While the City compares Plaintiffs' claims to the conclusory allegations in Iqbal, those were far from what we have here. In our case, Plaintiffs allege specifics about the Program, including when it was conceived (January 2002), where the City implemented it (in the New York Metropolitan area with a focus on New Jersey), and why it has been employed (because of the belief "that Muslim religious identity... is a permissible proxy for criminality," Compl. ¶ 36). The Complaint also articulates the "variety of methods" by which the surveillance is carried out. See, e.g., id.¶ 39 ("tak[ing] videos and photographs at mosques, Muslim owned businesses and schools"); id. ("monitor[ing Muslim] websites, listservs, and chat rooms"); id. ¶ 46 ("snap[ping] pictures, tak[ing] video, and collect[ing] license plate numbers of congregants as they arrive at mosques to pray"); id. ¶ 47 ("us[ing] undercover officers... to monitor daily life in [Muslim] neighborhoods ... and sermons and conversations in mosques"); id. ¶ 49 ("plac[ing] informants or undercover officers in all or virtually all MSAs"). These allegations are hardly "bare assertions ... amount[ing] to nothing more than a `formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional discrimination claim."Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
What occurs here in one guise is not new. We have been down similar roads before. Jewish-Americans during the Red Scare, African-Americans during the Civil Rights Movement, andJapanese-Americans during World War II are examples that readily spring to mind. We are left to wonder why we cannot see with foresight what we see so clearly with hindsight — that "[l]oyalty is a matter of the heart and mind[,] not race, creed, or color." Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302, 65 S.Ct. 208, 89 L.Ed. 243 (1944)."