injury to both the named Plaintiffs
 19 and members of the plaintiff class. *See* Pl. Br. 15-18 and declarations cited therein; *see also* Rose
 20 Brown Decl. ¶¶2-7; Love Decl. ¶¶8-11.

21 Moreover, to the extent Defendants mean to suggest that only injury to the named plaintiffs
 22 is relevant, or that irreparable injury to class members is irrelevant in the absence of injury to the
 23 named plaintiffs, they are mistaken. Neither the case cited by Defendants, or the decision on which
 24

25 ²⁵ The researchers also found "no evidence that family and friends will automatically step
 26 in and fill gaps in care" as a result of the IHSS reductions and terminations. *Id.* at 13. Instead, the
 27 cuts will attenuate "the fragile individualized safety net' cobbled together by families with (up to
 28 now) significant assistance from the state." *Id.* (also noting that "[l]egally-responsible adults like
 spouses are already stretched very thin in terms of the physical and economic resources they
 devote to care giving").

1 it relies, addressed the question whether a specific showing of harm to class members was adequate
 2 without a showing of injury to the named plaintiffs. *Mandrigues v. World Savings, Inc.*, 2009 WL
 3 160213 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009), *citing Angotti v. Rexam, Inc.*, 2006 WL 1646135. In fact,
 4 *Angotti* demanded a particularized showing of harm by “prospective class members,” not the
 5 named plaintiffs. *Id.* at 14-15. *See also LaForest v. Former Clean Air Holding Co., Inc.*, 376 F.3d
 6 48, 57 (3d Cir. 2004) (“That the six affidavits relied upon by the district court [to support showing
 7 of irreparable harm] were submitted by unnamed plaintiffs gives us little pause, given that these
 8 persons are now members of the certified class.”). Although the named plaintiffs here will clearly
 9 suffer irreparable harm, additional IHSS recipients who face termination and will also suffer
 10 irreparable harm are willing to act as named plaintiffs, should the Court deem this necessary.
 11 McHenry Supp. Decl. ¶ 5; Aho Supp. Decl. ¶ 3.

12 Whether the named plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury, as Plaintiffs have shown, would
 13 be relevant to their adequacy as class representatives, not to whether this Court should issue a
 14 preliminary injunction. Defendants did not file an opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for class
 15 certification, and concede that class certification is not necessary for the Court to grant class-wide
 16 injunctive relief. Opp. Br. 31:5-7.

17 CONCLUSION

18 For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs request that this Court issue a preliminary
 19 injunction.

20 Dated: October 15, 2009

Respectfully Submitted,

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