

**IN THE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY  
FRANKFORT DIVISION**

**ELECTRONICALLY FILED**

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BRIAN KEITH MOORE,	)	
	)	
and	)	
	)	
JEFFREY LEONARD	)	
Plaintiffs	)	CIV. ACTION # 3:06-cv-22
	)	
v.	)	<b>CAPITAL CASE</b>
	)	
JOHN D. REES,	)	
Commissioner,	)	
Kentucky Department of Corrections,	)	
Frankfort, Kentucky	)	
	)	
THOMAS SIMPSON,	)	
Warden, Kentucky State	)	
Penitentiary, Eddyville Kentucky,	)	
	)	
SCOTT HAAS	)	
Medical Director for the	)	
Kentucky Department of Corrections	)	
	)	
ERNIE FLETCHER,	)	
Governor of the Commonwealth	)	
of Kentucky	)	
	)	
and,	)	
	)	
UNKNOWN EXECUTIONERS,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

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**THOMAS CLYDE BOWLING'S EMERGENCY MOTION TO INTERVENE  
AS PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR**

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Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b), Thomas Clyde Bowling hereby moves this Court for leave to intervene as a plaintiff in this action. As the attached intervenor complaint establishes, Bowling shares a common legal question with Brian Keith Moore and Jeffrey Leonard's complaint: whether the implementation of Kentucky's lethal injection procedure and chemicals will subject him to an unreasonable risk that he will suffer cruel and unusual punishment. Because this case is still in its early stages, allowing Bowling to intervene will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. In addition, neither the failure to exhaust administrative remedies nor res judicata prevents this Court from considering Bowling's challenge to the chemicals and procedures used in Kentucky lethal injections. Thus, this Court should permit Bowling to intervene in this action as it did with Leonard.

Because Bowling will likely receive an execution date before Moore and Leonard, Bowling requests expedited review of his motion to intervene.

The grounds for this Motion are set forth in the Memorandum below.

#### **MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT**

Thomas Clyde Bowling should be permitted to intervene in this action because he is asserting an identical claim to that raised by Moore and Leonard and is raising his claim in a timely fashion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b), permits intervention upon a timely application that establishes that the intervening party's claim shares a question of law or fact with the original parties and intervening will not substantially impair the rights of the original parties to the pending action. Plaintiff Brian Keith Moore, a Kentucky death sentenced inmate, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations and threatened violations of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Four months later, this Court allowed Jeffrey Leonard to intervene. Bowling is a true party in interest because he is similarly situated, asserts the same cause of action, and makes the same arguments as Plaintiffs Moore and Leonard, with the exception of compromised veins. *See* Intervenor Bowling's Proposed Complaint (attached).

Specifically, Bowling argues that the Commonwealth's current lethal injection procedures including the chemicals Defendants plan to inject and the procedures for injecting the chemicals are unconstitutional under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Like Moore and Slaughter, he also challenges Defendants' lack of adequate life-preserving equipment and personnel if a stay of execution is granted after the first or second chemical is injected, as well as the constitutionality of electrocution. Because these are the same claims presented by Moore and Leonard, the commonality requirement is satisfied. This motion is also being made in a timely fashion and will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the other parties. Finally, neither exhaustion of administrative remedies nor *res judicata* poses an obstacle to this Court's authority to allow Bowling to intervene.

**A. Bowling satisfies the requirements for permissive intervention laid out in Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (2).**

Rule 24 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to intervene if three requirements are satisfied: 1) the application to intervene is timely; 2) the applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common; and, 3) intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. For the reasons discussed below, each of these requirements is satisfied.

**1. Bowling's application is timely.**

In determining whether Bowling's motion to intervene is timely, this Court should consider the extent to which this case has progressed and how quickly after the action was initiated Bowling moved to intervene. Moore filed this action approximately nine months ago. At the end of August, this Court allowed Leonard to intervene. No action has occurred in this case since then. Currently, this case remains in its infancy as the pro se clerk's office considers numerous discovery motions. Thus, the current status of this case will not be impacted by allowing Bowling to intervene - - a request that he is making less than a week after the Kentucky Supreme Court decided his case, thereby removing any impediment to Bowling joining this action. The expedience in which Bowling has moved to intervene and the lack of progression of this case means that Bowling's motion to intervene is timely.

**2. Bowling's claim and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.**

As this Court recognized in permitting Leonard to intervene, the commonality requirement for permissive intervention may be satisfied where the legal question involved is the same, notwithstanding factual differences between the parties. Like Leonard, Bowling shares a common legal question with Moore's complaint: whether the implementation of Kentucky's lethal injection procedure will subject him to an unreasonable risk that he will suffer cruel and unusual punishment and whether Kentucky's life-saving equipment is sufficient to maintain life if a stay of execution is granted after the first or second lethal injection chemical is administered. Bowling thus satisfies the commonality requirement for permissive intervention.

**3. Intervention by Bowling will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.**

Allowing Bowling to intervene will not “unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.”<sup>1</sup> This case remains in its early stages as this Court has yet to rule on numerous discovery motions. Admittedly, mandatory disclosures under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26, responses to request for production of documents, interrogatories, and admissions have been provided, but this should have no impact on this Court’s decision to allow Bowling to intervene. Much of these initial discovery methods were undertaken prior to this Court’s ruling allowing Leonard to intervene, and Bowling does not intend to file any additional discovery requests. Further, Bowling will likely receive an execution date prior to Moore or Leonard. For these reasons, neither the current Plaintiffs nor the current Defendants will suffer any delay or prejudice from Bowling intervening in this action. Rather, allowing Bowling to intervene will further the interests of all parties and this Court by not forcing Bowling to duplicate efforts by filing a separate lawsuit. Accordingly, the unduly delay and prejudice analysis for permissive intervention favors allowing Bowling to intervene in this action.

**B. Administrative Remedies**

Bowling has not exhausted his administrative remedies. However, this should not affect this Court’s decision on his intervention for three reasons. First, exhausting administrative remedies is not a requirement to intervene. As this Court ruled in the June 13, 2006 order in Moore’s case, there is nothing suggesting that the Prison Litigation Reform Act overrules the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not mention exhaustion of administrative remedies in the context of

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<sup>1</sup> Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).

intervention, doing so is not a prerequisite to intervening in a lawsuit. Second, Bowling is dealing with prospective injuries that cannot be remedied after they occur. Third, exhausting administrative remedies should be excused because there is no adequate corrective process for doing so. Both Moore and Leonard have filed a grievance with the prison. Their grievances were rejected as non-grievable because it involved a statute. Thus, there is no adequate process for grieving this claim through the inmate grievance system. If Bowling filed a grievance, it would be treated in the same way. Thus, there is no relief that can be afforded through the administrative grievance process, and therefore there is no available administrative remedy to exhaust. Finally, this Court allowed Leonard to intervene before he exhausted administrative remedies. For these reasons, Bowling should not be required to exhaust his administrative remedies in order to intervene in this action.

**C. Res judicata does not prevent this Court from exercising jurisdiction.**

By prohibiting Bowling from deposing or otherwise questioning the execution team, the state courts deprived Bowling the opportunity to discover information that was necessary to fully prepare and litigate the issues concerning the chemicals and procedures Defendants intend to use to carry out his execution. This prevents the application of res judicata in this case.

Res judicata does not apply where the losing party in the first decision did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue.<sup>2</sup> This includes situations where a plaintiff was denied sufficient discovery, which has the effect of burdening the

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<sup>2</sup> *Allen v. McCurry*, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).

plaintiff's ability to prepare his or her case.<sup>3</sup> When "there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation," redetermination of issues is warranted.<sup>4</sup> Here, there are substantial reasons to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of the procedures used in the Kentucky state courts to adjudicate Bowling's lethal injection claims.

The state courts prohibited Bowling from deposing or otherwise examining the execution team members. As a result, at the state court hearing, both Bowling and the court were required to rely on representations made by counsel for Defendants and other individuals who neither participate in carrying out executions nor are physically present during crucial stages of the execution process. These representations included statements about the qualifications and experience of the execution team, what happened in past executions, and what will happen at future executions. The representations also include the responsibilities of individual members of the execution team. Four days ago, the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling. By doing so, the Kentucky Supreme Court made it clear that it was not going to require a full and fair opportunity to litigate the constitutionality of the chemicals and procedures Kentucky uses in lethal injections.

As recent lethal injection litigation in Missouri has proven, representations from attorneys and corrections personnel who are not on the execution team is no substitute for questioning the execution team members and can be the difference between prevailing and losing on a challenge to the chemicals and procedures used in lethal injections.

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<sup>3</sup> *West v. Ruff*, 961 F.2d 1064, 1066 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing the lack of sufficient discovery as one of the reasons why the plaintiff lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim in state court).

<sup>4</sup> *Montana v. United States*, 440 U.S. 147, 164 n. 11 (1979).

In *Taylor v. Crawford*,<sup>5</sup> after hearing testimony from Dr. Heath and Dr. Dershwitz (two experts that testified in the state court lethal injection litigation), a federal district court judge in Missouri upheld Missouri's lethal injection procedures and chemicals - - the same chemicals that are used in Kentucky.<sup>6</sup> On remand from the Eighth Circuit to conduct a more thorough hearing, a Missouri federal district court judge allowed interrogatories of members of the execution team and an anonymous deposition of one of the members of the execution team.<sup>7</sup> The information learned from the Missouri execution team proved that the previously made representations about what would happen during an execution are not what were actually occurring.

At least some members of the execution team had not seen a written execution protocol and were not fully aware of their responsibilities.<sup>8</sup> In addition, deviations from the protocol were occurring on a regular basis and members of the execution team were found to not be as qualified as the Missouri Department of Corrections had held them out to be.<sup>9</sup> Thus, it quickly became clear that what was believed to be occurring during an execution that was considered constitutional by a Missouri federal court judge was merely a theoretical plan that was not taking place - - a fact that only became known because the judge allowed discovery of the execution team. Relying on the information obtained from the execution team members, the federal judge in Missouri ruled that Missouri's lethal injection procedures create an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.<sup>10</sup> Thus, a

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<sup>5</sup> No. 2:05-cv-04173 (W.D. Mo., order dated, June 26, 2006) (attached).

<sup>6</sup> *Id.* at 2-3.

<sup>7</sup> *Id.* at 4.

<sup>8</sup> *Id.* at 8-10.

<sup>9</sup> *Id.*

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 13.



constitutional procedure became unconstitutional because of information that was obtained only by examining the execution team. The same thing could happen here if Bowling is given the opportunity to examine the execution team members, which has also been permitted in California, Louisiana, and Maryland.

In addition to not being able to examine the members of the execution team, recent information out of California and North Carolina showing that the testimony of Dr. Dershwitz - - the only expert that testified on behalf of Defendants in the state litigation - - was misleading, inaccurate, and possibly intentionally so casts substantial doubt on the reliability of Dr. Dershwitz's testimony,<sup>11</sup> the only medical testimony that contradicted the evidence Bowling presented in state court. The recent developments which discredit Dr. Dershwitz' testimony and the state court's refusal to allow Bowling to depose or otherwise examine the execution team members create "a reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in the prior litigation."<sup>12</sup> As a result, the state court's adjudication of Bowling's claims was "inadequate for ascertainment of the truth," making it this Court's "duty to disregard the state findings and take evidence anew."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> As discussed in Bowling's intervenor complaint, toxicology analysis results from individual executed in North Carolina after the state court trial in Bowling's lethal injection case that were conducted to prove Dr. Dershwitz's conclusions have done the exact opposite by proving that the amount of sodium thiopental in the condemned inmates body was not enough to prevent the inmate from feeling pain. In addition, California execution logs prove that inmates do not cease breathing within a minute of the injection of sodium thiopental as Dr. Dershwitz alleges.

<sup>12</sup> *Montana v. United States*, 440 U.S. at 164 n.11.

<sup>13</sup> *Townsend v. Sain*, 372 U.S. 239, 316 (1963) (holding that where a hearing is "seriously inadequate for ascertainment of the truth, it is the federal judge's duty to disregard the state findings and take evidence anew").

### **Conclusion**

The three requirements for permissive intervention - - a timely request to intervene in a case where the intervenor's claim and the main action share a question of law or fact and intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the rights of the parties - - are satisfied here. Bowling's motion to intervene is being filed four days after the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his claim, thereby affirming the fact that he would not receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in state court. As this Court recognized in allowing Leonard to intervene, Bowling's complaint shares a common legal action with Moore's complaint. And, because this case remains in its early stages with discovery issues not having been resolved and no action beyond discovery have taken place, none of the parties to the main action will be prejudiced by allowing Bowling to intervene. Thus, the requirements for permissive intervention are satisfied. The failure to exhaust administrative remedies has no impact on this Court's authority to allow Bowling to intervene. Because Bowling was not allowed to depose or otherwise question the execution team members and new evidence casts doubt on the only medical testimony presented by Defendants in state court, res judicata also does not bar this Court from allowing Bowling to intervene in this case. Thus, Bowling requests that this Court grant his motion for permissive intervention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b).

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

/s/ David M. Barron

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COUNSEL FOR THOMAS CLYDE BOWLING

November 27, 2006.

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was electronically filed with the Court by using the CM/ECF system on this 27<sup>th</sup> day of November 2006 and that a copy of the foregoing document was personally delivered to Marguerite Thomas at 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301, Frankfort, Kentucky, 40601 on the same day.

/s/ David M. Barron

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Counsel for Thomas Clyde Bowling

**IN THE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY  
FRANKFORT DIVISION**

**ELECTRONICALLY FILED**

THOMAS CLYDE BOWLING	)	
	)	
Plaintiff	)	CIV. ACTION # 3:06-cv-222
	)	
v.	)	<b>CAPITAL CASE</b>
	)	
JOHN D. REES,	)	
Commissioner,	)	
Kentucky Department of Corrections,	)	
Frankfort, Kentucky	)	
	)	
THOMAS SIMPSON,	)	
Warden, Kentucky State	)	
Penitentiary, Eddyville Kentucky,	)	
	)	
SCOTT HAAS	)	
Medical Director for the	)	
Kentucky Department of Corrections	)	
	)	
ERNIE FLETCHER,	)	
Governor of the Commonwealth	)	
of Kentucky	)	
	)	
and,	)	
	)	
UNKNOWN EXECUTIONERS,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	
	)	

**COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

## I. NATURE OF ACTION<sup>1</sup>

1. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations and threatened violations of Plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff seeks equitable and injunctive relief.

2. Defendants' current method of lethal injection is unconstitutional because there is an unnecessary risk that Plaintiff will be tortured to death. No government within the United States may intentionally or negligently use an excruciatingly painful and unreliable procedure or chemical for carrying out executions, particularly when readily available alternative means of carrying out the sentence exist.

3. Kentucky's alternative method of execution for individuals sentenced to death prior to 1998, electrocution, violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

4. Kentucky uses three chemicals to carry out lethal injections: sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride.

5. Each of Defendants' lethal injection chemicals poses an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering.

6. Defendants' execution procedures fail to ensure that personnel responsible for anesthesia and monitoring of lethal injection are properly trained and qualified.

7. Monitoring to ensure that the inmate is in the appropriate plane of consciousness to prevent the inmate from feeling pain is essential to ensuring that the condemned inmate does not feel pain during an execution.

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<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff incorporates by reference the memorandum of law and exhibits filed by Brian Keith Moore in this case.

8. Defendants' protocol lacks standards for administering lethal injection and monitoring consciousness.

9. Defendants' fail to monitor for the appropriate plane of consciousness that prevents the condemned inmate from feeling pain during the execution by lethal injection.

10. Defendants' execution procedures fail to provide for identification of and addressing of contingencies that may occur during an execution, in event of problems.

11. Kentucky's failure to have adequate equipment to maintain life if a last minute stay is granted after the first or second chemical is administered and failure to have adequately trained individuals to operate the equipment violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and federal due process.

12. Plaintiff is not alleging that Defendants could never execute him. Rather, he asserts that any execution must comport with the United States Constitution. Plaintiff could be executed if: 1) no separate legal challenge reverses his conviction or death sentence; 2) Plaintiff does not receive executive clemency; 3) Defendants design a constitutionally acceptable method for executing Plaintiff, which can include lethal injection if done in a manner that does not pose an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering, and which monitors for consciousness; and, 4) Defendants maintain proper equipment at the execution chamber for maintaining life if a stay of execution is granted after the first or second chemical is administered, and have adequately trained individuals at the execution chamber to operate the equipment and render life saving measures.

13. Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing Defendants from carrying out his execution until Defendants come up with a means of guaranteeing venous access.

14. Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing Defendants from carrying out his execution by the means currently employed for carrying out an execution by lethal injection in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

15. Plaintiff does not claim that lethal injection is per se unconstitutional, but instead seeks an Order declaring that Defendants' current chemicals and means for conducting an execution by lethal injection violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

16. Plaintiff also seeks an Order that Defendants' failure to have proper drugs and equipment for maintaining life if a last minute stay of execution is granted and Defendants' failure to have adequately trained personnel at the death chamber to operate the life-maintaining equipment violate due process and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

17. Plaintiff seeks an Order declaring that electrocution violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

## **II. PLAINTIFF**

18. Plaintiff Thomas Clyde Bowling is a United States citizen and a resident of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. He is currently a death sentenced inmate under the supervision of the Kentucky Department of Corrections. He is held at the Kentucky State Penitentiary in Eddyville, Kentucky.

19. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Plaintiff's state-court challenge to lethal injection on November 22, 2006. Because Plaintiff was not allowed to depose or otherwise question the execution team, he did not receive a full and fair hearing in state court. Thus, principles of res judicata do not bar this Court from reviewing the claims in this complaint.

### **III. DEFENDANTS**

20. Defendant John D. Rees is the Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections

21. Defendant Thomas Simpson is the Warden of the Kentucky State Penitentiary, where Plaintiff's execution will occur.

22. Defendant Scott Haas is the Medical Director for Kentucky Department of Corrections. He is responsible for designating a physician to examine Plaintiff in the weeks leading up to his execution, and for designating a physician to be present at the execution facility to render medical treatment if a stay of execution is granted after the first and/or second chemical is administered.

23. Defendant Ernie Fletcher is the Governor of Kentucky. He is responsible for scheduling Plaintiff's execution and has the authority to call off an execution if a suitable vein in Plaintiff's body cannot be accessed within 60 minutes of attempting peripheral venous access.

24. Defendants Unknown Executioners are employed by or under contract with the Kentucky Department of Corrections, to make preparations for, and carry out, Plaintiff's execution. They include, but are not limited to, physicians, emergency medical technicians, phlebotomists, physician's assistants, the execution team, the executioner, the I.V. team, and the team leader. Plaintiff does not yet know their identities and Defendants will not reveal the identities of these persons.



#### **IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

25. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question), 1343 (civil rights violation), 1651 (all-writs), 2201 (declaratory relief), and 2202 (further relief).

26. This action arises under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

27. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. All Defendants reside in the same state. The principal place of business for Defendant Rees, Defendant Fletcher, and Defendant Haas is Frankfort, Kentucky.

28. All Defendants are state actors acting under color of state law.

#### **V. FACTS**

29. Defendants are responsible for carrying out executions in Kentucky.

30. Under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, cruel and unusual punishment claims involving a particular means of effectuating a sentence of death are analyzed under a six prong test in which proof of any one prong establishes an Eighth Amendment violation:

- a) the physical pain inflicted is excessive in light of readily available alternatives;
- b) the risk of pain is more than the Constitution tolerates;
- c) the risk of pain and suffering is unnecessary in light of available alternatives;
- d) mutilation of the body during the execution;
- e) unnecessary psychological suffering;
- f) the particular means of effectuating the sentence of death violates evolving standards of decency.

31. Defendant Rees worked with the Oklahoma Department of Corrections from July 1976 until December 1980.

32. The first state to adopt lethal injection was Oklahoma in 1977.

33. Defendant Rees was involved in creating the policies and procedures for carrying out lethal injections in Oklahoma.

34. In 1978, Oklahoma drafted the first lethal injection protocol in the country.

35. Defendant Rees was involved in drafting Oklahoma's 1978 lethal injection protocol.

36. Prior to adopting the 1978 protocol, Oklahoma neither conducted nor consulted any medical or scientific studies in deciding what chemicals to use or the quantities of the chemicals to administer.

37. Oklahoma's original execution protocol called for the administration of a short acting barbiturate in conjunction with a paralytic agent. Potassium chloride was mentioned as a possible paralytic agent.

38. Potassium chloride is not a paralytic agent.

39. The first lethal injection execution in the United States was carried out in Texas in 1982 by the administration of sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride.

40. Prior to the first lethal injection in 1982, no state conducted or consulted any medical or scientific studies in determining which chemicals to use for lethal injections or in what quantity to administer them.

41. No state has conducted or consulted any medical or scientific studies on sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, or potassium chloride during lethal injections, or into the quantity of each drug to administer.

42. Defendants intend to execute Plaintiff by administering the following drugs in the following manner:

- a) sodium thiopental (also known as sodium pentothal) (3 grams);
- b) pancuronium bromide (also referred to as pavulon) (50 milligrams); and,
- c) potassium chloride (240 milliequivalents)

The drugs are injected in succession, one after the other. Saline solution is injected in between each drug.

43. Defendants use these three chemicals because these chemicals were used by other states at the time Kentucky created its first lethal injection protocol.

44. Defendants neither conducted nor relied upon any medical or scientific studies in determining to use these chemicals.

45. Defendants neither conducted nor relied upon any medical or scientific studies in determining the quantity of chemicals to administer.

46. In deciding which chemicals to use in Kentucky lethal injections, Defendants did not consult with any anesthesiologists, doctors, or other medically trained personnel.

47. During state-court lethal injection litigation on behalf of Plaintiff, Defendants changed their protocol to increase the dose of sodium thiopental from 2 grams to 3 grams. This change was made in late 2004.

48. The decision to increase the amount of sodium thiopental was made by Defendant Rees.

49. Defendant Rees has no medical training.

50. Prior to increasing the amount of thiopental from 2 grams to 3 grams, Defendant Rees did not consult any medical professionals about increasing the dose of thiopental.

51. Defendant Rees conducted no medical or scientific studies on the effects of the lethal injection chemicals before increasing the amount of thiopental from 2 grams to 3 grams.

52. Defendant Rees did not consult any anesthesiologists or medically trained person about increasing the amount of thiopental before increasing the dose from 2 grams to 3 grams.

53. Prior to April 18, 2005, Defendant Rees thought the directions on the lethal injection chemical bottles would say how much of the chemical to administer.

54. The package inserts and labels on the lethal injection chemicals do not say how much of the chemicals to administer during a lethal injection.

55. Other than the fact that sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride are used in other states, prior to April 18, 2005, Defendant Rees had no idea why these three chemicals are used in Kentucky lethal injections.

56. Defendant Rees currently has no knowledge why these three chemicals are used in Kentucky lethal injections.

57. Prior to April 18, 2005, Defendant Rees did not know why Kentucky lethal injections used three chemicals instead of one or two.

58. Defendant Rees still does not know why Kentucky lethal injections used three chemicals instead of one or two.

59. Until April 18, 2005, Defendants thought that all states that carry out lethal injection administer sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride.

60. New Jersey's lethal injection protocol does not use pancuronium bromide. Instead, they administer only sodium thiopental and potassium chloride.

61. Prior to April 18, 2005, Defendants were unaware that New Jersey uses only two chemicals: sodium thiopental and potassium chloride to carry out lethal injections.

62. Defendants have not consulted with the New Jersey Department of Corrections about why they do not use pancuronium bromide or any other neuromuscular blocking agent in lethal injections.

63. Defendants have not considered adopting New Jersey's chemical combination (sodium thiopental and potassium chloride).

64. Defendants have not consulted any anesthesiologists about the viability of administering only sodium thiopental and potassium chloride.

65. Defendants have not consulted any medical professionals about the viability of administering only sodium thiopental and potassium chloride.

66. Assisted suicide is legal in Oregon. According to the Death with Dignity reports required by Oregon law, more than 170 terminally ill people have been prescribed medication to end their lives in Oregon.

67. In almost all of these cases, the terminally ill person was prescribed a large dose of pentobarbital, a long-acting barbiturate, as the only chemical to cause death.

68. Defendants have not consulted any medical personnel about replacing sodium thiopental with pentobarbital.

69. Defendants have not considered replacing sodium thiopental with pentobarbital.

70. Defendants have not consulted any medical personnel about administering pentobarbital as the sole chemical to cause death.

71. Defendants have not considered administering pentobarbital as the sole lethal injection chemical.

72. The usage of sodium thiopental is not mandated by Kentucky law.

73. The usage of pancurium bromide is not mandated by Kentucky law.

74. The usage of potassium chloride is not mandated by Kentucky law.

75. Finding that any one, a combination of, or all these chemicals violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution will not require statutory amendment or variance.

76. To carry out Plaintiff's execution, Defendants intend to insert two I.V.'s into Plaintiff.

77. The three chemicals will be injected from only one I.V. line.

78. The I.V. insertion team will spend up to 60 minutes attempting to insert an I.V. into Plaintiffs' body.

79. If the I.V. insertion team is unable to insert the I.V.'s after 60 minutes, Defendant Rees and Defendant Simpson will ask Defendant Fletcher to call off the execution and reschedule it.

80. The chemicals are injected from outside the execution chamber by pushing them through a tube that flows approximately five feet to the catheter that is inserted into the condemned inmate's vein.

81. The chemicals are injected by a member of the execution team referred to as the executioner.

82. The executioner (the person who actually injects the chemicals) has no medical training.

83. Plaintiff has never been allowed to depose or otherwise question Kentucky's execution team.

84. Plaintiffs in lethal injection litigation in other states have been allowed to depose or otherwise examine the execution team in California, Maryland, and Missouri.

85. Based on information learned from questioning Missouri's execution team, a federal district court judge in Missouri reversed his decision upholding Missouri's execution protocol and instead ruled that the chemicals and procedures Missouri uses in carrying out lethal injections pose an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

86. Testimony from the only expert presented by the state in *Baze v. Rees* is now known to have been inaccurate.

**A. Facts related to the unconstitutionality of the tri-chemical cocktail used in Kentucky lethal injections.**

87. Sodium thiopental (pentothal) is an ultra-short acting barbiturate.

88. Sodium thiopental begins to wear off almost immediately.

89. Pancuronium bromide is a curare-derived agent that paralyzes all skeletal and voluntary muscles.

90. Pancuronium bromide has no impact whatsoever on awareness, cognition, or sensation.

91. Potassium chloride is an extraordinarily painful chemical which activates the nerve fibers lining a person's veins and interferes with the rhythmic contractions of the heart, causing cardiac arrest.

92. This particular combination and sequence of chemicals create an unnecessary risk that Plaintiff will suffer an excruciatingly painful and protracted death in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

93. Prior to injecting sodium thiopental, Defendants offer the condemned inmate Valium.

94. If Plaintiff refuses to take Valium prior to his execution, Defendants will force him to do so if Defendants determine that Valium should be administered.

95. Defendants have no guidelines for determining under what circumstance a forced administration of Valium should take place.

96. Valium can interfere with sodium thiopental's effectiveness.

97. Sodium thiopental is a powder that must be mixed into a liquid before injecting it.

98. According to the package insert for sodium thiopental, it should be administered only "by individuals experienced in the conduct of intravenous anesthesia."

99. Defendants are not experienced in the process of intravenous anesthesia.

100. The executioner, the person administering thiopental, is not experienced in the conduct of intravenous anesthesia.

101. According to the package insert for sodium thiopental, "individual response to the drug is so varied that there can be no fixed dosage."

102. Defendants inject the same dose of thiopental to all condemned inmates.

103. The concentration of thiopental injected determines the potency of sodium thiopental, i.e., if the sodium thiopental is too diluted, it will be less potent, and not ensure that the condemned inmate does not feel pain at any point during his execution.

104. Defendants are not adequately trained in mixing the lethal injection chemicals to ensure that the concentration of thiopental injected into the condemned inmate prevents the inmate from feeling pain.

105. Sodium thiopental is an ultra short-acting barbiturate which is ordinarily used only in the induction phase of anesthesia to render a surgical patient unconscious for mere



minutes, specifically so that the patient may re-awaken and breathe on their own power if any complications arise in inserting a breathing tube pre-surgery.

106. Defendants administer sodium thiopental to prevent the condemned inmate from feeling pain.

107. Sodium thiopental is the only chemical administered by Defendants to prevent the condemned inmate from feeling pain.

108. Sodium thiopental does not relieve pain.

109. Analgesics (which include opiates) are the class of chemicals that relieve pain.

110. Sodium thiopental is not an analgesic.

111. Defendants do not administer an analgesic while carrying out lethal injections.

112. Sodium thiopental is almost never used as the only anesthetic during a surgical proceeding.

113. During surgical procedures, a barbiturate is administered to render a person unconscious and an analgesic is administered to ensure that the patient does not feel pain.

114. Both a barbiturate and an analgesic are continuously administered during surgical procedures.

115. Sodium thiopental was a state of the art barbiturate in 1977 when lethal injection first became a method of execution in the United States.

116. Sodium thiopental has been supplanted in the medical field by propafol.

117. As of April 20, 2005, Defendants are aware that sodium thiopental has been supplanted in the medical field by propafol.

118. Propafol is a safer and longer acting barbiturate than sodium thiopental.

119. Defendants have not consulted any medical professionals about the viability of using propafol instead of sodium thiopental.

120. Defendants have not taken any steps to look into the viability of using propafol instead of sodium thiopental.

121. Defendants have not taken any steps to look into the viability of replacing sodium thiopental with pentobarbital.

122. Because of its brief duration (usually about five to seven minutes), there is a reasonable probability that sodium thiopental will fail to provide a sedative effect throughout the entire execution process.

123. Three grams of sodium thiopental or even a larger dose is insufficient to induce unconsciousness if sufficient sodium thiopental does not reach the condemned prisoner's bloodstream.

124. The concentration of sodium thiopental not the dose of thiopental injected into the condemned inmate determines whether the condemned inmate will feel pain.

125. Defendants fail to monitor the concentration of sodium thiopental and fail to monitor to ensure that the full quantity of sodium thiopental reaches the inmate's bloodstream.

126. Defendants fail to determine if the inmate is unconscious to the point of being unable to feel pain prior to administering pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride.

127. Defendants' only form of monitoring for unconsciousness prior to injecting the second and third chemical is physical observation of the inmate.

128. Prior to the administration of pancuronium bromide, checking corneal reflexes or pinching a person to see if a person responds are methods that could indicate whether a person can feel painful stimuli.

129. After the injection of pancuronium bromide, machines such as an EEG monitor can be used to monitor for the ability to feel painful stimuli.

130. If a person is able to feel pain, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride would be extremely painful.

131. Because Defendants choose to use potassium chloride, instead of less painful alternatives, it is essential to ensure that a person cannot feel pain.

132. There are multiple levels of unconsciousness.

133. General anesthesia, also known as surgical anesthesia, is the level of anesthesia a person must be in to not feel pain during a lethal injection.

134. A person who appears unconscious to the lay observer may not be in a state of general anesthesia.

135. A person who appears unconscious can feel pain or wake up from painful stimuli if they are not in a state of general anesthesia.

136. A person who is unable to respond to verbal stimuli might be conscious enough to wake and feel painful stimuli, such as the pain caused by pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride.

137. When sodium thiopental is the sole anesthetic, at least 39-42 mg/L of thiopental in the bloodstream is necessary to ensure that a person will not wake up from painful stimuli. *See* Baselt, Disposition of Toxic Drugs and Chemicals in Man.

138. The 39-42 mg/L is the amount of thiopental necessary in the blood stream to prevent a person from waking from painful stimuli (in other words, the amount of thiopental necessary to achieve surgical anesthesia), not the amount of thiopental necessary to prevent a person from responding to a verbal command.

139. North Carolina injects sodium thiopental during executions.

140. Numerous toxicology reports on executed death row inmates in North Carolina, including toxicology results from four executions conducted between November 2005 and the end of January 2006, indicate thiopental levels below 39-42 mg/L.

141. Because the level of thiopental in bodies of inmates executed in North Carolina was below 39-42 mg/L, these inmates were likely able to feel pain during their executions.

142. Because North Carolina injects pancuronium bromide, the condemned inmate could not communicate that they were conscious and feeling pain, and evidence of consciousness could not be apparent to the observers of the execution.

143. South Carolina administers two grams of sodium thiopental.

144. Toxicology reports on death row inmates in Arizona and South Carolina indicate that numerous death-sentenced inmates in Arizona and South Carolina had less than 39-42 mg/L of thiopental in their bloodstream when executed.

145. Because the level of thiopental in body of inmates executed in Arizona and South Carolina was below 39-42 mg/L, these inmates were likely able to feel pain during their execution.

146. Because both Arizona and South Carolina inject pancuronium bromide, none of the condemned inmates could communicate that they were conscious and feeling pain, and evidence of consciousness could not be apparent to the observers of the execution.

147. Edward Harper is the only person judicially executed by lethal injection in Kentucky.

148. Toxicology reports show that the level of thiopental in Edward Harper's blood at the time of his execution by Defendants was between 3 and 6.5 mg/L.

149. The concentration of thiopental in Harper's bloodstream was insufficient to ensure that he could not feel painful stimuli during his execution.

150. Edward Harper likely was conscious enough to feel pain when pancuronium bromide was administered.

151. Edward Harper likely was conscious enough to feel pain when potassium chloride was administered.

152. Because Defendants injected Harper with pancuronium bromide, Harper could not communicate that he was conscious and feeling pain, and evidence of consciousness was not apparent to the observers of the execution.

153. Dr. Dershwitz, who has testified on behalf of multiple correctional departments in lethal injection challenges in many states asserts that neither Harper nor any other inmate were likely conscious, defined by him as the ability to respond to verbal stimuli, during their execution.

154. Dr. Dershwitz has conducted no studies on sodium thiopental.

155. Dr. Dershwitz bases his opinions on how chemicals, other than sodium thiopental, react with the human body.

156. Dr. Dershwitz bases his opinion on his knowledge of the use of sodium thiopental in conjunction with other chemicals to render an inmate unconscious.

157. Dr. Dershwitz's opinion is also based on the amount of thiopental necessary to ensure a lack of response to verbal stimuli.

158. Dr. Dershwitz rarely relies on thiopental as the sole anesthetic during surgical procedures.

159. Dr. Dershwitz has not reviewed literature on injecting thiopental as the sole anesthetic and, until he testified in *Baze v. Rees*, he was unfamiliar with Baselt's standard text for determining the amount of thiopental necessary to ensure that a person will not respond to painful stimuli.

160. A larger concentration of sodium thiopental is necessary to obtain and maintain unconsciousness when thiopental is used as the only chemical for this purpose.

161. An individual who is unable to respond to verbal stimuli can feel pain.

162. A larger concentration of sodium thiopental is necessary to ensure that a person who cannot respond to verbal stimuli also cannot feel pain.

163. Even according to Dershwitz, with 7 mg/L of sodium thiopental in the bloodstream, 50% of the population will be able to respond to verbal commands.

164. Based on Dershwitz's calculations, the amount of thiopental in the blood necessary to prevent a person from feeling pain must be higher than 7 mg/L.

165. Toxicology results from numerous individuals executed in Arizona, North Carolina, South Carolina, and the lone lethal injection in Kentucky indicate that the thiopental levels in the bloodstream were lower than 7 mg/L.

166. Dershwitz has calculated the amount of thiopental he expects to find in the blood five minutes after an injection of 3grams of thiopental. Dershwitz's predictions on this change depending on what state has hired him as an expert.

167. In litigation in Maryland on behalf of Steven Oken, Dr. Dershwitz testified (by affidavit) that 30.15 mg/L of thiopental should be in Oken's blood five minutes after injection.

168. 30.15 mg/L is below the 39-42 mg/L threshold level necessary to prevent a person from feeling painful stimuli, according to Baselt.

169. Toxicology results from Oken's execution show that 10 mg/L of thiopental, not 30.15 mg/L, was found in Oken's bloodstream.

170. In the four most recent executions in North Carolina, blood to test for the amount of thiopental was drawn shortly after death and at the time of the autopsy.

171. Steven Van McHone's toxicology results showed thiopental levels of 1.5 mg/L and 21 mg/L.

172. The thiopental levels in McHone were lower than predicted by Derschwitz.

173. The thiopental levels in McHone were lower than the amount Derschwitz says is necessary to prevent 50 % of the population from responding to verbal stimuli.

174. The thiopental levels in McHone were lower than the 39-42 mg/L of thiopental necessary to prevent a person from feeling painful stimuli, according to Baselt.

175. Elias Syriani's toxicology results showed thiopental levels of 4.4 mg/L, 11 mg/L, and 12 mg/L.

176. The thiopental levels in Syriani were lower than predicted by Derschwitz.

177. The thiopental levels in Syriani were lower than the amount Derschwitz says is necessary to prevent 50 % of the population from responding to verbal stimuli.

178. The thiopental levels in Syriani were lower than the 39-42 mg/L of thiopental necessary to prevent a person from feeling painful stimuli, according to Baselt.

179. Kenneth Boyd's toxicology results showed thiopental levels of 11 mg/L, and 29 mg/L.

180. The thiopental levels in Boyd were lower than predicted by Derschwitz.

181. The thiopental levels in Boyd were lower than the amount Derschwitz says is necessary to prevent 50 % of the population from responding to verbal stimuli.

182. The thiopental levels in Boyd were lower than the 39-42 mg/L of thiopental necessary to prevent a person from feeling painful stimuli, according to Baselt.

183. Perrie Simpson's toxicology results showed thiopental levels of 8.7 mg/L, 12 mg/L, 42 mg/L.

184. Two of the thiopental levels in Simpson were lower than predicted by Dershwitz.

185. Two of the thiopental levels in Simpson were lower than the amount Dershwitz says is necessary to prevent 50% of the population from responding to verbal stimuli.

186. Two of the thiopental levels in Simpson were lower than the 39-42 mg/L of thiopental necessary to prevent a person from feeling painful stimuli, according to Dershwitz.

187. According to Dershwitz, 5 grams of thiopental should render a person unconscious in about one minute.

188. Recently, Delaware executed Brian Steckel. It took many minutes for the chemicals to take effect.

189. After the sodium thiopental was injected, Steckel was able to speak and asked why it was taking so long for the chemicals to take effect.

190. Steckel was not rendered unconscious within a minute of the injection of thiopental.

191. The length of time it took for Steckel to be rendered unconscious shows that the concentration or amount of thiopental (or both) that reached his bloodstream was insufficient to prevent him from reacting to painful stimuli.

192. Witnesses to Steckel's execution observed Steckel's convulsions during his execution.

193. Convulsions are caused by potassium chloride.



194. Pancuronium bromide prevents witnesses from seeing convulsions caused by potassium chloride.

195. Because Steckel convulsed during his execution, the pancuronium bromide did not paralyze the body.

196. Because the sodium thiopental did not prevent Steckel from feeling pain, he was able to feel the excruciating agony of pancuronium bromide and pain of potassium chloride.

197. California administers 5 grams of sodium thiopental.

198. Recently disclosed information on the last 13 lethal injections in California establishes that many inmates are conscious, and thus feeling the pain of pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride during their executions.

199. Because sodium thiopental begins to wear off almost immediately and cessation of respiration does not mean death, within five minutes or less of the injection, the inmates will be able to feel painful stimuli.

200. According to Dershwitz, a 5 gram dose of sodium thiopental will cause virtually all people to cease respiration and consciousness within a minute.

201. Evidence from six executions in California show that, even after a 5 gram dose of sodium thiopental, a condemned inmate's breathing does not stop within a minute, and in some situations has lasted for as long as twelve minutes.

202. Jaturun Siripongs was executed in California on February 9, 1999. The administration of sodium thiopental began at 12:04 a.m. and the administration of pancuronium bromide began at 12:08 a.m., yet respiration did not cease until 12:09 a.m., five minutes after the administration of sodium thiopental began and one minute after the administration of pancuronium bromide.

203. The amount of time that elapsed before respiration stopped establishes that Siripongs did not stop breathing within one minute of the injection of sodium thiopental.

204. The amount of time that elapsed before respiration stopped creates a high likelihood that the sodium thiopental was not working and that Siripongs was able to feel pain during his execution.

205. Manuel Babbitt was executed in California on May 4, 1999. The administration of sodium thiopental began at 12:28 a.m. and the administration of pancuronium bromide began at 12:31 a.m., yet respiration did not cease until 12:33 a.m., five minutes after the administration of sodium thiopental began and two minutes after the administration of pancuronium bromide began.

206. In addition, brief spasmodic movements were observed in Babbitt's upper chest at 12:32 a.m. Babbitt maintained a steady heart rate of 95 or 96 beats per minute for seven minutes after he was injected with sodium thiopental.

207. Babbitt's heart rate and the amount of time that elapsed before respiration ceased establishes that Babbitt did not stop breathing within one minute of the injection of sodium thiopental

208. Babbitt's heart rate and the amount of time that elapsed before death establishes that the sodium thiopental was not working and that Babbitt was likely able to feel pain during his execution.

209. Darrell Keith Rich was executed in California on March 15, 2000. The administration of sodium thiopental began at 12:06 a.m. and the administration of pancuronium bromide began at 12:08 a.m., yet respiration did not cease until 12:08 a.m., when pancuronium bromide was injected, two minutes after the administration of sodium thiopental began.

210. Chest movements were observed in Rich from 12:09 a.m. to 12:10 a.m.

211. The above information on Rich's execution establishes that Rich did not stop breathing within one minute of the injection of sodium thiopental

212. The above information on Rich's execution establishes that the sodium thiopental was not working and that Rich was able to feel painful stimuli during his execution.

213. Stephen Wayne Anderson was executed in California on January 29, 2002. The administration of thiopental began at 12:17 a.m. and the administration of pancuronium bromide began at 12:19 a.m., yet respiration did not cease until 12:22 a.m., five minutes after the administration of sodium thiopental began and three minutes after the administration of pancuronium bromide began.

214. The above information establishes that Anderson did not stop breathing within one minute of the injection of sodium thiopental.

215. The above information establishes that the sodium thiopental was not working and that Anderson was likely able to feel painful stimuli during his execution.

216. Stanley Tookie Williams was executed on December 13, 2005. The administration of sodium thiopental began at 12:22 a.m., the administration of pancuronium bromide began at 12:28 a.m., and the administration of potassium chloride began at 12:32 a.m. or 12:34 a.m., yet respiration did not cease until either 12:28 a.m. or 12:34 a.m.

217. The above information establishes that Williams did not stop breathing within a minute of the injection of sodium thiopental.

218. The above information establishes that the sodium thiopental was not working and that Williams was likely able to feel painful stimuli during his execution.

219. Clarence Ray Allen was executed on January 17, 2006. The administration of sodium thiopental began at 12:18 a.m., yet respiration did not cease until 12:27 a.m., when pancuronium bromide was injected.

220. The above information establishes that Allen did not stop breathing within one minute of the injection of sodium thiopental.

221. The above information establishes that the sodium thiopental was not working and that Allen was likely able to feel painful stimuli during his execution.

222. Defendants do not keep logs on whether and how long the condemned inmate is breathing.

223. Defendants have taken no precautions or corrective measures to ensure that three grams of sodium thiopental will reach an inmate's bloodstream in the correct concentration and render the inmate unconscious enough to not feel pain.

224. Defendants do not use any medical equipment to monitor the condemned inmate's respiration, heart beat, pulse, or brain waves during the execution.

225. If thiopental is not injected directly into a vein, it will not render a person unconscious.

226. If the vein collapses, thiopental will leak into the surrounding tissue and fail to render the inmate unconscious.

227. If thiopental is injected into a location in the body that is not a vein, the thiopental in the inmate's body would be extremely painful.

228. During the execution of Joseph Clark in Ohio on May 2, 2006, Clark appeared to fall asleep, but about three or four minutes later, he raised his head and began speaking.

229. Clark's vein collapsed after the chemicals began to flow.

230. Because Clark's vein collapsed, the chemicals began to flow into other parts of his body, causing pain but not rendering him unconscious or causing his death.

231. It took one hour and twenty six minutes to carry out Clark's execution.

232. In surgical procedures, the quantity of anesthetic administered depends upon factors unique to the patient including size, weight, and past drug usage.

233. Administration of valium can lessen the efficacy of sodium thiopental.

234. In an individual who is resistant to sodium thiopental, a higher dose of sodium thiopental is necessary to induce unconsciousness to the point where the person will not feel pain.

235. An overweight person is likely to be more resistant to sodium thiopental.

236. Prolonged usage of barbiturates builds up a resistance to sodium thiopental.

237. Edward Harper presented none of the above mentioned risk factors.

238. An insufficient amount or concentration of sodium thiopental reached Edward Harper's bloodstream.

239. Due to the chemical combination and sequence used in the Kentucky execution process, there is a probability that the sedative effect of the sodium thiopental will be neutralized instantly by the second chemical, pancuronium bromide.

240. When sodium thiopental is exposed to pancuronium bromide, sodium thiopental precipitates, i.e., returns to the solid condition.

241. Once sodium thiopental returns to its solid condition, it no longer performs its anesthetic function.

242. If Plaintiff is not adequately sedated to the point where he cannot feel painful stimuli, he will suffer the conscious experience of being paralyzed while suffocating and an

intense fiery burning sensation in every nerve in his body, if Defendants execute him with the three chemicals Kentucky plans to use for his execution.

243. The second chemical involved in the lethal injection process, pancuronium bromide, is a derivative of curare that acts as a neuromuscular blocking agent.

244. Pancuronium bromide is a long acting neuromuscular blocking agent.

245. While pancuronium bromide paralyzes skeletal and voluntary muscles, including the diaphragm, it has no effect on consciousness or the ability to feel pain.

246. Pancuronium bromide will serve only to mask the excruciating pain and convulsions suffered by Plaintiff.

247. Pancuronium bromide prevents a conscious individual from notifying anyone that he or she is conscious or in pain.

248. Pancuronium bromide prevents a conscious individual from showing any signs of consciousness or pain.

249. Defendants do not monitor for consciousness or pain after the injection of sodium thiopental or pancuronium bromide.

250. Many means of monitoring for consciousness after injecting pancuronium bromide exist, including blood pressure cuffs, EEG monitoring, using an EKG machine (if located in the execution chamber and read throughout the execution, not just at the end to determine death).

251. None of the above means of monitoring for consciousness after injecting sodium thiopental or pancuronium bromide are used by Defendants.

252. A condemned inmate who appears unconscious could feel pain because

- 1) less than the expected dose of the anesthetizing drug, sodium thiopental, has been successfully injected into the individual's bloodstream, or has failed to remain in the person's bloodstream;
- 2) sensitivity to sodium thiopental varies greatly among the population and some individuals;
- 3) the duration of the effectiveness of sodium thiopental has worn off; OR,
- 4) the concentration of sodium thiopental was insufficient to render the inmate unconscious to the point where the inmate cannot feel pain.

253. If a condemned inmate regains consciousness or the ability to feel pain during an execution, the inmate will suffer the agony of suffocation and paralysis due to pancuronium bromide and the excruciating pain of potassium chloride.

254. The pain suffered by a conscious inmate would be less if Defendants replaced potassium chloride with some other chemical to stop the heart.

255. Pancuronium bromide collapses the lungs and, in a conscious person, causes the extreme agony of paralysis and suffocation.

256. Death by suffocation is akin to drowning.

257. Death by suffocation is akin to dying in a gas chamber.

258. Pancuronium bromide can cause individuals to have a gastric reaction that causes vomit to fill an inmate's mouth.

259. The vomit caused by the usage of pancuronium bromide can flow into a person's lungs causing suffocation.

260. Because pancuronium bromide paralyzes the diaphragm, a person is unable to regurgitate the vomit.

261. If a person is conscious when the vomit flows into the mouth, a person paralyzed by pancuronium bromide is likely to suffer extreme pain and suffering as the person silently chokes to death on vomit.

262. The American Veterinary Medicine Association (AVMA) condemns the use of neuromuscular blocking agents such as pancuronium bromide in the euthanasia of animals when a sedative (anesthetic or barbiturate) is administered.

263. At least 31 states have made the use of pancuronium bromide on domestic animals illegal. Kentucky is one of a majority of States that have banned its use. K.R.S. section 321.181(17) and 201 K.A.R. 16:090.

264. Since legislatures began prohibiting using neuromuscular blocking agents with sedatives, no legislature or other governing body has expressly condoned this practice or repealed statutes forbidding it.

265. The first lethal injection procedure designed in the United States called for a paralytic agent to cause death.

266. Using pancuronium bromide or any chemical to stop respiration is not necessary to cause death.

267. Potassium chloride, the third chemical involved in Kentucky's lethal injection process, stops the prisoner's heart, and, thereby cause cardiac arrest and death.

268. With the use of potassium chloride, pancuronium bromide is not necessary to cause death.

269. Pancuronium bromide serves no legitimate purpose in a lethal injection execution, particularly considering the readily available alternative of conducting the lethal injection execution without pancuronium bromide.



270. Pancuronium bromide is administered to make the lethal injection process more aesthetically palatable for the official witnesses by preventing the witnesses from seeing any involuntary twitching, convulsions, or seizures that may be caused by the potassium chloride or the dying process itself.

271. The involuntary muscle reactions caused by potassium chloride can be avoided by using many other non painful ways of stopping the heart that will not cause involuntary muscles reactions.

272. Eliminating pancuronium bromide from the lethal injection process will not increase the amount of pain that a condemned inmate suffers during the dying process.

273. Preventing official witnesses from seeing the effects of each chemical during the lethal injection process is not a legitimate reason to administer a drug, particularly when the drug increases the risk of inflicting horrific pain and suffering upon the condemned person.

274. Preventing witnesses from seeing the effects of the killing agent prevents public perception and awareness regarding that agent, and thus violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it prevents the public from moving towards an informed consensus either for or against the use of the killing chemical.

275. A chancery court in Tennessee has found the usage of pancuronium bromide during lethal injections to be arbitrary and unnecessary.

276. The use of pancuronium bromide during an execution violates evolving standards of decency.

277. The use of pancuronium bromide during an execution creates an unacceptable risk that Plaintiff will suffer an unnecessarily painful death.

278. Potassium chloride, the third chemical used in Kentucky's lethal injection process, is a strong alkaline chemical.

279. Potassium chloride is commonly used as road salt.

280. In Kentucky lethal injections, potassium chloride is used to stop the heart from beating, and thus to cause death.

281. The EKG printout from the one lethal injection execution in Kentucky (that of Edward Harper) shows that Harper was alive when potassium chloride was administered and that potassium chloride caused his death.

282. During the execution of Clarence Ray Allen in California on January 17, 2006, a second administration of potassium chloride had to be administered because the first one did not kill him.

283. The dose of potassium chloride administered to Allen should have caused his death in less than a couple of minutes, as soon as the potassium chloride cycled through Allen's body.

284. The fact that a second dose of potassium chloride had to be administered to Allen establishes that the full dose of potassium chloride did not reach Allen's heart.

285. When potassium chloride reaches the heart in large doses, such as that used in Kentucky lethal injections, it causes a massive heart attack.

286. The administration of potassium chloride is extremely painful when administered intravenously.

287. Potassium chloride ravages the organs by causing an extremely painful burning sensation in every nerve as it courses through the body.

288. Pancuronium bromide prevents an inmate from expressing the pain caused by potassium chloride.

289. Potassium chloride can be replaced by many non-painful chemicals that would stop the heart in a short period of time without causing any convulsions.

290. Dilantin is a non-painful chemicals that would stop the heart in a short period of time without causing any convulsions.

291. Veterinarians do not use potassium chloride in euthanizing animals.

292. Veterinarians euthanize animals by injecting a lethal dose of pentobarbital.

293. Pentobarbital is a long acting barbiturate.

294. Pentobarbital is a potential alternative to the tri-chemical cocktail used in Kentucky lethal injections.

295. Defendants have shown a deliberate indifference to the risk of inflicting unnecessary pain and suffering and towards serious medical needs, by copying lethal injection procedures from other states without investing meaningful and independent efforts to ensure that Kentucky's lethal injection execution procedures comply with contemporary medical standards and long-standing constitutional standards.

296. Upon information and belief, Defendants have conducted no scientific or medical studies concerning the chemicals and procedures they use for lethal injection since they were made aware of potential problems with the process in August 2004.

297. Defendants' failure to conduct medical or scientific tests on the chemicals since August 2004 and their failure to adopt alternative chemicals and procedures in light of the information presented to them since August 2004 shows their deliberate indifference towards known medical needs.

298. The risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain and suffering upon Plaintiff during his execution is grave because Warden Simpson, who is in charge of the prison where executions take place, has never been involved in an execution by lethal injection.

299. The risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain and suffering upon Plaintiff during his execution is grave because Warden Simpson, who is in charge of the prison where executions take place, has never witnessed an execution by lethal injection.

300. The risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain and suffering upon Plaintiff during his execution is grave because execution team members regularly have had difficulty inserting the IV needle into test subjects during mock lethal injections.

301. The risk of unnecessary pain and suffering is grave because when the Kentucky Department of Corrections carried out its first and only lethal injection, unanticipated problems occurred and the Department of Corrections proceeded without correcting these problems.

302. According to witnesses at the execution of Edward Harper on May 25, 1999, it took ten minutes and at least three stabs with a needle to find a suitable vein to inject the chemicals.

303. According to witnesses at the execution of Edward Harper on May 25, 1999, within two minutes of the administration of sodium thiopental, Harper's face turned purple and became puffy.

304. Defendants did not determine if a purple and puffy face was normal during an execution by lethal injection, but continued with the execution.

305. Defendants have taken no steps subsequently to determine whether a purple and puffy face is normal during a lethal injection.

306. The risk of unnecessary pain and suffering is grave in Kentucky because the

individuals responsible for mixing the chemicals, inserting the I.V.s, and injecting the chemicals are not adequately trained.

307. The risk of unnecessary pain and suffering and malfunctions in the lethal injection process is grave in Kentucky because Defendants inject the chemicals from outside the execution chamber by sending the chemicals through a tube that carries the chemicals to the vein rather than injecting the chemicals directly into the vein.

308. The lethal injection chemicals travel through a tube in the wall for five feet before entering the condemned inmate.

309. Defendants could inject the chemicals directly into the vein if the executioner was inside the execution chamber and inserted the chemicals directly into the catheter.

310. Plunging the chemicals through a tube connected to a catheter rather than injecting the chemicals directly into the vein increases the risk that the condemned inmate will suffer unnecessary pain during his execution.

311. How fast the lethal injection chemicals are pushed through the plunger into the tube impacts whether the chemical will get into a person's vein.

312. How fast the lethal injection chemicals are pushed through the plunger into the tube impacts how long it will take for a chemical to take effect and how quickly that effect will wear off.

313. The executioner is not trained in how fast to push the plunger.

314. The executioner is not instructed on how fast to push the plunger.

315. The package inserts and labels on the lethal injection chemicals do not say how fast to push the plunger.

316. There is a high risk that the executioner may push the lethal injection chemicals into Plaintiff too quickly or too slowly.

317. If the lethal injection chemicals are pushed into Plaintiff too quickly or too slowly, Plaintiff will suffer unnecessary pain.

318. Defendants use one size catheter to inject the lethal injection chemicals.

319. The size of the catheter used during lethal injections is different than the size standardly used in medical settings for drawing blood or inserting an I.V.

320. If too small a catheter is used during Plaintiff's execution, the chemicals will not reach Plaintiffs' bloodstream as quickly as they should.

321. Using too small a catheter creates an unnecessary risk that the injection of sodium thiopental will not prevent the inmate from feeling pain throughout the execution.

**B. Facts relevant to inserting an I.V.**

322. Defendants plan to insert two I.V. lines into Plaintiff.

323. Different size catheters are used in medical proceedings depending on the height and weight of the patient and the size of the patient's veins.

324. If the catheter is too large, the vein could blow out.

325. A blown vein means that the chemicals would be going into a part of the body other than the vein or not entering the body at all if it causes the I.V. to dislodge.

326. Injecting the lethal injection chemicals into a part of the body other than the vein would be extremely painful.

327. Injecting the lethal injection chemicals into a part of the body other than the vein would prevent the chemicals from having the desired effect.

328. Injecting sodium thiopental into a part of the body other than the vein means that the thiopental would not render a person unconscious.

329. Defendants use only one size catheter during lethal injections.

330. Defendants do not take into consideration the condemned inmate's weight, height, or the size of the inmate's veins in determining what size catheter to use during the inmate's execution.

331. The size of the catheter used by Defendants during lethal injections is different from the size most commonly used when drawing blood or inserting an I.V. in a medical setting.

332. The size of the catheter used in lethal injections increases the likelihood that Defendants will not be able to insert an I.V. into Plaintiff's veins.

333. Training and experience in drawing blood is different from training and experience in inserting a catheter.

334. The I.V. team has no experience in inserting a catheter.

335. The I.V. team has no training in inserting a catheter.

336. Defendants will spend up to 60 minutes attempting to insert the two I.V. lines.

337. The decision to spend up to 60 minutes inserting an I.V. is a change to Defendants' execution procedures that occurred during the lethal injection litigation on behalf of Ralph Baze and Thomas Bowling.

338. Defendant Rees made the decision to require the execution team to attempt to insert the I.V. for 60 minutes.

339. Defendant Rees did not consult any medical professionals concerning attempting to insert an I.V. for 60 minutes prior to requiring the execution team to spend 60 minutes attempting to insert an I.V.

340. In Kentucky, doctors and nurses are not involved in obtaining venous access.

341. In Kentucky, doctors and nurses are not permitted to intervene if complications arise from attempting to obtain venous access.

342. Defendants may attempt to insert an I.V. into the groin.

343. Inserting an I.V. in the groin creates an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering.

344. Inserting an I.V. in the groin mutilates the body.

345. Inserting an I.V. in the groin violates the dignity of man.

346. Defendants have stated that if they are unable to insert an I.V. after 60 minutes, they will ask Defendant Fletcher to call off the execution.

347. Defendants have not declared what they will do if Defendant Fletcher refuses to call off the execution.

348. If Defendant Fletcher refuses to call off the execution, Defendants may use a cut down procedure to insert an I.V. into Plaintiff during his execution.

349. If Defendant Fletcher calls off the execution, Defendants will practice and attempt the same process of inserting a needle into Plaintiff.

350. This cycle of calling off Plaintiff's execution, practicing inserting I.V.'s, rescheduling Plaintiff's execution, and performing the same method of inserting an I.V. will continue repeatedly with no likelihood that Defendants will be able to insert an I.V. into Plaintiff.

351. The likelihood that a problem will arise inserting an I.V. needle is great because Defendants had difficulty inserting an I.V. needle in the only lethal injection execution they carried out, and because Plaintiff has bad veins.

352. In executing Edward Harper on May 25, 1999, it took Defendants ten minutes to access his veins.



353. The difficulty accessing Edward Harper's vein during his execution in 1999 was an unanticipated problem.

354. Similarly, Ohio's difficulty accessing the veins of Joseph Clark on May 2, 2006 was an unanticipated problem.

355. It took the execution team more than twenty minutes to insert an I.V. in Clark's vein.

356. When Clark's vein collapsed, it took the execution team approximately 40 additional minutes to reinsert an I.V. into Clark's vein.

357. Throughout the attempts to insert an I.V. and the injections of the chemicals, Clark was heard moaning and groaning in pain.

358. It is likely that Defendants will have difficulty inserting an I.V. into Plaintiff during his execution.

359. If veins or blood vessels blow during an execution, the chemicals will not have the desired effect.

360. If the chemicals do not remain in Plaintiff's veins, Plaintiff will suffer an excruciatingly painful death.

361. It should only take two to three minutes to insert an I.V.

362. Well before 20 minutes of attempting to insert an I.V. has elapsed, the inmate will experience a great deal of pain and discomfort.

363. After 20 minutes of attempting to insert an I.V., the I.V. team will have exhausted all available locations to insert a needle.

364. Attempting to insert a needle for 60 minutes mutilates the body in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

365. Attempting to insert a needle for 60 minutes is excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

366. Attempting to insert a needle for 60 minutes is unnecessarily painful in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

367. Subjecting Slaughter to the possibility of multiple attempts to execute him causes unnecessary psychological suffering, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**C. Facts relevant to Defendants' inadequate equipment and personnel for maintaining life if a stay of execution is granted after the first or second chemical is administered.**

368. Life can be maintained after 3 grams of sodium thiopental has been injected into a person.

369. Maintaining life after an injection of 3 grams of sodium thiopental would not be difficult if medical personnel certified in cardiac life support are present at the execution chamber and provided with the proper equipment.

370. Life can be maintained after the administration of pancuronium bromide during lethal injections.

371. Maintaining life after an injection of pancuronium bromide would not be difficult if medical personnel certified in cardiac life support are present at the execution chamber and provided with the proper equipment.

372. There are chemicals that will stop the heart, but are easier to reverse than potassium chloride.

373. EMT's, phlebotomists, and doctors of general medicine are not trained in how to reverse the effects of sodium thiopental or pancuronium bromide.

374. No member of Defendants' execution team is adequately trained in reversing the effects of sodium thiopental or pancuronium bromide.

375. No doctor or medical professional is present inside the execution chamber to reverse the effects of sodium thiopental or pancuronium bromide.

376. Having a medical professional trained in how to reverse the effects of sodium thiopental and pancuronium bromide physically located in the execution chamber is essential to reversing the effects of the chemical before death occurs.

377. If a stay of execution is granted after sodium thiopental or pancuronium bromide is administered, Defendants have an obligation to take measures to maintain the life of the condemned inmate.

378. During lethal injection litigation on behalf of Ralph Baze and Thomas Bowling, Defendants created a one page document on the duration of onset of the chemicals, and how to reverse the effects of the lethal injection chemicals.

379. This one page document is what Defendants are relying on in determining how to reverse the effects of the lethal injection chemicals.

380. This one page document is incorrect on how to reverse the effects of the lethal injection chemicals.

381. This one page document instructs Defendants to use equipment and chemicals to reverse the effects of the lethal injection chemicals that could cause the inmate's death.

382. This one page document instructs Defendants to use equipment and chemicals to reverse the effects of the lethal injection chemicals that would not reverse the effects of the lethal injection chemicals.

383. This one page document fails to instruct Defendants to use equipment and chemicals to reverse the effects of the lethal injection chemical that are absolutely necessary to reverse the effects of the lethal injection chemicals.

384. Defendants have a “crash cart” available purportedly to maintain life if a stay of execution is granted after sodium thiopental or pancuronium bromide is administered.

385. Defendants’ crash cart does not have all the chemicals listed on Middendorf’s one page document.

386. Defendant Haas designates the person who will operate the crash cart.

387. For the previously scheduled execution of Thomas Clyde Bowling, Defendant Haas was the individual who would operate the crash cart.

388. Defendant Haas is the Medical Director for the Department of Corrections.

389. Defendant Haas has not worked in an emergency medical setting since medical school.

390. Defendant Haas is a practicing psychiatrist.

391. Defendant Haas has not treated patients in many years.

392. Defendant Haas is not adequately trained in maintaining life after sodium thiopental or pancuronium bromide has been injected into a person.

393. No medical professional employed by the Kentucky Department of Corrections is adequately trained in maintaining life after sodium thiopental or pancuronium bromide has been injected into a person.

394. The crash cart Defendants have available at the Kentucky State Penitentiary is insufficient to maintain life after sodium thiopental or pancuronium bromide has been administered.

395. Medications to increase blood pressure and contract the heart are necessary to maintain life after 3 grams of sodium thiopental has been administered.

396. Epinephrine is necessary to maintain life once 3 grams of sodium thiopental has been administered.

397. Once pancuronium bromide is administered, artificial ventilation is necessary to maintain life.

398. Artificial ventilation is not part of the equipment included on Defendants' crash cart.

399. Insulin is also necessary to maintain life if a stay of execution is granted after the lethal injection chemicals have begun to flow through the condemned inmate's body.

400. Insulin is not one of the drugs in Defendants' crash cart.

401. Neostigmine is necessary to maintain life if a stay of execution is granted after the lethal injection chemicals have begun to flow through the condemned inmate's body.

402. Neostigmine is not one of the drugs in Defendants' crash cart.

403. Because Defendants' crash cart does not contain the equipment necessary to maintain life after sodium thiopental or pancuronium bromide have been injected, Defendants' crash cart does not meet the minimum constitutional requirements for maintaining life.

404. It would not be difficult for Defendants to obtain the necessary equipment for maintaining life after the first or second chemical has been administered.

**D. Facts Relevant to the Due Process and Fundamental Fairness Claim.**

405. The Due Process clause prevents a person from being sentenced to death and executed upon information that he is barred from refuting.

406. The Due Process clause requires notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.

407. In Kentucky, inmates sentenced to death prior to March 31, 1998 are permitted to choose electrocution.

408. In order to make a knowing and intelligent choice between lethal injection and electrocution, death sentenced inmates must have an opportunity to review the entire execution procedures for both methods.

409. Defendants refuse to disclose the execution procedures that will be utilized in carrying out Plaintiff's executions.

410. Due process and notions of fundamental fairness mandate that Defendants provide Plaintiffs with a copy of the execution procedures that will be used to extinguish their lives so that they can make an intelligent and knowing decision of a method of execution.

411. Due process and notions of fundamental fairness mandate that Defendants provide Plaintiffs with a copy of the execution procedures that will be used to extinguish their lives so that they can independently determine whether a particular aspect of the lethal injection or electrocution process may constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and to consult medical experts concerning that possibility.

**E. Facts Relevant to the Electrocution Claim.**

412. In Kentucky, condemned inmates sentenced prior to March 31, 1998, may choose between electrocution and lethal injection.

413. Plaintiff will not select a method of execution.

414. The default method of execution in Kentucky is lethal injection.

415. If lethal injection is found unconstitutional on its face, Kentucky law requires

executions to be carried out by electrocution.

416. Execution by electrocution violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

417. Nebraska is the only state in the country that utilizes electrocution as the sole method of execution.

418. Warden Simpson, who is in charge of the prison where executions take place, has never been involved in an execution by electrocution.

419. The Deputy Wardens at the Kentucky State Penitentiary have not participated in an execution by electrocution.

420. Execution by electrocution will cause Plaintiff to consciously suffer an excruciatingly painful and protracted death.

421. The American Veterinary Medicine Association bans electrocution in the euthanasia of animals.

422. Electrocution causes death by asphyxia and cardiac arrest.

423. At least 2000 volts of electricity are necessary to cause heart death.

424. If heart death is not immediately achieved, execution by electrocution is excruciatingly painful.

425. During an execution by electrocution, the body fluids heat to a temperature near the boiling point of water.

426. Execution by electrocution causes third and fourth degree burns.

427. Third and fourth degree burns are extremely painful.

428. Consciousness is controlled by the brain.

429. The human skull insulates the brain from high voltage electricity.

430. If high voltage electricity does not reach the brain, Plaintiff will remain conscious during his execution.

431. There are documented cases of condemned inmates who were alive after the first administration of electricity.

432. Condemned inmates' hearts have beaten after the flow of electricity has stopped.

433. The continued beating of the heart after the cessation of the current indicates that unconsciousness was not instantaneous.

434. Respiratory movement has been observed in condemned inmates after the flow of electricity has stopped.

435. Respiratory movement indicates brain function and a lack of instant incapacitation.

436. Respiratory centers are located near deep pain centers.

437. Respiratory movement shows that the pain centers are not instantly destroyed.

438. If Plaintiff is conscious during his electrocution, he will suffer an excruciatingly painful death by asphyxia and cardiac arrest.

439. Unnecessary pain and suffering is inherent in executions by electrocution.

440. Botched electrocutions have occurred in the United States.

441. Execution by electrocution causes mutilation of the body including:

- a) severe burns to the face and scalp;
- b) burns to the legs;
- c) burns to other parts of the body;
- d) discoloring of the skin;
- e) layers of skin peeling and melting away;



- f) contortion of the limbs, fingers, and toes;
- g) vomiting blood;
- h) vomiting drool; and,
- i) exploding body parts.

442. The Commonwealth of Kentucky has carried out one execution by electrocution since 1962, the electrocution of Harold McQueen in 1997.

443. According to the post mortem examination of Harold McQueen conducted by the Western Regional Medical Examiner, McQueen suffered the following types of injuries from the electrocution:

- a) a 1-2 mm ring like contact electrical burn encircling the parietal and frontal scalp, gray-brown in color, which was bordered by a 5mm –1 cm rim of pallor, which was bordered by a lateral rim of up to 3cm. of subcutaneous congestion;
- b) a 17 x 6 cm. “irregular” contact electrical burn on the right calf just below the knee;
- c) partially charred skin with blistering;
- d) a 1-2 mm “C” shaped electrical burn on the right thigh;
- e) pressure marks from the electric chair straps present on the face, back of head, extremities, and abdomen;
- f) red-purple ecchymosis (escape of blood into the tissue) on the right bicep;
- g) “irregular” red-purple ecchymosis on the upper left forearm; and,
- h) a cluster of red-purple petechiae (hemorrhage) on the dorsal right foot.

444. Execution by electrocution violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment because electrocution:

- a) causes unnecessary pain and suffering;
- b) creates a risk of unnecessary pain and suffering;
- c) mutilates the body;
- d) serves no legitimate purpose considering the existence of readily available and less painful alternatives; and,
- e) violates evolving standards of decency.

## **VI. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES**

445. Exhausting administrative remedies through a prison grievance policy is not required for this type of action because the injuries are prospective in the sense that the injuries will not occur until the execution takes place.

446. Bowling has not filed an institutional grievance. But based on the treatment of Moore and Leonard's grievance, it is clear that administrative remedies are unavailable for the type of claims at issue in this case. With Moore, Defendants denied his grievance on the basis that it was not a grievable issue. *See* Grievance Rejection Notice for Brian Keith Moore attached to Brian Keith Moore's complaint. Defendants did the same thing with Leonard's grievance. Thus, Bowling need not exhaust administrative remedies because there can be no relief afforded through the institutional grievance process and thus no available administrative remedy to exhaust.

447. This Court allowed Leonard to intervene in this action without exhausting administrative remedies. Thus, the law of the case is that exhausting administrative remedies is not a requirement for intervening in this action.

## **VII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

### **Claim A - - administration of chemicals.**

448. Defendants intend to extinguish Plaintiff's life by administering chemicals in a manner that creates an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

### **Claim B - - three chemical combination.**

449. Defendants intend to execute Plaintiff by injecting a combination of three chemicals - - sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride - - that creates an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

### **Claim C - - analgesic**

450. Defendants' failure to administer an analgesic during the lethal injection process creates an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

### **Claim D - - sodium thiopental**

451. Defendants' use of sodium thiopental as one of the lethal injection chemicals creates an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

### **Claim E - - pancuronium bromide as lethal injection chemical**

452. Defendants' use of pancuronium bromide as one of the lethal injection chemicals creates an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**Claim F - - pancuronium bromide preventing public perception of effects of chemicals**

453. The use of pancuronium bromide prevents public awareness necessary to any change in consensus for or against lethal injection, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**Claim G - - pancuronium bromide under standards of decency**

454. The use of pancuronium bromide does not conform with evolving standards of decency, and thus, Defendants' use of pancuronium bromide violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**Claim H - - potassium chloride**

455. Defendants' use of potassium chloride as one of the lethal injection chemicals creates an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**Claim I - - deliberate indifference involving the chemicals**

456. Defendants' adoption of lethal injection chemicals on the basis that other states use the same chemicals, their failure to consult with medical professionals, and their failure to consider using alternative chemicals for lethal injections after they were put on notice of problems with the lethal injection chemicals and less painful alternative chemicals that could be used to carry out lethal injections constitutes deliberate indifference towards medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM J - - monitoring to ensure that the inmate does not feel pain after sodium thiopental injected**

457. Defendants' failure to ensure that the condemned inmate is incapable of feeling pain after the injection of sodium thiopental and before the injection of pancuronium bromide

creates an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM K - - deliberate indifference for not monitoring to ensure that the inmate does not feel pain after sodium thiopental injected**

458. Defendants' failure to ensure that the condemned inmate is incapable of feeling pain after the injection of sodium thiopental and before the injection of pancuronium bromide creates constitutes deliberate indifference towards medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM L - - monitoring to ensure that the inmate does not feel pain after pancuronium bromide is injected**

459. Defendants' failure to ensure that the condemned inmate is incapable of feeling pain after the injection of pancuronium bromide creates an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM M - - deliberate indifference for not monitoring to ensure that the inmate does not feel pain after pancuronium bromide is injected**

460. Defendants' failure to ensure that the condemned inmate is incapable of feeling pain after the injection of sodium thiopental and before the injection of pancuronium bromide constitutes deliberate indifference towards medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM N - - training of execution team**

461. Defendants' failure to provide adequate training in inserting I.V.'s, mixing lethal injection chemicals, injecting the lethal injection chemicals, and monitoring to ensure that the condemned inmate cannot feel pain creates an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM O - - inserting an I.V. in the groin**

462. Inserting an I.V. in the groin creates an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM P - - attempting to insert an I.V. for up to 60 minutes**

463. Attempting to insert an I.V. for up to 60 minutes causes excessive pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM Q - - pain from attempting to insert I.V. for up to 60 minutes**

464. Attempting to insert an I.V. for up to 60 minutes creates an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM R - - mutilation by attempting to insert I.V. for up to 60 minutes**

465. Attempting to insert an I.V. for up to 60 minutes mutilates the body in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM S- - not having a guaranteed method of obtaining venous access**

466. Defendant's failure to have a guaranteed means for accessing Plaintiff's veins will cause Plaintiff unnecessary psychological suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM T- - deliberate indifference for not having guaranteed means of accessing Plaintiff's veins**

467. Defendant's failure to have a guaranteed means for accessing Plaintiff's veins evinces deliberate indifference towards known medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM U - - maintaining life if a stay of execution is granted after the first or second chemical is administered.**

468. Defendants' failure to have the proper equipment, chemicals, and personnel available at the execution chamber in case a stay of execution is granted after the first or second

chemical is administered constitutes the arbitrary deprivation of life in violation of the Eighth Amendment and violates substantive due process.

**CLAIM V - - deliberate indifference involving maintaining life if a stay of execution is granted after the first or second chemical is administered.**

469. Defendants' failure to have the proper equipment, chemicals, and personnel available at the execution chamber in case a stay of execution is granted after the first or second chemical is administered is deliberate indifference towards known medical needs in violation of the Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM W - - deliberate indifference for lack of training in emergency cardiac life support**

470. Defendants' failure to adequately train its personnel in reversing the effects of the chemicals and in emergency cardiac life support is deliberate indifference towards known medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because despite knowing that a stay of execution could be granted after the first or second chemical is administered, Defendants have done nothing to ensure that their execution team is adequately trained to maintain Plaintiff's life if such a stay is granted.

**CLAIM X - - deliberate indifference for not seeking medical advice on what equipment, chemicals, and personnel are necessary to maintain life after the first or second chemical is injected.**

471. Defendants' reliance on their general counsel, who is not a medical professional, to inform them of what chemicals, personnel, and equipment is necessary to maintain life after sodium thiopental or pancuronium bromide is injected, rather than consulting medical professionals experienced with these chemicals, is deliberate indifference towards known medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM Y - - Refusal to provide Plaintiff with execution protocols.**

472. Defendants' refusal to provide Plaintiff with a complete copy of the electrocution and lethal injection execution protocols deprives Plaintiff of federal due process and fundamental fairness because it prevents them from making a meaningful choice between methods of execution as permitted under Kentucky law, and because it prevents them from reviewing the execution procedures to determine if additional constitutional violations may exist for which they are currently unaware.

**CLAIM Z- - electrocution as mutilation.**

473. Execution by electrocution is unconstitutional because it mutilates the body in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM AA - - electrocution as inherent pain**

474. Execution by electrocution violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because pain is inherent in the method of execution.

**CLAIM BB - - electrocution and the risk of pain**

475. Execution by electrocution creates an unnecessary risk of pain and suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**CLAIM CC - - electrocution violates evolving standards of decency**

476. Execution by electrocution is contrary to evolving standards of decency and thus violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

**VIII - - PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

477. Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from carrying out Plaintiff's execution during this lawsuit.

478. Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from carrying out Plaintiff's execution in the manner they currently utilize



for carrying out lethal injections. Plaintiff also seeks an order declaring that Defendants' current chemicals and procedures for carrying out lethal injections violate the Eighth Amendment.

479. Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction barring Defendants from carrying out his execution until they come up with a reasonable, humane means for guaranteeing venous access during his execution.

480. Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from carrying out his execution by a lethal injection process that does not administer an analgesic. Plaintiff also seeks an order declaring that the failure to administer an analgesic during the lethal injection process violates the Eighth Amendment.

481. Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from forcibly medicating Plaintiff with Valium prior to his execution. Plaintiffs also request an order declaring that administering Valium when using sodium thiopental violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

482. Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from carrying out his execution by a lethal injection process that utilizes sodium thiopental. Plaintiff also seeks an order declaring that the use of sodium thiopental in lethal injections violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

483. Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from carrying out his execution by a lethal injection process that utilizes pancuronium bromide. Plaintiff also seeks an order declaring that the use of pancuronium bromide in lethal injections violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

484. Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from carrying out his execution by a lethal injection process that utilizes potassium

chloride. Plaintiff also seeks an order declaring that the use of potassium chloride in lethal injections violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

485. Plaintiff seeks an order declaring that Defendants' failure to consider using alternative chemicals in lethal injections constitutes deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

486. Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction barring Defendants from executing him by lethal injection unless Defendants inject the chemicals directly into his vein.

487. Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction barring Defendants from carrying out Plaintiff's execution without adequate procedures for monitoring for the ability to feel pain prior to and during the injections of pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. Plaintiff also seeks an order declaring that Defendants' failure to monitor for the ability to feel pain prior to and during the injections of pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

488. Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction barring Defendants from carrying out Plaintiff's execution unless an anesthesiologist monitors for consciousness throughout the execution, and unless the anesthesiologist can take remedial measures to stop Plaintiff from feeling pain if the anesthesiologist determines that Plaintiff is in pain at any point during the execution.

489. Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction barring Defendants from inserting an I.V. in the groin and an order declaring that inserting an I.V. in the groin violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

490. Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction barring Defendants from attempting to insert an I.V. into Plaintiff for more than 20 minutes and an order declaring that attempting to insert an I.V. for more than 20 minutes violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

491. Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction barring Defendants from carrying out Plaintiff's execution until Defendants have the proper equipment for maintaining life after sodium thiopental and pancuronium bromide have been injected, and until Defendants have properly trained individuals to operate that equipment. Plaintiff also seeks an order declaring that Defendants' current equipment for maintaining life after the injection of sodium thiopental and pancuronium bromide is injected is insufficient to maintain life, and that their failure to have the proper equipment at the execution chamber violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

492. Plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction barring Defendants from carrying out Plaintiff's execution until they have been provided with a copy of the lethal injection and electrocution protocols and given adequate time to review the protocols. Plaintiff also seeks an order declaring that the failure to disclose the execution protocols violates due process and fundamental notions of fairness.

493. Plaintiff requests an order declaring that execution by electrocution violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

494. Plaintiff requests such further relief that this Court finds necessary.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

/s/ David M. Barron

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November 27, 2006.

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was electronically filed with the Court by using the CM/ECF system on this 27<sup>th</sup> day of November 2006 and that a copy of the foregoing document was personally delivered to Marguerite Thomas at 100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 301, Frankfort, Kentucky, 40601 on the same day.

/s/ David M. Barron

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Counsel for Thomas Clyde Bowling

